diff --git a/.openssh.metadata b/.openssh.metadata new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4ce41b --- /dev/null +++ b/.openssh.metadata @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +5761a2d5e3ea29e0b415424338d27deaabdd75f4 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2 +cf5fe0eb118d7e4f9296fbc5d6884965885fc55d SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz diff --git a/README.md b/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0e7897f..0000000 --- a/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -The master branch has no content - -Look at the c7 branch if you are working with CentOS-7, or the c4/c5/c6 branch for CentOS-4, 5 or 6 - -If you find this file in a distro specific branch, it means that no content has been checked in yet diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9dc835 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +--- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info 2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200 +@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ + err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0, + GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, + GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, +- "Could not grab %s. " +- "A malicious client may be eavesdropping " +- "on your session.", what); ++ "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n" ++ "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, " ++ "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping " ++ "on your session.\n" ++ "Either close the application which grabs the %s or " ++ "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what); + gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label), + TRUE); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec93b87 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +--- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress 2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200 +@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia + gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); + } + ++static void ++move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress) ++{ ++ gdouble step; ++ g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); ++ ++ step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1); ++ gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step); ++ gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); ++} ++ + static int + passphrase_dialog(char *message) + { + const char *failed; + char *passphrase, *local; + int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer; +- GtkWidget *dialog, *entry; ++ GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox; + GdkGrabStatus status; + + grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL); +@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message) + "%s", + message); + ++ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE, ++ FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_widget_show(hbox); ++ + entry = gtk_entry_new(); +- gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE, ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, + FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2); + gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); + gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); + gtk_widget_show(entry); + ++ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE, ++ FALSE, 8); ++ gtk_widget_show(hbox); ++ ++ progress = gtk_progress_bar_new(); ++ ++ gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally"); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE, ++ TRUE, 5); ++ gtk_widget_show(progress); ++ + gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH"); + gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); +@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message) + gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); + g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate", + G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog); ++ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed", ++ G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress); + + gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e314a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1 +--- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage 2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1 2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200 +@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing + as host specifiers. + Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted. + .Pp ++When copying a source file to a target file which already exists, ++.Nm ++will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode). ++.Pp ++If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target ++file name is created, then filled with the source file contents. ++No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files. ++.Pp + The options are as follows: + .Bl -tag -width Ds + .It Fl 1 diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96aaab1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c +--- openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts 2009-02-14 06:28:21.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c 2009-09-01 15:31:29.000000000 +0200 +@@ -169,12 +169,27 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr) + option_size = sizeof(options); + if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options, + &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { +- text[0] = '\0'; +- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) +- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, +- " %2.2x", options[i]); +- fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", +- ipaddr, text); ++ i = 0; ++ do { ++ switch (options[i]) { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ ++i; ++ break; ++ case 131: ++ case 137: ++ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict ++ * source routing options. */ ++ text[0] = '\0'; ++ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) ++ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, ++ " %2.2x", options[i]); ++ fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", ++ ipaddr, text); ++ default: ++ i += options[i + 1]; ++ } ++ } while (i < option_size); + } + #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ + } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cac5d5e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c 2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200 +@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ + } + + static int +-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) ++connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len) + { + int sock; + struct sockaddr_un addr; +@@ -3195,11 +3195,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *p + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; +- strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); +- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) ++ if (len <= 0) ++ return -1; ++ if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path) ++ len = sizeof addr.sun_path; ++ memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len); ++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof addr - (sizeof addr.sun_path - len) ) == 0) + return sock; + close(sock); +- error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + +@@ -3207,8 +3210,21 @@ static int + connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) + { + char buf[1024]; +- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); +- return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); ++ int len; ++#ifdef linux ++ int ret; ++#endif ++ len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); ++#ifdef linux ++ /* try abstract socket first */ ++ buf[0] = '\0'; ++ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0) ++ return ret; ++#endif ++ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0) ++ return ret; ++ error("connect %.100s: %.100s", buf + 1, strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; + } + + int diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..278dfa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock openssh-5.6p1/channels.c +--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock 2010-08-05 15:09:48.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c 2010-08-23 12:41:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -1647,6 +1647,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *r + u_int dlen, olen = 0; + int len; + ++ if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { ++ debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self); ++ FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); ++ } + /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ + if (c->wfd != -1 && + FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..76deaef --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c +--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo 2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c 2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100 +@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; ++#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG ++ hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG; ++#endif + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { +diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c +--- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo 2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c 2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100 +@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) + fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb45cd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c +--- openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob 2011-03-07 20:17:34.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c 2011-03-07 20:18:47.000000000 +0100 +@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons + memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur)); + cur.conn = conn; + +- return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob)); ++ return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_LIMIT | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob)); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6167c14 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c +--- openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm 2010-12-01 02:03:39.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c 2011-04-21 16:43:36.859648916 +0200 +@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "cipher.h" +@@ -600,6 +612,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename + #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(filename)) + #endif ++ if (st.st_mode & 040) { ++ struct group *gr; ++ ++ if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) ++ st.st_mode &= ~040; ++ } ++ + if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f21658 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain 2011-04-22 11:37:49.273648812 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config 2011-04-22 11:39:31.758648401 +0200 +@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ X11Forwarding yes + # override default of no subsystems + Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server + ++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain ++#Host *.local ++# CheckHostIP no ++ + # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis + #Match User anoncvs + # X11Forwarding no diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4951af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c +--- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet 2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c 2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200 +@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void) + struct sockaddr_storage from, to; + socklen_t fromlen, tolen; + ++ if (!active_state) ++ return 0; + /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ + if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) + return 1; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a25d9e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale openssh-5.8p2/mux.c +--- openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale 2011-01-14 02:01:32.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.8p2/mux.c 2011-06-09 15:27:42.556360291 +0200 +@@ -1867,6 +1867,9 @@ muxclient(const char *path) + unlink(path); + } else if (errno == ENOENT) { + debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); ++ } else if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) { ++ debug("Removing stale control socket \"%.100s\"", path); ++ unlink(path); + } else { + error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, + strerror(errno)); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56af045 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c +--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe 2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c 2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200 +@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + fdlim_set(maxfd); + fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); + ++ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); ++ + read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); + read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34f3851 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/dns.c +--- openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/dns.c 2011-09-09 08:05:27.782440497 +0200 +@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname + { + u_int counter; + int result; ++ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0; + struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; + + u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; +@@ -200,8 +201,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname + return -1; + } + ++ /* ++ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example, ++ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in ++ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf. ++ * ++ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag. ++ */ ++#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME ++ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0; ++#endif + result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, +- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); ++ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints); ++ + if (result) { + verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); + return -1; +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c +--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns 2009-07-13 03:38:23.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c 2011-09-09 15:03:39.930500801 +0200 +@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns + goto fail; + } + +- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ +- if (flags) { ++ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */ ++ if ((flags & ~RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } +@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns + #endif /* DEBUG */ + + #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC +- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */ +- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0) +- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC; ++ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */ ++ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) ++ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC); + #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */ + + /* make query */ +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h +--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns 2007-10-26 08:26:50.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h 2011-09-09 08:05:27.965438689 +0200 +@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ + #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED + # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1 + #endif ++#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 ++# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001 ++#endif + + /* + * Return codes for getrrsetbyname() diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ece1a73 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 +--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200 +@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information. + .Nm + exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 + if an error occurred. ++.Sh IPV6 ++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr scp 1 , + .Xr sftp 1 , +diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 +--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200 +@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c + started last). + The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. + .El ++.Sh IPV6 ++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr scp 1 , + .Xr sftp 1 , diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2c5d33 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c +--- openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean 2011-08-30 13:52:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c 2011-08-30 13:57:44.630111338 +0200 +@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void) + fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " + "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); + ++ /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */ ++ atexit(RAND_cleanup); ++ + #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY + if (RAND_status() == 1) { + debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a00046a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm 2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in 2011-09-12 16:24:18.643674014 +0200 +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b + cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \ + compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ + log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ +- readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ ++ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o whereIam.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ + atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm openssh-5.9p1/log.h +--- openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm 2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/log.h 2011-09-12 16:34:52.984674326 +0200 +@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void verbose(const char *, ...) __at + void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); ++void _debug_wIm_body(const char *, int, const char *, const char *, int); ++#define debug_wIm(a,b) _debug_wIm_body(a,b,__func__,__FILE__,__LINE__) + + + void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *); +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm 2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c 2011-09-12 16:38:35.787816490 +0200 +@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ int deny_severity; + + extern char *__progname; + ++/* trace of fork processes */ ++extern int whereIam; ++ + /* Server configuration options. */ + ServerOptions options; + +@@ -666,6 +669,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + return 1; + } else { + /* child */ ++ whereIam = 1; + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); + +@@ -715,6 +719,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + + /* child */ + ++ whereIam = 2; + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; + +@@ -1325,6 +1330,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + Key *key; + Authctxt *authctxt; + ++ whereIam = 0; ++ + #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE + (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); + #endif +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c +--- openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm 2011-09-12 16:24:18.722674167 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c 2011-09-12 16:24:18.724674418 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++ ++int whereIam = -1; ++ ++void _debug_wIm_body(const char *txt, int val, const char *func, const char *file, int line) ++{ ++ if (txt) ++ debug("%s=%d, %s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", txt, val, func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid()); ++ else ++ debug("%s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid()); ++} ++ ++ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7a7fac --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile +--- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld 2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile 2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200 +@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all: + @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2" + + gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c +- $(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ ++ $(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \ + `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` + + gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +- $(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \ ++ $(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \ + `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11` + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eb5c2e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost 2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c 2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100 +@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int ok = 0; +- const char *gss_host; ++ const char *gss_host = NULL; + + if (options.gss_server_identity) + gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; +- else if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { + gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" ) == 0 ) ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; ++ } + else + gss_host = authctxt->host; + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7361a18 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no 2012-09-14 20:54:58.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c 2012-09-14 20:55:42.289477749 +0200 +@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, + &cfg, NULL); + ++ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux */ ++ if (! options.use_pam) ++ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several problems."); ++ + seed_rng(); + + /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ +diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no 2012-09-14 20:54:58.514255748 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config 2012-09-14 20:54:58.551255954 +0200 +@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. ++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several ++# problems. + #UsePAM no + UsePAM yes + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4553422 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.737611051 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c 2013-03-25 19:31:42.797611433 +0100 +@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ seed_rng(void) + memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + + #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++ linux_seed(); ++#endif /* __linux__ */ + if (RAND_status() != 1) + fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); + } +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 19:33:02.042116876 +0100 +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport + + COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o + +-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o ++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o + + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c 2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ ++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "port-linux.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++ ++void ++linux_seed(void) ++{ ++ int len; ++ char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"); ++ char *random = "/dev/random"; ++ size_t ienv, randlen = 14; ++ ++ if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0")) ++ random = "/dev/urandom"; ++ else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen) ++ randlen = ienv; ++ ++ errno = 0; ++ if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) { ++ if (errno) ++ fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno)); ++ else ++ fatal ("EOF reading %s", random); ++ } ++} +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy 2013-03-22 00:38:29.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0 2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100 +@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT + Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate + with the agent. + ++ SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++ The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done ++ from /dev/urandom. If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari- ++ able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is ++ reseeded from /dev/random. The number of bytes read is defined ++ by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. Minimum is 14 bytes. This set- ++ ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++ random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec- ++ tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++ + FILES + ~/.ssh/identity + Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy 2012-12-07 03:06:13.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100 +@@ -160,6 +160,20 @@ to make this work.) + Identifies the path of a + .Ux Ns -domain + socket used to communicate with the agent. ++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. + .El + .Sh FILES + .Bl -tag -width Ds +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy 2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100 +@@ -198,6 +198,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t + These sockets should only be readable by the owner. + The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr ssh 1 , + .Xr ssh-add 1 , +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8 +--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8 2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100 +@@ -945,6 +945,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c + started last). + The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh IPV6 + IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. + .Sh SEE ALSO +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy 2013-01-20 12:35:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100 +@@ -806,6 +806,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for + The file format is described in + .Xr moduli 5 . + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr ssh 1 , + .Xr ssh-add 1 , +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8 2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100 +@@ -78,6 +78,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe + If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate + information corresponding with the private keys above. + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr ssh 1 , + .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100 +@@ -1277,6 +1277,23 @@ For more information, see the + .Cm PermitUserEnvironment + option in + .Xr sshd_config 5 . ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh FILES + .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact + .It Pa ~/.rhosts diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddccd2c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.277495179 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac 2013-03-25 19:34:01.377495818 +0100 +@@ -4420,6 +4420,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], + fi + ] + ) ++AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel, ++ [ --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG specify a vendor patch level], ++ [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.]) ++ SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"], ++ [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.]) ++ SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none]) + + dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection + dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the +@@ -4681,6 +4687,7 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack + echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" + echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" + echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" ++echo " Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL" + + echo "" + +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.197494668 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c 2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100 +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->max_authtries = -1; + options->max_sessions = -1; + options->banner = NULL; ++ options->show_patchlevel = -1; + options->use_dns = -1; + options->client_alive_interval = -1; + options->client_alive_count_max = -1; +@@ -287,6 +288,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; + if (options->version_addendum == NULL) + options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); ++ if (options->show_patchlevel == -1) ++ options->show_patchlevel = 0; ++ + /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ + if (use_privsep == -1) + use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX; +@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ typedef enum { + sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, + sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, + sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, +- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, ++ sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, +@@ -439,6 +443,7 @@ static struct { + { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1163,6 +1168,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep; + goto parse_multistate; + ++ case sShowPatchLevel: ++ intptr = &options->show_patchlevel; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sAllowUsers: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS) +@@ -1950,6 +1959,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor 2013-01-09 05:56:45.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h 2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100 +@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ typedef struct { + int max_authtries; + int max_sessions; + char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ ++ int show_patchlevel; /* Show vendor patch level to clients */ + int use_dns; + int client_alive_interval; /* + * poke the client this often to +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.380495837 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config 2013-03-25 19:44:43.471296362 +0100 +@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Defaul + #Compression delayed + #ClientAliveInterval 0 + #ClientAliveCountMax 3 ++#ShowPatchLevel no + #UseDNS yes + #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid + #MaxStartups 10:30:100 +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0 +--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.361495716 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0 2013-03-25 19:34:01.381495844 +0100 +@@ -595,6 +595,11 @@ DESCRIPTION + Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 + server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024. + ++ ShowPatchLevel ++ Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of ++ the binary in the server identification string. The patch level ++ is set at compile-time. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. ++ + StrictModes + Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership + of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.362495722 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5 2013-03-25 19:34:01.382495850 +0100 +@@ -1019,6 +1019,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version + .It Cm ServerKeyBits + Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. + The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024. ++.It Cm ShowPatchLevel ++Specifies whether ++.Nm sshd ++will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. ++The patch level is set at compile-time. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option applies to protocol version 1 only. + .It Cm StrictModes + Specifies whether + .Xr sshd 8 +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.332495531 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 19:44:11.864112092 +0100 +@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in + } + + xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s", +- major, minor, SSH_VERSION, ++ major, minor, (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION, + *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", + options.version_addendum, newline); + +@@ -1675,7 +1675,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + exit(1); + } + +- debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, ++ debug("sshd version %s, %s", ++ (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION, + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); + + /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p2-dont-test-ecdsa-521-keys.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p2-dont-test-ecdsa-521-keys.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8404c20 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p2-dont-test-ecdsa-521-keys.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.2p2/configure.ac.ecc openssh-6.2p2/configure.ac +--- openssh-6.2p2/configure.ac.ecc 2013-06-12 15:53:42.507017657 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.2p2/configure.ac 2013-06-12 15:53:42.534017598 +0200 +@@ -2512,7 +2512,7 @@ AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_SHA256]) + + # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has complete ECC support]) +-AC_LINK_IFELSE( ++AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include +@@ -2524,8 +2524,9 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE( + # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" + #endif + ]], [[ +- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); ++ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ++ exit (e == NULL || m == NULL); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) +diff -up openssh-6.2p2/regress/kextype.sh.ecc openssh-6.2p2/regress/kextype.sh +--- openssh-6.2p2/regress/kextype.sh.ecc 2013-06-12 16:06:39.718376529 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.2p2/regress/kextype.sh 2013-06-12 16:06:47.587343883 +0200 +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + + if test "$TEST_SSH_ECC" = "yes"; then +- kextypes="ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-sha2-nistp521" ++ kextypes="ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384" + fi + if test "$TEST_SSH_SHA256" = "yes"; then + kextypes="$kextypes diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" +diff -up openssh-6.2p2/regress/keytype.sh.ecc openssh-6.2p2/regress/keytype.sh +--- openssh-6.2p2/regress/keytype.sh.ecc 2012-02-15 08:01:42.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p2/regress/keytype.sh 2013-06-12 15:53:42.534017598 +0200 +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + + ktypes="dsa-1024 rsa-2048 rsa-3072" + if test "$TEST_SSH_ECC" = "yes"; then +- ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256 ecdsa-384 ecdsa-521" ++ ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256 ecdsa-384" + fi + + for kt in $ktypes; do diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69bcb81 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch @@ -0,0 +1,788 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.288298063 +0200 +@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void * + if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) + return (sshpam_thread_status); + signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); +- waitpid(thread, &status, 0); ++ while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINTR) ++ continue; ++ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ } + return (status); + } + #endif +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/channels.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity 2013-09-13 08:19:31.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/channels.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200 +@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); + +- if (rfd != -1) ++ if (rfd >= 0) + fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); +- if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) ++ if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd) + fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); +- if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) ++ if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) + fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + c->rfd = rfd; +@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd + + /* enable nonblocking mode */ + if (nonblock) { +- if (rfd != -1) ++ if (rfd >= 0) + set_nonblock(rfd); +- if (wfd != -1) ++ if (wfd >= 0) + set_nonblock(wfd); +- if (efd != -1) ++ if (efd >= 0) + set_nonblock(efd); + } + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity 2013-06-10 05:07:12.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200 +@@ -2068,14 +2068,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_ + char *rtype; + int want_reply; + int success = 0; ++/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */ + + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + want_reply = packet_get_char(); + debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", + rtype, want_reply); + if (want_reply) { +- packet_start(success ? +- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); ++ packet_start(/*success ? ++ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/key.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity 2013-06-01 23:41:51.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.290298054 +0200 +@@ -807,8 +807,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) + success = 1; + /*XXXX*/ + key_free(k); ++/*XXXX + if (success != 1) + break; ++XXXX*/ + /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */ + while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') + cp++; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-07 13:54:36.761314042 +0200 +@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx + mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ +- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); +@@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m + break; + } + } ++ ++ debug3("%s: key %p is %s", ++ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); ++ + if (key != NULL) + key_free(key); + +@@ -1223,9 +1227,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m + free(chost); + } + +- debug3("%s: key %p is %s", +- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); +- + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, allowed); + buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200 +@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, + if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || + (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { + error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); +- if (tmp1 > 0) ++ if (tmp1 >= 0) + close(tmp1); +- if (tmp2 > 0) +- close(tmp2); ++ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0) ++ close(tmp2);*/ + return 0; + } + close(tmp1); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2010-12-03 00:50:26.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200 +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; + u_int16_t *portp; + u_int16_t port; +- socklen_t salen; ++ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + int i; + + if (sa == NULL) { +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/packet.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity 2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200 +@@ -1199,6 +1199,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void) + case DEATTACK_DETECTED: + packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: " + "network attack detected"); ++ break; + case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: + packet_disconnect("deattack denial of " + "service detected"); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity 2013-06-02 15:46:24.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c 2013-10-07 13:42:32.377850691 +0200 +@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int); + + static time_t start; /* start progress */ + static time_t last_update; /* last progress update */ +-static char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ ++static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ + static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ + static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ + static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */ +@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore) + } + + void +-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) ++start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) + { + start = last_update = monotime(); + file = f; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity 2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h 2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200 +@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +-void start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *); ++void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *); + void stop_progress_meter(void); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/scp.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity 2013-07-18 08:11:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/scp.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200 +@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo) + { + if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { + kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); +- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); ++ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); + } + + if (signo) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.293298039 +0200 +@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) { +- arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp); + break; + } + for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) +@@ -1414,8 +1414,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + /* increase optional counter */ +- if (intptr != NULL) +- *intptr = *intptr + 1; ++ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;) ++ if (intptr != NULL) ++ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */ + } + break; + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity 2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c 2013-10-07 13:43:36.620537138 +0200 +@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void) + static void + notify_parent(void) + { +- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0) + (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); + } + static void + notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) + { +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0) + FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); + } + static void +@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset) + { + char c; + +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) +- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) ++ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0) + debug2("notify_done: reading"); + } + +@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **rea + * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data + * to the program. + */ +- if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) ++ if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) + FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp); + } + notify_prepare(*readsetp); +@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset) + int len; + + /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */ +- if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { ++ if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { + data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer); + dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); + len = write(fdin, data, dlen); +@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int + set_nonblock(fdin); + set_nonblock(fdout); + /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */ +- if (fderr != -1) ++ if (fderr >= 0) + set_nonblock(fderr); + + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin)) +@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int + max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); +- if (fderr != -1) ++ if (fderr >= 0) + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); + #endif + +@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int + * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending + * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin. + */ +- if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { ++ if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { + if (fdin != fdout) + close(fdin); + else +@@ -739,15 +739,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int + buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); + + /* Close the file descriptors. */ +- if (fdout != -1) ++ if (fdout >= 0) + close(fdout); + fdout = -1; + fdout_eof = 1; +- if (fderr != -1) ++ if (fderr >= 0) + close(fderr); + fderr = -1; + fderr_eof = 1; +- if (fdin != -1) ++ if (fdin >= 0) + close(fdin); + fdin = -1; + +@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int + + debug("Window change received."); + packet_check_eom(); +- if (fdin != -1) ++ if (fdin >= 0) + pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel); + } + +@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ server_request_tun(void) + } + + tun = packet_get_int(); +- if (forced_tun_device != -1) { ++ if (forced_tun_device >= 0) { + if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun) + goto done; + tun = forced_tun_device; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity 2013-07-26 00:40:00.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c 2013-10-07 13:48:45.885027420 +0200 +@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer * + } + + static void +-send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, ++send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, + u_int len) + { + Buffer msg; +@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *co + + static void + send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, +- char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) ++ const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) + { + Buffer msg; + +@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *con + } + + int +-do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) ++do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len) + { + u_int id, status; + Buffer msg; +@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h + + + static int +-do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag, ++do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int printflag, + SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) + { + Buffer msg; +@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha + } + + int +-do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) ++do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) + { + return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); + } +@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) + } + + int +-do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path + } + + int +-do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag) ++do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p + } + + int +-do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p + } + + Attrib * +-do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) ++do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) + { + u_int id; + +@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *pa + } + + Attrib * +-do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) ++do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) + { + u_int id; + +@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h + #endif + + int +-do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a) ++do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char + } + + int +-do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, ++do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, + Attrib *a) + { + u_int status, id; +@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char + } + + char * +-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int type, expected_id, count, id; +@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char + } + + int +-do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) ++do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; +@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char * + } + + int +-do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) ++do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; +@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char + } + + int +-do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) ++do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; +@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn + } + + int +-do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path, ++do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, + Attrib *a, int pflag, int resume) + { + Attrib junk; +@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char + } + + static int +-download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, ++download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int depth, int resume) + { + int i, ret = 0; +@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn * + } + + int +-download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, ++download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int resume) + { + char *src_canon; +@@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha + } + + int +-do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path, ++do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, + int pflag) + { + int local_fd; +@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char * + } + + static int +-upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, ++upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + int pflag, int printflag, int depth) + { + int ret = 0, status; +@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co + } + + int +-upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int printflag, ++upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int printflag, + int pflag) + { + char *dst_canon; +@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char + } + + char * +-path_append(char *p1, char *p2) ++path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) + { + char *ret; + size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity 2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h 2013-10-07 13:45:10.108080813 +0200 +@@ -56,49 +56,49 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_in + u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); + + /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ +-int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int); ++int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int); + + /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ +-int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); ++int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); + + /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ + void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); + + /* Delete file 'path' */ +-int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *); ++int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + + /* Create directory 'path' */ +-int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int); ++int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); + + /* Remove directory 'path' */ +-int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *); ++int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + + /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ +-Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); ++Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + + /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ +-Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); ++Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + + /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ +-int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *); ++int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); + + /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ +-int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *); ++int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *); + + /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ +-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *); ++char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + + /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ + int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); + + /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); ++int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + + /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +-int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); ++int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + +-/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +-int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); ++/* Symlink 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ ++int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + + /* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */ + +@@ -106,27 +106,27 @@ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char + * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int); ++int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int); + + /* + * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); ++int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); + + /* + * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int); ++int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int); + + /* + * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int); ++int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int); + + /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ +-char *path_append(char *, char *); ++char *path_append(const char *, const char *); + + #endif +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity 2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c 2013-10-07 13:49:47.322727449 +0200 +@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ killchild(int signo) + { + if (sshpid > 1) { + kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); +- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); ++ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); + } + + _exit(1); +@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args) + + /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ + static char * +-path_strip(char *path, char *strip) ++path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) + { + size_t len; + +@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip) + } + + static char * +-make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd) ++make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) + { + char *abs_str; + +@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **a + } + + static int +-is_dir(char *path) ++is_dir(const char *path) + { + struct stat sb; + +@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ is_dir(char *path) + } + + static int +-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + Attrib *a; + +@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch + + /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ + static int +-pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) ++pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname) + { + size_t l = strlen(pathname); + +@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) + } + + static int +-process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, ++process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, + int pflag, int rflag, int resume) + { + char *abs_src = NULL; +@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out: + } + + static int +-process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, ++process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, + int pflag, int rflag) + { + char *tmp_dst = NULL; +@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void + + /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ + static int +-do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) ++do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) + { + int n; + u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; +@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char * + + /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ + static int +-do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, ++do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, + int lflag) + { + char *fname, *lname; +@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch + } + + static int +-do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag) ++do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) + { + struct sftp_statvfs st; + char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:22:49.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200 +@@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + sanitise_stdfd(); + + /* drop */ +- setegid(getgid()); +- setgid(getgid()); ++ (void) setegid(getgid()); ++ (void) setgid(getgid()); + + #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) + /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200 +@@ -699,8 +699,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) + privsep_preauth_child(); + setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); +- if (box != NULL) ++ if (box != NULL) { + ssh_sandbox_child(box); ++ free(box); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -1345,6 +1347,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so + if (num_listen_socks < 0) + break; + } ++ ++ if (fdset != NULL) ++ free(fdset); + } + + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cd9997 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs 2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c 2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ ++/* ++ * ++ * invocation (all of the following are equal): ++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 ++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000 ++ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++ ++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ ++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" ++ ++void usage(void) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo \n" ++ " --key --mode \n" ++ " [--iv ] --data \n\n" ++ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n" ++ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n"); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len) ++{ ++ unsigned char *bin; ++ char *p; ++ size_t n = 0; ++ int shift = 4; ++ unsigned char out = 0; ++ unsigned char *optr; ++ ++ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2); ++ optr = bin; ++ ++ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) { ++ unsigned char c; ++ ++ c = *p; ++ if (isspace(c)) ++ continue; ++ ++ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { ++ c = c - '0'; ++ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') { ++ c = c - 'A' + 10; ++ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') { ++ c = c - 'a' + 10; ++ } else { ++ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */ ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ out |= c << shift; ++ shift = (shift + 4) % 8; ++ ++ if (shift) { ++ *(optr++) = out; ++ out = 0; ++ ++n; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ *len = n; ++ return bin; ++} ++ ++#define READ_CHUNK 4096 ++#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100 ++char *read_stdin(void) ++{ ++ char *buf; ++ size_t n, total = 0; ++ ++ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK); ++ ++ do { ++ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin); ++ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */ ++ break; ++ ++ total += n; ++ buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1); ++ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE); ++ return buf; ++} ++ ++int main (int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ ++ Cipher *c; ++ CipherContext cc; ++ char *algo = "aes128-ctr"; ++ char *hexkey = NULL; ++ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; ++ char *hexdata = NULL; ++ char *p; ++ int i; ++ int encrypt = 1; ++ void *key; ++ size_t keylen; ++ void *iv; ++ size_t ivlen; ++ void *data; ++ size_t datalen; ++ void *outdata; ++ ++ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { ++ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) { ++ algo = argv[++i]; ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) { ++ hexkey = argv[++i]; ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) { ++ ++i; ++ if (argv[i] == NULL) { ++ usage(); ++ } ++ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) { ++ encrypt = 1; ++ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) { ++ encrypt = 0; ++ } else { ++ usage(); ++ } ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) { ++ hexiv = argv[++i]; ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) { ++ hexdata = argv[++i]; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) { ++ usage(); ++ } ++ ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ ++ c = cipher_by_name(algo); ++ if (c == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ if (hexdata == NULL) { ++ hexdata = read_stdin(); ++ } else { ++ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata); ++ } ++ ++ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen); ++ ++ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen); ++ ++ if (ivlen != 16) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen); ++ ++ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt); ++ ++ free(key); ++ free(iv); ++ ++ outdata = malloc(datalen); ++ if(outdata == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ cipher_crypt(&cc, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0); ++ ++ free(data); ++ ++ cipher_cleanup(&cc); ++ ++ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) { ++ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p); ++ } ++ ++ free(outdata); ++ ++ printf("\n"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs 2013-03-25 21:35:52.451586280 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 21:37:14.956114584 +0100 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign + SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper + SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper + SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat ++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + MANFMT=@MANFMT@ + INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) + + LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ +@@ -174,6 +175,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l + ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) + ++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + +@@ -281,6 +285,7 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ + fi + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddcb7f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c +--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp 2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c 2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100 +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in + + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx + { +- AES_KEY aes_ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ecbctx; + u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + }; + +@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char + { + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + size_t n = 0; +- u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256]; ++ u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256]; + + if (len == 0) + return (1); + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) + return (0); + +- while ((len--) > 0) { ++ for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) { ++ u_int r,a,b; ++ + if (n == 0) { +- AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx); +- ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ int outl, i, buflen; ++ ++ buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf)); ++ ++ for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { ++ memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ } ++ ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl, ++ ctrbuf, buflen); + } +- *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n]; +- n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a)); ++ memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b)); ++ r = a ^ b; ++ memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r)); ++ src += sizeof(a); ++ dest += sizeof(r); ++ ++ n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf); + } ++ memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf)); ++ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + return (1); + } + +@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co + c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); + } +- if (key != NULL) +- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, +- &c->aes_ctx); ++ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx); ++ ++ if (key != NULL) { ++ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; ++ switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) { ++ case 128: ++ cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); ++ break; ++ case 192: ++ cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); ++ break; ++ case 256: ++ cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length"); ++ } ++ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL)) ++ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption"); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0); ++ } + if (iv != NULL) + memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return (1); +@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + free(c); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9cfbdb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.c 2013-10-07 15:42:05.243812405 +0200 +@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) + case 1: + revoked: + /* Key revoked */ +- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); + error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked " +- "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp); ++ "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp); + free(key_fp); + return 1; + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2013-10-07 15:43:49.747355927 +0200 +@@ -200,16 +200,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, + + if (host_status == HOST_OK) { + if (key_is_cert(key)) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, ++ SSH_FP_HEX); + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " +- "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, +- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, ++ "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, ++ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, + cuser, lookup); + } else { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", +- key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s", ++ key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), ++ fp, cuser, lookup); + } + free(fp); + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint 2013-07-18 08:10:10.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-07 15:50:44.617495624 +0200 +@@ -359,10 +359,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, + continue; + if (!key_is_cert_authority) + continue; +- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", +- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s", ++ file, linenum, key_type(found), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + /* + * If the user has specified a list of principals as + * a key option, then prefer that list to matching +@@ -400,9 +400,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, + if (key_is_cert_authority) + continue; + found_key = 1; +- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", +- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s", ++ key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + break; + } +@@ -425,13 +425,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, + if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) + return 0; + +- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + + if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) { +- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, +- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, ++ debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, ++ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys); + goto out; + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.971968285 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200 +@@ -598,6 +598,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty + return retval; + } + ++enum fp_type ++key_fingerprint_selection(void) ++{ ++ static enum fp_type rv; ++ static char rv_defined = 0; ++ char *env; ++ ++ if (!rv_defined) { ++ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); ++ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? ++ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ rv_defined = 1; ++ } ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++char * ++key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) ++{ ++ return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep); ++} ++ ++char * ++key_fingerprint_prefix(void) ++{ ++ return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : ""; ++} ++ + /* + * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances + * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h 2013-10-07 15:44:17.574233450 +0200 +@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ int key_equal_public(const Key *, cons + int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *); + char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); + u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); ++enum fp_type key_fingerprint_selection(void); ++char *key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep); ++char *key_fingerprint_prefix(void); + const char *key_type(const Key *); + const char *key_cert_type(const Key *); + int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c 2013-10-07 14:44:57.466515766 +0200 +@@ -326,10 +326,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection + key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { + had_identities = 1; + if (do_fp) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_HEX); +- printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", +- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n", ++ key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), ++ fp, comment, key_type(key)); + free(fp); + } else { + if (!key_write(key, stdout)) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2013-10-07 15:41:11.627044336 +0200 +@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id) + char *p; + int ret = -1; + +- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", +- id->comment, p)) ++ p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.", ++ id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p)) + ret = 0; + free(p); + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint 2013-07-20 05:22:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2013-10-07 14:25:52.864145038 +0200 +@@ -767,13 +767,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + { + FILE *f; + Key *public; +- char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra; ++ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx; + int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1; + enum fp_rep rep; + enum fp_type fptype; + struct stat st; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); ++ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix(); + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; + + if (!have_identity) +@@ -785,8 +786,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment); + if (public != NULL) { + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment, ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment, + key_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); +@@ -851,8 +852,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + } + comment = *cp ? cp : comment; + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, + comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); +@@ -970,13 +971,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key + if (print_fingerprint) { + enum fp_rep rep; + enum fp_type fptype; +- char *fp, *ra; ++ char *fp, *ra, *pfx; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); ++ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix(); + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; ++ + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name, ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name, + key_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); +@@ -1855,16 +1858,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) + fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); + v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00; + +- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + + printf("%s:\n", identity_file); + printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key), + key_cert_type(key)); +- printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp); +- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", +- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); ++ printf(" Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp); ++ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s%s\n", ++ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp); + printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); + if (!v00) { + printf(" Serial: %llu\n", +@@ -2655,13 +2659,12 @@ passphrase_again: + fclose(f); + + if (!quiet) { +- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", + identity_file); + printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); +- printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); ++ printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment); + printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint 2013-06-01 23:31:19.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c 2013-10-07 14:43:54.859822036 +0200 +@@ -830,10 +830,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so + "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " + "of known hosts.", type, ip); + } else if (options.visual_host_key) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n", ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } +@@ -871,9 +871,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so + else + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); + /* The default */ +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + msg2[0] = '\0'; + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { + if (matching_host_key_dns) +@@ -888,10 +887,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " + "established%s\n" +- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" ++ "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s" + "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " + "(yes/no)? ", +- host, ip, msg1, type, fp, ++ host, ip, msg1, type, ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, + options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", + options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", + msg2); +@@ -1136,8 +1136,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka + int flags = 0; + char *fp; + +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + + /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ +@@ -1238,14 +1239,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey + continue; + if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) + continue; +- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" + "in %s:%lu\n" +- "%s key fingerprint %s.", ++ "%s key fingerprint %s%s.", + key_type(found->key), + found->host, found->file, found->line, +- key_type(found->key), fp); ++ key_type(found->key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + if (options.visual_host_key) + logit("%s", ra); + free(ra); +@@ -1260,7 +1262,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) + { + char *fp; + +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); +@@ -1268,8 +1270,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); +- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", +- key_type(host_key), fp); ++ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.", ++ key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + + free(fp); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:37.001968139 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2013-10-07 15:20:09.403234714 +0200 +@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t + key->type, pktype); + goto done; + } +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s", ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + + /* +@@ -1202,8 +1203,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, + int have_sig = 1; + char *fp; + +- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + + if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..acf4e82 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch @@ -0,0 +1,607 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.850031186 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200 +@@ -147,25 +147,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + + ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) + + sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) + + scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o + $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + + ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) + + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o + $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips 2013-10-24 15:43:46.019999906 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c 2013-10-24 15:44:09.262890686 +0200 +@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p + "actual %d vs. announced %d.", + file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", + file, linenum, key_type(key), fp); + free(fp); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips 2013-10-24 15:39:05.008319990 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-24 15:39:05.029319892 +0200 +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con + + if (key_is_cert(key)) { + fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", + key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, +@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con + extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); + free(fp); + } else { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp, + extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); + free(fp); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.857031153 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200 +@@ -148,8 +148,14 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffe + /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ + cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); + +- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, +- CIPHER_ENCRYPT); ++ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, ++ CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) { ++ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); ++ buffer_free(&encrypted); ++ buffer_free(&buffer); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, + buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0); + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); +@@ -472,8 +478,13 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, con + cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(©)); + + /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ +- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, +- CIPHER_DECRYPT); ++ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, ++ CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) { ++ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); ++ buffer_free(&decrypted); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, + buffer_ptr(©), buffer_len(©), 0, 0); + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200 +@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) + aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; + #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP + aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | +- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; ++ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | ++ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; + #endif + return (&aes_ctr); + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200 +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +@@ -86,6 +87,27 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { + { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } + }; + ++static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = { ++ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, ++ { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, ++ { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, ++ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, ++ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, ++ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, ++ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, ++ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, ++ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, ++ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, ++ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM ++ { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, ++ { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, ++#endif ++ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } ++}; + /*--*/ + + /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ +@@ -96,7 +118,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(void) + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const Cipher *c; + +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { + if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) + continue; + if (ret != NULL) +@@ -161,7 +183,7 @@ const Cipher * + cipher_by_name(const char *name) + { + const Cipher *c; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c; + return NULL; +@@ -171,7 +193,7 @@ const Cipher * + cipher_by_number(int id) + { + const Cipher *c; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (c->number == id) + return c; + return NULL; +@@ -215,7 +237,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name) + const Cipher *c; + if (name == NULL) + return -1; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c->number; + return -1; +@@ -374,14 +396,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc) + * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. + */ + +-void ++int + cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher, + const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) + { + MD5_CTX md; + u_char digest[16]; + +- MD5_Init(&md); ++ if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0) ++ return -1; + MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + MD5_Final(digest, &md); + +@@ -389,6 +412,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, + + memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); ++ return 0; + } + + /* +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h 2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200 +@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void cipher_init(CipherContext *, const + void cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, + u_int, u_int, u_int); + void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *); +-void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int); ++int cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int); + u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *); + u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *); + u_int cipher_authlen(const Cipher *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/key.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200 +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include + + #include +@@ -606,9 +607,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void) + char *env; + + if (!rv_defined) { +- env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); +- rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? +- SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ rv = SSH_FP_SHA1; ++ else { ++ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); ++ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? ++ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ } + rv_defined = 1; + } + return rv; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/mac.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.c 2013-10-11 22:25:35.394737186 +0200 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ struct macalg { + int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ + }; + +-static const struct macalg macs[] = { ++static const struct macalg all_macs[] = { + /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ + { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, +@@ -91,6 +92,18 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { + { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } + }; + ++static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = { ++ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, ++ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 ++ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, ++ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, ++ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, ++ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, ++#endif ++ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } ++}; ++ + /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported MACs. */ + char * + mac_alg_list(void) +@@ -99,7 +112,7 @@ mac_alg_list(void) + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct macalg *m; + +- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { ++ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = '\n'; + nlen = strlen(m->name); +@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name) + { + const struct macalg *m; + +- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { ++ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) + continue; + if (mac != NULL) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips 2013-06-11 04:10:02.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h 2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200 +@@ -114,6 +114,19 @@ + #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" + #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" + ++#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ ++ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ ++ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ ++ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512" ++#else ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1" ++#endif + + static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { + KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips 2010-03-25 22:52:02.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200 +@@ -37,25 +37,18 @@ + #define REKEY_BYTES (1 << 24) + + static int rc4_ready = 0; +-static RC4_KEY rc4; + + unsigned int + arc4random(void) + { + unsigned int r = 0; +- static int first_time = 1; ++ void *rp = &r; + +- if (rc4_ready <= 0) { +- if (first_time) +- seed_rng(); +- first_time = 0; ++ if (!rc4_ready) { + arc4random_stir(); + } ++ RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r)); + +- RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r); +- +- rc4_ready -= sizeof(r); +- + return(r); + } + +@@ -63,24 +56,11 @@ void + arc4random_stir(void) + { + unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE]; +- int i; + +- memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4)); + if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0) + fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", + ERR_get_error()); +- RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf); +- +- /* +- * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in: +- * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps +- */ +- for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf)) +- RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf); +- +- memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf)); +- +- rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES; ++ rc4_ready = 1; + } + #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2013-10-24 15:45:06.055623916 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2013-10-24 15:45:36.906478986 +0200 +@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) + enum fp_type fptype; + char *fp, *ra; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : (FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5); + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; + + pkcs11_init(0); +@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5, ++ ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]), + fp, key_type(keys[i])); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips 2013-07-25 03:55:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200 +@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +@@ -253,6 +255,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) ++ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ else ++ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); + + #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ +@@ -330,6 +339,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '1': ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode."); ++ } + options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; + break; + case '2': +@@ -647,7 +659,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (!host) + usage(); + +- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ +@@ -748,6 +759,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + seed_rng(); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + if (options.user == NULL) + options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + +@@ -816,6 +831,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2; ++ if (options.protocol == 0) ++ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode."); ++ } ++ + /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ + if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, + options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.810031374 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.873031077 +0200 +@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#include ++ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + + #include "xmalloc.h" +@@ -170,6 +172,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; ++ + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); +@@ -185,7 +191,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; + } ++ + if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + options.hostkeyalgorithms; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.842031223 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.873031077 +0200 +@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE +@@ -1450,6 +1452,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #endif + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) ++ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ else ++ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ + /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ + saved_argc = ac; + rexec_argc = ac; +@@ -1601,8 +1611,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + else + closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); + +- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +- + /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ + if (logfile != NULL) { + log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); +@@ -1773,6 +1781,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype, + key_type(key ? key : pubkey)); + } ++ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); ++ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; ++ } + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; +@@ -1936,6 +1948,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Initialize the random number generator. */ + arc4random_stir(); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + unmounted if desired. */ + if (chdir("/") == -1) +@@ -2498,6 +2514,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); +@@ -2507,6 +2526,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; + } + if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..695c0eb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.553948159 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2013-10-11 21:40:49.972337025 +0200 +@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include ++#include + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "key.h" +@@ -40,10 +42,12 @@ + #include "auth.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "servconf.h" ++#include "misc.h" + + #include "buffer.h" + #include "ssh-gss.h" + ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern ServerOptions options; + + #ifdef HEIMDAL +@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options; + # include + #endif + ++/* all commands are allowed by default */ ++char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; ++ ++static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); ++static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *, ++ int); ++ + static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; + + /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ +@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client + krb5_principal princ; + int retval; + const char *errmsg; ++ int k5login_exists; + + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) + return 0; +@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return 0; + } +- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { ++ /* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login. ++ * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */ ++ k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); ++ /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, ++ * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials ++ * to access these files aren't available yet. */ ++ if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value, ++ name, k5login_exists)) { ++ retval = 1; ++ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s " ++ "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)", ++ name, (char *)client->displayname.value); + } else + retval = 0; + +@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client + return retval; + } + ++/* Test for existence of .k5login. ++ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok() ++ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself. ++ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence ++ * of .k5login to authorize self-login. (absence of both is required) ++ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise. ++ */ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() ++{ ++ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); ++ return access(file, F_OK) == 0; ++} ++ ++/* check .k5users for login or command authorization ++ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise. ++ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated. ++ */ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, ++ const char *luser, int k5login_exists) ++{ ++ FILE *fp; ++ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char line[BUFSIZ]; ++ char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */ ++ struct stat st; ++ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ int found_principal = 0; ++ int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0; ++ u_long linenum; ++ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); ++ /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ ++ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { ++ return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal, ++ sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) && ++ (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0); ++ } ++ if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { ++ int saved_errno = errno; ++ /* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong. ++ * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */ ++ if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) { ++ logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s", ++ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno)); ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */ ++ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) { ++ /* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */ ++ logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s", ++ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno)); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) { ++ logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user", ++ pw->pw_name, file); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* .k5users must be a regular file. krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this ++ * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { ++ logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ ++ /* Check each line. ksu allows unlimited length lines. We don't. */ ++ while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line), ++ &linenum) != -1) { ++ char *token; ++ ++ /* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */ ++ if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL) ++ continue; ++ if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) { ++ /* we matched on client principal */ ++ found_principal = 1; ++ if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) { ++ /* only shell is allowed */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = ++ xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = ++ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ break; ++ } ++ /* process the allowed commands */ ++ while (token) { ++ if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) { ++ allcommands = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = ++ xstrdup(token); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = ++ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n"); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { ++ /* terminate vector */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL; ++ /* if all commands are allowed, free vector */ ++ if (allcommands) { ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) { ++ free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]); ++ } ++ free(k5users_allowed_cmds); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ fclose(fp); ++ return found_principal; ++} ++ + + /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated + * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/session.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.487948468 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c 2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200 +@@ -823,6 +823,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command); + } + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */ ++ else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { ++ const char *match = command; ++ int allowed = 0, i = 0; ++ ++ if (!match) ++ match = s->pw->pw_shell; ++ while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) { ++ if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) { ++ debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match); ++ allowed = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ if (!allowed) { ++ debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) + fatal("do_exec: command already set"); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.558948136 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h 2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200 +@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ + # endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */ + + # endif /* !HEIMDAL */ ++ ++/* .k5users support */ ++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; ++ + #endif /* KRB5 */ + + /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8 +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.537948234 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8 2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200 +@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter + The client tries to authenticate itself using + host-based authentication, + public key authentication, ++GSSAPI authentication, + challenge-response authentication, + or password authentication. + .Pp +@@ -797,6 +798,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same wa + but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + .Pp ++.It Pa ~/.k5login ++.It Pa ~/.k5users ++These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control. ++Further details are described in ++.Xr ksu 1 . ++.Pp + .It Pa ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration + and authentication information. diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eefd792 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2900 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi +--- openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.284216176 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2013-10-11 15:15:17.284216176 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ ++20110101 ++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1 ++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney ++ ++20100308 ++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ] ++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1 ++ - [ servconf.c ] ++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag ++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin ++ Watson. ++ - ++ ++20100124 ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to ++ Colin Watson ++ ++20090615 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c ++ sshd.c ] ++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review ++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs ++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled ++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange ++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value ++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust ++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled ++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list ++ Cast data.length before printing ++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL ++ ++20090201 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h ++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] ++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user ++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server ++ ++20080404 ++ - [ gss-serv.c ] ++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow ++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav ++ Stoichkov ++ ++20070317 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a ++ function ++ ++20061220 ++ - [ servconf.c ] ++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and ++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. ++ ++20060910 ++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ++ ssh-gss.h ] ++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms ++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] ++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of ++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. ++ ++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] ++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample ++ configuration files ++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] ++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() ++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client ++ ++20060909 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] ++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server ++ only, where they belong ++ ++ ++20060829 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment ++ variable ++ ++20060828 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ] ++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem ++ ++ ++20060818 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] ++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled ++ ++ ++20060421 ++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to ++ fix compiler errors/warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ fix uninitialized variable warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ gssgenr.c ] ++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c ++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.281216190 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-11 15:15:17.289216153 +0200 +@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o + atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ ++ kexgssc.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ + jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o auditstub.o + +@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \ + monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ + auth-krb5.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ + roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.213216506 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.283216181 +0200 +@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u + static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); + static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ int authenticated = 0; ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic)))) ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ free(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -240,7 +274,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, + + packet_check_eom(); + +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -282,7 +317,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = ++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -299,6 +335,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.214216502 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.283216181 +0200 +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.178216669 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.284216176 +0200 +@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ + #include "msg.h" + #include "roaming.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* import options */ + extern Options options; + +@@ -1608,6 +1612,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!rekeying) { + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { + debug("need rekeying"); + xxx_kex->done = 0; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.273216227 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac 2013-10-11 15:15:17.285216171 +0200 +@@ -548,6 +548,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], + AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2013-06-01 23:31:18.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.286216167 +0200 +@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ + #include "buffer.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + + extern u_char *session_id2; + extern u_int session_id2_len; + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client)); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client) { ++ Buffer buf; ++ size_t i; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); ++ EVP_MD_CTX md; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ free(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ buffer_init(&buf); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), ++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ ++ if (oidpos != 0) ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); ++ ++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_free(&buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ free(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con + } + + OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context) +@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2013-07-20 05:35:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2013-10-23 21:48:20.558346236 +0200 +@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; +- int len; ++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; + const char *errmsg; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { +@@ -174,11 +174,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') ++ new_ccname++; ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); ++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { ++ char *p; ++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ } ++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -187,9 +202,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + ++ client->store.data = krb_context; ++ + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -197,7 +279,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2013-07-20 05:35:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c 2013-10-23 21:51:52.212347754 +0200 +@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ + #include "channels.h" + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) + char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + +- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (-1); ++ } + +- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (-1); +- } ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, ++ NULL, NULL))) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + +- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); ++ } else { ++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + } +- +- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, +- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) +- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +- +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (ctx->major); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + /* Privileged */ +@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss + } + + /* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { ++ gss_OID_set supported; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, ++ NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + { +@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -249,8 +286,48 @@ OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -265,6 +342,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -282,6 +366,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -292,11 +378,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + void + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) + { +- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { +- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ +- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", +- gssapi_client.store.filename); +- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) { ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) { ++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) { ++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else { ++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data); ++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -329,7 +424,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + +@@ -339,9 +434,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -354,14 +451,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { ++ int ok; ++ int ret; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ if (!use_privsep) { ++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + #endif +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kex.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.gsskex 2013-10-30 15:26:39.339608716 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.c 2013-10-31 10:50:41.254535382 +0100 +@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ + #include "roaming.h" + #include "audit.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) + # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 +@@ -81,6 +85,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, EVP_sha384 }, + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, EVP_sha512 }, + #endif ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, ++#endif + { NULL, -1, -1, NULL}, + }; + +@@ -110,6 +119,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) { ++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) ++ return k; ++ } ++#endif + } + return NULL; + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kex.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.197216581 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.h 2013-10-11 15:43:21.757429309 +0200 +@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, + KEX_ECDH_SHA2, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -133,6 +136,12 @@ struct Kex { + int flags; + const EVP_MD *evp_md; + int ec_nid; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); +@@ -162,6 +171,11 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); + void kexecdh_client(Kex *); + void kexecdh_server(Kex *); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++void kexgss_client(Kex *); ++void kexgss_server(Kex *); ++#endif ++ + void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); + + void +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++void ++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; ++ DH *dh; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; ++ u_char *empty = ""; ++ char *msg; ++ char *lang; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); ++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ packet_put_int(min); ++ packet_put_int(nbits); ++ packet_put_int(max); ++ ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ ++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(p); ++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(g); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ ++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ ++ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); ++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ free(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = packet_read(); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ serverhostkey = ++ packet_get_string(&slen); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); ++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ msg_tok.length = strlen; ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if (packet_get_char()) { ++ recv_tok.value= ++ packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ maj_status = packet_get_int(); ++ min_status = packet_get_int(); ++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); ++ ++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); ++ if ((int)kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ free(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ dh->pub_key, /* e */ ++ dh_server_pub, /* f */ ++ shared_secret, /* K */ ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ free(msg_tok.value); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ free(serverhostkey); ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ ++ /* save session id */ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++} ++ ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++void ++kexgss_server(Kex *kex) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ DH *dh; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) ++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) ++ free(mechs); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ min = packet_get_int(); ++ nbits = packet_get_int(); ++ max = packet_get_int(); ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, nbits, max); ++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); ++ if (dh == NULL) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_write_wait(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); ++ type = packet_read(); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ ++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ break; ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect( ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ free(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); ++ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); ++ if ((int)kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ free(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ ++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh_client_pub, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ } else { ++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++} ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/key.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.288216158 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-11 15:41:44.982868222 +0200 +@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = + KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, ++ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 }, + { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } + }; + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/key.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.198216576 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.289216153 +0200 +@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum types { + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, + KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + enum fp_type { +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.214216502 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 +@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE + {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, +@@ -283,6 +286,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, +@@ -405,6 +414,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; + +@@ -519,6 +532,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +@@ -1968,6 +1985,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); + kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); +@@ -2192,6 +2216,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer + OM_uint32 major; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + goid.length = len; + +@@ -2219,6 +2246,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + in.length = len; + major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); +@@ -2236,6 +2266,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -2247,6 +2278,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer + OM_uint32 ret; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + gssbuf.length = len; + mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); +@@ -2273,7 +2307,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m + { + int authenticated; + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); +@@ -2286,6 +2324,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ data.length = len; ++ if (data.length != 20) ++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, ++ (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ free(data.value); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, major); ++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int ok; ++ ++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ free(store.filename); ++ free(store.envvar); ++ free(store.envval); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, ok); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.215216497 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 +@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, + #endif ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85, + + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.215216497 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 +@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + Buffer m; + int authenticated = 0; +@@ -1346,6 +1346,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ ++ major = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); ++ hash->length = len; ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return(major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ int ok; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ ++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.215216497 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 +@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2013-07-18 08:09:05.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.291216143 +0200 +@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, ++ oGssServerIdentity, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -172,10 +174,19 @@ static struct { + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, + #endif + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, +@@ -516,10 +527,30 @@ parse_flag: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssServerIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1168,7 +1199,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -1268,8 +1304,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2013-05-16 12:30:03.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.291216143 +0200 +@@ -48,7 +48,12 @@ typedef struct { + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ ++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.273216227 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 +@@ -107,7 +107,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -241,8 +244,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; ++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -342,7 +351,9 @@ typedef enum { + sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, ++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, + sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, +@@ -409,10 +420,20 @@ static struct { + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1078,10 +1099,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStrictAcceptor: ++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1994,6 +2027,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE + dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.273216227 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 +@@ -111,7 +111,10 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ ++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2013-02-25 01:24:44.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -117,16 +134,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); + void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2013-07-18 08:11:50.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 +@@ -529,11 +529,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. ++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the ++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target ++hostname. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Dq no . +-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.265216264 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP yes + # AddressFamily any +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.251216330 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2013-10-11 15:28:22.617529416 +0200 +@@ -162,9 +162,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + { + Kex *kex; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = host; ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { + logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); + options.ciphers = NULL; +@@ -207,6 +232,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ free(gss); ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, + (time_t)options.rekey_interval); +@@ -218,10 +254,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++#endif + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; ++ } else { ++ kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); +@@ -317,6 +373,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3 + void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); ++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); + #endif + + void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); +@@ -332,6 +389,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_authentication, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + NULL, +@@ -636,19 +698,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int ok = 0; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) ++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; ++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (gss_supported == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { ++ gss_supported = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; +@@ -745,8 +819,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_ + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; +- int oidlen; +- char *oidv; ++ u_int oidlen; ++ u_char *oidv; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); +@@ -855,6 +929,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p + free(msg); + free(lang); + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); ++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + int +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.277216209 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 +@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "version.h" + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifdef LIBWRAP + #include + #include +@@ -1794,10 +1798,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } ++#ifndef GSSAPI ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; + } ++#endif + if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); +@@ -2130,6 +2137,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Log the connection. */ + verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++ /* ++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if ++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched ++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not ++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from ++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. ++ * ++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an ++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating ++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the ++ * same session (bad). ++ * ++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us ++ * automatically. ++ * ++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored ++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). ++ */ ++ { ++ OSStatus err = 0; ++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; ++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) ++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " ++ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); ++ else { ++ debug("Creating new security session..."); ++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, ++ &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is +@@ -2551,6 +2612,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ newstr = gss; ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; +@@ -2558,6 +2661,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.274216223 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 +@@ -484,12 +484,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck ++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor ++a client authenticates against. If ++.Dq yes ++then the client must authenticate against the ++.Pa host ++service on the current hostname. If ++.Dq no ++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the ++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation ++on multi homed machines. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . ++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, ++and setting it to ++.Dq no ++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . + .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together + with successful public key client host authentication is allowed +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.277216209 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 +@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + GSSAPIAuthentication yes + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..941aa72 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +diff -U0 openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog +--- openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df 2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog 2013-10-23 22:39:46.051788366 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ ++20131010 ++ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13 ++ [dh.c dh.h] ++ Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each ++ symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with ++ the upper limit specified by RFC4419. Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok ++ djm@. ++ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df 2013-07-18 08:12:07.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.c 2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.51 2013/07/02 12:31:43 markus Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.52 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * +@@ -352,17 +352,20 @@ dh_new_group14(void) + + /* + * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an +- * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). Estimate +- * with: O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3))) ++ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). ++ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key ++ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value ++ * from RFC4419 section 3. + */ + + int + dh_estimate(int bits) + { +- ++ if (bits <= 112) ++ return 2048; + if (bits <= 128) +- return (1024); /* O(2**86) */ ++ return 3072; + if (bits <= 192) +- return (2048); /* O(2**116) */ +- return (4096); /* O(2**156) */ ++ return 7680; ++ return 8192; + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df 2008-06-29 14:47:04.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.h 2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.10 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); + + int dh_estimate(int); + ++/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */ + #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 + #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90cfb7e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,371 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat +--- openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ++of an user in any environment. This includes environments with ++polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled. ++ ++To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: ++ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat ++ AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs root ++ ++Do not forget to enable public key authentication: ++ PubkeyAuthentication yes ++ ++ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.442566930 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign + SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper + SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper ++SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + MANFMT=@MANFMT@ + INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + + LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ +@@ -172,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) + ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o + $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + ++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +@@ -279,6 +283,7 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ + $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ + fi ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.429566992 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 +@@ -606,6 +606,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd + _exit(1); + } + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { ++ error ("failed to copy environment: %s", ++ strerror(errno)); ++ _exit(127); ++ } ++#endif ++ + execl(options.authorized_keys_command, + options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL); + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.435566964 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2013-10-10 15:32:19.946065189 +0200 +@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ + static int +-ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *)) + { + const char *reqlvl; + char *role; +@@ -324,16 +324,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) + + ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); + +- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + + if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { + use_current = "1"; + } else { + use_current = ""; +- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); + } + +- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); + + if (role != NULL) + free(role); +@@ -341,6 +341,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) + return rv; + } + ++static int ++ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); ++} ++ ++static int ++do_setenv(char *name, char *value) ++{ ++ return setenv(name, value, 1); ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) ++{ ++ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); ++} ++ + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void + ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c 2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ ++/* ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, ++ * including the disclaimer of warranties. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote ++ * products derived from this software without specific prior ++ * written permission. ++ * ++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of ++ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are ++ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is ++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and ++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED ++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE ++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, ++ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR ++ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. ++ * Written by Tomas Mraz ++*/ ++ ++#define _GNU_SOURCE ++ ++#include "config.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "uidswap.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++ ++#define ERR_USAGE 1 ++#define ERR_PAM_START 2 ++#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3 ++#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4 ++#define ERR_PAM_END 5 ++#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6 ++#define ERR_MEMORY 7 ++#define ERR_OPEN 8 ++#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9 ++#define ERR_FDOPEN 10 ++#define ERR_STAT 11 ++#define ERR_WRITE 12 ++#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13 ++#define BUFLEN 4096 ++ ++/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */ ++static int ++dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm, ++ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr) ++{ ++ struct pam_response *rsp; ++ ++ (void)msgm; ++ (void)appdata_ptr; ++ ++ if (num_msg <= 0) ++ return PAM_CONV_ERR; ++ ++ /* Just allocate the array as empty responses */ ++ rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response)); ++ if (rsp == NULL) ++ return PAM_CONV_ERR; ++ ++ *response = rsp; ++ return PAM_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++static struct pam_conv conv = { ++ dummy_conv, ++ NULL ++}; ++ ++char * ++make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd) ++{ ++ char *fname; ++ ++ if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return fname; ++} ++ ++int ++dump_keys(const char *user) ++{ ++ struct passwd *pwd; ++ int fd = -1; ++ FILE *f = NULL; ++ char *fname = NULL; ++ int rv = 0; ++ char buf[BUFLEN]; ++ size_t len; ++ struct stat st; ++ ++ if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { ++ return ERR_GETPWNAM; ++ } ++ ++ if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) { ++ return ERR_MEMORY; ++ } ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(pwd); ++ ++ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) { ++ rv = ERR_OPEN; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { ++ rv = ERR_STAT; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || ++ (st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) { ++ rv = ERR_FILE_MODE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ unset_nonblock(fd); ++ ++ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { ++ rv = ERR_FDOPEN; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ fd = -1; ++ ++ while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) { ++ rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0; ++ } ++ ++fail: ++ if (fd != -1) ++ close(fd); ++ if (f != NULL) ++ fclose(f); ++ free(fname); ++ restore_uid(); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", ++ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", ++ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE" ++}; ++ ++extern char **environ; ++ ++int ++set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh) ++{ ++ int i; ++ size_t j; ++ ++ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) { ++ int len = strlen(env_names[j]); ++ ++ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) { ++ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 && ++ environ[i][len] == '=') { ++ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ int retval; ++ int ev = 0; ++ ++ if (argc != 2) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s \n", argv[0]); ++ return ERR_USAGE; ++ } ++ ++ retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ return ERR_PAM_START; ++ } ++ ++ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh); ++ if (ev != 0) ++ goto finish; ++ ++ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION; ++ goto finish; ++ } ++ ++ ev = dump_keys(argv[1]); ++ ++ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION; ++ } ++ ++finish: ++ retval = pam_end (pamh,retval); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_PAM_END; ++ } ++ return ev; ++} diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9c8000 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name 2013-10-23 22:03:52.322950759 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2013-10-23 22:04:24.295799873 +0200 +@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include ++#include + + extern ServerOptions options; + +@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + #endif + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ const char *ccache_type; + int len; + char *client, *platform_client; + const char *errmsg; +@@ -191,12 +194,30 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + goto out; + #endif + ++ ccache_type = krb5_cc_get_type(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + +- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; ++ if (authctxt->krb5_ticket_file[0] == ':') ++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file++; ++ ++ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type); + authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", ++ ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#else ++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "%s:%s", ++ ccache_type, authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#endif ++ ++ if (strcmp(ccache_type, "DIR") == 0) { ++ char *p; ++ p = strrchr(authctxt->krb5_ccname, '/'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ } ++ + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -235,10 +256,34 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + void + krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + { ++ struct stat krb5_ccname_stat; ++ char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end; ++ + debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); + if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; ++ ++ strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10); ++ krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1; ++ *krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0'; ++ if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) { ++ ++ strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary"); ++ ++ if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) { ++ if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) { ++ krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/'); ++ *krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0'; ++ if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1) ++ debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)); ++ } ++ else ++ debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s", ++ krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno) ++ ); ++ } ++ } + } + if (authctxt->krb5_user) { + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); +@@ -250,34 +295,139 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + } + ++int ++ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) { ++ char *src, *old; ++ va_list ap; ++ int i; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ if (i == -1 || src == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ old = *dsc; ++ ++ i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src); ++ if (i == -1 || src == NULL) { ++ free(src); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ free(old); ++ free(src); ++ ++ return i; ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) { ++ char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template; ++ ++ if (template == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template); ++ r = xstrdup(""); ++ ++ while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) { ++ ++ *p_n++ = '\0'; ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 || ++ strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) { ++ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ continue; ++ } ++ else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) { ++ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ continue; ++ } else { ++ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; ++ p_o = '\0'; ++ debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template); ++ /* unknown token, fallback to the default */ ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ *result = r; ++ free(tmp_template); ++ return 0; ++ ++cleanup: ++ free(r); ++ free(tmp_template); ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++krb5_error_code ++ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) { ++ profile_t p; ++ int ret = 0; ++ char *value = NULL; ++ ++ ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ + #ifndef HEIMDAL + krb5_error_code + ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { + int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; +- char ccname[40]; ++ char *ccname; ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; ++#else + mode_t old_umask; ++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; + +- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), +- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); +- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) +- return ENOMEM; +- +- old_umask = umask(0177); +- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); +- oerrno = errno; +- umask(old_umask); +- if (tmpfd == -1) { +- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); +- return oerrno; +- } ++#endif ++ ++ ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname); + +- if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { ++ if (ret) { ++ ret = asprintf(&ccname, cctemplate, geteuid()); ++ if (ret == -1) ++ return ENOMEM; ++ old_umask = umask(0177); ++ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); + oerrno = errno; +- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ umask(old_umask); ++ if (tmpfd == -1) { ++ logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ return oerrno; ++ } ++ ++ if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { ++ oerrno = errno; ++ logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ close(tmpfd); ++ return oerrno; ++ } + close(tmpfd); +- return oerrno; + } +- close(tmpfd); ++ debug("%s: Setting ccname to %s", __func__, ccname); + + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60688db --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.889087613 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2013-10-11 21:41:42.905087537 +0200 +@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ + + extern ServerOptions options; + ++int ++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client) ++{ ++ if (options.use_kuserok) ++ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client); ++ else { ++ char kuser[65]; ++ ++ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser)) ++ return 0; ++ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0; ++ } ++} ++ + static int + krb5_init(void *context) + { +@@ -159,7 +173,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + if (problem) + goto out; + +- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) { ++ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) { + problem = -1; + goto out; + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.901087556 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2013-10-11 21:46:42.898673597 +0200 +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr + int); + + static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; ++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *); + + /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ + +@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client + /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, + * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials + * to access these files aren't available yet. */ +- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { ++ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c 2013-10-11 21:48:24.664194016 +0200 +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->version_addendum = NULL; ++ options->use_kuserok = -1; + } + + void +@@ -310,6 +311,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); + if (options->show_patchlevel == -1) + options->show_patchlevel = 0; ++ if (options->use_kuserok == -1) ++ options->use_kuserok = 1; + + /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ + if (use_privsep == -1) +@@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, + sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, + sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, +- sKerberosGetAFSToken, ++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok, + sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, +@@ -409,11 +412,13 @@ static struct { + #else + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #else + { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #endif + { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1515,6 +1520,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + *activep = value; + break; + ++ case sKerberosUseKuserok: ++ intptr = &options->use_kuserok; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPermitOpen: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') +@@ -1815,6 +1824,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); ++ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + +@@ -2055,6 +2065,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); + + /* string arguments */ + dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h 2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200 +@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct { + + int num_permitted_opens; + ++ int use_kuserok; + char *chroot_directory; + char *revoked_keys_file; + char *trusted_user_ca_keys; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200 +@@ -675,6 +675,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr + file on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . ++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok ++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +@@ -833,6 +837,7 @@ Available keywords are + .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , + .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , + .Cm KerberosAuthentication , ++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok , + .Cm MaxAuthTries , + .Cm MaxSessions , + .Cm PasswordAuthentication , +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config 2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200 +@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes + #KerberosTicketCleanup yes + #KerberosGetAFSToken no ++#KerberosUseKuserok yes + + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..994ef59 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2609 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.ldap openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.ldap 2013-03-20 02:55:15.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac 2013-03-25 21:27:15.888248071 +0100 +@@ -1509,6 +1509,106 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([audit], + esac ] + ) + ++# Check whether user wants LDAP support ++LDAP_MSG="no" ++INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="" ++AC_ARG_WITH(ldap, ++ [ --with-ldap[[=PATH]] Enable LDAP pubkey support (optionally in PATH)], ++ [ ++ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then ++ ++ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="yes" ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DLDAP_DEPRECATED" ++ ++ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" ++ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" ++ fi ++ ++ AC_DEFINE([WITH_LDAP_PUBKEY], 1, [Enable LDAP pubkey support]) ++ LDAP_MSG="yes" ++ ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(lber.h) ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate )) ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap_ssl.h) ++ ++ AC_ARG_WITH(ldap-lib, ++ [ --with-ldap-lib=type select ldap library [auto|netscape5|netscape4|netscape3|umich|openldap]]) ++ ++ if test -z "$with_ldap_lib"; then ++ with_ldap_lib=auto ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = umich -o $with_ldap_lib = openldap \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(lber, main, LIBS="-llber $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap, main, LIBS="-lldap $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape5 \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap50, main, LIBS="-lldap50 -lssldap50 -lssl3 -lnss3 -lnspr4 -lprldap50 -lplc4 -lplds4 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape4 \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl41, main, LIBS="-lldapssl41 -lplc3 -lplds3 -lnspr3 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl40, main, LIBS="-lldapssl40 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap41, main, LIBS="-lldap41 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap40, main, LIBS="-lldap40 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape3 \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl30, main, LIBS="-lldapssl30 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate a valid LDAP library) ++ fi ++ ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working LDAP support]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ++ #include ], ++ [(void)ldap_init(0, 0);], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ++ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldap libraries **]) ++ ]) ++ AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \ ++ ldap_init \ ++ ldap_get_lderrno \ ++ ldap_set_lderrno \ ++ ldap_parse_result \ ++ ldap_memfree \ ++ ldap_controls_free \ ++ ldap_set_option \ ++ ldap_get_option \ ++ ldapssl_init \ ++ ldap_start_tls_s \ ++ ldap_pvt_tls_set_option \ ++ ldap_initialize \ ++ ) ++ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(ldap_set_rebind_proc, ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ++ #include ], ++ [ldap_set_rebind_proc(0, 0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=3], ++ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=2]) ++ AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc) ++ AC_DEFINE(LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS, $ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc, [number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) ++ ) ++ fi ++ ] ++) ++AC_SUBST(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ++ + dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + arc4random \ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys +--- openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ ++ ++HOW TO START ++ ++1) configure LDAP server ++ * Use LDAP server documentation ++2) add appropriate LDAP schema ++ * For OpenLDAP or SunONE Use attached schema, otherwise you have to create it. ++ * LDAP user entry ++ User entry: ++ - attached to the 'ldapPublicKey' objectclass ++ - attached to the 'posixAccount' objectclass ++ - with a filled 'sshPublicKey' attribute ++3) insert users into LDAP ++ * Use LDAP Tree management tool as useful ++ * Entry in the LDAP server must respect 'posixAccount' and 'ldapPublicKey' which are defined in core.schema and the additionnal lpk.schema. ++ * Example: ++ dn: uid=captain,ou=commanders,dc=enterprise,dc=universe ++ objectclass: top ++ objectclass: person ++ objectclass: organizationalPerson ++ objectclass: posixAccount ++ objectclass: ldapPublicKey ++ description: Jonathan Archer ++ userPassword: Porthos ++ cn: onathan Archer ++ sn: onathan Archer ++ uid: captain ++ uidNumber: 1001 ++ gidNumber: 1001 ++ homeDirectory: /home/captain ++ sshPublicKey: ssh-rss AAAAB3.... =captain@universe ++ sshPublicKey: command="kill -9 1" ssh-rss AAAAM5... ++4) on the ssh side set in sshd_config ++ * Set up the backend ++ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-wrapper ++ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ++ * Do not forget to set ++ PubkeyAuthentication yes ++ * Swith off unnecessary auth methods ++5) confugure ldap.conf ++ * Default ldap.conf is placed in /etc/ssh ++ * The configuration style is the same as other ldap based aplications ++6) if necessary edit ssh-ldap-wrapper ++ * There is a possibility to change ldap.conf location ++ * There are some debug options ++ * Example ++ /usr/libexec/openssh -s -f /etc/ldap.conf -w -d >> /tmp/ldapdebuglog.txt ++ ++HOW TO MIGRATE FROM LPK ++ ++1) goto HOW TO START 4) .... the ldap schema is the same ++ ++2) convert the group requests to the appropriate LDAP requests ++ ++HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ++ ++1) use debug in sshd ++ * /usr/sbin/sshd -d -d -d -d ++2) use debug in ssh-ldap-helper ++ * ssh-ldap-helper -d -d -d -d -s ++3) use tcpdump ... other ldap client etc. ++ ++ADVANTAGES ++ ++1) Blocking an user account can be done directly from LDAP (if sshd is using PubkeyAuthentication + AuthorizedKeysCommand with ldap only). ++ ++DISADVANTAGES ++ ++1) LDAP must be well configured, getting the public key of some user is not a problem, but if anonymous LDAP ++ allows write to users dn, somebody could replace some user's public key by his own and impersonate some ++ of your users in all your server farm -- be VERY CAREFUL. ++2) With incomplete PKI the MITM attack when sshd is requesting the public key, could lead to a compromise of your servers allowing login ++ as the impersonated user. ++3) If LDAP server is down there may be no fallback on passwd auth. ++ ++MISC. ++ ++1) todo ++ * Possibility to reuse the ssh-ldap-helper. ++ * Tune the LDAP part to accept all possible LDAP configurations. ++ ++2) differences from original lpk ++ * No LDAP code in sshd. ++ * Support for various LDAP platforms and configurations. ++ * LDAP is configured in separate ldap.conf file. ++ ++3) docs/link ++ * http://pacsec.jp/core05/psj05-barisani-en.pdf ++ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/openssh-lpk/ ++ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/sshgate/ ++ * http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/openssh-lpk ++ * http://lam.sf.net/ ( http://lam.sourceforge.net/documentation/supportedSchemas.htm ) ++ ++4) contributors/ideas/greets ++ - Eric AUGE ++ - Andrea Barisani ++ - Falk Siemonsmeier. ++ - Jacob Rief. ++ - Michael Durchgraf. ++ - frederic peters. ++ - Finlay dobbie. ++ - Stefan Fisher. ++ - Robin H. Johnson. ++ - Adrian Bridgett. ++ ++5) Author ++ Jan F. Chadima ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ldapconf.h" ++#include "ldapmisc.h" ++#include "ldapbody.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++#define LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT "(&(objectclass=%s)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%s)%s)" ++#define PUBKEYATTR "sshPublicKey" ++#define LDAP_LOGFILE "%s/ldap.%d" ++ ++static FILE *logfile = NULL; ++static LDAP *ld; ++ ++static char *attrs[] = { ++ PUBKEYATTR, ++ NULL ++}; ++ ++void ++ldap_checkconfig (void) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE ++ if (options.host == NULL && options.uri == NULL) ++#else ++ if (options.host == NULL) ++#endif ++ fatal ("missing \"host\" in config file"); ++} ++ ++#if defined(LDAP_API_FEATURE_X_OPENLDAP) && (LDAP_API_VERSION > 2000) ++static int ++_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, LDAP_CONST char *url, int request, ber_int_t msgid) ++{ ++ struct timeval timeout; ++ int rc; ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ LDAPMessage *result; ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ ++ ++ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind to %s", options.binddn); ++ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ error ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#if !defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) || !defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ return ldap_simple_bind_s (ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw); ++#else ++ if (ldap_simple_bind(ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw) < 0) ++ fatal ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); ++ ++ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; ++ timeout.tv_usec = 0; ++ result = NULL; ++ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, FALSE, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { ++ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); ++ ldap_msgfree (result); ++ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; ++ } ++ debug3 ("LDAP rebind to %s succesfull", options.binddn); ++ return rc; ++#endif ++} ++#else ++ ++static int ++_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, char **whop, char **credp, int *methodp, int freeit) ++{ ++ if (freeit) ++ return LDAP_SUCCESS; ++ ++ *whop = strdup (options.binddn); ++ *credp = strdup (options.bindpw); ++ *methodp = LDAP_AUTH_SIMPLE; ++ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind for %s", *whop); ++ return LDAP_SUCCESS; ++} ++#endif ++ ++void ++ldap_do_connect(void) ++{ ++ int rc, msgid, ld_errno = 0; ++ struct timeval timeout; ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ int parserc; ++ LDAPMessage *result; ++ LDAPControl **controls; ++ int reconnect = 0; ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ ++ ++ debug ("LDAP do connect"); ++ ++retry: ++ if (reconnect) { ++ debug3 ("Reconnecting with ld_errno %d", ld_errno); ++ if (options.bind_policy == 0 || ++ (ld_errno != LDAP_SERVER_DOWN && ld_errno != LDAP_TIMEOUT) || ++ reconnect > 5) ++ fatal ("Cannot connect to LDAP server"); ++ ++ if (reconnect > 1) ++ sleep (reconnect - 1); ++ ++ if (ld != NULL) { ++ ldap_unbind (ld); ++ ld = NULL; ++ } ++ logit("reconnecting to LDAP server..."); ++ } ++ ++ if (ld == NULL) { ++ int rc; ++ struct timeval tv; ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION ++ if (options.debug > 0) { ++#ifdef LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE ++ if (options.logdir) { ++ char *logfilename; ++ int logfilenamelen; ++ ++ logfilenamelen = strlen (LDAP_LOGFILE) + strlen ("000000") + strlen (options.logdir); ++ logfilename = xmalloc (logfilenamelen); ++ snprintf (logfilename, logfilenamelen, LDAP_LOGFILE, options.logdir, (int) getpid ()); ++ logfilename[logfilenamelen - 1] = 0; ++ if ((logfile = fopen (logfilename, "a")) == NULL) ++ fatal ("cannot append to %s: %s", logfilename, strerror (errno)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP debug into %s", logfilename); ++ free (logfilename); ++ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE, logfile); ++ } ++#endif ++ if (options.debug) { ++#ifdef LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL ++ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); ++#endif /* LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ ++#ifdef LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL ++ (void) ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); ++#endif /* LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ ++ debug3 ("Set LDAP debug to %d", options.debug); ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION */ ++ ++ ld = NULL; ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT ++ if (options.host != NULL) { ++ if (options.ssl_on == SSL_LDAPS) { ++ if ((rc = ldapssl_client_init (options.sslpath, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldapssl_client_init %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAPssl client init"); ++ } ++ ++ if (options.ssl_on != SSL_OFF) { ++ if ((ld = ldapssl_init (options.host, options.port, TRUE)) == NULL) ++ fatal ("ldapssl_init failed"); ++ debug3 ("LDAPssl init"); ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT */ ++ ++ /* continue with opening */ ++ if (ld == NULL) { ++#if defined (HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S) || (defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS)) ++ /* Some global TLS-specific options need to be set before we create our ++ * session context, so we set them here. */ ++ ++#ifdef LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE ++ /* rand file */ ++ if (options.tls_randfile != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE, ++ options.tls_randfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS random file %s", options.tls_randfile); ++ } ++#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE */ ++ ++ /* ca cert file */ ++ if (options.tls_cacertfile != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, ++ options.tls_cacertfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ error ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert file %s ", options.tls_cacertfile); ++ } ++ ++ /* ca cert directory */ ++ if (options.tls_cacertdir != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR, ++ options.tls_cacertdir)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert dir %s ", options.tls_cacertdir); ++ } ++ ++ /* require cert? */ ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, ++ &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS check peer to %d ", options.tls_checkpeer); ++ ++ /* set cipher suite, certificate and private key: */ ++ if (options.tls_ciphers != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE, ++ options.tls_ciphers)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS ciphers to %s ", options.tls_ciphers); ++ } ++ ++ /* cert file */ ++ if (options.tls_cert != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE, ++ options.tls_cert)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS cert file %s ", options.tls_cert); ++ } ++ ++ /* key file */ ++ if (options.tls_key != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE, ++ options.tls_key)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS key file %s ", options.tls_key); ++ } ++#endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE ++ if (options.uri != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_initialize (&ld, options.uri)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_initialize %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP initialize %s", options.uri); ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INTITIALIZE */ ++ ++ /* continue with opening */ ++ if ((ld == NULL) && (options.host != NULL)) { ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INIT ++ if ((ld = ldap_init (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) ++ fatal ("ldap_init failed"); ++ debug3 ("LDAP init %s:%d", options.host, options.port); ++#else ++ if ((ld = ldap_open (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) ++ fatal ("ldap_open failed"); ++ debug3 ("LDAP open %s:%d", options.host, options.port); ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INIT */ ++ } ++ ++ if (ld == NULL) ++ fatal ("no way to open ldap"); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) ++ if (options.ssl == SSL_LDAPS) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS, &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_%d", options.tls_checkpeer); ++ } ++#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS */ ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ++ &options.ldap_version); ++#else ++ ld->ld_version = options.ldap_version; ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", options.ldap_version); ++ ++#if LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 3 ++ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc, NULL); ++#elif LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 2 ++ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc); ++#else ++#warning unknown LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set rebind proc"); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_DEREF) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_DEREF, &options.deref); ++#else ++ ld->ld_deref = options.deref; ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set deref to %d", options.deref); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT, ++ &options.timelimit); ++#else ++ ld->ld_timelimit = options.timelimit; ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set timelimit to %d", options.timelimit); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT) ++ /* ++ * This is a new option in the Netscape SDK which sets ++ * the TCP connect timeout. For want of a better value, ++ * we use the bind_timelimit to control this. ++ */ ++ timeout = options.bind_timelimit * 1000; ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, &timeout); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set opt connect timeout to %d", timeout); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT) ++ tv.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; ++ tv.tv_usec = 0; ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &tv); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set opt network timeout to %ld.0", tv.tv_sec); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, ++ options.referrals ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set referrals to %d", options.referrals); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_RESTART) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESTART, ++ options.restart ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set restart to %d", options.restart); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S ++ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { ++ int version; ++ ++ if (ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &version) ++ == LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ if (version < LDAP_VERSION3) { ++ version = LDAP_VERSION3; ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ++ &version); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", version); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP start TLS"); ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S */ ++ } ++ ++ if ((msgid = ldap_simple_bind (ld, options.binddn, ++ options.bindpw)) == -1) { ++ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); ++ ++ error ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); ++ reconnect++; ++ goto retry; ++ } ++ debug3 ("LDAP simple bind (%s)", options.binddn); ++ ++ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; ++ timeout.tv_usec = 0; ++ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, FALSE, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { ++ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); ++ ++ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); ++ reconnect++; ++ goto retry; ++ } ++ debug3 ("LDAP result in time"); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ controls = NULL; ++ if ((parserc = ldap_parse_result (ld, result, &rc, 0, 0, 0, &controls, TRUE)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_parse_result %s", ldap_err2string (parserc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP parse result OK"); ++ ++ if (controls != NULL) { ++ ldap_controls_free (controls); ++ } ++#else ++ rc = ldap_result2error (session->ld, result, TRUE); ++#endif ++ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("error trying to bind as user \"%s\" (%s)", ++ options.binddn, ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ ++ debug2 ("LDAP do connect OK"); ++} ++ ++void ++process_user (const char *user, FILE *output) ++{ ++ LDAPMessage *res, *e; ++ char *buffer; ++ int bufflen, rc, i; ++ struct timeval timeout; ++ ++ debug ("LDAP process user"); ++ ++ /* quick check for attempts to be evil */ ++ if ((strchr(user, '(') != NULL) || (strchr(user, ')') != NULL) || ++ (strchr(user, '*') != NULL) || (strchr(user, '\\') != NULL)) { ++ logit ("illegal user name %s not processed", user); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* build filter for LDAP request */ ++ bufflen = strlen (LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT) + strlen(options.account_class) + strlen (user); ++ if (options.ssh_filter != NULL) ++ bufflen += strlen (options.ssh_filter); ++ buffer = xmalloc (bufflen); ++ snprintf(buffer, bufflen, LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT, options.account_class, user, (options.ssh_filter != NULL) ? options.ssh_filter : NULL); ++ buffer[bufflen - 1] = 0; ++ ++ debug3 ("LDAP search scope = %d %s", options.scope, buffer); ++ ++ timeout.tv_sec = options.timelimit; ++ timeout.tv_usec = 0; ++ if ((rc = ldap_search_st(ld, options.base, options.scope, buffer, attrs, 0, &timeout, &res)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ error ("ldap_search_st(): %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ free (buffer); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* free */ ++ free (buffer); ++ ++ for (e = ldap_first_entry(ld, res); e != NULL; e = ldap_next_entry(ld, e)) { ++ int num; ++ struct berval **keys; ++ ++ keys = ldap_get_values_len(ld, e, PUBKEYATTR); ++ num = ldap_count_values_len(keys); ++ for (i = 0 ; i < num ; i++) { ++ char *cp; //, *options = NULL; ++ ++ for (cp = keys[i]->bv_val; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); ++ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') ++ continue; ++ ++ /* We have found the desired key. */ ++ fprintf (output, "%s\n", keys[i]->bv_val); ++ } ++ ++ ldap_value_free_len(keys); ++ } ++ ++ ldap_msgfree(res); ++ debug2 ("LDAP process user finished"); ++} ++ ++void ++ldap_do_close(void) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ ++ debug ("LDAP do close"); ++ if ((rc = ldap_unbind_ext(ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_unbind_ext: %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ ++ ld = NULL; ++ debug2 ("LDAP do close OK"); ++ return; ++} ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPBODY_H ++#define LDAPBODY_H ++ ++#include ++ ++void ldap_checkconfig(void); ++void ldap_do_connect(void); ++void process_user(const char *, FILE *); ++void ldap_do_close(void); ++ ++#endif /* LDAPBODY_H */ ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.c.ldap openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.c +--- openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.c.ldap 2013-06-07 15:10:05.601942693 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.c 2013-06-07 15:10:24.928857566 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,691 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "ldap-helper.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ldapconf.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* Keyword tokens. */ ++ ++typedef enum { ++ lBadOption, ++ lHost, lURI, lBase, lBindDN, lBindPW, lRootBindDN, ++ lScope, lDeref, lPort, lTimeLimit, lBind_TimeLimit, ++ lLdap_Version, lBind_Policy, lSSLPath, lSSL, lReferrals, ++ lRestart, lTLS_CheckPeer, lTLS_CaCertFile, ++ lTLS_CaCertDir, lTLS_Ciphers, lTLS_Cert, lTLS_Key, ++ lTLS_RandFile, lLogDir, lDebug, lSSH_Filter, ++ lAccountClass, lDeprecated, lUnsupported ++} OpCodes; ++ ++/* Textual representations of the tokens. */ ++ ++static struct { ++ const char *name; ++ OpCodes opcode; ++} keywords[] = { ++ { "URI", lURI }, ++ { "Base", lBase }, ++ { "BindDN", lBindDN }, ++ { "BindPW", lBindPW }, ++ { "RootBindDN", lRootBindDN }, ++ { "Host", lHost }, ++ { "Port", lPort }, ++ { "Scope", lScope }, ++ { "Deref", lDeref }, ++ { "TimeLimit", lTimeLimit }, ++ { "TimeOut", lTimeLimit }, ++ { "Bind_Timelimit", lBind_TimeLimit }, ++ { "Network_TimeOut", lBind_TimeLimit }, ++/* ++ * Todo ++ * SIZELIMIT ++ */ ++ { "Ldap_Version", lLdap_Version }, ++ { "Version", lLdap_Version }, ++ { "Bind_Policy", lBind_Policy }, ++ { "SSLPath", lSSLPath }, ++ { "SSL", lSSL }, ++ { "Referrals", lReferrals }, ++ { "Restart", lRestart }, ++ { "TLS_CheckPeer", lTLS_CheckPeer }, ++ { "TLS_ReqCert", lTLS_CheckPeer }, ++ { "TLS_CaCertFile", lTLS_CaCertFile }, ++ { "TLS_CaCert", lTLS_CaCertFile }, ++ { "TLS_CaCertDir", lTLS_CaCertDir }, ++ { "TLS_Ciphers", lTLS_Ciphers }, ++ { "TLS_Cipher_Suite", lTLS_Ciphers }, ++ { "TLS_Cert", lTLS_Cert }, ++ { "TLS_Certificate", lTLS_Cert }, ++ { "TLS_Key", lTLS_Key }, ++ { "TLS_RandFile", lTLS_RandFile }, ++/* ++ * Todo ++ * TLS_CRLCHECK ++ * TLS_CRLFILE ++ */ ++ { "LogDir", lLogDir }, ++ { "Debug", lDebug }, ++ { "SSH_Filter", lSSH_Filter }, ++ { "AccountClass", lAccountClass }, ++ { NULL, lBadOption } ++}; ++ ++/* Configuration ptions. */ ++ ++Options options; ++ ++/* ++ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. ++ */ ++ ++static OpCodes ++parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) ++ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) ++ return keywords[i].opcode; ++ ++ if (config_warning_config_file) ++ logit("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", ++ filename, linenum, cp); ++ return lBadOption; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This ++ * only sets those values that have not already been set. ++ */ ++#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" ++ ++static int ++process_config_line(char *line, const char *filename, int linenum) ++{ ++ char *s, **charptr, **xstringptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg; ++ char *rootbinddn = NULL; ++ int opcode, *intptr, value; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ ++ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { ++ if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) ++ break; ++ line[len] = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ s = line; ++ /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ ++ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ ++ if (*keyword == '\0') ++ keyword = strdelim(&s); ++ if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') ++ return 0; ++ ++ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum); ++ ++ switch (opcode) { ++ case lBadOption: ++ /* don't panic, but count bad options */ ++ return -1; ++ /* NOTREACHED */ ++ ++ case lHost: ++ xstringptr = &options.host; ++parse_xstring: ++ if (!s || *s == '\0') ++ fatal("%s line %d: missing dn",filename,linenum); ++ if (*xstringptr == NULL) ++ *xstringptr = xstrdup(s); ++ return 0; ++ ++ case lURI: ++ xstringptr = &options.uri; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lBase: ++ xstringptr = &options.base; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lBindDN: ++ xstringptr = &options.binddn; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lBindPW: ++ charptr = &options.bindpw; ++parse_string: ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*charptr == NULL) ++ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ ++ case lRootBindDN: ++ xstringptr = &rootbinddn; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lScope: ++ intptr = &options.scope; ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp (arg, "sub") == 0 || strcasecmp (arg, "subtree") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; ++ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "one") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; ++ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "base") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lDeref: ++ intptr = &options.scope; ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (!strcasecmp (arg, "never")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "searching")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "finding")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_FINDING; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "always")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lPort: ++ intptr = &options.port; ++parse_int: ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); ++ ++ /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ ++ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); ++ if (arg == endofnumber) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lTimeLimit: ++ intptr = &options.timelimit; ++parse_time: ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) ++ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lBind_TimeLimit: ++ intptr = &options.bind_timelimit; ++ goto parse_time; ++ ++ case lLdap_Version: ++ intptr = &options.ldap_version; ++ goto parse_int; ++ ++ case lBind_Policy: ++ intptr = &options.bind_policy; ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_open") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_init") == 0) ++ value = 1; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "soft") == 0) ++ value = 0; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ break; ++ ++ case lSSLPath: ++ charptr = &options.sslpath; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lSSL: ++ intptr = &options.ssl; ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) ++ value = SSL_LDAPS; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) ++ value = SSL_OFF; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "start_tls")) ++ value = SSL_START_TLS; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lReferrals: ++ intptr = &options.referrals; ++parse_flag: ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) ++ value = 1; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) ++ value = 0; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lRestart: ++ intptr = &options.restart; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case lTLS_CheckPeer: ++ intptr = &options.tls_checkpeer; ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "never") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "demand") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "allow") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "try") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ break; ++ ++ case lTLS_CaCertFile: ++ charptr = &options.tls_cacertfile; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_CaCertDir: ++ charptr = &options.tls_cacertdir; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_Ciphers: ++ xstringptr = &options.tls_ciphers; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lTLS_Cert: ++ charptr = &options.tls_cert; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_Key: ++ charptr = &options.tls_key; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_RandFile: ++ charptr = &options.tls_randfile; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lLogDir: ++ charptr = &options.logdir; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lDebug: ++ intptr = &options.debug; ++ goto parse_int; ++ ++ case lSSH_Filter: ++ xstringptr = &options.ssh_filter; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lAccountClass: ++ charptr = &options.account_class; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lDeprecated: ++ debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", ++ filename, linenum, keyword); ++ return 0; ++ ++ case lUnsupported: ++ error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", ++ filename, linenum, keyword); ++ return 0; ++ ++ default: ++ fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode); ++ } ++ ++ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ ++ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", ++ filename, linenum, arg); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options ++ * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if ++ * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. ++ */ ++ ++void ++read_config_file(const char *filename) ++{ ++ FILE *f; ++ char line[1024]; ++ int active, linenum; ++ int bad_options = 0; ++ struct stat sb; ++ ++ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) ++ fatal("fopen %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ++ ++ if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) ++ fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ++ if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || ++ (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) ++ fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); ++ ++ debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); ++ ++ /* ++ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned ++ * on/off by Host specifications. ++ */ ++ active = 1; ++ linenum = 0; ++ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { ++ /* Update line number counter. */ ++ linenum++; ++ if (process_config_line(line, filename, linenum) != 0) ++ bad_options++; ++ } ++ fclose(f); ++ if ((bad_options > 0) && config_exclusive_config_file) ++ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", ++ filename, bad_options); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet ++ * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options ++ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, ++ * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. ++ */ ++ ++void ++initialize_options(void) ++{ ++ memset(&options, 'X', sizeof(options)); ++ options.host = NULL; ++ options.uri = NULL; ++ options.base = NULL; ++ options.binddn = NULL; ++ options.bindpw = NULL; ++ options.scope = -1; ++ options.deref = -1; ++ options.port = -1; ++ options.timelimit = -1; ++ options.bind_timelimit = -1; ++ options.ldap_version = -1; ++ options.bind_policy = -1; ++ options.sslpath = NULL; ++ options.ssl = -1; ++ options.referrals = -1; ++ options.restart = -1; ++ options.tls_checkpeer = -1; ++ options.tls_cacertfile = NULL; ++ options.tls_cacertdir = NULL; ++ options.tls_ciphers = NULL; ++ options.tls_cert = NULL; ++ options.tls_key = NULL; ++ options.tls_randfile = NULL; ++ options.logdir = NULL; ++ options.debug = -1; ++ options.ssh_filter = NULL; ++ options.account_class = NULL; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those ++ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. ++ */ ++ ++void ++fill_default_options(void) ++{ ++ if (options.uri != NULL) { ++ LDAPURLDesc *ludp; ++ ++ if (ldap_url_parse(options.uri, &ludp) == LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ if (options.ssl == -1) { ++ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap") == 0) ++ options.ssl = 2; ++ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldapi") == 0) ++ options.ssl = 0; ++ else if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldaps") == 0) ++ options.ssl = 1; ++ } ++ if (options.host == NULL) ++ options.host = xstrdup (ludp->lud_host); ++ if (options.port == -1) ++ options.port = ludp->lud_port; ++ ++ ldap_free_urldesc (ludp); ++ } ++ } ++ if (options.ssl == -1) ++ options.ssl = SSL_START_TLS; ++ if (options.port == -1) ++ options.port = (options.ssl == 0) ? 389 : 636; ++ if (options.uri == NULL) { ++ int len; ++#define MAXURILEN 4096 ++ ++ options.uri = xmalloc (MAXURILEN); ++ len = snprintf (options.uri, MAXURILEN, "ldap%s://%s:%d", ++ (options.ssl == 0) ? "" : "s", options.host, options.port); ++ options.uri[MAXURILEN - 1] = 0; ++ options.uri = xrealloc (options.uri, len + 1, 1); ++ } ++ if (options.binddn == NULL) ++ options.binddn = ""; ++ if (options.bindpw == NULL) ++ options.bindpw = ""; ++ if (options.scope == -1) ++ options.scope = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; ++ if (options.deref == -1) ++ options.deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; ++ if (options.timelimit == -1) ++ options.timelimit = 10; ++ if (options.bind_timelimit == -1) ++ options.bind_timelimit = 10; ++ if (options.ldap_version == -1) ++ options.ldap_version = 3; ++ if (options.bind_policy == -1) ++ options.bind_policy = 1; ++ if (options.referrals == -1) ++ options.referrals = 1; ++ if (options.restart == -1) ++ options.restart = 1; ++ if (options.tls_checkpeer == -1) ++ options.tls_checkpeer = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; ++ if (options.debug == -1) ++ options.debug = 0; ++ if (options.ssh_filter == NULL) ++ options.ssh_filter = ""; ++ if (options.account_class == NULL) ++ options.account_class = "posixAccount"; ++} ++ ++static const char * ++lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) ++ if (keywords[i].opcode == code) ++ return(keywords[i].name); ++ return "UNKNOWN"; ++} ++ ++static void ++dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) ++{ ++ if (val == NULL) ++ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); ++ else ++ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); ++} ++ ++static void ++dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) ++{ ++ if (val == -1) ++ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); ++ else ++ debug3("%s %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); ++} ++ ++struct names { ++ int value; ++ char *name; ++}; ++ ++static void ++dump_cfg_namedint(OpCodes code, int val, struct names *names) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ if (val == -1) ++ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); ++ else { ++ for (i = 0; names[i].value != -1; i++) ++ if (names[i].value == val) { ++ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), names[i].name); ++ return; ++ } ++ debug3("%s unknown: %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); ++ } ++} ++ ++static struct names _yesnotls[] = { ++ { 0, "No" }, ++ { 1, "Yes" }, ++ { 2, "Start_TLS" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _scope[] = { ++ { LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "Base" }, ++ { LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "One" }, ++ { LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE, "Sub"}, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _deref[] = { ++ { LDAP_DEREF_NEVER, "Never" }, ++ { LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING, "Searching" }, ++ { LDAP_DEREF_FINDING, "Finding" }, ++ { LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS, "Always" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _yesno[] = { ++ { 0, "No" }, ++ { 1, "Yes" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _bindpolicy[] = { ++ { 0, "Soft" }, ++ { 1, "Hard" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _checkpeer[] = { ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER, "Never" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD, "Hard" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND, "Demand" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW, "Allow" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY, "TRY" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++void ++dump_config(void) ++{ ++ dump_cfg_string(lURI, options.uri); ++ dump_cfg_string(lHost, options.host); ++ dump_cfg_int(lPort, options.port); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lSSL, options.ssl, _yesnotls); ++ dump_cfg_int(lLdap_Version, options.ldap_version); ++ dump_cfg_int(lTimeLimit, options.timelimit); ++ dump_cfg_int(lBind_TimeLimit, options.bind_timelimit); ++ dump_cfg_string(lBase, options.base); ++ dump_cfg_string(lBindDN, options.binddn); ++ dump_cfg_string(lBindPW, options.bindpw); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lScope, options.scope, _scope); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lDeref, options.deref, _deref); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lReferrals, options.referrals, _yesno); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lRestart, options.restart, _yesno); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lBind_Policy, options.bind_policy, _bindpolicy); ++ dump_cfg_string(lSSLPath, options.sslpath); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lTLS_CheckPeer, options.tls_checkpeer, _checkpeer); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertFile, options.tls_cacertfile); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertDir, options.tls_cacertdir); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Ciphers, options.tls_ciphers); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Cert, options.tls_cert); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Key, options.tls_key); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_RandFile, options.tls_randfile); ++ dump_cfg_string(lLogDir, options.logdir); ++ dump_cfg_int(lDebug, options.debug); ++ dump_cfg_string(lSSH_Filter, options.ssh_filter); ++ dump_cfg_string(lAccountClass, options.logdir); ++} ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h.ldap openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h +--- openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h.ldap 2013-06-07 15:10:05.602942689 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h 2013-06-07 15:10:24.928857566 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPCONF_H ++#define LDAPCONF_H ++ ++#define SSL_OFF 0 ++#define SSL_LDAPS 1 ++#define SSL_START_TLS 2 ++ ++/* Data structure for representing option data. */ ++ ++typedef struct { ++ char *host; ++ char *uri; ++ char *base; ++ char *binddn; ++ char *bindpw; ++ int scope; ++ int deref; ++ int port; ++ int timelimit; ++ int bind_timelimit; ++ int ldap_version; ++ int bind_policy; ++ char *sslpath; ++ int ssl; ++ int referrals; ++ int restart; ++ int tls_checkpeer; ++ char *tls_cacertfile; ++ char *tls_cacertdir; ++ char *tls_ciphers; ++ char *tls_cert; ++ char *tls_key; ++ char *tls_randfile; ++ char *logdir; ++ int debug; ++ char *ssh_filter; ++ char *account_class; ++} Options; ++ ++extern Options options; ++ ++void read_config_file(const char *); ++void initialize_options(void); ++void fill_default_options(void); ++void dump_config(void); ++ ++#endif /* LDAPCONF_H */ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.891248091 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf 2013-03-25 21:27:15.891248091 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ ++# $Id: openssh-5.5p1-ldap.patch,v 1.3 2010/07/07 13:48:36 jfch2222 Exp $ ++# ++# This is the example configuration file for the OpenSSH ++# LDAP backend ++# ++# see ssh-ldap.conf(5) ++# ++ ++# URI with your LDAP server name. This allows to use ++# Unix Domain Sockets to connect to a local LDAP Server. ++#uri ldap://127.0.0.1/ ++#uri ldaps://127.0.0.1/ ++#uri ldapi://%2fvar%2frun%2fldapi_sock/ ++# Note: %2f encodes the '/' used as directory separator ++ ++# Another way to specify your LDAP server is to provide an ++# host name and the port of our LDAP server. Host name ++# must be resolvable without using LDAP. ++# Multiple hosts may be specified, each separated by a ++# space. How long nss_ldap takes to failover depends on ++# whether your LDAP client library supports configurable ++# network or connect timeouts (see bind_timelimit). ++#host 127.0.0.1 ++ ++# The port. ++# Optional: default is 389. ++#port 389 ++ ++# The distinguished name to bind to the server with. ++# Optional: default is to bind anonymously. ++#binddn cn=openssh_keys,dc=example,dc=org ++ ++# The credentials to bind with. ++# Optional: default is no credential. ++#bindpw TopSecret ++ ++# The distinguished name of the search base. ++#base dc=example,dc=org ++ ++# The LDAP version to use (defaults to 3 ++# if supported by client library) ++#ldap_version 3 ++ ++# The search scope. ++#scope sub ++#scope one ++#scope base ++ ++# Search timelimit ++#timelimit 30 ++ ++# Bind/connect timelimit ++#bind_timelimit 30 ++ ++# Reconnect policy: hard (default) will retry connecting to ++# the software with exponential backoff, soft will fail ++# immediately. ++#bind_policy hard ++ ++# SSL setup, may be implied by URI also. ++#ssl no ++#ssl on ++#ssl start_tls ++ ++# OpenLDAP SSL options ++# Require and verify server certificate (yes/no) ++# Default is to use libldap's default behavior, which can be configured in ++# /etc/openldap/ldap.conf using the TLS_REQCERT setting. The default for ++# OpenLDAP 2.0 and earlier is "no", for 2.1 and later is "yes". ++#tls_checkpeer hard ++ ++# CA certificates for server certificate verification ++# At least one of these are required if tls_checkpeer is "yes" ++#tls_cacertfile /etc/ssl/ca.cert ++#tls_cacertdir /etc/pki/tls/certs ++ ++# Seed the PRNG if /dev/urandom is not provided ++#tls_randfile /var/run/egd-pool ++ ++# SSL cipher suite ++# See man ciphers for syntax ++#tls_ciphers TLSv1 ++ ++# Client certificate and key ++# Use these, if your server requires client authentication. ++#tls_cert ++#tls_key ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pka-ldap.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ldapconf.h" ++#include "ldapbody.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++static int config_debug = 0; ++int config_exclusive_config_file = 0; ++static char *config_file_name = "/etc/ssh/ldap.conf"; ++static char *config_single_user = NULL; ++static int config_verbose = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; ++int config_warning_config_file = 0; ++extern char *__progname; ++ ++static void ++usage(void) ++{ ++ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", ++ __progname); ++ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -d Output the log messages to stderr.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -e Check the config file for unknown commands.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Use alternate config file (default is /etc/ssh/ldap.conf).\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -s user Do not demonize, send the user's key to stdout.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -v Increase verbosity of the debug output (implies -d).\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -w Warn on unknown commands in the config file.\n"); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Main program for the ssh pka ldap agent. ++ */ ++ ++int ++main(int ac, char **av) ++{ ++ int opt; ++ FILE *outfile = NULL; ++ ++ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); ++ ++ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); ++ ++ /* ++ * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been ++ * set. ++ */ ++ initialize_options(); ++ ++ /* Parse command-line arguments. */ ++ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "def:s:vw")) != -1) { ++ switch (opt) { ++ case 'd': ++ config_debug = 1; ++ break; ++ ++ case 'e': ++ config_exclusive_config_file = 1; ++ config_warning_config_file = 1; ++ break; ++ ++ case 'f': ++ config_file_name = optarg; ++ break; ++ ++ case 's': ++ config_single_user = optarg; ++ outfile = fdopen (dup (fileno (stdout)), "w"); ++ break; ++ ++ case 'v': ++ config_debug = 1; ++ if (config_verbose < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) ++ config_verbose++; ++ break; ++ ++ case 'w': ++ config_warning_config_file = 1; ++ break; ++ ++ case '?': ++ default: ++ usage(); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Initialize loging */ ++ log_init(__progname, config_verbose, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, config_debug); ++ ++ if (ac != optind) ++ fatal ("illegal extra parameter %s", av[1]); ++ ++ /* Ensure that fds 0 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ ++ if (config_debug == 0) ++ sanitise_stdfd(); ++ ++ /* Read config file */ ++ read_config_file(config_file_name); ++ fill_default_options(); ++ if (config_verbose == SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { ++ debug3 ("=== Configuration ==="); ++ dump_config(); ++ debug3 ("=== *** ==="); ++ } ++ ++ ldap_checkconfig(); ++ ldap_do_connect(); ++ ++ if (config_single_user) { ++ process_user (config_single_user, outfile); ++ } else { ++ usage(); ++ fatal ("Not yet implemented"); ++/* TODO ++ * open unix socket a run the loop on it ++ */ ++ } ++ ++ ldap_do_close(); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* Ugly hack */ ++void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *b, u_int *l) { return NULL; } ++void buffer_put_string(Buffer *b, const void *f, u_int l) {} ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldap-helper.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAP_HELPER_H ++#define LDAP_HELPER_H ++ ++extern int config_exclusive_config_file; ++extern int config_warning_config_file; ++ ++#endif /* LDAP_HELPER_H */ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPINCLUDES_H ++#define LDAPINCLUDES_H ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LBER_H ++#include ++#endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_H ++#include ++#endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SSL_H ++#include ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* LDAPINCLUDES_H */ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "ldapmisc.h" ++ ++#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_GET_LDERRNO ++int ++ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP * ld, char **m, char **s) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION ++ int rc; ++#endif ++ int lderrno; ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) ++ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ lderrno = ld->ld_errno; ++#endif ++ ++ if (s != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) ++ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ *s = ld->ld_error; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ if (m != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) ++ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ *m = ld->ld_matched; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return lderrno; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_SET_LDERRNO ++int ++ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP * ld, int lderrno, const char *m, const char *s) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION ++ int rc; ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ ld->ld_errno = lderrno; ++#endif ++ ++ if (s != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ ld->ld_error = s; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ if (m != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ ld->ld_matched = m; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return LDAP_SUCCESS; ++} ++#endif ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h +--- openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPMISC_H ++#define LDAPMISC_H ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++ ++int ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP *, char **, char **); ++int ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP *, int, const char *, const char *); ++ ++#endif /* LDAPMISC_H */ ++ +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ldap openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.850247822 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 21:27:57.356518817 +0100 +@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh + ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass + SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign ++SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper ++SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +@@ -60,8 +62,9 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ + LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ + EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + MANFMT=@MANFMT@ ++INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) + + LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ +@@ -95,8 +98,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw + sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ + sandbox-seccomp-filter.o + +-MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out +-MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 ++MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-ldap-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out ssh-ldap.conf.5.out ++MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-ldap-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 ssh-ldap.conf.5 + MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ + + CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out +@@ -164,6 +167,9 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss + ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + ++ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +@@ -266,6 +272,10 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ ++ fi + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 +@@ -282,6 +292,10 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ++ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \ ++ fi + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 +@@ -311,6 +325,13 @@ install-sysconf: + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi ++ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ ++ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf ]; then \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ldap.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf; \ ++ else \ ++ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ ++ fi ; \ ++ fi + + host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ +@@ -368,6 +389,8 @@ uninstall: + -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 +@@ -379,6 +402,7 @@ uninstall: + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ++ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 + + regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema +--- openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ ++# ++# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey ++# useful with PKA-LDAP also ++# ++# Author: Eric AUGE ++# ++# Based on the proposal of : Mark Ruijter ++# ++ ++ ++# octetString SYNTAX ++attributetype ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' ++ EQUALITY octetStringMatch ++ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) ++ ++# printableString SYNTAX yes|no ++objectclass ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' ++ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) ++ ) +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema +--- openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ ++# ++# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey ++# useful with PKA-LDAP also ++# ++# Author: Eric AUGE ++# ++# Schema for Sun Directory Server. ++# Based on the original schema, modified by Stefan Fischer. ++# ++ ++dn: cn=schema ++ ++# octetString SYNTAX ++attributeTypes: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' ++ EQUALITY octetStringMatch ++ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) ++ ++# printableString SYNTAX yes|no ++objectClasses: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' ++ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) ++ ) +diff -up openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5 +--- openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap 2013-06-07 15:10:05.604942680 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5 2013-06-07 15:10:24.928857566 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ ++.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap.conf.5,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ ++.\" ++.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++.\" ++.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++.\" ++.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++.\" ++.Dd $Mdocdate: may 12 2010 $ ++.Dt SSH-LDAP.CONF 5 ++.Os ++.Sh NAME ++.Nm ssh-ldap.conf ++.Nd configuration file for ssh-ldap-helper ++.Sh SYNOPSIS ++.Nm /etc/ssh/ldap.conf ++.Sh DESCRIPTION ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++reads configuration data from ++.Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf ++(or the file specified with ++.Fl f ++on the command line). ++The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. ++Lines starting with ++.Ql # ++and empty lines are interpreted as comments. ++.Pp ++The value starts with the first non-blank character after ++the keyword's name, and terminates at the end of the line, ++or at the last sequence of blanks before the end of the line. ++Quoting values that contain blanks ++may be incorrect, as the quotes would become part of the value. ++The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that ++keywords are case-insensitive, and arguments, on a case by case basis, may be case-sensitive). ++.Bl -tag -width Ds ++.It Cm URI ++The argument(s) are in the form ++.Pa ldap[si]://[name[:port]] ++and specify the URI(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++should connect. The URI scheme may be any of ++.Dq ldap , ++.Dq ldaps ++or ++.Dq ldapi , ++which refer to LDAP over TCP, LDAP over SSL (TLS) and LDAP ++over IPC (UNIX domain sockets), respectively. ++Each server's name can be specified as a ++domain-style name or an IP address literal. Optionally, the ++server's name can followed by a ':' and the port number the LDAP ++server is listening on. If no port number is provided, the default ++port for the scheme is used (389 for ldap://, 636 for ldaps://). ++For LDAP over IPC, name is the name of the socket, and no port ++is required, nor allowed; note that directory separators must be ++URL-encoded, like any other characters that are special to URLs; ++A space separated list of URIs may be provided. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm Base ++Specifies the default base Distinguished Name (DN) to use when performing ldap operations. ++The base must be specified as a DN in LDAP format. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm BindDN ++Specifies the default BIND DN to use when connecting to the ldap server. ++The bind DN must be specified as a Distinguished Name in LDAP format. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm BindPW ++Specifies the default password to use when connecting to the ldap server via ++.Cm BindDN . ++There is no default. ++.It Cm RootBindDN ++Intentionaly does nothing. Recognized for compatibility reasons. ++.It Cm Host ++The argument(s) specifies the name(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++should connect. Each server's name can be specified as a ++domain-style name or an IP address and optionally followed by a ':' and ++the port number the ldap server is listening on. A space-separated ++list of hosts may be provided. ++There is no default. ++.Cm Host ++is deprecated in favor of ++.Cm URI . ++.It Cm Port ++Specifies the default port used when connecting to LDAP servers(s). ++The port may be specified as a number. ++The default port is 389 for ldap:// or 636 for ldaps:// respectively. ++.Cm Port ++is deprecated in favor of ++.Cm URI . ++.It Cm Scope ++Specifies the starting point of an LDAP search and the depth from the base DN to which the search should descend. ++There are three options (values) that can be assigned to the ++.Cm Scope parameter: ++.Dq base , ++.Dq one ++and ++.Dq subtree . ++Alias for the subtree is ++.Dq sub . ++The value ++.Dq base ++is used to indicate searching only the entry at the base DN, resulting in only that entry being returned (keeping in mind that it also has to meet the search filter criteria!). ++The value ++.Dq one ++is used to indicate searching all entries one level under the base DN, but not including the base DN and not including any entries under that one level under the base DN. ++The value ++.Dq subtree ++is used to indicate searching of all entries at all levels under and including the specified base DN. ++The default is ++.Dq subtree . ++.It Cm Deref ++Specifies how alias dereferencing is done when performing a search. There are four ++possible values that can be assigned to the ++.Cm Deref ++parameter: ++.Dq never , ++.Dq searching , ++.Dq finding , ++and ++.Dq always . ++The value ++.Dq never ++means that the aliases are never dereferenced. ++The value ++.Dq searching ++means that the aliases are dereferenced in subordinates of the base object, but ++not in locating the base object of the search. ++The value ++.Dq finding ++means that the aliases are only dereferenced when locating the base object of the search. ++The value ++.Dq always ++means that the aliases are dereferenced both in searching and in locating the base object ++of the search. ++The default is ++.Dq never . ++.It Cm TimeLimit ++Specifies a time limit (in seconds) to use when performing searches. ++The number should be a non-negative integer. A ++.Cm TimeLimit ++of zero (0) specifies that the search time is unlimited. Please note that the server ++may still apply any server-side limit on the duration of a search operation. ++The default value is 10. ++.It Cm TimeOut ++Is an aliast to ++.Cm TimeLimit . ++.It Cm Bind_TimeLimit ++Specifies the timeout (in seconds) after which the poll(2)/select(2) ++following a connect(2) returns in case of no activity. ++The default value is 10. ++.It Cm Network_TimeOut ++Is an alias to ++.Cm Bind_TimeLimit . ++.It Cm Ldap_Version ++Specifies what version of the LDAP protocol should be used. ++The allowed values are 2 or 3. The default is 3. ++.It Cm Version ++Is an alias to ++.Cm Ldap_Version . ++.It Cm Bind_Policy ++Specifies the policy to use for reconnecting to an unavailable LDAP server. There are 2 available values: ++.Dq hard ++and ++.Dq soft. ++.Dq hard has 2 aliases ++.Dq hard_open ++and ++.Dq hard_init . ++The value ++.Dq hard ++means that reconects that the ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++tries to reconnect to the LDAP server 5 times before failure. There is exponential backoff before retrying. ++The value ++.Dq soft ++means that ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++fails immediately when it cannot connect to the LDAP seerver. ++The deault is ++.Dq hard . ++.It Cm SSLPath ++Specifies the path to the X.509 certificate database. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm SSL ++Specifies whether to use SSL/TLS or not. ++There are three allowed values: ++.Dq yes , ++.Dq no ++and ++.Dq start_tls ++Both ++.Dq true ++and ++.Dq on ++are the aliases for ++.Dq yes . ++.Dq false ++and ++.Dq off ++are the aliases for ++.Dq no . ++If ++.Dq start_tls ++is specified then StartTLS is used rather than raw LDAP over SSL. ++The default for ldap:// is ++.Dq start_tls , ++for ldaps:// ++.Dq yes ++and ++.Dq no ++for the ldapi:// . ++In case of host based configuration the default is ++.Dq start_tls . ++.It Cm Referrals ++Specifies if the client should automatically follow referrals returned ++by LDAP servers. ++The value can be or ++.Dq yes ++or ++.Dq no . ++.Dq true ++and ++.Dq on ++are the aliases for ++.Dq yes . ++.Dq false ++and ++.Dq off ++are the aliases for ++.Dq no . ++The default is yes. ++.It Cm Restart ++Specifies whether the LDAP client library should restart the select(2) system call when interrupted. ++The value can be or ++.Dq yes ++or ++.Dq no . ++.Dq true ++and ++.Dq on ++are the aliases for ++.Dq yes . ++.Dq false ++and ++.Dq off ++are the aliases for ++.Dq no . ++The default is yes. ++.It Cm TLS_CheckPeer ++Specifies what checks to perform on server certificates in a TLS session, ++if any. The value ++can be specified as one of the following keywords: ++.Dq never , ++.Dq hard , ++.Dq demand , ++.Dq allow ++and ++.Dq try . ++.Dq true , ++.Dq on ++and ++.Dq yes ++are aliases for ++.Dq hard . ++.Dq false , ++.Dq off ++and ++.Dq no ++are the aliases for ++.Dq never . ++The value ++.Dq never ++means that the client will not request or check any server certificate. ++The value ++.Dq allow ++means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, ++the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, it will ++be ignored and the session proceeds normally. ++The value ++.Dq try ++means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, ++the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, ++the session is immediately terminated. ++The value ++.Dq demand ++means that the server certificate is requested. If no ++certificate is provided, or a bad certificate is provided, the session ++is immediately terminated. ++The value ++.Dq hard ++is the same as ++.Dq demand . ++It requires an SSL connection. In the case of the plain conection the ++session is immediately terminated. ++The default is ++.Dq hard . ++.It Cm TLS_ReqCert ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_CheckPeer . ++.It Cm TLS_CACertFile ++Specifies the file that contains certificates for all of the Certificate ++Authorities the client will recognize. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_CACert ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_CACertFile . ++.It Cm TLS_CACertDIR ++Specifies the path of a directory that contains Certificate Authority ++certificates in separate individual files. The ++.Cm TLS_CACert ++is always used before ++.Cm TLS_CACertDir . ++The specified directory must be managed with the OpenSSL c_rehash utility. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_Ciphers ++Specifies acceptable cipher suite and preference order. ++The value should be a cipher specification for OpenSSL, ++e.g., ++.Dq HIGH:MEDIUM:+SSLv2 . ++The default is ++.Dq ALL . ++.It Cm TLS_Cipher_Suite ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_Ciphers . ++.It Cm TLS_Cert ++Specifies the file that contains the client certificate. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_Certificate ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_Cert . ++.It Cm TLS_Key ++Specifies the file that contains the private key that matches the certificate ++stored in the ++.Cm TLS_Cert ++file. Currently, the private key must not be protected with a password, so ++it is of critical importance that the key file is protected carefully. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_RandFile ++Specifies the file to obtain random bits from when /dev/[u]random is ++not available. Generally set to the name of the EGD/PRNGD socket. ++The environment variable RANDFILE can also be used to specify the filename. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm LogDir ++Specifies the directory used for logging by the LDAP client library. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm Debug ++Specifies the debug level used for logging by the LDAP client library. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm SSH_Filter ++Specifies the user filter applied on the LDAP serch. ++The default is no filter. ++.It Cm AccountClass ++Specifies the LDAP class used to find user accounts. ++The default is posixAccount. ++.El ++.Sh FILES ++.Bl -tag -width Ds ++.It Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf ++Ldap configuration file for ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 . ++.El ++.Sh "SEE ALSO" ++.Xr ldap.conf 5 , ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++.Sh HISTORY ++.Nm ++first appeared in ++OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . ++.Sh AUTHORS ++.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.895248117 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 2013-03-25 21:27:15.895248117 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ ++.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap-helper.8,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ ++.\" ++.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++.\" ++.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++.\" ++.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++.\" ++.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2010 $ ++.Dt SSH-LDAP-HELPER 8 ++.Os ++.Sh NAME ++.Nm ssh-ldap-helper ++.Nd sshd helper program for ldap support ++.Sh SYNOPSIS ++.Nm ssh-ldap-helper ++.Op Fl devw ++.Op Fl f Ar file ++.Op Fl s Ar user ++.Sh DESCRIPTION ++.Nm ++is used by ++.Xr sshd 1 ++to access keys provided by an LDAP. ++.Nm ++is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the ++sshd configuration file ++.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config ++by setting ++.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ++to ++.Dq /usr/libexec/ssh-ldap-wrapper . ++.Pp ++.Nm ++is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ++.Xr sshd 8 via ++.Xr ssh-ldap-wrapper . ++.Pp ++The options are as follows: ++.Bl -tag -width Ds ++.It Fl d ++Set the debug mode; ++.Nm ++prints all logs to stderr instead of syslog. ++.It Fl e ++Implies \-w; ++.Nm ++halts if it encounters an unknown item in the ldap.conf file. ++.It Fl f ++.Nm ++uses this file as the ldap configuration file instead of /etc/ssh/ldap.conf (default). ++.It Fl s ++.Nm ++prints out the user's keys to stdout and exits. ++.It Fl v ++Implies \-d; ++increases verbosity. ++.It Fl w ++.Nm ++writes warnings about unknown items in the ldap.conf configuration file. ++.El ++.Sh SEE ALSO ++.Xr sshd 8 , ++.Xr sshd_config 5 , ++.Xr ssh-ldap.conf 5 , ++.Sh HISTORY ++.Nm ++first appeared in ++OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . ++.Sh AUTHORS ++.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com +diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper +--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.896248124 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper 2013-03-25 21:27:15.896248124 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++ ++exec /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-helper -s "$1" ++ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..529468c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux 2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2013-10-10 15:13:57.864306950 +0200 +@@ -503,6 +503,25 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n + free(newctx); + } + ++void ++ssh_selinux_copy_context(void) ++{ ++ security_context_t *ctx; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ ++ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { ++ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (ctx != NULL) { ++ if (setcon(ctx) != 0) ++ logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); ++ freecon(ctx); ++ } ++} ++ + #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux 2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200 +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); + void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); ++void ssh_selinux_copy_context(void); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + #endif + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/session.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux 2013-10-10 14:58:20.617762326 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c 2013-10-10 15:13:16.520503590 +0200 +@@ -1522,6 +1522,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + pw->pw_uid); + chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); + free(tmp); + free(chroot_path); +@@ -1544,6 +1547,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + #endif ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || ++ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) ++ ssh_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { + fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); +@@ -1808,9 +1817,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); +-#endif + exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); + } + +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2013-10-10 14:58:20.632762255 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-10 14:58:20.635762241 +0200 +@@ -668,6 +668,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); ++#endif ++ + /* Change our root directory */ + if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) + fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, +@@ -811,6 +815,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); + + skip: ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ /* switch SELinux content for root too */ ++ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { ++ ssh_selinux_copy_context(); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ + monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b1ec1d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.redhat 2013-10-11 14:51:18.345876648 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config 2013-10-11 15:13:05.429829266 +0200 +@@ -46,3 +46,14 @@ + # VisualHostKey no + # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com + # RekeyLimit 1G 1h ++Host * ++ GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access ++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted ++# mode correctly we set this to yes. ++ ForwardX11Trusted yes ++# Send locale-related environment variables ++ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++ SendEnv XMODIFIERS +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0 +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2013-09-13 08:20:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0 2013-10-11 14:51:18.345876648 +0200 +@@ -653,9 +653,9 @@ DESCRIPTION + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, +- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The +- default is AUTH. ++ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, ++ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. ++ The default is AUTH. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 2013-10-11 14:51:18.346876643 +0200 +@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco + .It Cm SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + .Xr sshd 8 . +-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, ++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, + LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. + The default is AUTH. + .It Cm TCPKeepAlive +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.redhat 2013-10-11 14:51:18.343876657 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config 2013-10-11 14:51:18.346876643 +0200 +@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ + # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the + # default value. + ++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell ++# SELinux about this change. ++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER ++# + #Port 22 + #AddressFamily any + #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +@@ -35,6 +39,7 @@ + # Logging + # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging + #SyslogFacility AUTH ++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV + #LogLevel INFO + + # Authentication: +@@ -70,9 +75,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! + #PasswordAuthentication yes + #PermitEmptyPasswords no ++PasswordAuthentication yes + + # Change to no to disable s/key passwords + #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes ++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + + # Kerberos options + #KerberosAuthentication no +@@ -82,7 +89,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no ++GSSAPIAuthentication yes + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +@@ -94,11 +103,13 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. + #UsePAM no ++UsePAM yes + + #AllowAgentForwarding yes + #AllowTcpForwarding yes + #GatewayPorts no + #X11Forwarding no ++X11Forwarding yes + #X11DisplayOffset 10 + #X11UseLocalhost yes + #PrintMotd yes +@@ -120,6 +131,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Defaul + # no default banner path + #Banner none + ++# Accept locale-related environment variables ++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS ++ + # override default of no subsystems + Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89d54b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch @@ -0,0 +1,931 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.799494546 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 +@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) + * during the ssh authentication process. + */ + int +-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) ++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) + { + int ret = 1; + #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls 2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void); + void do_pam_set_tty(const char *); + void do_pam_setcred(int ); + void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); ++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); + char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); + char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); + void free_pam_environment(char **); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.834494379 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.h 2013-10-10 14:38:45.060348227 +0200 +@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt { + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ + char *style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role; ++#endif + void *kbdintctxt; + char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ + void *jpake_ctx; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c.role-mls 2013-06-02 00:01:24.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 +@@ -381,6 +381,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) + { + u_int ulen; + char *user, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role=NULL; ++#endif + + /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ + packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER); +@@ -389,11 +392,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) + user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen); + packet_check_eom(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = '\0'; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = '\0'; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ else ++ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL) ++ *style++ = '\0'; ++#endif + + authctxt->user = user; + authctxt->style = style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role; ++#endif + + /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ + if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2013-06-01 23:31:18.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 +@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + int authenticated = 0; ++ char *micuser; + Buffer b; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + u_int len; +@@ -268,7 +269,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); + mic.length = len; + +- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0)) ++ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); ++ else ++#endif ++ micuser = authctxt->user; ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-with-mic"); + + gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); +@@ -280,6 +287,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + + buffer_free(&b); ++ if (micuser != authctxt->user) ++ free(micuser); + free(mic.value); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.818494455 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 +@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); +- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role) { ++ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); ++ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); ++ } else ++#endif ++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); + buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-10 14:57:17.452062486 +0200 +@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); +- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, ++ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", +- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); ++ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "", ++ authctxt->role ? "/" : "", ++ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); + free(userstyle); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.819494451 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 +@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role = NULL; ++#endif + int authenticated = 0; + + if (authctxt == NULL) +@@ -232,6 +235,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = 0; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + +@@ -254,8 +262,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; +- if (use_privsep) ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; ++#endif ++ if (use_privsep) { + mm_inform_authserv(service, style); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ mm_inform_authrole(role); ++#endif ++ } + userauth_banner(); + if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) + packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/misc.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/misc.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/misc.c.role-mls 2013-08-08 04:50:06.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/misc.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 +@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ char * + colon(char *cp) + { + int flag = 0; ++ int start = 1; + + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return NULL; +@@ -444,6 +445,13 @@ colon(char *cp) + return (cp); + if (*cp == '/') + return NULL; ++ if (start) { ++ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */ ++ if (*cp == '/') ++ return (0); ++ if (*cp != '.') ++ start = 0; ++ } + } + return NULL; + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.821494441 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-10 14:54:57.933725463 +0200 +@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *); ++#endif + int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); +@@ -233,6 +236,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -853,6 +859,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m + else { + /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1); ++#endif + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); + } + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -894,6 +903,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) + return (0); + } + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int ++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ monitor_permit_authentications(1); ++ ++ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ debug3("%s: role=%s", ++ __func__, authctxt->role); ++ ++ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { ++ free(authctxt->role); ++ authctxt->role = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++#endif ++ + int + mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) + { +@@ -1269,7 +1297,7 @@ static int + monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) + { + Buffer b; +- char *p, *userstyle; ++ char *p, *r, *userstyle; + u_int len; + int fail = 0; + +@@ -1295,6 +1323,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); ++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) ++ *r = '\0'; + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); +@@ -1330,7 +1360,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data + char *chost) + { + Buffer b; +- char *p, *userstyle; ++ char *p, *r, *userstyle; + u_int len; + int fail = 0; + +@@ -1347,6 +1377,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); ++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) ++ *r = '\0'; + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.821494441 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h 2013-10-10 14:34:43.837494365 +0200 +@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2 = 56, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2 = 57, + MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 58, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 59, + MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 60, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 61, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, ++#endif + + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.822494436 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.838494360 +0200 +@@ -338,6 +338,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char * + buffer_free(&m); + } + ++/* Inform the privileged process about role */ ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void ++mm_inform_authrole(char *role) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* Do the password authentication */ + int + mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.822494436 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-10-10 14:34:43.838494360 +0200 +@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void); + DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); + int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); + void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void mm_inform_authrole(char *); ++#endif + struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); + char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); + int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls 2013-05-10 08:28:56.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2013-10-10 14:34:43.838494360 +0200 +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport + + COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o + +-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o ++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o + + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2013-10-10 14:40:41.841793347 +0200 +@@ -31,68 +31,271 @@ + + #include "log.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" + #include "port-linux.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + #include + #include ++#include + #include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++#include ++#include ++#endif + + #ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE + # define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:" + #endif + +-/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ +-int +-ssh_selinux_enabled(void) ++extern ServerOptions options; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern int rexeced_flag; ++ ++/* Send audit message */ ++static int ++send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, ++ security_context_t selected_context) + { +- static int enabled = -1; ++ int rc=0; ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++ char *msg = NULL; ++ int audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ security_context_t default_raw=NULL; ++ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL; ++ rc = -1; ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ error("Error connecting to audit system."); ++ return rc; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating default context."); ++ default_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating selected context."); ++ selected_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s", ++ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"), ++ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) { ++ error("Error allocating memory."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, ++ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) { ++ error("Error sending audit message."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ rc = 0; ++ out: ++ free(msg); ++ freecon(default_raw); ++ freecon(selected_raw); ++ close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++static int ++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) ++{ ++ struct av_decision avd; ++ int retval; ++ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS; ++ ++ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst); ++ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd); ++ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, ++ security_context_t *sc) { ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his ++ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the ++ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */ ++#endif ++ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ } ++#endif ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ context_t con; ++ char *type=NULL; ++ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) { ++ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'", ++ role); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_role_set(con, role); ++ context_type_set(con, type); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ if (!*sc) ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) { ++ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */ ++ context_t con; ++ security_context_t obtained_raw; ++ security_context_t requested_raw; ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_range_set(con, lvl); ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) { ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) { ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } + +- if (enabled == -1) { +- enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); +- debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); ++ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'", ++ obtained_raw, requested_raw); ++ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) { ++ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */ ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); + } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++ out: ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++} + +- return (enabled); ++static void ++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) ++{ ++ *role = NULL; ++ *level = NULL; ++ if (the_authctxt) { ++ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { ++ char *slash; ++ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); ++ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *slash = '\0'; ++ *level = slash + 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } + } + + /* Return the default security context for the given username */ + static security_context_t +-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) ++ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, ++ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) + { +- security_context_t sc = NULL; +- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL; +- int r; ++ char *sename, *lvl; ++ char *role; ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ int r = 0; ++ context_t con = NULL; ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); + + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME +- if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0) +- return NULL; ++ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { ++ sename = NULL; ++ lvl = NULL; ++ } + #else + sename = pwname; +- lvl = NULL; ++ lvl = ""; + #endif + ++ if (r == 0) { + #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL +- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); ++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc); + #else +- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); ++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc); + #endif ++ } ++ ++ if (r == 0) { ++ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; ++ ++ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) ++ fatal("failed to allocate security context"); ++ ++ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL) ++ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context"); ++ reqlvl = context_range_get(con); ++ freecon(sshdsc); ++ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0) ++ /* we actually don't change level */ ++ reqlvl = ""; ++ ++ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl); + +- if (r != 0) { +- switch (security_getenforce()) { +- case -1: +- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: " +- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__); +- case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); +- sc = NULL; +- break; +- default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " +- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)", +- __func__, pwname); + } ++ ++ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) { ++ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc); ++ ++ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) { ++ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0) ++ default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */ ++ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) { ++ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } else { ++ r = -1; ++ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } ++ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc) ++ freecon(default_level_sc); ++ } ++ } else { ++ *user_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " ++ "context for %s", __func__, pwname); + } + + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME +@@ -100,7 +303,42 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + free(lvl); + #endif + +- return sc; ++ if (role != NULL) ++ free(role); ++ if (con) ++ context_free(con); ++ ++ return (r); ++} ++ ++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ ++static int ++ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ char *role; ++ char *use_current; ++ int rv; ++ ++ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ++ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ use_current = "1"; ++ } else { ++ use_current = ""; ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ } ++ ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ ++ if (role != NULL) ++ free(role); ++ ++ return rv; + } + + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ +@@ -108,28 +346,71 @@ void + ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + { + security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; ++ int r = 0; ++ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; + + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) + return; + ++ if (options.use_pam) { ++ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ ++ if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { ++ switch (security_getenforce()) { ++ case -1: ++ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); ++ case 0: ++ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", ++ __func__); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.", ++ __func__); ++ } ++ } ++ return; ++ } ++ + debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); + +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); +- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { ++ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); ++ if (r >= 0) { ++ r = setexeccon(user_ctx); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", ++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON ++ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", ++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ if (user_ctx == NULL) { ++ user_ctx = default_ctx; ++ } ++ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) { ++ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was ++ a failure */ ++ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx); ++ } ++ if (r < 0) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: + fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); + case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); ++ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", ++ __func__); + break; + default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " +- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); ++ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.", ++ __func__); + } + } +- if (user_ctx != NULL) ++ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) + freecon(user_ctx); ++ if (default_ctx != NULL) ++ freecon(default_ctx); + + debug3("%s: done", __func__); + } +@@ -147,7 +428,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons + + debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); + +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); ++ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) { ++ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ goto out; ++ } + + /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ + +@@ -219,21 +503,6 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n + free(newctx); + } + +-void +-ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path) +-{ +- security_context_t context; +- +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) +- return; +- if (path == NULL) { +- setfscreatecon(NULL); +- return; +- } +- if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0) +- setfscreatecon(context); +-} +- + #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.839494355 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.839494355 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ ++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh ++ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST) ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "port-linux.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ ++int ++ssh_selinux_enabled(void) ++{ ++ static int enabled = -1; ++ ++ if (enabled == -1) { ++ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); ++ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); ++ } ++ ++ return (enabled); ++} ++ ++void ++ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path) ++{ ++ security_context_t context; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ if (path == NULL) { ++ setfscreatecon(NULL); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0) ++ setfscreatecon(context); ++} ++ ++#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ ++ ++#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.824494427 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.839494355 +0200 +@@ -2179,6 +2179,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + restore_uid(); + } + #endif ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); ++#endif + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c4ce54 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2258 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.audit 2013-06-11 03:26:10.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 +@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ +- jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o ++ jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o auditstub.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ + sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2012-02-24 00:40:43.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 +@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, + #endif + } + +-void ++int + audit_run_command(const char *command) + { + /* not implemented */ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ /* not necessary */ + } + + void +@@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li + /* not implemented */ + } + ++int ++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ + void + audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + { +@@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + } + } ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} + #endif /* BSM */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 +@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@ + + #include "log.h" + #include "audit.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++#include "servconf.h" + #include "canohost.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "cipher.h" + ++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128 ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern u_int utmp_len; + const char* audit_username(void); + +-int +-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, +- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) ++static void ++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, ++ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) + { + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + +@@ -49,11 +60,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) +- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else +- return 0; /* Must prevent login */ ++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ + } +- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, + NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", + username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; +@@ -65,35 +76,150 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; +- return (rc >= 0); ++ if (rc < 0) { ++fatal_report: ++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ } + } + ++static void ++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, ++ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) ++{ ++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ static const char *event_name[] = { ++ "maxtries exceeded", ++ "root denied", ++ "success", ++ "none", ++ "password", ++ "challenge-response", ++ "pubkey", ++ "hostbased", ++ "gssapi", ++ "invalid user", ++ "nologin", ++ "connection closed", ++ "connection abandoned", ++ "unknown" ++ }; ++ ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ ++ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) ++ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; ++ ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, ++ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", ++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); ++ saved_errno = errno; ++ close(audit_fd); ++ /* ++ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non ++ * root user. ++ */ ++ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) ++ rc = 0; ++ errno = saved_errno; ++ if (rc < 0) { ++fatal_report: ++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ } ++} ++ ++int ++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ return 0; /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); ++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ goto out; ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", ++ type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); ++out: ++ saved_errno = errno; ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ errno = saved_errno; ++ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); ++} ++ ++static int user_login_count = 0; ++ + /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ + + void + audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) + { +-} + /* not implemented */ ++} + +-void ++int + audit_run_command(const char *command) + { +- /* not implemented */ ++ if (!user_login_count++) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ user_login_count++; + } + + void + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { +- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, +- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) +- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (!user_login_count++) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + } + + void + audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + { +- /* not implemented */ ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + + void +@@ -101,21 +227,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + { + switch(event) { + case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: +- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); ++ break; ++ + case SSH_NOLOGIN: +- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + ++ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); ++ break; ++ ++ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: ++ if (user_login_count) { ++ while (user_login_count--) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: +- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, +- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + + default: +@@ -123,4 +271,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + } + } + ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; ++ char *s; ++ int audit_fd; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), ++ get_local_port()); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) ++ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ ++ return; ++ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, ++ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++} ++ ++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; ++ ++void ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); ++ char *s; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, ++ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, ++ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, ++ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ ++#endif ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ char *s; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, ++ get_remote_port(), ++ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), ++ get_local_port()); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", ++ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, ++ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(), ++ NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} + #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/audit.c.audit 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/audit.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + +@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ + #include "key.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" + + /* + * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when +@@ -111,6 +115,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) + return(event_lookup[i].name); + } + ++void ++audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) ++{ ++ char *fp; ++ const char *crypto_name; ++ ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) ++ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; ++ else ++ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); ++ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) ++ *rv = 0; ++ free(fp); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(int what) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid())); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(int ctos) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); ++} ++ + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* + * Null implementations of audit functions. +@@ -140,6 +178,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + } + + /* ++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, ++ * audit_session_open. ++ */ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), ++ audit_username()); ++} ++ ++/* + * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to + * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. + * +@@ -174,13 +223,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li + /* + * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows +- * multiple sessions within a single connection. ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for ++ * audit_end_command. + */ +-void ++int + audit_run_command(const char *command) + { + debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that ++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from ++ * the corresponding audit_run_command. ++ */ ++void ++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), ++ audit_username(), command); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. ++ * ++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. ++ */ ++int ++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", ++ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. ++ */ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. ++ */ ++void ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid, ++ (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard ++ */ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key ++ */ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key ++ */ ++void ++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) ++{ ++ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); + } + # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/audit.h.audit 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/audit.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + # define _SSH_AUDIT_H + + #include "loginrec.h" ++#include "key.h" + + enum ssh_audit_event_type { + SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, +@@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { + }; + typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; + ++int listening_for_clients(void); ++ + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); + void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); ++void audit_count_session_open(void); + void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); + void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); +-void audit_run_command(const char *); ++int audit_run_command(const char *); ++void audit_end_command(int, const char *); + ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); ++int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); ++void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); ++void audit_unsupported(int); ++void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *); ++void audit_unsupported_body(int); ++void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); ++void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); + + #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ ++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima ++ */ ++ ++#include ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(int n) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(int ctos) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++} +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.audit 2013-07-18 08:12:44.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 +@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU + { + u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; + MD5_CTX md; +- int len; ++ int len, rv; ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ char *fp; ++#endif + + /* don't allow short keys */ + if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { +@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU + MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); + + /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ +- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { +- /* Wrong answer. */ +- return (0); ++ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0; ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { ++ debug("unsuccessful audit"); ++ rv = 0; + } +- /* Correct answer. */ +- return (1); ++ free(fp); ++#endif ++ ++ return rv; + } + + /* +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.audit 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.h 2013-10-07 16:02:38.629171107 +0200 +@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt + + char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); + char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); ++int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); + + FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); + FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); +@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int); + int get_hostkey_index(Key *); + int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); + void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); ++int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); + + /* debug messages during authentication */ + void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.223717384 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 +@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) + /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && +- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), ++ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + buffer_len(&b))) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + +@@ -140,6 +140,18 @@ done: + return authenticated; + } + ++int ++hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ ++ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_key(0, &rv, key); ++#endif ++ return rv; ++} ++ + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ + int + hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.224717379 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-08 15:11:42.282436972 +0200 +@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) + /* test for correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && +- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), ++ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + buffer_len(&b))) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + buffer_free(&b); +@@ -223,6 +223,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con + free(extra); + } + ++int ++user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ ++ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_key(1, &rv, key); ++#endif ++ return rv; ++} ++ + static int + match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert) + { +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.audit 2013-06-01 23:41:51.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.248717268 +0200 +@@ -245,9 +245,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + } else { + logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); +-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); +-#endif + } + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.248717268 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c 2013-10-07 16:06:51.117971891 +0200 +@@ -55,18 +55,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(voi + extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); + extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); + +-struct Cipher { +- char *name; +- int number; /* for ssh1 only */ +- u_int block_size; +- u_int key_len; +- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ +- u_int auth_len; +- u_int discard_len; +- u_int cbc_mode; +- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +-}; +- + static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { + { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, + { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.audit 2013-04-23 11:24:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.248717268 +0200 +@@ -61,7 +61,18 @@ + typedef struct Cipher Cipher; + typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext; + +-struct Cipher; ++struct Cipher { ++ char *name; ++ int number; /* for ssh1 only */ ++ u_int block_size; ++ u_int key_len; ++ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ ++ u_int auth_len; ++ u_int discard_len; ++ u_int cbc_mode; ++ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); ++}; ++ + struct CipherContext { + int plaintext; + int encrypt; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/kex.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.audit 2013-06-01 23:31:18.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 +@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ + #include "dispatch.h" + #include "monitor.h" + #include "roaming.h" ++#include "audit.h" + + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) +@@ -341,9 +342,13 @@ static void + choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(0); ++#endif + fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", + client, server); ++ } + if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) + fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name); + enc->name = name; +@@ -359,9 +364,13 @@ static void + choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(1); ++#endif + fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", + client, server); ++ } + if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) + fatal("unsupported mac %s", name); + /* truncate the key */ +@@ -376,8 +385,12 @@ static void + choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(2); ++#endif + fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server); ++ } + if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { + comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; + } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { +@@ -492,6 +505,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) + newkeys->enc.name, + authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", + newkeys->comp.name); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name); ++#endif + } + choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], +@@ -656,3 +672,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } + #endif ++ ++static void ++enc_destroy(Enc *enc) ++{ ++ if (enc == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (enc->key) { ++ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); ++ free(enc->key); ++ } ++ ++ if (enc->iv) { ++ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); ++ free(enc->iv); ++ } ++ ++ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); ++} ++ ++void ++newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys) ++{ ++ if (newkeys == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); ++ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); ++ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); ++} ++ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/kex.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.audit 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 +@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); + void kexecdh_client(Kex *); + void kexecdh_server(Kex *); + ++void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); ++ + void + kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, + BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/key.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.224717379 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 +@@ -1773,6 +1773,30 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) + } + + int ++key_is_private(const Key *k) ++{ ++ switch (k->type) { ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_RSA1: ++ case KEY_RSA: ++ return k->rsa->d != NULL; ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_DSA: ++ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_ECDSA: ++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; ++#endif ++ default: ++ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); ++ return 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++int + key_is_cert(const Key *k) + { + if (k == NULL) +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/key.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.224717379 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 +@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Key *key_generate(int, u_int); + Key *key_from_private(const Key *); + int key_type_from_name(char *); + int key_is_cert(const Key *); ++int key_is_private(const Key *k); + int key_type_plain(int); + int key_to_certified(Key *, int); + int key_drop_cert(Key *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/mac.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.audit 2013-06-06 00:12:37.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.250717259 +0200 +@@ -224,6 +224,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac) + mac->umac_ctx = NULL; + } + ++void ++mac_destroy(Mac *mac) ++{ ++ if (mac == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (mac->key) { ++ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); ++ free(mac->key); ++ } ++ ++ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); ++} ++ + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ + #define MAC_SEP "," + int +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/mac.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/mac.h.audit 2013-04-23 11:24:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.250717259 +0200 +@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *); + int mac_init(Mac *); + u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int); + void mac_clear(Mac *); ++void mac_destroy(Mac *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.217717411 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-08 15:10:38.270726936 +0200 +@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ + #include "jpake.h" + #include "roaming.h" + #include "authfd.h" ++#include "audit.h" + + #ifdef GSSAPI + static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; +@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; + extern int auth_debug_init; + extern Buffer loginmsg; + ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); ++ + /* State exported from the child */ + + struct { +@@ -186,6 +189,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer * + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); +@@ -237,6 +245,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + #endif + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + #ifdef BSD_AUTH + {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, +@@ -273,6 +285,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -304,6 +321,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] + #endif + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -315,6 +336,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15 + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -1365,9 +1391,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) + Key *key; + u_char *signature, *data, *blob; + u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; ++ int type = 0; + int verified = 0; + int valid_data = 0; + ++ type = buffer_get_int(m); + blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); + signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); + data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); +@@ -1375,6 +1403,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) + if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || + !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) + fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); ++ if (type != key_blobtype) ++ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); + + key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); + if (key == NULL) +@@ -1395,7 +1425,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) + if (!valid_data) + fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); + +- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); ++ switch (key_blobtype) { ++ case MM_USERKEY: ++ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); ++ break; ++ case MM_HOSTKEY: ++ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); ++ break; ++ default: ++ verified = 0; ++ break; ++ } + debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", + __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); + +@@ -1448,6 +1488,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) + debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); + session_pty_cleanup2(s); + } ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); ++ session_end_command2(s); ++ } ++#endif + session_unused(s->self); + } + +@@ -1728,6 +1774,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) + sshpam_cleanup(); + #endif + ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); ++ + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + exit(1); +@@ -1770,11 +1818,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff + { + u_int len; + char *cmd; ++ Session *s; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ +- audit_run_command(cmd); ++ s = session_new(); ++ if (s == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); ++ s->command = cmd; ++ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, s->self); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int handle; ++ u_int len; ++ char *cmd; ++ Session *s; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ handle = buffer_get_int(m); ++ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ ++ s = session_by_id(handle); ++ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || ++ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); ++ mm_session_close(s); + free(cmd); + return (0); + } +@@ -1910,11 +1990,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor + + blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); + current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); + blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); + current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */ +@@ -1960,6 +2042,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor + } + + buffer_free(&m); ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (compat20) { ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); ++ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ ; ++ + } + + +@@ -2361,3 +2458,86 @@ mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, + } + + #endif /* JPAKE */ ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++int ++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int what; ++ ++ what = buffer_get_int(m); ++ ++ audit_unsupported_body(what); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int ctos, len; ++ char *cipher, *mac, *compress; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); ++ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ ++ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid); ++ ++ free(cipher); ++ free(mac); ++ free(compress); ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int ctos; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); ++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ ++ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int len; ++ char *fp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); ++ ++ free(fp); ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.audit 2012-12-02 23:53:21.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.251717254 +0200 +@@ -68,7 +68,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, +- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125 + + }; + +diff -up openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2013-11-08 13:26:47.062595006 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-11-08 13:26:47.089594877 +0100 +@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha + */ + + int +-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) + { + Buffer m; + u_char *blob; +@@ -447,6 +447,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i + return (0); + + buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, type); + buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); + buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); + buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); +@@ -464,6 +465,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i + return (verified); + } + ++int ++mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); ++} ++ ++ + /* Export key state after authentication */ + Newkeys * + mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) +@@ -642,12 +656,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor + fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); + + buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) + fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); + + buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); +@@ -1191,10 +1207,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + buffer_free(&m); + } + +-void ++int + mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) + { + Buffer m; ++ int handle; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + +@@ -1202,6 +1219,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command + buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); ++ ++ handle = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (handle); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, handle); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); + buffer_free(&m); + } + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +@@ -1453,3 +1490,72 @@ mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k, + return success; + } + #endif /* JPAKE */ ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++void ++mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, what); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, ++ &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, ++ &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, ++ &m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, ++ &m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.252717250 +0200 +@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char + int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); + int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); + int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); +-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); ++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); ++int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); + int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); + int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); + BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); +@@ -74,7 +75,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + #include "audit.h" + void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); ++int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); ++void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); ++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); ++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); + #endif + + struct Session; +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/packet.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.231717347 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.c 2013-10-07 16:08:00.764639577 +0200 +@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ + #include + + #include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "buffer.h" + #include "packet.h" + #include "crc32.h" +@@ -476,6 +477,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void) + return active_state->connection_out; + } + ++static int ++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) ++{ ++ return state != NULL && ++ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); ++} ++ + /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ + + void +@@ -484,13 +492,6 @@ packet_close(void) + if (!active_state->initialized) + return; + active_state->initialized = 0; +- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { +- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); +- close(active_state->connection_out); +- } else { +- close(active_state->connection_in); +- close(active_state->connection_out); +- } + buffer_free(&active_state->input); + buffer_free(&active_state->output); + buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); +@@ -499,8 +500,18 @@ packet_close(void) + buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer); + buffer_compress_uninit(); + } +- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); +- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); ++ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) { ++ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); ++ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); ++ audit_session_key_free(2); ++ } ++ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { ++ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); ++ close(active_state->connection_out); ++ } else { ++ close(active_state->connection_in); ++ close(active_state->connection_out); ++ } + } + + /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ +@@ -735,6 +746,25 @@ packet_send1(void) + */ + } + ++static void ++newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys) ++{ ++ if (newkeys == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ free(newkeys->enc.name); ++ ++ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { ++ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); ++ free(newkeys->mac.name); ++ } ++ ++ free(newkeys->comp.name); ++ ++ newkeys_destroy(newkeys); ++ free(newkeys); ++} ++ + void + set_newkeys(int mode) + { +@@ -760,21 +790,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode) + } + if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { + debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); ++ audit_session_key_free(mode); + cipher_cleanup(cc); +- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; +- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; +- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; +- mac_clear(mac); +- memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len); +- memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); +- memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); +- free(enc->name); +- free(enc->iv); +- free(enc->key); +- free(mac->name); +- free(mac->key); +- free(comp->name); +- free(active_state->newkeys[mode]); ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]); + } + active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode); + if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) +@@ -2003,6 +2021,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) + return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode]; + } + ++static void ++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) ++{ ++ if (state == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); ++ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); ++ ++ buffer_free(&state->input); ++ buffer_free(&state->output); ++ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet); ++ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet); ++ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer); ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); ++ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); ++ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; ++ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); ++// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; ++// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); ++} ++ ++void ++packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) ++{ ++ if (audit_it) ++ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) || ++ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state); ++ packet_destroy_state(active_state); ++ packet_destroy_state(backup_state); ++ if (audit_it) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (privsep) ++ audit_session_key_free(2); ++ else ++ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); ++#endif ++ } ++} ++ + /* + * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when + * resuming a suspended connection. +@@ -2010,18 +2069,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) + void + packet_backup_state(void) + { +- struct session_state *tmp; +- + close(active_state->connection_in); + active_state->connection_in = -1; + close(active_state->connection_out); + active_state->connection_out = -1; +- if (backup_state) +- tmp = backup_state; +- else +- tmp = alloc_session_state(); + backup_state = active_state; +- active_state = tmp; ++ active_state = alloc_session_state(); + } + + /* +@@ -2038,9 +2091,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void) + backup_state = active_state; + active_state = tmp; + active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in; +- backup_state->connection_in = -1; + active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out; +- backup_state->connection_out = -1; + len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input); + if (len > 0) { + buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input); +@@ -2048,4 +2099,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void) + buffer_clear(&backup_state->input); + add_recv_bytes(len); + } ++ backup_state->connection_in = -1; ++ backup_state->connection_out = -1; ++ packet_destroy_state(backup_state); ++ free(backup_state); ++ backup_state = NULL; + } ++ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/packet.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/packet.h.audit 2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.252717250 +0200 +@@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void); + void *packet_get_input(void); + void *packet_get_output(void); + ++void packet_destroy_all(int, int); + #endif /* PACKET_H */ +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/session.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.audit 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c 2013-10-07 16:03:43.975861636 +0200 +@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ extern int log_stderr; + extern int debug_flag; + extern u_int utmp_len; + extern int startup_pipe; +-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + extern Buffer loginmsg; + + /* original command from peer. */ +@@ -745,6 +745,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm + /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + ++#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA ++ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, ++ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely ++ ugly. */ ++ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) ++ audit_count_session_open(); ++#endif ++ + /* Enter interactive session. */ + s->ptymaster = ptymaster; + packet_set_interactive(1, +@@ -816,15 +824,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + } + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) ++ fatal("do_exec: command already set"); + if (command != NULL) +- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); ++ s->command = xstrdup(command); + else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { + char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; + + if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ + shell =_PATH_BSHELL; +- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); ++ s->command = xstrdup(shell); + } ++ if (s->command != NULL) ++ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); + #endif + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); +@@ -1642,7 +1654,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command + int r = 0; + + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(1); ++ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the ++ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ ++ packet_destroy_all(0, 1); + + /* Force a password change */ + if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { +@@ -1869,6 +1884,7 @@ session_unused(int id) + sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; + sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; + sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; ++ sessions[id].command_handle = -1; + sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; + sessions_first_unused = id; + } +@@ -1951,6 +1967,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha + } + + Session * ++session_by_id(int id) ++{ ++ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { ++ Session *s = &sessions[id]; ++ if (s->used) ++ return s; ++ } ++ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id); ++ session_dump(); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++Session * + session_by_tty(char *tty) + { + int i; +@@ -2467,6 +2496,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta + chan_write_failed(c); + } + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++void ++session_end_command2(Session *s) ++{ ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); ++ free(s->command); ++ s->command = NULL; ++ s->command_handle = -1; ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ++session_end_command(Session *s) ++{ ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); ++ free(s->command); ++ s->command = NULL; ++ s->command_handle = -1; ++ } ++} ++#endif ++ + void + session_close(Session *s) + { +@@ -2475,6 +2528,10 @@ session_close(Session *s) + debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + session_pty_cleanup(s); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command) ++ session_end_command(s); ++#endif + free(s->term); + free(s->display); + free(s->x11_chanids); +@@ -2688,6 +2745,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) + server_loop2(authctxt); + } + ++static void ++do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) ++{ ++ session_pty_cleanup2(s); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ session_end_command2(s); ++#endif ++} ++ + void + do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) + { +@@ -2736,5 +2802,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) + * or if running in monitor. + */ + if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) +- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); ++ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); + } +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/session.h +--- openssh-6.3p1/session.h.audit 2008-05-19 07:34:50.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/session.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.253717245 +0200 +@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session { + char *name; + char *val; + } *env; ++ ++ /* exec */ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ int command_handle; ++ char *command; ++#endif + }; + + void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); +@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); + void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); + void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); + void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); ++void session_end_command2(Session *); + + Session *session_new(void); ++Session *session_by_id(int); + Session *session_by_tty(char *); + void session_close(Session *); + void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); +diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.221717393 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.254717240 +0200 +@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ + #endif + #include "monitor_wrap.h" + #include "roaming.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "version.h" + +@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; + struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; + + /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ +-void destroy_sensitive_data(void); ++void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + void demote_sensitive_data(void); + + static void do_ssh1_kex(void); +@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) + num_listen_socks = -1; + } + ++/* ++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific ++ * client connection?) ++ */ ++int listening_for_clients(void) ++{ ++ return num_listen_socks > 0; ++} ++ + static void + close_startup_pipes(void) + { +@@ -550,22 +560,47 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in + } + } + +-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ ++/* ++ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, ++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. ++ */ + void +-destroy_sensitive_data(void) ++destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) + { + int i; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; + + if (sensitive_data.server_key) { + key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); + sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; + } ++ pid = getpid(); ++ uid = getuid(); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { ++ char *fp; ++ ++ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) ++ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], ++ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, ++ SSH_FP_HEX); ++ else ++ fp = NULL; + key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; ++ if (fp != NULL) { ++ if (privsep) ++ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, ++ pid, uid)); ++ else ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, ++ pid, uid); ++ free(fp); ++ } + } +- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { ++ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates ++ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + } +@@ -579,6 +614,8 @@ void + demote_sensitive_data(void) + { + Key *tmp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; + int i; + + if (sensitive_data.server_key) { +@@ -587,13 +624,27 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) + sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; + } + ++ pid = getpid(); ++ uid = getuid(); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { ++ char *fp; ++ ++ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) ++ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], ++ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, ++ SSH_FP_HEX); ++ else ++ fp = NULL; + tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; + if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; ++ if (fp != NULL) { ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); ++ free(fp); ++ } + } + /* Certs do not need demotion */ + } +@@ -708,6 +759,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + } + ++extern Newkeys *current_keys[]; ++ + static void + privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + { +@@ -732,6 +785,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + buffer_clear(&loginmsg); ++ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]); ++ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]); ++ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); ++ packet_destroy_all(0, 0); + monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); + + /* NEVERREACHED */ +@@ -1178,6 +1235,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", + (int) received_sigterm); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); + close_listen_socks(); + unlink(options.pid_file); + exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); +@@ -2093,6 +2151,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + */ + if (use_privsep) { + mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); ++ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); + exit(0); + } + +@@ -2135,7 +2194,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + privsep_postauth(authctxt); + /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ + if (!compat20) +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); + } + + packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, +@@ -2145,6 +2204,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + do_authenticated(authctxt); + + /* The connection has been terminated. */ ++ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(1); ++ + packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); + packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", +@@ -2302,6 +2364,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) + if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) + packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none"); ++#endif ++ + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); + + /* Get the encrypted integer. */ +@@ -2368,7 +2434,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) + session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; + } + /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); + + if (use_privsep) + mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); +@@ -2480,6 +2546,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + void + cleanup_exit(int i) + { ++ static int in_cleanup = 0; ++ int is_privsep_child; ++ ++ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep ++ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse ++ indefinitely. */ ++ if (in_cleanup) ++ _exit(i); ++ in_cleanup = 1; ++ + if (the_authctxt) { + do_cleanup(the_authctxt); + if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { +@@ -2490,9 +2566,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) + pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); + } + } ++ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor(); ++ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) ++ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); ++ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ +- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) ++ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && ++ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) + audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); + #endif + _exit(i); diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f036cc --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +atomicio.h +authfd.h +buffer.h +cipher.h +compat.h +defines.h +entropy.h +includes.h +kex.h +key.h +log.h +match.h +misc.h +pathnames.h +platform.h +rsa.h +ssh.h +ssh2.h +uuencode.h +xmalloc.h diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7f12a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid 2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100 +@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui + } + + errno = 0; +- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat +- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */ ++ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat ++ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */ ++ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) { ++ close(sock); ++ error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid); ++ return -1; ++ } + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { + close(sock); +- if(errno == EACCES) +- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid); +- return -1; ++ sock = -1; ++ if(errno == EACCES) ++ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid); + } + + seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */ diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f229144 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility 2009-12-21 20:57:34.000000000 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2012-06-21 20:01:31.356259429 +0200 +@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ char *__progname; + extern char *__progname; + #endif + +-PAM_EXTERN int ++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) + pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) + { + char **argv_ptr; +@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + } + + +-PAM_EXTERN int ++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) + pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) + { + return PAM_SUCCESS; diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40ab19d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build 2010-01-13 03:17:01.000000000 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200 +@@ -37,7 +37,16 @@ + #include "buffer.h" + #include "key.h" + #include "authfd.h" ++#include "ssh.h" + #include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include + #include + + #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h" +@@ -69,6 +78,96 @@ session_id2_gen() + return cookie; + } + ++/* ++ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user ++ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary ++ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. ++ * ++ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that ++ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a ++ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated. ++ */ ++ ++int ++ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid) ++{ ++ const char *authsocket; ++ int sock; ++ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; ++ struct stat sock_st; ++ ++ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); ++ if (!authsocket) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */ ++ if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) { ++ if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) { ++ fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody ++ * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication. ++ */ ++ if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) { ++ error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; ++ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); ++ ++ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); ++ if (sock < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* close on exec */ ++ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) { ++ close(sock); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ errno = 0; ++ seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat ++ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */ ++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { ++ close(sock); ++ if(errno == EACCES) ++ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */ ++ ++ return sock; ++} ++ ++AuthenticationConnection * ++ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid) ++{ ++ AuthenticationConnection *auth; ++ int sock; ++ ++ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid); ++ ++ /* ++ * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we ++ * exited due to a timeout. ++ */ ++ if (sock < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); ++ auth->fd = sock; ++ buffer_init(&auth->identities); ++ auth->howmany = 0; ++ ++ return auth; ++} ++ + int + find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid) + { +@@ -81,7 +180,7 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid) + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); + session_id2 = session_id2_gen(); + +- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) { ++ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) { + verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", getpwuid(uid)->pw_name, uid); + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) + { +@@ -109,3 +208,4 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid) + EVP_cleanup(); + return retval; + } ++ +diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build 2009-10-27 21:19:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in 2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200 +@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ PATHS= + CC=@CC@ + LD=@LD@ + CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ ++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ + LIBS=@LIBS@ + AR=@AR@ + AWK=@AWK@ +@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ + PERL=@PERL@ + SED=@SED@ + ENT=@ENT@ +-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ ++LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ + LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@ + EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so + + SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o + +-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o ++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o + + + MANPAGES_IN = pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod +@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< + +-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a ++LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a + $(LIBCOMPAT): always + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) + always: + +-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o +- $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ++ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3 pam_ssh_agent_auth.o + + $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) + pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.8 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8 +diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba67c33 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch @@ -0,0 +1,430 @@ +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/authfd.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.013615342 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/authfd.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.353327799 +0100 +@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ + { + buffer_free(&auth->identities); + close(auth->fd); +- xfree(auth); ++ free(auth); + } + + /* Lock/unlock agent */ +@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ + blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); +- xfree(blob); ++ free(blob); + break; + default: + return NULL; +@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen); + buffer_put_int(&msg, flags); +- xfree(blob); ++ free(blob); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); +@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ + key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); +- xfree(blob); ++ free(blob); + } else { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufaux.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufaux.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.354327768 +0100 +@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ + /* Get the string. */ + if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) { + logerror("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed"); +- xfree(value); ++ free(value); + return (NULL); + } + /* Append a null character to make processing easier. */ +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufbn.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufbn.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.354327768 +0100 +@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ + if (oi != bin_size) { + logerror("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d", + oi, bin_size); +- xfree(buf); ++ free(buf); + return (-1); + } + +@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ + buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi); + + memset(buf, 0, bin_size); +- xfree(buf); ++ free(buf); + + return (0); + } +@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ + if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) { + logerror("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: " + "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes); +- xfree(buf); ++ free(buf); + return (-1); + } + hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1; + buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh); + memset(buf, 0, bytes); +- xfree(buf); ++ free(buf); + return (0); + } + +@@ -197,21 +197,21 @@ + + if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) { + logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported"); +- xfree(bin); ++ free(bin); + return (-1); + } + if (len > 8 * 1024) { + logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", + len); +- xfree(bin); ++ free(bin); + return (-1); + } + if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) { + logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed"); +- xfree(bin); ++ free(bin); + return (-1); + } +- xfree(bin); ++ free(bin); + return (0); + } + +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/buffer.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/buffer.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.355327737 +0100 +@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ + if (buffer->alloc > 0) { + memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc); + buffer->alloc = 0; +- xfree(buffer->buf); ++ free(buffer->buf); + } + } + +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.031614782 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.357327674 +0100 +@@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ + if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) { + retval = 1; + } +- xfree(id->filename); ++ free(id->filename); + key_free(id->key); +- xfree(id); ++ free(id); + if(retval == 1) + break; + } +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ + else { + verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted"); + } +- xfree(session_id2); ++ free(session_id2); + EVP_cleanup(); + return retval; + } +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/key.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/key.