diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c

--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid	2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200

+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100

@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui

 	}

 	errno = 0; 

-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat

-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */

+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat

+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */

+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {

+		close(sock);

+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);

+		return -1;

+	}

 	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {

 		close(sock);

-        if(errno == EACCES)

-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);

-		return -1;

+		sock = -1;

+		if(errno == EACCES)

+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);

 	}

 	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */