diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2	2011-01-17 11:15:29.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -316,6 +316,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li

 	/* not implemented */

 }

+int

+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)

+{

+	/* not implemented */

+}

+

 void

 audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)

 {

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@

 #include "key.h"

 #include "hostfile.h"

 #include "auth.h"

+#include "xmalloc.h"

 /*

  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when

@@ -111,6 +112,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)

 	return(event_lookup[i].name);

 }

+void

+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)

+{

+	char *fp;

+	const char *crypto_name;

+

+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)

+		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";

+	else

+		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);

+	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)

+		*rv = 0;

+	xfree(fp);

+}

+

 # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

 /*

  * Null implementations of audit functions.

@@ -182,5 +199,17 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)

 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),

 	    audit_username(), command);

 }

+

+/*

+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.

+ *

+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.

+ */

+int

+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)

+{

+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d", 

+		host_user ? "hostbased" : "pubkey", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, fp, rv);

+}

 # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.h

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@

 # define _SSH_AUDIT_H

 #include "loginrec.h"

+#include "key.h"

 enum ssh_audit_event_type {

 	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,

@@ -53,5 +54,7 @@ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo

 void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);

 void	audit_run_command(const char *);

 ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);

+int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);

+void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);

 #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c	2011-02-22 14:05:28.000000000 +0100

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@

 #include "servconf.h"

 #include "canohost.h"

+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128

+

 extern ServerOptions options;

 extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;

 extern u_int utmp_len;

@@ -130,6 +132,37 @@ fatal_report:

 	}

 }

+int

+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)

+{

+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];

+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;

+

+	audit_fd = audit_open();

+	if (audit_fd < 0) {

+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||

+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)

+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */

+		else                                                                                                                                       

+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */

+	}

+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "hostbased" : "pubkey", get_remote_port());

+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,

+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);

+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))

+		goto out;

+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d",

+			type, bits, fp, get_remote_port());

+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,

+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);

+out:

+	saved_errno = errno;

+	audit_close(audit_fd);

+	errno = saved_errno;

+	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */

+	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));

+}

+

 static int user_login_count = 0;

 /* Below is the sshd audit API code */

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2	2010-08-05 05:04:50.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ done:

 	return authenticated;

 }

+int

+hostkey_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+{

+	int rv;

+

+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	audit_key(0, &rv, key);

+#endif

+	return rv;

+}

+

 /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */

 int

 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2	2010-12-01 01:50:14.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ done:

 	return authenticated;

 }

+int

+pubkey_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)

+{

+	int rv;

+

+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	audit_key(1, &rv, key);

+#endif

+	return rv;

+}

+

 static int

 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)

 {

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth.h

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2	2010-05-10 03:58:03.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.h	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt

 char	*authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);

 char	*authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);

 char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);

+int	 pubkey_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);

 FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);

 FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);

@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);

 Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);

 int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);

 int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);

+int	 hostkey_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);

 /* debug messages during authentication */

 void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2	2010-12-04 23:01:47.000000000 +0100

+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU

 {

 	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];

 	MD5_CTX md;

-	int len;

+	int len, rv;

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	char *fp;

+#endif

 	/* don't allow short keys */

 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {

@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU

 	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);

 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */

-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {

-		/* Wrong answer. */

-		return (0);

+	rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;

+

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {

+		debug("unsuccessful audit");

+		rv = 0;

 	}

-	/* Correct answer. */

-	return (1);

+	xfree(fp);

+#endif

+

+	return rv;

 }

 /*

diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c

--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2	2010-09-10 03:23:34.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c	2011-02-22 14:04:27.000000000 +0100

@@ -1235,7 +1235,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)

 	if (!valid_data)

 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);

-	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);

+	switch (key_blobtype) {

+	case MM_USERKEY:

+		verified = pubkey_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);

+		break;

+	case MM_HOSTKEY:

+		verified = hostkey_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);

+		break;

+	default:

+		verified = 0;

+		break;

+	}

 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",

 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");