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Blame SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch

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From b68d6a626977f48ac4d05396edcb70a73b12c66c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 12:42:45 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 09/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: eliminate
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 "Status" variable
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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RH-Author: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Message-id: <20200131124248.22369-10-lersek@redhat.com>
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Patchwork-id: 93619
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O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 edk2 PATCH 09/12] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: eliminate "Status" variable
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Bugzilla: 1751993
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RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
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The "Status" variable is set to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED at the top of the
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function. Then it is overwritten with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION under the
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"Failed" (earlier: "Done") label. We finally return "Status".
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The above covers the complete usage of "Status" in
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DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Remove the variable, and simply return
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EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in the end.
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This patch is a no-op, regarding behavior.
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Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
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Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
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Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
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Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
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Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-9-lersek@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
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[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
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 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
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 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
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(cherry picked from commit fb02f5b2cd0b2a2d413a4f4fc41e085be2ede089)
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Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
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---
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 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c        | 5 +----
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 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
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index 51968bd..b49fe87 100644
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--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
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+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
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@@ -1560,7 +1560,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
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   IN  BOOLEAN                          BootPolicy
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   )
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 {
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-  EFI_STATUS                           Status;
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   EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER                 *DosHdr;
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   BOOLEAN                              IsVerified;
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   EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST                   *SignatureList;
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@@ -1588,7 +1587,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
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   SecDataDir        = NULL;
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   PkcsCertData      = NULL;
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   Action            = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
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-  Status            = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
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   IsVerified        = FALSE;
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@@ -1880,13 +1878,12 @@ Failed:
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     DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr));
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     FreePool(NameStr);
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   }
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-  Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
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   if (SignatureList != NULL) {
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     FreePool (SignatureList);
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   }
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-  return Status;
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+  return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
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 }
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 /**
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-- 
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1.8.3.1
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