diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -329,6 +329,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li

 	/* not implemented */

 }

+int

+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)

+{

+	/* not implemented */

+}

+

 void

 audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)

 {

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@

 #include "key.h"

 #include "hostfile.h"

 #include "auth.h"

+#include "xmalloc.h"

 /*

  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when

@@ -111,6 +112,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)

 	return(event_lookup[i].name);

 }

+void

+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)

+{

+	char *fp;

+	const char *crypto_name;

+

+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)

+		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";

+	else

+		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);

+	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)

+		*rv = 0;

+	xfree(fp);

+}

+

 # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

 /*

  * Null implementations of audit functions.

@@ -209,5 +226,17 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char

 	    audit_username(), command);

 }

+/*

+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.

+ *

+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.

+ */

+int

+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)

+{

+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", 

+		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,

+		key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);

+}

 # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.h

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@

 # define _SSH_AUDIT_H

 #include "loginrec.h"

+#include "key.h"

 enum ssh_audit_event_type {

 	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,

@@ -55,5 +56,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininf

 int	audit_run_command(const char *);

 void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);

 ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);

+int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);

+void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);

 #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@

 #include "servconf.h"

 #include "canohost.h"

+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128

+

 extern ServerOptions options;

 extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;

 extern u_int utmp_len;

@@ -130,6 +132,37 @@ fatal_report:

 	}

 }

+int

+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)

+{

+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];

+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;

+

+	audit_fd = audit_open();

+	if (audit_fd < 0) {

+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||

+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)

+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */

+		else                                                                                                                                       

+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */

+	}

+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());

+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,

+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);

+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))

+		goto out;

+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d",

+			type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port());

+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,

+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);

+out:

+	saved_errno = errno;

+	audit_close(audit_fd);

+	errno = saved_errno;

+	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */

+	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));

+}

+

 static int user_login_count = 0;

 /* Below is the sshd audit API code */

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)

 	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */

 	authenticated = 0;

 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&

-	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),

+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),

 			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)

 		authenticated = 1;

@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ done:

 	return authenticated;

 }

+int

+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+{

+	int rv;

+

+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	audit_key(0, &rv, key);

+#endif

+	return rv;

+}

+

 /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */

 int

 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)

 		/* test for correct signature */

 		authenticated = 0;

 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&

-		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),

+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),

 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)

 			authenticated = 1;

 		buffer_free(&b);

@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ done:

 	return authenticated;

 }

+int

+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+{

+	int rv;

+

+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	audit_key(1, &rv, key);

+#endif

+	return rv;

+}

+

 static int

 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)

 {

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth.h

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2	2010-05-10 03:58:03.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.h	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt

 char	*authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);

 char	*authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);

 char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);

+int	 user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);

 FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);

 FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);

@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);

 Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);

 int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);

 int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);

+int	 hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);

 /* debug messages during authentication */

 void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU

 {

 	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];

 	MD5_CTX md;

-	int len;

+	int len, rv;

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	char *fp;

+#endif

 	/* don't allow short keys */

 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {

@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU

 	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);

 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */

-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {

-		/* Wrong answer. */

-		return (0);

+	rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;

+

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {

+		debug("unsuccessful audit");

+		rv = 0;

 	}

-	/* Correct answer. */

-	return (1);

+	xfree(fp);

+#endif

+

+	return rv;

 }

 /*

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -1208,9 +1208,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)

 	Key *key;

 	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;

 	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;

+	int type = 0;

 	int verified = 0;

 	int valid_data = 0;

+	type = buffer_get_int(m);

 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);

 	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);

 	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);

@@ -1218,6 +1220,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)

 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||

 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))

 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);

+	if (type != key_blobtype)

+		fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);

 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);

 	if (key == NULL)

@@ -1238,7 +1242,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)

 	if (!valid_data)

 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);

-	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);

+	switch (key_blobtype) {

+	case MM_USERKEY:

+		verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);

+		break;

+	case MM_HOSTKEY:

+		verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);

+		break;

+	default:

+		verified = 0;

+		break;

+	}

 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",

 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha

  */

 int

-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)

 {

 	Buffer m;

 	u_char *blob;

@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i

 		return (0);

 	buffer_init(&m);

+	buffer_put_int(&m, type);

 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);

 	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);

 	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);

@@ -424,6 +425,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i

 	return (verified);

 }

+int

+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+{

+	return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);

+}

+

+int

+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+{

+	return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);

+}

+

+

 /* Export key state after authentication */

 Newkeys *

 mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h

--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit2	2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h	2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100

@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char

 int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);

 int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);

 int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);

-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);

+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);

+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);

 int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);

 int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);

 BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);