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.358327643 +0100 +@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ + fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type); + break; + } +- xfree(k); ++ free(k); + } + + int +@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len); + EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length); + memset(blob, 0, len); +- xfree(blob); ++ free(blob); + } else { + fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null"); + } +@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ + break; + } + memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len); +- xfree(dgst_raw); ++ free(dgst_raw); + return retval; + } + +@@ -447,11 +447,11 @@ + n = uudecode(cp, blob, len); + if (n < 0) { + logerror("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp); +- xfree(blob); ++ free(blob); + return -1; + } + k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n); +- xfree(blob); ++ free(blob); + if (k == NULL) { + logerror("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp); + return -1; +@@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ + fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu); + success = 1; + } +- xfree(blob); +- xfree(uu); ++ free(blob); ++ free(uu); + } + return success; + } +@@ -673,12 +673,12 @@ + switch (key_type_from_name(p)) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_UNSPEC: +- xfree(s); ++ free(s); + return 0; + } + } + verbose("key names ok: [%s]", names); +- xfree(s); ++ free(s); + return 1; + } + +@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ + logerror("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); + out: + if (ktype != NULL) +- xfree(ktype); ++ free(ktype); + buffer_free(&b); + return key; + } +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/misc.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/misc.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.360327581 +0100 +@@ -251,13 +251,13 @@ + *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; + sp = xstrdup(s); + if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { +- xfree(sp); ++ free(sp); + return (a2tun(s, NULL)); + } + ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; + *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); + tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); +- xfree(sp); ++ free(sp); + return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); + } + +@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ + if (which >= args->num) + fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", + which, args->num); +- xfree(args->list[which]); ++ free(args->list[which]); + args->list[which] = cp; + } + +@@ -501,8 +501,8 @@ + + if (args->list != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) +- xfree(args->list[i]); +- xfree(args->list); ++ free(args->list[i]); ++ free(args->list); + args->nalloc = args->num = 0; + args->list = NULL; + } +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100 +@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ + } + authorized_keys_file = tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid); + strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 ); +- xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */; ++ free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */; + } + + if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) { +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.018615187 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100 +@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ + fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + logit("Found matching %s key: %s", + key_type(found), fp); +- xfree(fp); ++ free(fp); + break; + } + } +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-dss.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-dss.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100 +@@ -135,17 +135,17 @@ + if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { + logerror("ssh_dss_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype); + buffer_free(&b); +- xfree(ktype); ++ free(ktype); + return -1; + } +- xfree(ktype); ++ free(ktype); + sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); + rlen = buffer_len(&b); + buffer_free(&b); + if (rlen != 0) { + logerror("ssh_dss_verify: " + "remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen); +- xfree(sigblob); ++ free(sigblob); + return -1; + } + } +@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ + + /* clean up */ + memset(sigblob, 0, len); +- xfree(sigblob); ++ free(sigblob); + + /* sha1 the data */ + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-rsa.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.015615278 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-rsa.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100 +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ + + logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s", + ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL)); +- xfree(sig); ++ free(sig); + return -1; + } + if (len < slen) { +@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ + memset(sig, 0, diff); + } else if (len > slen) { + logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, len); +- xfree(sig); ++ free(sig); + return -1; + } + /* encode signature */ +@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ + } + buffer_free(&b); + memset(sig, 's', slen); +- xfree(sig); ++ free(sig); + + return 0; + } +@@ -128,23 +128,23 @@ + if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) { + logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype); + buffer_free(&b); +- xfree(ktype); ++ free(ktype); + return -1; + } +- xfree(ktype); ++ free(ktype); + sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); + rlen = buffer_len(&b); + buffer_free(&b); + if (rlen != 0) { + logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen); +- xfree(sigblob); ++ free(sigblob); + return -1; + } + /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ + modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + if (len > modlen) { + logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: len %u > modlen %u", len, modlen); +- xfree(sigblob); ++ free(sigblob); + return -1; + } else if (len < modlen) { + u_int diff = modlen - len; +@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ + nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1; + if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { + logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid); +- xfree(sigblob); ++ free(sigblob); + return -1; + } + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ + ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); + memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest)); + memset(sigblob, 's', len); +- xfree(sigblob); ++ free(sigblob); + verbose("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : ""); + return ret; + } +@@ -258,6 +258,6 @@ + ret = 1; + done: + if (decrypted) +- xfree(decrypted); ++ free(decrypted); + return ret; + } +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100 +@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ + if(&b != NULL) + buffer_free(&b); + if(sig != NULL) +- xfree(sig); ++ free(sig); + if(pkblob != NULL) +- xfree(pkblob); ++ free(pkblob); + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); + return authenticated; + } +--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/uuencode.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.015615278 +0100 ++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/uuencode.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100 +@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ + /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */ + *p = '\0'; + len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize); +- xfree(encoded); ++ free(encoded); + return len; + } + +@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ + } + if (i % 70 != 69) + fprintf(fp, "\n"); +- xfree(buf); ++ free(buf); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam b/SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7a3f67 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule +session required pam_selinux.so close +session required pam_loginuid.so +# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context +session required pam_selinux.so open env_params +session required pam_namespace.so + diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen new file mode 100644 index 0000000..012bb64 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server. +# +# The creation is controlled by the $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS environment +# variable. +AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=RSAONLY + +# source function library +. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions + +# Some functions to make the below more readable +KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen +RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +ECDSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key + +# pull in sysconfig settings +[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +fips_enabled() { + if [ -r /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled ]; then + cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled + else + echo 0 + fi +} + +do_rsa1_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then + echo -n $"Generating SSH1 RSA host key: " + rm -f $RSA1_KEY + if test ! -f $RSA1_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chgrp ssh_keys $RSA1_KEY + chmod 640 $RSA1_KEY + chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub + if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then + /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY.pub + fi + success $"RSA1 key generation" + echo + else + failure $"RSA1 key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} + +do_rsa_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then + echo -n $"Generating SSH2 RSA host key: " + rm -f $RSA_KEY + if test ! -f $RSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chgrp ssh_keys $RSA_KEY + chmod 640 $RSA_KEY + chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub + if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then + /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY.pub + fi + success $"RSA key generation" + echo + else + failure $"RSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} + +do_dsa_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then + echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: " + rm -f $DSA_KEY + if test ! -f $DSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chgrp ssh_keys $DSA_KEY + chmod 640 $DSA_KEY + chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub + if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then + /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY.pub + fi + success $"DSA key generation" + echo + else + failure $"DSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} + +do_ecdsa_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $ECDSA_KEY ]; then + echo -n $"Generating SSH2 ECDSA host key: " + rm -f $ECDSA_KEY + if test ! -f $ECDSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t ecdsa -f $ECDSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chgrp ssh_keys $ECDSA_KEY + chmod 600 $ECDSA_KEY + chmod 644 $ECDSA_KEY.pub + if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then + /sbin/restorecon $ECDSA_KEY.pub + fi + success $"ECDSA key generation" + echo + else + failure $"ECDSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} + +# Create keys if necessary +if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNO ]; then + do_rsa_keygen + if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xRSAONLY ]; then + do_rsa1_keygen + do_dsa_keygen + do_ecdsa_keygen + fi +fi diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4be6fb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH Server Key Generation +ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key + +[Service] +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen +Type=oneshot diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.init b/SOURCES/sshd.init new file mode 100755 index 0000000..8901b4f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.init @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# sshd Start up the OpenSSH server daemon +# +# chkconfig: 2345 55 25 +# description: SSH is a protocol for secure remote shell access. \ +# This service starts up the OpenSSH server daemon. +# +# processname: sshd +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed +# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config +# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid + +### BEGIN INIT INFO +# Provides: sshd +# Required-Start: $local_fs $network $syslog +# Required-Stop: $local_fs $syslog +# Should-Start: $syslog +# Should-Stop: $network $syslog +# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5 +# Default-Stop: 0 1 6 +# Short-Description: Start up the OpenSSH server daemon +# Description: SSH is a protocol for secure remote shell access. +# This service starts up the OpenSSH server daemon. +### END INIT INFO + +# source function library +. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions + +# pull in sysconfig settings +[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +RETVAL=0 +prog="sshd" +lockfile=/var/lock/subsys/$prog + +# Some functions to make the below more readable +SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd +XPID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid +PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd-s.pid + +runlevel=$(set -- $(runlevel); eval "echo \$$#" ) + +do_restart_sanity_check() +{ + $SSHD -t + RETVAL=$? + if [ $RETVAL -ne 0 ]; then + failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid" + echo + fi +} + +start() +{ + [ -x $SSHD ] || exit 5 + [ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ] || exit 6 + # Create keys if necessary + /usr/sbin/sshd-keygen + + echo -n $"Starting $prog: " + $SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure + RETVAL=$? + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch $lockfile + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && cp -f $XPID_FILE $PID_FILE + echo + return $RETVAL +} + +stop() +{ + + echo -n $"Stopping $prog: " + if [ ! -f "$PID_FILE" ]; then + # not running; per LSB standards this is "ok" + action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/true + return 0 + fi + PID=`cat "$PID_FILE"` + if [ -n "$PID" ]; then + /bin/kill "$PID" >/dev/null 2>&1 + RETVAL=$? + if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ]; then + RETVAL=1 + action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/false + else + action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/true + fi + else + # failed to read pidfile + action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/false + RETVAL=4 + fi + # if we are in halt or reboot runlevel kill all running sessions + # so the TCP connections are closed cleanly + if [ "x$runlevel" = x0 -o "x$runlevel" = x6 ] ; then + trap '' TERM + killall $prog 2>/dev/null + trap TERM + fi + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f $lockfile + rm -f "$PID_FILE" + return $RETVAL +} + +reload() +{ + echo -n $"Reloading $prog: " + if [ -n "`pidfileofproc $SSHD`" ] ; then + killproc $SSHD -HUP + else + failure $"Reloading $prog" + fi + RETVAL=$? + echo +} + +restart() { + stop + start +} + +force_reload() { + restart +} + +rh_status() { + status -p $PID_FILE openssh-daemon +} + +rh_status_q() { + rh_status >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +case "$1" in + start) + rh_status_q && exit 0 + start + ;; + stop) + if ! rh_status_q; then + rm -f $lockfile + exit 0 + fi + stop + ;; + restart) + restart + ;; + reload) + rh_status_q || exit 7 + reload + ;; + force-reload) + force_reload + ;; + condrestart|try-restart) + rh_status_q || exit 0 + if [ -f $lockfile ] ; then + do_restart_sanity_check + if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then + stop + # avoid race + sleep 3 + start + else + RETVAL=6 + fi + fi + ;; + status) + rh_status + RETVAL=$? + if [ $RETVAL -eq 3 -a -f $lockfile ] ; then + RETVAL=2 + fi + ;; + *) + echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|force-reload|condrestart|try-restart|status}" + RETVAL=2 +esac +exit $RETVAL diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.pam b/SOURCES/sshd.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a80e450 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.pam @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required pam_sepermit.so +auth substack password-auth +auth include postlogin +account required pam_nologin.so +account include password-auth +password include password-auth +# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule +session required pam_selinux.so close +session required pam_loginuid.so +# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context +session required pam_selinux.so open env_params +session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke +session include password-auth +session include postlogin diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.service b/SOURCES/sshd.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6348bc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.service @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH server daemon +After=syslog.target network.target auditd.service + +[Service] +EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/sshd +ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS +ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID +KillMode=process +Restart=on-failure +RestartSec=42s + +[Install] +WantedBy=multi-user.target diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.socket b/SOURCES/sshd.socket new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94b9533 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.socket @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH Server Socket +Conflicts=sshd.service + +[Socket] +ListenStream=22 +Accept=yes + +[Install] +WantedBy=sockets.target diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig b/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a30a83 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Configuration file for the sshd service. + +# The server keys are automatically generated if they ommited +# to change the automatic creation uncomment the approprite +# line. The default is RSAONLY + +# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=RSAONLY +# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NO +# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=YES + +# Do not change this option unless you have hardware random +# generator and you REALLY know what you are doing + +SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=0 +# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=1 diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd@.service b/SOURCES/sshd@.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac1b8e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd@.service @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon +Wants=sshd-keygen.service +After=auditd.service sshd-keygen.service + +[Service] +EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd +ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS +StandardInput=socket diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe0d5d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,2317 @@ +# Do we want SELinux & Audit +%if 0%{?!noselinux:1} +%define WITH_SELINUX 1 +%else +%define WITH_SELINUX 0 +%endif + +# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID +%define sshd_uid 74 +%define sshd_gid 74 + +# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) +%define no_gnome_askpass 0 + +# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) +%define static_libcrypto 0 + +# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass +%define gtk2 1 + +# Build position-independent executables (requires toolchain support)? +%define pie 1 + +# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) +%define kerberos5 1 + +# Do we want libedit support +%define libedit 1 + +# Do we want LDAP support +%define ldap 1 + +# Whether to build pam_ssh_agent_auth +%if 0%{?!nopam:1} +%define pam_ssh_agent 1 +%else +%define pam_ssh_agent 0 +%endif + +# Reserve options to override askpass settings with: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' +%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1} + +# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. +# Red Hat Linux <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' +%{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0} + +# Options for static OpenSSL link: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" +%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1} + +# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) +%define rescue 0 +%{?build_rescue:%global rescue 1} +%{?build_rescue:%global rescue_rel rescue} + +# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds +%if %{rescue} +%define kerberos5 0 +%define libedit 0 +%define pam_ssh_agent 0 +%endif + +# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 +%define openssh_ver 6.4p1 +%define openssh_rel 1 +%define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.9.3 +%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 1 + +Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2 +Name: openssh +Version: %{openssh_ver} +Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel} +URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html +#URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net +Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +#Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc +Source2: sshd.pam +Source3: sshd.init +Source4: http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/pamsshagentauth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.bz2 +Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders +Source6: ssh-keycat.pam +Source7: sshd.sysconfig +Source9: sshd@.service +Source10: sshd.socket +Source11: sshd.service +Source12: sshd-keygen.service +Source13: sshd-keygen + +# Internal debug +Patch0: openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch + +#? +Patch100: openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1872 +Patch101: openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1894 +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=735889 +Patch102: openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1889 +Patch103: openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch + +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402 +Patch200: openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch + +# --- pam_ssh-agent --- +# make it build reusing the openssh sources +Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch +# check return value of seteuid() +Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch +# explicitly make pam callbacks visible +Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch +# don't use xfree (#1024965) +Patch303: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX) +Patch400: openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634 +Patch404: openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch + +#?-- unwanted child :( +Patch501: openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch +#? +Patch502: openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch + +#http6://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644 +Patch601: openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1701 +Patch602: openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch +#http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/src/crypto/dist/ssh/Attic/sftp-glob.c.diff?r1=1.13&r2=1.13.12.1&f=h +Patch603: openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893 +Patch604: openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329 (WONTFIX) +Patch605: openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925 +Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch +#? +Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch +#? +Patch608: openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789 +Patch609: openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch + +#? +Patch700: openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch +#? +Patch701: openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch +#? +Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch +#? +Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch +#? +Patch704: openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch +#? +Patch705: openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch +#? +Patch706: openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX) +Patch707: openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1890 (WONTFIX) need integration to prng helper which is discontinued :) +Patch708: openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1640 (WONTFIX) +Patch709: openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch +# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545) +Patch711: openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch +# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL +Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch +# add cavs test binary for the aes-ctr +Patch713: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch + + +#http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html +#changed cache storage type - #848228 +Patch800: openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch +#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html +Patch801: openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch +Patch900: openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780 +Patch901: openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch +# use default_ccache_name from /etc/krb5.conf (#991186) +Patch902: openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch +# increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups (#1010607) +Patch903: openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch +# don't test ecdsa-521 keys (#969342) +Patch1000: openssh-6.2p2-dont-test-ecdsa-521-keys.patch + + +License: BSD +Group: Applications/Internet +BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n) +Requires: /sbin/nologin + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +%if %{gtk2} +BuildRequires: gtk2-devel +BuildRequires: libX11-devel +%else +BuildRequires: gnome-libs-devel +%endif +%endif + +%if %{ldap} +BuildRequires: openldap-devel +%endif +BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl, zlib-devel +BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5 +BuildRequires: util-linux, groff +BuildRequires: pam-devel +BuildRequires: tcp_wrappers-devel +BuildRequires: fipscheck-devel >= 1.3.0 +BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j +BuildRequires: perl-podlators + +%if %{kerberos5} +BuildRequires: krb5-devel +%endif + +%if %{libedit} +BuildRequires: libedit-devel ncurses-devel +%endif + +%if %{WITH_SELINUX} +Requires: libselinux >= 1.27.7 +BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.27.7 +Requires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8 +BuildRequires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8 +%endif + +BuildRequires: xauth + +%package clients +Summary: An open source SSH client applications +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Requires: fipscheck-lib%{_isa} >= 1.3.0 + +%package server +Summary: An open source SSH server daemon +Group: System Environment/Daemons +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd +Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3 +Requires: fipscheck-lib%{_isa} >= 1.3.0 +Requires(post): systemd-units +Requires(preun): systemd-units +Requires(postun): systemd-units + +# Not yet ready +# %package server-ondemand +# Summary: Systemd unit file to run an ondemand OpenSSH server +# Group: System Environment/Daemons +# Requires: %{name}-server%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} + +%package server-sysvinit +Summary: The SysV initscript to manage the OpenSSH server. +Group: System Environment/Daemons +Requires: %{name}-server%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} + +%if %{ldap} +%package ldap +Summary: A LDAP support for open source SSH server daemon +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Group: System Environment/Daemons +%endif + +%package keycat +Summary: A mls keycat backend for openssh +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Group: System Environment/Daemons + +%package askpass +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: openssh-askpass-gnome +Provides: openssh-askpass-gnome + +%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth +Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent +Group: System Environment/Base +Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel} +License: BSD + +%description +SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing +commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and +rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two +untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing +it up to date in terms of security and features. + +This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH +client and server. To make this package useful, you should also +install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. + +%description clients +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes +the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. + +%description server +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to +securely connect to your SSH server. + +%description server-sysvinit +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +the SysV init script to manage the OpenSSH server when running a legacy +SysV-compatible init system. + +It is not required when the init system used is systemd. + +%if %{ldap} +%description ldap +OpenSSH LDAP backend is a way how to distribute the authorized tokens +among the servers in the network. +%endif + +%description keycat +OpenSSH mls keycat is backend for using the authorized keys in the +openssh in the mls mode. + +%description askpass +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. + +%description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth +This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate +users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the +forwarding of ssh-agent connection it also allows to authenticate with +remote ssh-agent instance. + +The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks. + +%prep +%setup -q -a 4 +#Do not enable by default +%if 0 +%patch0 -p1 -b .wIm +%endif + +%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity +%patch101 -p1 -b .fingerprint +%patch102 -p1 -b .getaddrinfo +%patch103 -p1 -b .packet + +%patch200 -p1 -b .audit + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +%patch300 -p1 -b .psaa-build +%patch301 -p1 -b .psaa-seteuid +%patch302 -p1 -b .psaa-visibility +%patch303 -p1 -b .psaa-xfree +# Remove duplicate headers +rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE5}) +popd +%endif + +%if %{WITH_SELINUX} +%patch400 -p1 -b .role-mls +%patch404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux +%endif + +%if %{ldap} +%patch501 -p1 -b .ldap +%endif +%patch502 -p1 -b .keycat + +%patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts +%patch602 -p1 -b .randclean +%patch603 -p1 -b .glob +%patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm +%patch605 -p1 -b .remove_stale +%patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man +%patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe +%patch608 -p1 -b .askpass-ld +%patch609 -p1 -b .x11 + +%patch700 -p1 -b .fips +%patch701 -p1 -b .exit-deadlock +%patch702 -p1 -b .progress +%patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info +%patch704 -p1 -b .edns +%patch705 -p1 -b .manpage +%patch706 -p1 -b .localdomain +%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat +%patch708 -p1 -b .entropy +%patch709 -p1 -b .vendor +%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no +%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr +%patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs + +%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex +%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb + +%patch900 -p1 -b .canohost +%patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok +%patch902 -p1 -b .ccache_name +%patch903 -p1 -b .dh +%patch1000 -p1 -b .ecc + +%if 0 +# Nothing here yet +%endif + +autoreconf +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +autoreconf +popd + +%build +# the -fvisibility=hidden is needed for clean build of the pam_ssh_agent_auth +# and it makes the ssh build more clean and even optimized better +CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fvisibility=hidden"; export CFLAGS +%if %{rescue} +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Os" +%endif +%if %{pie} +%ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64 +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC" +%else +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fpic" +%endif +SAVE_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -pie -z relro -z now" + +export CFLAGS +export LDFLAGS + +%endif +%if %{kerberos5} +if test -r /etc/profile.d/krb5-devel.sh ; then + source /etc/profile.d/krb5-devel.sh +fi +krb5_prefix=`krb5-config --prefix` +if test "$krb5_prefix" != "%{_prefix}" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${krb5_prefix}/include -I${krb5_prefix}/include/gssapi"; export CPPFLAGS + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I${krb5_prefix}/include -I${krb5_prefix}/include/gssapi" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${krb5_prefix}/%{_lib}"; export LDFLAGS +else + krb5_prefix= + CPPFLAGS="-I%{_includedir}/gssapi"; export CPPFLAGS + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I%{_includedir}/gssapi" +fi +%endif + +%configure \ + --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ + --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ + --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ + --with-tcp-wrappers \ + --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \ + --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ + --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ + --enable-vendor-patchlevel="FC-%{version}-%{release}" \ + --disable-strip \ + --without-zlib-version-check \ + --with-ssl-engine \ + --with-ipaddr-display \ +%if %{ldap} + --with-ldap \ +%endif +%if %{rescue} + --without-pam \ +%else + --with-pam \ +%endif +%if %{WITH_SELINUX} + --with-selinux --with-audit=linux \ +%if 0 +#seccomp_filter cannot be build right now + --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \ +%else + --with-sandbox=rlimit \ +%endif +%endif +%if %{kerberos5} + --with-kerberos5${krb5_prefix:+=${krb5_prefix}} \ +%else + --without-kerberos5 \ +%endif +%if %{libedit} + --with-libedit +%else + --without-libedit +%endif + +%if %{static_libcrypto} +perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile +%endif + +make + +# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary +# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. +%if %{gtk2} + gtk2=yes +%else + gtk2=no +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +pushd contrib +if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then + make gnome-ssh-askpass2 + mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass +else + make gnome-ssh-askpass1 + mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass +fi +popd +%endif + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +LDFLAGS="$SAVE_LDFLAGS" +%configure --with-selinux --libexecdir=/%{_libdir}/security --with-mantype=man +make +popd +%endif + +# Add generation of HMAC checksums of the final stripped binaries +%define __spec_install_post \ + %{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \ + %{__arch_install_post} \ + %{__os_install_post} \ + fipshmac -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/fipscheck $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/sshd \ +%{nil} + +%check +#to run tests use "--with check" +%if %{?_with_check:1}%{!?_with_check:0} +make tests +%endif + +%install +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd +make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT +rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf + +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/fipscheck +install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +install -m644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat +install -m755 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd +install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/sshd +install -m755 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/sshd-keygen +install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir} +install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd@.service +install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket +install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service +install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.service +install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ +install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +ln -s gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +%endif + +%if %{no_gnome_askpass} +rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* +%endif + +perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT +popd +%endif +%clean +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT + +%pre +getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || : + +%pre server +getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || : +getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ + useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \ + -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /var/empty/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : + +%post server +%systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket + +%preun server +%systemd_preun sshd.service sshd.socket + +%postun server +%systemd_postun_with_restart sshd.service + +%triggerun -n openssh-server -- openssh-server < 5.8p2-12 +/usr/bin/systemd-sysv-convert --save sshd >/dev/null 2>&1 || : +/bin/systemctl enable sshd.service >/dev/null 2>&1 +/sbin/chkconfig --del sshd >/dev/null 2>&1 || : +/bin/systemctl try-restart sshd.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || : + +%triggerun -n openssh-server -- openssh-server < 5.9p1-22 +/bin/systemctl --no-reload disable sshd-keygen.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || : + +%triggerpostun -n openssh-server-sysvinit -- openssh-server < 5.8p2-12 +/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd >/dev/null 2>&1 || : + +%files +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns TODO +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli +%if ! %{rescue} +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh +%attr(2111,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ctr-cavstest +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* +%endif + +%files clients +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_libdir}/fipscheck/ssh.hmac +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* +%if ! %{rescue} +%attr(2111,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-copy-id +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* +%endif + +%if ! %{rescue} +%files server +%defattr(-,root,root) +%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd-keygen +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_libdir}/fipscheck/sshd.hmac +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd +%attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/sshd +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.service +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd@.service +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.service + +%files server-sysvinit +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0755,root,root) /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd +%endif + +%if %{ldap} +%files ldap +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema ldap.conf +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-ldap-helper +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-ldap-wrapper +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-ldap-helper.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh-ldap.conf.5* +%endif + +%files keycat +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keycat +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +%files askpass +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +%files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/security/pam_ssh_agent_auth.so +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/pam_ssh_agent_auth.8* +%endif + +%changelog +* Fri Nov 08 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.4p1-1 + 0.9.3-1 +- new upstream release + +* Fri Nov 01 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-4 + 0.9.3-7 +- adjust gss kex mechanism to the upstream changes (#1024004) +- don't use xfree in pam_ssh_agent_auth sources (#1024965) + +* Thu Oct 24 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-3 + 0.9.3-6 +- don't use SSH_FP_MD5 for fingerprints in FIPS mode (#1020948) + +* Wed Oct 23 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-2 + 0.9.3-6 +- use default_ccache_name from /etc/krb5.conf for a kerberos cache (#991186) +- increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups (#1010607) +- sshd-keygen to generate ECDSA keys (#1019222) + +* Mon Oct 14 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-1 + 0.9.3-6 +- new upstream release (#1013635) + +* Tue Oct 08 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-9 + 0.9.3-5 +- use dracut-fips package to determine if a FIPS module is installed (#1001566) +- revert -fips subpackages and hmac files suffixes + +* Wed Sep 25 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-8 + 0.9.3-5 +- sshd-keygen: generate only RSA keys by default (#1010361) +- use dist tag in suffixes for hmac checksum files + +* Wed Sep 11 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-7 + 0.9.3-5 +- use hmac_suffix for ssh{,d} hmac checksums +- bump the minimum value of SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG to 14 according to SP800-131A +- automatically restart sshd.service on-failure after 42s interval + +* Thu Aug 29 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-6.1 + 0.9.3-5 +- add -fips subpackages that contains the FIPS module files + +* Wed Jul 31 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-5 + 0.9.3-5 +- gssapi credentials need to be stored before a pam session opened (#987792) + +* Tue Jul 23 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-4 + 0.9.3-5 +- don't show Success for EAI_SYSTEM (#985964) +- make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware (#841771) + +* Mon Jun 17 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-3 + 0.9.3-5 +- move default gssapi cache to /run/user/ (#848228) + +* Tue May 21 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-2 + 0.9.3-5 +- add socket activated sshd units to the package (#963268) +- fix the example in the HOWTO.ldap-keys + +* Mon May 20 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-1 + 0.9.3-5 +- new upstream release (#963582) + +* Wed Apr 17 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-4 + 0.9.3-4 +- don't use export in sysconfig file (#953111) + +* Tue Apr 16 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-3 + 0.9.3-4 +- sshd.service: use KillMode=process (#890376) +- add latest config.{sub,guess} to support aarch64 (#926284) + +* Tue Apr 09 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-2 + 0.9.3-4 +- keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and + which were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. + (mindrot#2084) + +* Tue Apr 09 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-1 + 0.9.3-4 +- new upstream release (#924727) + +* Wed Mar 06 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-7 + 0.9.3-3 +- use SELinux type sshd_net_t for [net] childs (#915085) + +* Thu Feb 14 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-6 + 0.9.3-3 +- fix AuthorizedKeysCommand option + +* Fri Feb 08 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-5 + 0.9.3-3 +- change default value of MaxStartups - CVE-2010-5107 (#908707) + +* Mon Dec 03 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-4 + 0.9.3-3 +- fix segfault in openssh-5.8p2-force_krb.patch (#882541) + +* Mon Dec 03 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-3 + 0.9.3-3 +- replace RequiredAuthentications2 with AuthenticationMethods based on upstream +- obsolete RequiredAuthentications[12] options +- fix openssh-6.1p1-privsep-selinux.patch + +* Fri Oct 26 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-2 +- add SELinux comment to /etc/ssh/sshd_config about SELinux command to modify port (#861400) +- drop required chkconfig (#865498) +- drop openssh-5.9p1-sftp-chroot.patch (#830237) + +* Sat Sep 15 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-1 + 0.9.3-3 +- new upstream release (#852651) +- use DIR: kerberos type cache (#848228) +- don't use chroot_user_t for chrooted users (#830237) +- replace scriptlets with systemd macros (#850249) +- don't use /bin and /sbin paths (#856590) + +* Mon Aug 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.0p1-1 + 0.9.3-2 +- new upstream release + +* Mon Aug 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-26 + 0.9.3-1 +- change SELinux context also for root user (#827109) + +* Fri Jul 27 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-25 + 0.9.3-1 +- fix various issues in openssh-5.9p1-required-authentications.patch + +* Tue Jul 17 2012 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-24 + 0.9.3-1 +- allow sha256 and sha512 hmacs in the FIPS mode + +* Fri Jun 22 2012 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-23 + 0.9.3-1 +- fix segfault in su when pam_ssh_agent_auth is used and the ssh-agent + is not running, most probably not exploitable +- update pam_ssh_agent_auth to 0.9.3 upstream version + +* Fri Apr 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-22 + 0.9.2-32 +- don't create RSA1 key in FIPS mode +- don't install sshd-keygen.service (#810419) + +* Fri Mar 30 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-21 + 0.9.2-32 +- fix various issues in openssh-5.9p1-required-authentications.patch + +* Wed Mar 21 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-20 + 0.9.2-32 +- Fix dependencies in systemd units, don't enable sshd-keygen.service (#805338) + +* Wed Feb 22 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-19 + 0.9.2-32 +- Look for x11 forward sockets with AI_ADDRCONFIG flag getaddrinfo (#735889) + +* Mon Feb 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-18 + 0.9.2-32 +- replace TwoFactorAuth with RequiredAuthentications[12] + https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=983 + +* Tue Jan 31 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-17 + 0.9.2-32 +- run privsep slave process as the users SELinux context (#781634) + +* Tue Dec 13 2011 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-16 + 0.9.2-32 +- add CAVS test driver for the aes-ctr ciphers + +* Sun Dec 11 2011 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-15 + 0.9.2-32 +- enable aes-ctr ciphers use the EVP engines from OpenSSL such as the AES-NI + +* Tue Dec 06 2011 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-14 + 0.9.2-32 +- warn about unsupported option UsePAM=no (#757545) + +* Mon Nov 21 2011 Tomas Mraz - 5.9p1-13 + 0.9.2-32 +- add back the restorecon call to ssh-copy-id - it might be needed on older + distributions (#739989) + +* Fri Nov 18 2011 Tomas Mraz - 5.9p1-12 + 0.9.2-32 +- still support /etc/sysconfig/sshd loading in sshd service (#754732) +- fix incorrect key permissions generated by sshd-keygen script (#754779) + +* Fri Oct 14 2011 Tomas Mraz - 5.9p1-11 + 0.9.2-32 +- remove unnecessary requires on initscripts +- set VerifyHostKeyDNS to ask in the default configuration (#739856) + +* Mon Sep 19 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-10 + 0.9.2-32 +- selinux sandbox rewrite +- two factor authentication tweaking + +* Wed Sep 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-9 + 0.9.2-32 +- coverity upgrade +- wipe off nonfunctional nss +- selinux sandbox tweaking + +* Tue Sep 13 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-8 + 0.9.2-32 +- coverity upgrade +- experimental selinux sandbox + +* Tue Sep 13 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-7 + 0.9.2-32 +- fully reanable auditing + +* Mon Sep 12 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-6 + 0.9.2-32 +- repair signedness in akc patch + +* Mon Sep 12 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-5 + 0.9.2-32 +- temporarily disable part of audit4 patch + +* Fri Sep 9 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-3 + 0.9.2-32 +- Coverity second pass +- Reenable akc patch + +* Thu Sep 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-2 + 0.9.2-32 +- Coverity first pass + +* Wed Sep 7 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-1 + 0.9.2-32 +- Rebase to 5.9p1 +- Add chroot sftp patch +- Add two factor auth patch + +* Tue Aug 23 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-21 + 0.9.2-31 +- ignore SIGPIPE in ssh keyscan + +* Tue Aug 9 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-20 + 0.9.2-31 +- save ssh-askpass's debuginfo + +* Mon Aug 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-19 + 0.9.2-31 +- compile ssh-askpass with corect CFLAGS + +* Mon Aug 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-18 + 0.9.2-31 +- improve selinux's change context log + +* Mon Aug 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-17 + 0.9.2-31 +- repair broken man pages + +* Mon Jul 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-16 + 0.9.2-31 +- rebuild due to broken rpmbiild + +* Thu Jul 21 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-15 + 0.9.2-31 +- Do not change context when run under unconfined_t + +* Thu Jul 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-14 + 0.9.2-31 +- Add postlogin to pam. (#718807) + +* Tue Jun 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-12 + 0.9.2-31 +- Systemd compatibility according to Mathieu Bridon +- Split out the host keygen into their own command, to ease future migration + to systemd. Compatitbility with the init script was kept. +- Migrate the package to full native systemd unit files, according to the Fedora + packaging guidelines. +- Prepate the unit files for running an ondemand server. (do not add it actually) + +* Tue Jun 21 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-10 + 0.9.2-31 +- Mention IPv6 usage in man pages + +* Mon Jun 20 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-9 + 0.9.2-31 +- Improve init script + +* Thu Jun 16 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-7 + 0.9.2-31 +- Add possibility to compile openssh without downstream patches + +* Thu Jun 9 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-6 + 0.9.2-31 +- remove stale control sockets (#706396) + +* Tue May 31 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-5 + 0.9.2-31 +- improove entropy manuals + +* Fri May 27 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-4 + 0.9.2-31 +- improove entropy handling +- concat ldap patches + +* Tue May 24 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-3 + 0.9.2-31 +- improove ldap manuals + +* Mon May 23 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-2 + 0.9.2-31 +- add gssapi forced command + +* Tue May 3 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-1 + 0.9.2-31 +- update the openssh version + +* Thu Apr 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-34 + 0.9.2-30 +- temporarily disabling systemd units + +* Wed Apr 27 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-33 + 0.9.2-30 +- add flags AI_V4MAPPED and AI_ADDRCONFIG to getaddrinfo + +* Tue Apr 26 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-32 + 0.9.2-30 +- update scriptlets + +* Fri Apr 22 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-30 + 0.9.2-30 +- add systemd units + +* Fri Apr 22 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-28 + 0.9.2-30 +- improving sshd -> passwd transation +- add template for .local domain to sshd_config + +* Thu Apr 21 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-27 + 0.9.2-30 +- the private keys may be 640 root:ssh_keys ssh_keysign is sgid + +* Wed Apr 20 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-26 + 0.9.2-30 +- improving sshd -> passwd transation + +* Tue Apr 5 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-25 + 0.9.2-30 +- the intermediate context is set to sshd_sftpd_t +- do not crash in packet.c if no connection + +* Thu Mar 31 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-24 + 0.9.2-30 +- resolve warnings in port_linux.c + +* Tue Mar 29 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-23 + 0.9.2-30 +- add /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +* Mon Mar 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-22 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve reseeding and seed source (documentation) + +* Tue Mar 22 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-20 + 0.9.2-30 +- use /dev/random or /dev/urandom for seeding prng +- improve periodical reseeding of random generator + +* Thu Mar 17 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-18 + 0.9.2-30 +- add periodical reseeding of random generator +- change selinux contex for internal sftp in do_usercontext +- exit(0) after sigterm + +* Thu Mar 10 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-17 + 0.9.2-30 +- improove ssh-ldap (documentation) + +* Tue Mar 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-16 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve session keys audit + +* Mon Mar 7 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-15 + 0.9.2-30 +- CVE-2010-4755 + +* Fri Mar 4 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-14 + 0.9.2-30 +- improove ssh-keycat (documentation) + +* Thu Mar 3 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-13 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve audit of logins and auths + +* Tue Mar 1 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-12 + 0.9.2-30 +- improove ssk-keycat + +* Mon Feb 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-11 + 0.9.2-30 +- add ssk-keycat + +* Fri Feb 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-10 + 0.9.2-30 +- reenable auth-keys ldap backend + +* Fri Feb 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-9 + 0.9.2-30 +- another audit improovements + +* Thu Feb 24 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-8 + 0.9.2-30 +- another audit improovements +- switchable fingerprint mode + +* Thu Feb 17 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-4 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve audit of server key management + +* Wed Feb 16 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-3 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve audit of logins and auths + +* Mon Feb 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-1 + 0.9.2-30 +- bump openssh version to 5.8p1 + +* Tue Feb 08 2011 Fedora Release Engineering - 5.6p1-30.