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From 19a16f26bdeb6302159736e182a18b06160a3f42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 19:01:28 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 057/116] virtiofsd: move to an empty network namespace
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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RH-Author: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Message-id: <20200127190227.40942-54-dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Patchwork-id: 93508
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O-Subject: [RHEL-AV-8.2 qemu-kvm PATCH 053/112] virtiofsd: move to an empty network namespace
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Bugzilla: 1694164
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RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Sergio Lopez Pascual <slp@redhat.com>
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From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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If the process is compromised there should be no network access. Use an
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empty network namespace to sandbox networking.
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit d74830d12ae233186ff74ddf64c552d26bb39e50)
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Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
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---
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tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
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index 0570453..27ab328 100644
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--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
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+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
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@@ -1944,6 +1944,19 @@ static void print_capabilities(void)
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printf("}\n");
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}
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+/*
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+ * Called after our UNIX domain sockets have been created, now we can move to
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+ * an empty network namespace to prevent TCP/IP and other network activity in
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+ * case this process is compromised.
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+ */
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+static void setup_net_namespace(void)
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+{
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+ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) != 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWNET): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+}
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+
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/* This magic is based on lxc's lxc_pivot_root() */
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static void setup_pivot_root(const char *source)
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{
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@@ -2035,6 +2048,7 @@ static void setup_mount_namespace(const char *source)
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*/
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static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo)
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{
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+ setup_net_namespace();
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setup_mount_namespace(lo->source);
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}
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--
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1.8.3.1
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