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_15_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Feb 7 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-30 + 0.9.2-29 +- clean the data structures in the non privileged process +- clean the data structures when roaming + +* Wed Feb 2 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-28 + 0.9.2-29 +- clean the data structures in the privileged process + +* Tue Jan 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-25 + 0.9.2-29 +- clean the data structures before exit net process + +* Mon Jan 17 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-24 + 0.9.2-29 +- make audit compatible with the fips mode + +* Fri Jan 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-23 + 0.9.2-29 +- add audit of destruction the server keys + +* Wed Jan 12 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-22 + 0.9.2-29 +- add audit of destruction the session keys + +* Fri Dec 10 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-21 + 0.9.2-29 +- reenable run sshd as non root user +- renable rekeying + +* Wed Nov 24 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-20 + 0.9.2-29 +- reapair clientloop crash (#627332) +- properly restore euid in case connect to the ssh-agent socket fails + +* Mon Nov 22 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-19 + 0.9.2-28 +- striped read permissions from suid and sgid binaries + +* Mon Nov 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-18 + 0.9.2-27 +- used upstream version of the biguid patch + +* Mon Nov 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-17 + 0.9.2-27 +- improoved kuserok patch + +* Fri Nov 5 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-16 + 0.9.2-27 +- add auditing the host based key ussage +- repait X11 abstract layer socket (#648896) + +* Wed Nov 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-15 + 0.9.2-27 +- add auditing the kex result + +* Tue Nov 2 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-14 + 0.9.2-27 +- add auditing the key ussage + +* Wed Oct 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-12 + 0.9.2-27 +- update gsskex patch (#645389) + +* Wed Oct 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-11 + 0.9.2-27 +- rebase linux audit according to upstream + +* Fri Oct 1 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-10 + 0.9.2-27 +- add missing headers to linux audit + +* Wed Sep 29 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-9 + 0.9.2-27 +- audit module now uses openssh audit framevork + +* Wed Sep 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-8 + 0.9.2-27 +- Add the GSSAPI kuserok switch to the kuserok patch + +* Wed Sep 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-7 + 0.9.2-27 +- Repaired the kuserok patch + +* Mon Sep 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-6 + 0.9.2-27 +- Repaired the problem with puting entries with very big uid into lastlog + +* Mon Sep 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-5 + 0.9.2-27 +- Merging selabel patch with the upstream version. (#632914) + +* Mon Sep 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-4 + 0.9.2-27 +- Tweaking selabel patch to work properly without selinux rules loaded. (#632914) + +* Wed Sep 8 2010 Tomas Mraz - 5.6p1-3 + 0.9.2-27 +- Make fipscheck hmacs compliant with FHS - requires new fipscheck + +* Fri Sep 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-2 + 0.9.2-27 +- Added -z relro -z now to LDFLAGS + +* Fri Sep 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-1 + 0.9.2-27 +- Rebased to openssh5.6p1 + +* Wed Jul 7 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-18 + 0.9.2-26 +- merged with newer bugzilla's version of authorized keys command patch + +* Wed Jun 30 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-17 + 0.9.2-26 +- improved the x11 patch according to upstream (#598671) + +* Fri Jun 25 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-16 + 0.9.2-26 +- improved the x11 patch (#598671) + +* Thu Jun 24 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-15 + 0.9.2-26 +- changed _PATH_UNIX_X to unexistent file name (#598671) + +* Wed Jun 23 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-14 + 0.9.2-26 +- sftp works in deviceless chroot again (broken from 5.5p1-3) + +* Tue Jun 8 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-13 + 0.9.2-26 +- add option to switch out krb5_kuserok + +* Fri May 21 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-12 + 0.9.2-26 +- synchronize uid and gid for the user sshd + +* Thu May 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-11 + 0.9.2-26 +- Typo in ssh-ldap.conf(5) and ssh-ladap-helper(8) + +* Fri May 14 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-10 + 0.9.2-26 +- Repair the reference in man ssh-ldap-helper(8) +- Repair the PubkeyAgent section in sshd_config(5) +- Provide example ldap.conf + +* Thu May 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-9 + 0.9.2-26 +- Make the Ldap configuration widely compatible +- create the aditional docs for LDAP support. + +* Thu May 6 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-8 + 0.9.2-26 +- Make LDAP config elements TLS_CACERT and TLS_REQCERT compatiple with pam_ldap (#589360) + +* Thu May 6 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-7 + 0.9.2-26 +- Make LDAP config element tls_checkpeer compatiple with nss_ldap (#589360) + +* Tue May 4 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-6 + 0.9.2-26 +- Comment spec.file +- Sync patches from upstream + +* Mon May 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-5 + 0.9.2-26 +- Create separate ldap package +- Tweak the ldap patch +- Rename stderr patch properly + +* Thu Apr 29 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-4 + 0.9.2-26 +- Added LDAP support + +* Mon Apr 26 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-3 + 0.9.2-26 +- Ignore .bashrc output to stderr in the subsystems + +* Tue Apr 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-2 + 0.9.2-26 +- Drop dependency on man + +* Fri Apr 16 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-1 + 0.9.2-26 +- Update to 5.5p1 + +* Fri Mar 12 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-3 + 0.9.2-25 +- repair configure script of pam_ssh_agent +- repair error mesage in ssh-keygen + +* Fri Mar 12 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-2 +- source krb5-devel profile script only if exists + +* Tue Mar 9 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-1 +- Update to 5.4p1 +- discontinued support for nss-keys +- discontinued support for scard + +* Wed Mar 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-0.snap20100302.1 +- Prepare update to 5.4p1 + +* Mon Feb 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-22 +- ImplicitDSOLinking (#564824) + +* Fri Jan 29 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-21 +- Allow to use hardware crypto if awailable (#559555) + +* Mon Jan 25 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-20 +- optimized FD_CLOEXEC on accept socket (#541809) + +* Mon Jan 25 2010 Tomas Mraz - 5.3p1-19 +- updated pam_ssh_agent_auth to new version from upstream (just + a licence change) + +* Thu Jan 21 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-18 +- optimized RAND_cleanup patch (#557166) + +* Wed Jan 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-17 +- add RAND_cleanup at the exit of each program using RAND (#557166) + +* Tue Jan 19 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-16 +- set FD_CLOEXEC on accepted socket (#541809) + +* Fri Jan 8 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-15 +- replaced define by global in macros + +* Tue Jan 5 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-14 +- Update the pka patch + +* Mon Dec 21 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-13 +- Update the audit patch + +* Fri Dec 4 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-12 +- Add possibility to autocreate only RSA key into initscript (#533339) + +* Fri Nov 27 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-11 +- Prepare NSS key patch for future SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD (#537411) + +* Tue Nov 24 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-10 +- Update NSS key patch (#537411, #356451) + +* Fri Nov 20 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-9 +- Add gssapi key exchange patch (#455351) + +* Fri Nov 20 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-8 +- Add public key agent patch (#455350) + +* Mon Nov 2 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-7 +- Repair canohost patch to allow gssapi to work when host is acessed via pipe proxy (#531849) + +* Thu Oct 29 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-6 +- Modify the init script to prevent it to hang during generating the keys (#515145) + +* Tue Oct 27 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-5 +- Add README.nss + +* Mon Oct 19 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.3p1-4 +- Add pam_ssh_agent_auth module to a subpackage. + +* Fri Oct 16 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-3 +- Reenable audit. + +* Fri Oct 2 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-2 +- Upgrade to new wersion 5.3p1 + +* Tue Sep 29 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-29 +- Resolve locking in ssh-add (#491312) + +* Thu Sep 24 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-28 +- Repair initscript to be acord to guidelines (#521860) +- Add bugzilla# to application of edns and xmodifiers patch + +* Wed Sep 16 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-26 +- Changed pam stack to password-auth + +* Fri Sep 11 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-25 +- Dropped homechroot patch + +* Mon Sep 7 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-24 +- Add check for nosuid, nodev in homechroot + +* Tue Sep 1 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-23 +- add correct patch for ip-opts + +* Tue Sep 1 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-22 +- replace ip-opts patch by an upstream candidate version + +* Mon Aug 31 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-21 +- rearange selinux patch to be acceptable for upstream +- replace seftp patch by an upstream version + +* Fri Aug 28 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-20 +- merged xmodifiers to redhat patch +- merged gssapi-role to selinux patch +- merged cve-2007_3102 to audit patch +- sesftp patch only with WITH_SELINUX flag +- rearange sesftp patch according to upstream request + +* Wed Aug 26 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-19 +- minor change in sesftp patch + +* Fri Aug 21 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-18 +- rebuilt with new openssl + +* Thu Jul 30 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-17 +- Added dnssec support. (#205842) + +* Sat Jul 25 2009 Fedora Release Engineering - 5.2p1-16 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_12_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jul 24 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-15 +- only INTERNAL_SFTP can be home-chrooted +- save _u and _r parts of context changing to sftpd_t + +* Fri Jul 17 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-14 +- changed internal-sftp context to sftpd_t + +* Fri Jul 3 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-13 +- changed home length path patch to upstream version + +* Tue Jun 30 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-12 +- create '~/.ssh/known_hosts' within proper context + +* Mon Jun 29 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-11 +- length of home path in ssh now limited by PATH_MAX +- correct timezone with daylight processing + +* Sat Jun 27 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-10 +- final version chroot %%h (sftp only) + +* Tue Jun 23 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-9 +- repair broken ls in chroot %%h + +* Fri Jun 12 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-8 +- add XMODIFIERS to exported environment (#495690) + +* Fri May 15 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-6 +- allow only protocol 2 in the FIPS mode + +* Thu Apr 30 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-5 +- do integrity verification only on binaries which are part + of the OpenSSH FIPS modules + +* Mon Apr 20 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-4 +- log if FIPS mode is initialized +- make aes-ctr cipher modes work in the FIPS mode + +* Fri Apr 3 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-3 +- fix logging after chroot +- enable non root users to use chroot %%h in internal-sftp + +* Fri Mar 13 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-2 +- add AES-CTR ciphers to the FIPS mode proposal + +* Mon Mar 9 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-1 +- upgrade to new upstream release + +* Thu Feb 26 2009 Fedora Release Engineering - 5.1p1-8 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_11_Mass_Rebuild + +* Thu Feb 12 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-7 +- drop obsolete triggers +- add testing FIPS mode support +- LSBize the initscript (#247014) + +* Fri Jan 30 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-6 +- enable use of ssl engines (#481100) + +* Thu Jan 15 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-5 +- remove obsolete --with-rsh (#478298) +- add pam_sepermit to allow blocking confined users in permissive mode + (#471746) +- move system-auth after pam_selinux in the session stack + +* Thu Dec 11 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-4 +- set FD_CLOEXEC on channel sockets (#475866) +- adjust summary +- adjust nss-keys patch so it is applicable without selinux patches (#470859) + +* Fri Oct 17 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-3 +- fix compatibility with some servers (#466818) + +* Thu Jul 31 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-2 +- fixed zero length banner problem (#457326) + +* Wed Jul 23 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-1 +- upgrade to new upstream release +- fixed a problem with public key authentication and explicitely + specified SELinux role + +* Wed May 21 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.0p1-3 +- pass the connection socket to ssh-keysign (#447680) + +* Mon May 19 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.0p1-2 +- add LANGUAGE to accepted/sent environment variables (#443231) +- use pam_selinux to obtain the user context instead of doing it itself +- unbreak server keep alive settings (patch from upstream) +- small addition to scp manpage + +* Mon Apr 7 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.0p1-1 +- upgrade to new upstream (#441066) +- prevent initscript from killing itself on halt with upstart (#438449) +- initscript status should show that the daemon is running + only when the main daemon is still alive (#430882) + +* Thu Mar 6 2008 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-10 +- fix race on control master and cleanup stale control socket (#436311) + patches by David Woodhouse + +* Fri Feb 29 2008 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-9 +- set FD_CLOEXEC on client socket +- apply real fix for window size problem (#286181) from upstream +- apply fix for the spurious failed bind from upstream +- apply open handle leak in sftp fix from upstream + +* Tue Feb 12 2008 Dennis Gilmore - 4.7p1-8 +- we build for sparcv9 now and it needs -fPIE + +* Thu Jan 3 2008 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-7 +- fix gssapi auth with explicit selinux role requested (#427303) - patch + by Nalin Dahyabhai + +* Tue Dec 4 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-6 +- explicitly source krb5-devel profile script + +* Tue Dec 04 2007 Release Engineering - 4.7p1-5 +- Rebuild for openssl bump + +* Tue Nov 20 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-4 +- do not copy /etc/localtime into the chroot as it is not + necessary anymore (#193184) +- call setkeycreatecon when selinux context is established +- test for NULL privk when freeing key (#391871) - patch by + Pierre Ossman + +* Mon Sep 17 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-2 +- revert default window size adjustments (#286181) + +* Thu Sep 6 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-1 +- upgrade to latest upstream +- use libedit in sftp (#203009) +- fixed audit log injection problem (CVE-2007-3102) + +* Thu Aug 9 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-8 +- fix sftp client problems on write error (#247802) +- allow disabling autocreation of server keys (#235466) + +* Wed Jun 20 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-7 +- experimental NSS keys support +- correctly setup context when empty level requested (#234951) + +* Tue Mar 20 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-6 +- mls level check must be done with default role same as requested + +* Mon Mar 19 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-5 +- make profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* regular files (#226218) + +* Tue Feb 27 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-4 +- reject connection if requested mls range is not obtained (#229278) + +* Thu Feb 22 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-3 +- improve Buildroot +- remove duplicate /etc/ssh from files + +* Tue Jan 16 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-2 +- support mls on labeled networks (#220487) +- support mls level selection on unlabeled networks +- allow / in usernames in scp (only beginning /, ./, and ../ is special) + +* Thu Dec 21 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-1 +- update to 4.5p1 (#212606) + +* Thu Nov 30 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-14 +- fix gssapi with DNS loadbalanced clusters (#216857) + +* Tue Nov 28 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-13 +- improved pam_session patch so it doesn't regress, the patch is necessary + for the pam_session_close to be called correctly as uid 0 + +* Fri Nov 10 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-12 +- CVE-2006-5794 - properly detect failed key verify in monitor (#214641) + +* Thu Nov 2 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-11 +- merge sshd initscript patches +- kill all ssh sessions when stop is called in halt or reboot runlevel +- remove -TERM option from killproc so we don't race on sshd restart + +* Mon Oct 2 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-10 +- improve gssapi-no-spnego patch (#208102) +- CVE-2006-4924 - prevent DoS on deattack detector (#207957) +- CVE-2006-5051 - don't call cleanups from signal handler (#208459) + +* Wed Aug 23 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-9 +- don't report duplicate syslog messages, use correct local time (#189158) +- don't allow spnego as gssapi mechanism (from upstream) +- fixed memleaks found by Coverity (from upstream) +- allow ip options except source routing (#202856) (patch by HP) + +* Tue Aug 8 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-8 +- drop the pam-session patch from the previous build (#201341) +- don't set IPV6_V6ONLY sock opt when listening on wildcard addr (#201594) + +* Thu Jul 20 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-7 +- dropped old ssh obsoletes +- call the pam_session_open/close from the monitor when privsep is + enabled so it is always called as root (patch by Darren Tucker) + +* Mon Jul 17 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-6 +- improve selinux patch (by Jan Kiszka) +- upstream patch for buffer append space error (#191940) +- fixed typo in configure.ac (#198986) +- added pam_keyinit to pam configuration (#198628) +- improved error message when askpass dialog cannot grab + keyboard input (#198332) +- buildrequires xauth instead of xorg-x11-xauth +- fixed a few rpmlint warnings + +* Wed Jul 12 2006 Jesse Keating - 4.3p2-5.1 +- rebuild + +* Fri Apr 14 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-5 +- don't request pseudoterminal allocation if stdin is not tty (#188983) + +* Thu Mar 2 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-4 +- allow access if audit is not compiled in kernel (#183243) + +* Fri Feb 24 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-3 +- enable the subprocess in chroot to send messages to system log +- sshd should prevent login if audit call fails + +* Tue Feb 21 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-2 +- print error from scp if not remote (patch by Bjorn Augustsson #178923) + +* Mon Feb 13 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-1 +- new version + +* Fri Feb 10 2006 Jesse Keating - 4.3p1-2.1 +- bump again for double-long bug on ppc(64) + +* Mon Feb 6 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p1-2 +- fixed another place where syslog was called in signal handler +- pass locale environment variables to server, accept them there (#179851) + +* Wed Feb 1 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p1-1 +- new version, dropped obsolete patches + +* Tue Dec 20 2005 Tomas Mraz - 4.2p1-10 +- hopefully make the askpass dialog less confusing (#174765) + +* Fri Dec 09 2005 Jesse Keating +- rebuilt + +* Tue Nov 22 2005 Tomas Mraz - 4.2p1-9 +- drop x11-ssh-askpass from the package +- drop old build_6x ifs from spec file +- improve gnome-ssh-askpass so it doesn't reveal number of passphrase + characters to person looking at the display +- less hackish fix for the __USE_GNU problem + +* Fri Nov 18 2005 Nalin Dahyabhai - 4.2p1-8 +- work around missing gccmakedep by wrapping makedepend in a local script +- remove now-obsolete build dependency on "xauth" + +* Thu Nov 17 2005 Warren Togami - 4.2p1-7 +- xorg-x11-devel -> libXt-devel +- rebuild for new xauth location so X forwarding works +- buildreq audit-libs-devel +- buildreq automake for aclocal +- buildreq imake for xmkmf +- -D_GNU_SOURCE in flags in order to get it to build + Ugly hack to workaround openssh defining __USE_GNU which is + not allowed and causes problems according to Ulrich Drepper + fix this the correct way after FC5test1 + +* Wed Nov 9 2005 Jeremy Katz - 4.2p1-6 +- rebuild against new openssl + +* Fri Oct 28 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-5 +- put back the possibility to skip SELinux patch +- add patch for user login auditing by Steve Grubb + +* Tue Oct 18 2005 Dan Walsh 4.2p1-4 +- Change selinux patch to use get_default_context_with_rolelevel in libselinux. + +* Thu Oct 13 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-3 +- Update selinux patch to use getseuserbyname + +* Fri Oct 7 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-2 +- use include instead of pam_stack in pam config +- use fork+exec instead of system in scp - CVE-2006-0225 (#168167) +- upstream patch for displaying authentication errors + +* Tue Sep 06 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-1 +- upgrade to a new upstream version + +* Tue Aug 16 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-5 +- use x11-ssh-askpass if openssh-askpass-gnome is not installed (#165207) +- install ssh-copy-id from contrib (#88707) + +* Wed Jul 27 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-4 +- don't deadlock on exit with multiple X forwarded channels (#152432) +- don't use X11 port which can't be bound on all IP families (#163732) + +* Wed Jun 29 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-3 +- fix small regression caused by the nologin patch (#161956) +- fix race in getpeername error checking (mindrot #1054) + +* Thu Jun 9 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-2 +- use only pam_nologin for nologin testing + +* Mon Jun 6 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-1 +- upgrade to a new upstream version +- call pam_loginuid as a pam session module + +* Mon May 16 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.0p1-3 +- link libselinux only to sshd (#157678) + +* Mon Apr 4 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.0p1-2 +- fixed Local/RemoteForward in ssh_config.5 manpage +- fix fatal when Local/RemoteForward is used and scp run (#153258) +- don't leak user validity when using krb5 authentication + +* Thu Mar 24 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.0p1-1 +- upgrade to 4.0p1 +- remove obsolete groups patch + +* Wed Mar 16 2005 Elliot Lee +- rebuilt + +* Mon Feb 28 2005 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.9p1-12 +- rebuild so that configure can detect that krb5_init_ets is gone now + +* Mon Feb 21 2005 Tomas Mraz 3.9p1-11 +- don't call syslog in signal handler +- allow password authentication when copying from remote + to remote machine (#103364) + +* Wed Feb 9 2005 Tomas Mraz +- add spaces to messages in initscript (#138508) + +* Tue Feb 8 2005 Tomas Mraz 3.9p1-10 +- enable trusted forwarding by default if X11 forwarding is + required by user (#137685 and duplicates) +- disable protocol 1 support by default in sshd server config (#88329) +- keep the gnome-askpass dialog above others (#69131) + +* Fri Feb 4 2005 Tomas Mraz +- change permissions on pam.d/sshd to 0644 (#64697) +- patch initscript so it doesn't kill opened sessions if + the sshd daemon isn't running anymore (#67624) + +* Mon Jan 3 2005 Bill Nottingham 3.9p1-9 +- don't use initlog + +* Mon Nov 29 2004 Thomas Woerner 3.9p1-8.1 +- fixed PIE build for all architectures + +* Mon Oct 4 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.9p1-8 +- add a --enable-vendor-patchlevel option which allows a ShowPatchLevel option + to enable display of a vendor patch level during version exchange (#120285) +- configure with --disable-strip to build useful debuginfo subpackages + +* Mon Sep 20 2004 Bill Nottingham 3.9p1-7 +- when using gtk2 for askpass, don't buildprereq gnome-libs-devel + +* Tue Sep 14 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.9p1-6 +- build + +* Mon Sep 13 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai +- disable ACSS support + +* Thu Sep 2 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-5 +- Change selinux patch to use get_default_context_with_role in libselinux. + +* Thu Sep 2 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-4 +- Fix patch + * Bad debug statement. + * Handle root/sysadm_r:kerberos + +* Thu Sep 2 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-3 +- Modify Colin Walter's patch to allow specifying rule during connection + +* Tue Aug 31 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-2 +- Fix TTY handling for SELinux + +* Tue Aug 24 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-1 +- Update to upstream + +* Sun Aug 1 2004 Alan Cox 3.8.1p1-5 +- Apply buildreq fixup patch (#125296) + +* Tue Jun 15 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.8.1p1-4 +- Clean up patch for upstream submission. + +* Tue Jun 15 2004 Elliot Lee +- rebuilt + +* Wed Jun 9 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.8.1p1-2 +- Remove use of pam_selinux and patch selinux in directly. + +* Mon Jun 7 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.8.1p1-1 +- request gssapi-with-mic by default but not delegation (flag day for anyone + who used previous gssapi patches) +- no longer request x11 forwarding by default + +* Thu Jun 3 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-36 +- Change pam file to use open and close with pam_selinux + +* Tue Jun 1 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.8.1p1-0 +- update to 3.8.1p1 +- add workaround from CVS to reintroduce passwordauth using pam + +* Tue Jun 1 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-35 +- Remove CLOSEXEC on STDERR + +* Tue Mar 16 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-34 + +* Wed Mar 03 2004 Phil Knirsch 3.6.1p2-33.30.1 +- Built RHLE3 U2 update package. + +* Wed Mar 3 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-33 +- Close file descriptors on exec + +* Mon Mar 1 2004 Thomas Woerner 3.6.1p2-32 +- fixed pie build + +* Thu Feb 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-31 +- Add restorecon to startup scripts + +* Thu Feb 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-30 +- Add multiple qualified to openssh + +* Mon Feb 23 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-29 +- Eliminate selinux code and use pam_selinux + +* Fri Feb 13 2004 Elliot Lee +- rebuilt + +* Mon Jan 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-27 +- turn off pie on ppc + +* Mon Jan 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-26 +- fix is_selinux_enabled + +* Wed Jan 14 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-25 +- Rebuild to grab shared libselinux + +* Wed Dec 3 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-24 +- turn on selinux + +* Tue Nov 18 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- un#ifdef out code for reporting password expiration in non-privsep + mode (#83585) + +* Mon Nov 10 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add machinery to build with/without -fpie/-pie, default to doing so + +* Thu Nov 06 2003 David Woodhouse 3.6.1p2-23 +- Don't whinge about getsockopt failing (#109161) + +* Fri Oct 24 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add missing buildprereq on zlib-devel (#104558) + +* Mon Oct 13 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-22 +- turn selinux off + +* Mon Oct 13 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-21.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Fri Sep 19 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-21 +- turn selinux off + +* Fri Sep 19 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-20.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Fri Sep 19 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- additional fix for apparently-never-happens double-free in buffer_free() +- extend fix for #103998 to cover SSH1 + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-19 +- rebuild + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-18 +- additional buffer manipulation cleanups from Solar Designer + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-17 +- turn selinux off + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-16.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Bill Nottingham 3.6.1p2-15 +- rebuild + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Bill Nottingham 3.6.1p2-14 +- additional buffer manipulation fixes (CAN-2003-0695) + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-13.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-12 +- rebuild + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-11 +- apply patch to store the correct buffer size in allocated buffers + (CAN-2003-0693) +- skip the initial PAM authentication attempt with an empty password if + empty passwords are not permitted in our configuration (#103998) + +* Fri Sep 5 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-10 +- turn selinux off + +* Fri Sep 5 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-9.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Tue Aug 26 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-8 +- Add BuildPreReq gtk2-devel if gtk2 + +* Tue Aug 12 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-7 +- rebuild + +* Tue Aug 12 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-6 +- modify patch which clears the supplemental group list at startup to only + complain if setgroups() fails if sshd has euid == 0 +- handle krb5 installed in %%{_prefix} or elsewhere by using krb5-config + +* Mon Jul 28 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-5 +- Add SELinux patch + +* Tue Jul 22 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-4 +- rebuild + +* Wed Jul 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-3 +- rebuild + +* Wed Jul 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-2 +- rebuild + +* Thu Jun 5 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-1 +- update to 3.6.1p2 + +* Wed Jun 04 2003 Elliot Lee +6 rebuilt + +* Mon Mar 24 2003 Florian La Roche +- add patch for getsockopt() call to work on bigendian 64bit archs + +* Fri Feb 14 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-6 +- move scp to the -clients subpackage, because it directly depends on ssh + which is also in -clients (#84329) + +* Mon Feb 10 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-5 +- rebuild + +* Wed Jan 22 2003 Tim Powers +- rebuilt + +* Tue Jan 7 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-3 +- rebuild + +* Tue Nov 12 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-2 +- patch PAM configuration to use relative path names for the modules, allowing + us to not worry about which arch the modules are built for on multilib systems + +* Tue Oct 15 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-1 +- update to 3.5p1, merging in filelist/perm changes from the upstream spec + +* Fri Oct 4 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.4p1-3 +- merge + +* Thu Sep 12 2002 Than Ngo 3.4p1-2.1 +- fix to build on multilib systems + +* Thu Aug 29 2002 Curtis Zinzilieta 3.4p1-2gss +- added gssapi patches and uncommented patch here + +* Wed Aug 14 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.4p1-2 +- pull patch from CVS to fix too-early free in ssh-keysign (#70009) + +* Thu Jun 27 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.4p1-1 +- 3.4p1 +- drop anon mmap patch + +* Tue Jun 25 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.3p1-2 +- rework the close-on-exit docs +- include configuration file man pages +- make use of nologin as the privsep shell optional + +* Mon Jun 24 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.3p1-1 +- update to 3.3p1 +- merge in spec file changes from upstream (remove setuid from ssh, ssh-keysign) +- disable gtk2 askpass +- require pam-devel by filename rather than by package for erratum +- include patch from Solar Designer to work around anonymous mmap failures + +* Fri Jun 21 2002 Tim Powers +- automated rebuild + +* Fri Jun 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.3p1-3 +- don't require autoconf any more + +* Fri May 31 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.3p1-2 +- build gnome-ssh-askpass with gtk2 + +* Tue May 28 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.3p1-1 +- update to 3.2.3p1 +- merge in spec file changes from upstream + +* Fri May 17 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.2p1-1 +- update to 3.2.2p1 + +* Fri May 17 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-4 +- drop buildreq on db1-devel +- require pam-devel by package name +- require autoconf instead of autoconf253 again + +* Tue Apr 2 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-3 +- pull patch from CVS to avoid printing error messages when some of the + default keys aren't available when running ssh-add +- refresh to current revisions of Simon's patches + +* Thu Mar 21 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2gss +- reintroduce Simon's gssapi patches +- add buildprereq for autoconf253, which is needed to regenerate configure + after applying the gssapi patches +- refresh to the latest version of Markus's patch to build properly with + older versions of OpenSSL + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 +- bump and grind (through the build system) + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 +- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) +- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't + work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck +- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again +- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from + http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're + building for 6.x + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 +- update to 3.1p1 + +* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 +- update to SNAP-20020305 +- drop debug patch, fixed upstream + +* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 +- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's + anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) + +* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 +- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key + exchange, authentication, and named key support + +* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 +- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole + by gnome-libs-devel + +* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix + from Hugo van der Kooij) + +* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 +- update to 3.0.2p1 + +* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 +- update to 3.0.1p1 + +* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) + +* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 +- merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream + 3.0p1 spec file and init script + +* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 3.0p1 +- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 +- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package +- replace primes with moduli + +* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 +- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs + +* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 +- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd + +* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 +- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper + preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. + (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) +- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) +- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) +- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) +- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug +- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) +- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) +- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) + +* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 +- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) + +* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 + +* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions +- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly +- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable + it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) + +* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) + +* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) + +* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 + +* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- rebuild in new environment + +* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- disable the gssapi patch + +* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.9p2 +- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch + +* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD +- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem + so that we can verify it +- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) +- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate +- clear supplemental groups list at startup + +* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config +- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not + dealing with comments right + +* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, + to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure + from the upstream version + +* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- finish marking strings in the init script for translation +- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd + at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by + Pekka Savola) +- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable + it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed + +* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.9 +- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS + +* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) + +* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown +- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue +- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid + races in condrestart + +* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't + limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) +- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, + because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like + open connections) +- require the version of openssl we had when we were built + +* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and + when to reinitialize them +- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata + +* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.5.2p2 +- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually + be group memberships + +* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) +- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not + have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to + three password attempts as it is) +- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely + +* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise + +* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- rebuild in new environment + +* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. +- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) +- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) + +* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Chuck the closing patch. +- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that + configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we + specify any other HostKey values, which we do. + +* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. +- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. + +* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update for 2.5.1p1. +- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. +- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. +- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try + adding id_rsa. + +* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update for 2.5.0p1. +- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass +- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including + update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. +- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init + script now. + +* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). +- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which + host the user is attempting a login from. +- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. +- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). +- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). + +* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd +- i18n-tweak to initscript. + +* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- More gettextizing. +- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). +- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). +- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. + +* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Finish with the gettextizing. + +* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) +- Gettextize the init script. + +* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. + +* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. + +* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has + succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" + authentication. (#21268) + +* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) +- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) + +* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when + doing keyboard-interactive authentication. + +* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. +- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and + enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client + will try it when the server disallows password authentication. +- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. + +* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. +- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. + +* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). +- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). +- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. + +* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. +- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. + +* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. +- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. +- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. + +* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. +- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). + +* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files + it generates. + +* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add BuildPreReq on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always + build PAM authentication in. +- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. +- Clean out no-longer-used patches. +- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only + when neither exists. + +* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) +- Add BuildPreReqs for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will + always find them in the right place. (#17909) +- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but + add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) +- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names + are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) + +* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) +- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) + +* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 20000823 snapshot. +- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} +- Back out the pipe patch. + +* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. +- Move the init script back. +- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. + +* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). + +* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Move condrestart to server postun. +- Move key generation to init script. +- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. +- Clean up the init script a bit. + +* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. + +* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p2. +- Use of strtok() considered harmful. + +* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Get the build root out of the man pages. + +* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add and use condrestart support in the init script. +- Add newer initscripts as a prereq. + +* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Build in new environment (release 2) +- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group + +* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.2.1p1 + +* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. +- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. +- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. + +* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller +- Updated for new location +- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build + +* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller +- Added Jim Knoble's askpass + +* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller +- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble + +* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller +- Added 'Obsoletes' directives + +* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller +- Use make install +- Subpackages + +* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller +- Added links for slogin +- Fixed perms on manpages + +* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller +- Renamed init script + +* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller +- Back to old binary names + +* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller +- Use autoconf +- New binary names + +* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller +- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec.