diff --git a/README.debrand b/README.debrand
deleted file mode 100644
index 01c46d2..0000000
--- a/README.debrand
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Warning: This package was configured for automatic debranding, but the changes
-failed to apply.
diff --git a/SOURCES/0228-powerpc-do-CAS-in-a-more-compatible-way.patch b/SOURCES/0228-powerpc-do-CAS-in-a-more-compatible-way.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32c06b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0228-powerpc-do-CAS-in-a-more-compatible-way.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 12:35:28 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: do CAS in a more compatible way
+
+I wrongly assumed that the most compatible way to perform CAS
+negotiation was to only set the minimum number of vectors required
+to ask for more memory. It turns out that this messes up booting
+if the minimum VP capacity would be less than the default 10% in
+vector 4.
+
+Linux configures the minimum capacity to be 1%, so copy it for that
+and for vector 3 which we now need to specify as well.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+(cherry picked from commit e6f02ad4e75cd995a8ee2954d28949c415b6cbfe)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 9704715c83..ef55107467 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -298,33 +298,37 @@ grub_ieee1275_total_mem (grub_uint64_t *total)
+
+ /* Based on linux - arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c */
+ struct option_vector2 {
+- grub_uint8_t byte1;
+- grub_uint16_t reserved;
+- grub_uint32_t real_base;
+- grub_uint32_t real_size;
+- grub_uint32_t virt_base;
+- grub_uint32_t virt_size;
+- grub_uint32_t load_base;
+- grub_uint32_t min_rma;
+- grub_uint32_t min_load;
+- grub_uint8_t min_rma_percent;
+- grub_uint8_t max_pft_size;
++ grub_uint8_t byte1;
++ grub_uint16_t reserved;
++ grub_uint32_t real_base;
++ grub_uint32_t real_size;
++ grub_uint32_t virt_base;
++ grub_uint32_t virt_size;
++ grub_uint32_t load_base;
++ grub_uint32_t min_rma;
++ grub_uint32_t min_load;
++ grub_uint8_t min_rma_percent;
++ grub_uint8_t max_pft_size;
+ } __attribute__((packed));
+
+ struct pvr_entry {
+- grub_uint32_t mask;
+- grub_uint32_t entry;
++ grub_uint32_t mask;
++ grub_uint32_t entry;
+ };
+
+ struct cas_vector {
+- struct {
+- struct pvr_entry terminal;
+- } pvr_list;
+- grub_uint8_t num_vecs;
+- grub_uint8_t vec1_size;
+- grub_uint8_t vec1;
+- grub_uint8_t vec2_size;
+- struct option_vector2 vec2;
++ struct {
++ struct pvr_entry terminal;
++ } pvr_list;
++ grub_uint8_t num_vecs;
++ grub_uint8_t vec1_size;
++ grub_uint8_t vec1;
++ grub_uint8_t vec2_size;
++ struct option_vector2 vec2;
++ grub_uint8_t vec3_size;
++ grub_uint16_t vec3;
++ grub_uint8_t vec4_size;
++ grub_uint16_t vec4;
+ } __attribute__((packed));
+
+ /* Call ibm,client-architecture-support to try to get more RMA.
+@@ -345,13 +349,17 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+ } args;
+ struct cas_vector vector = {
+ .pvr_list = { { 0x00000000, 0xffffffff } }, /* any processor */
+- .num_vecs = 2 - 1,
++ .num_vecs = 4 - 1,
+ .vec1_size = 0,
+ .vec1 = 0x80, /* ignore */
+ .vec2_size = 1 + sizeof(struct option_vector2) - 2,
+ .vec2 = {
+ 0, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 512, -1, 0, 48
+ },
++ .vec3_size = 2 - 1,
++ .vec3 = 0x00e0, // ask for FP + VMX + DFP but don't halt if unsatisfied
++ .vec4_size = 2 - 1,
++ .vec4 = 0x0001, // set required minimum capacity % to the lowest value
+ };
+
+ INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "call-method", 3, 2);
+@@ -364,7 +372,7 @@ grub_ieee1275_ibm_cas (void)
+ args.ihandle = root;
+ args.cas_addr = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t)&vector;
+
+- grub_printf("Calling ibm,client-architecture-support...");
++ grub_printf("Calling ibm,client-architecture-support from grub...");
+ IEEE1275_CALL_ENTRY_FN (&args);
+ grub_printf("done\n");
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0229-powerpc-prefix-detection-support-device-names-with-c.patch b/SOURCES/0229-powerpc-prefix-detection-support-device-names-with-c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0aeb10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0229-powerpc-prefix-detection-support-device-names-with-c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 14:34:32 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: prefix detection: support device names with commas
+
+Frustratingly, the device name itself can contain an embedded comma:
+e.g /pci@800000020000015/pci1014,034A@0/sas/disk@5000c50098a0ee8b
+
+So my previous approach was wrong: we cannot rely upon the presence
+of a comma to say that a partition has been specified!
+
+It turns out for prefixes like (,gpt2)/grub2 we really want to make
+up a full (device,partition)/patch prefix, because root discovery code
+in 10_linux will reset the root variable and use search to fill it again.
+If you have run grub-install, you probably don't have search built in,
+and if you don't have prefix containing (device,partition), grub will
+construct ($root)$prefix/powerpc-ieee1275/search.mod - but because $root
+has just been changed, this will no longer work, and the boot will fail!
+
+Retain the gist of the logic, but instead of looking for a comma, look for
+a leading '('. This matches the earlier code better anyway.
+
+There's certainly a better fix to be had. But any time you chose to build
+with a bare prefix like '/grub2', you're almost certainly going to build in
+search anyway, so this will do.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+(cherry picked from commit 80b6eb5e55e6d1a4c9896361e61de31c29e6939d)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/main.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/main.c b/grub-core/kern/main.c
+index 2d0d2bbd4c..4c4e6912f9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/main.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/main.c
+@@ -242,14 +242,29 @@ grub_set_prefix_and_root (void)
+ what sorts of paths represent disks with partition tables and those
+ without partition tables.
+
+- So we act unless there is a comma in the device, which would indicate
+- a partition has already been specified.
++ - Frustratingly, the device name itself can contain an embedded comma:
++ /pci@800000020000015/pci1014,034A@0/sas/disk@5000c50098a0ee8b
++ So we cannot even rely upon the presence of a comma to say that a
++ partition has been specified!
+
+- (If we only have a path, the code in normal to discover config files
+- will try both without partitions and then with any partitions so we
+- will cover both CDs and HDs.)
++ If we only have a path in $prefix, the code in normal to discover
++ config files will try all disks, both without partitions and then with
++ any partitions so we will cover both CDs and HDs.
++
++ However, it doesn't then set the prefix to be something like
++ (discovered partition)/path, and so it is fragile against runtime
++ changes to $root. For example some of the stuff done in 10_linux to
++ reload $root sets root differently and then uses search to find it
++ again. If the search module is not built in, when we change root, grub
++ will look in (new root)/path/powerpc-ieee1275, that won't work, and we
++ will not be able to load the search module and the boot will fail.
++
++ This is particularly likely to hit us in the grub-install
++ (,msdos2)/grub2 case, so we act unless the supplied prefix starts with
++ '(', which would likely indicate a partition has already been
++ specified.
+ */
+- if (grub_strchr (device, ',') == NULL)
++ if (prefix && prefix[0] != '(')
+ grub_env_set ("prefix", path);
+ else
+ #endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/0230-ibmvtpm-Add-support-for-trusted-boot-using-a-vTPM-2..patch b/SOURCES/0230-ibmvtpm-Add-support-for-trusted-boot-using-a-vTPM-2..patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00cf0f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0230-ibmvtpm-Add-support-for-trusted-boot-using-a-vTPM-2..patch
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2020 12:37:10 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] ibmvtpm: Add support for trusted boot using a vTPM 2.0
+
+Add support for trusted boot using a vTPM 2.0 on the IBM IEEE1275
+PowerPC platform. With this patch grub now measures text and binary data
+into the TPM's PCRs 8 and 9 in the same way as the x86_64 platform
+does.
+
+This patch requires Daniel Axtens's patches for claiming more memory.
+
+For vTPM support to work on PowerVM, system driver levels 1010.30
+or 1020.00 are required.
+
+Note: Previous versions of firmware levels with the 2hash-ext-log
+API call have a bug that, once this API call is invoked, has the
+effect of disabling the vTPM driver under Linux causing an error
+message to be displayed in the Linux kernel log. Those users will
+have to update their machines to the firmware levels mentioned
+above.
+
+Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d3e5a8e6ecb8b87701135d97f45d27bbfbf731a2)
+---
+ grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 7 ++
+ grub-core/commands/ieee1275/ibmvtpm.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 +
+ docs/grub.texi | 3 +-
+ 4 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/ieee1275/ibmvtpm.c
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+index 97abc01f06..407d68f917 100644
+--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
++++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+@@ -1172,6 +1172,13 @@ module = {
+ enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+ };
+
++module = {
++ name = tpm;
++ common = commands/tpm.c;
++ ieee1275 = commands/ieee1275/ibmvtpm.c;
++ enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
++};
++
+ module = {
+ name = terminal;
+ common = commands/terminal.c;
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ieee1275/ibmvtpm.c b/grub-core/commands/ieee1275/ibmvtpm.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..e68b8448bc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/commands/ieee1275/ibmvtpm.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++/*
++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
++ * Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++ * Copyright (C) 2021 IBM Corporation
++ *
++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++ * (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
++ * GNU General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++ *
++ * IBM vTPM support code.
++ */
++
++#include <grub/err.h>
++#include <grub/types.h>
++#include <grub/tpm.h>
++#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
++#include <grub/mm.h>
++#include <grub/misc.h>
++
++static grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t tpm_ihandle;
++static grub_uint8_t tpm_version;
++
++#define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t)0)
++
++static void
++tpm_get_tpm_version (void)
++{
++ grub_ieee1275_phandle_t vtpm;
++ char buffer[20];
++
++ if (!grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/vdevice/vtpm", &vtpm) &&
++ !grub_ieee1275_get_property (vtpm, "compatible", buffer,
++ sizeof (buffer), NULL) &&
++ !grub_strcmp (buffer, "IBM,vtpm20"))
++ tpm_version = 2;
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++tpm_init (void)
++{
++ static int init_success = 0;
++
++ if (!init_success)
++ {
++ if (grub_ieee1275_open ("/vdevice/vtpm", &tpm_ihandle) < 0) {
++ tpm_ihandle = IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID;
++ return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE;
++ }
++
++ init_success = 1;
++
++ tpm_get_tpm_version ();
++ }
++
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++static int
++ibmvtpm_2hash_ext_log (grub_uint8_t pcrindex,
++ grub_uint32_t eventtype,
++ const char *description,
++ grub_size_t description_size,
++ void *buf, grub_size_t size)
++{
++ struct tpm_2hash_ext_log
++ {
++ struct grub_ieee1275_common_hdr common;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t method;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t ihandle;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t size;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t buf;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t description_size;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t description;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t eventtype;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t pcrindex;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t catch_result;
++ grub_ieee1275_cell_t rc;
++ }
++ args;
++
++ INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "call-method", 8, 2);
++ args.method = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) "2hash-ext-log";
++ args.ihandle = tpm_ihandle;
++ args.pcrindex = pcrindex;
++ args.eventtype = eventtype;
++ args.description = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) description;
++ args.description_size = description_size;
++ args.buf = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) buf;
++ args.size = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) size;
++
++ if (IEEE1275_CALL_ENTRY_FN (&args) == -1)
++ return -1;
++
++ /*
++ * catch_result is set if firmware does not support 2hash-ext-log
++ * rc is GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE (0) on failure
++ */
++ if ((args.catch_result) || args.rc == GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE)
++ return -1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++tpm2_log_event (unsigned char *buf,
++ grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
++ const char *description)
++{
++ static int error_displayed = 0;
++ int err;
++
++ err = ibmvtpm_2hash_ext_log (pcr, EV_IPL,
++ description,
++ grub_strlen(description) + 1,
++ buf, size);
++ if (err && !error_displayed)
++ {
++ error_displayed++;
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
++ "2HASH-EXT-LOG failed: Firmware is likely too old.\n");
++ }
++
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++grub_err_t
++grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
++ const char *description)
++{
++ grub_err_t err = tpm_init();
++
++ /* Absence of a TPM isn't a failure. */
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++ grub_dprintf ("tpm", "log_event, pcr = %d, size = 0x%" PRIxGRUB_SIZE ", %s\n",
++ pcr, size, description);
++
++ if (tpm_version == 2)
++ return tpm2_log_event (buf, size, pcr, description);
++
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
+diff --git a/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h b/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
+index e0a6c2ce1e..f4c85265fe 100644
+--- a/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
++++ b/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
+@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
+ #include <grub/types.h>
+ #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h>
+
++#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
++#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
++
+ struct grub_ieee1275_mem_region
+ {
+ unsigned int start;
+diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
+index a4da9c2a1b..c433240f34 100644
+--- a/docs/grub.texi
++++ b/docs/grub.texi
+@@ -6221,7 +6221,8 @@ tpm module is loaded. As such it is recommended that the tpm module be built
+ into @file{core.img} in order to avoid a potential gap in measurement between
+ @file{core.img} being loaded and the tpm module being loaded.
+
+-Measured boot is currently only supported on EFI platforms.
++Measured boot is currently only supported on EFI and IBM IEEE1275 PowerPC
++platforms.
+
+ @node Lockdown
+ @section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
diff --git a/SOURCES/0231-make-ofdisk_retries-optional.patch b/SOURCES/0231-make-ofdisk_retries-optional.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac0bb44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0231-make-ofdisk_retries-optional.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Diego Domingos <diegdo@br.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 13:14:42 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] make ofdisk_retries optional
+
+The feature Retry on Fail added to GRUB can cause a LPM to take
+longer if the SAN is slow.
+
+When a LPM to external site occur, the path of the disk can change
+and thus the disk search function on grub can take some time since
+it is used as a hint. This can cause the Retry on Fail feature to
+try to access the disk 20x times (since this is hardcoded number)
+and, if the SAN is slow, the boot time can increase a lot.
+In some situations not acceptable.
+
+The following patch enables a configuration at user space of the
+maximum number of retries we want for this feature.
+
+The variable ofdisk_retries should be set using grub2-editenv
+and will be checked by retry function. If the variable is not set,
+so the default number of retries will be used instead.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4c5c7563f45a6410667ca08bcbfac4ab79d7de31)
+---
+ include/grub/ieee1275/ofdisk.h | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/ieee1275/ofdisk.h b/include/grub/ieee1275/ofdisk.h
+index 7d2d540930..0074d55eee 100644
+--- a/include/grub/ieee1275/ofdisk.h
++++ b/include/grub/ieee1275/ofdisk.h
+@@ -25,7 +25,12 @@ extern void grub_ofdisk_fini (void);
+ #define MAX_RETRIES 20
+
+
+-#define RETRY_IEEE1275_OFDISK_OPEN(device, last_ihandle) unsigned retry_i=0;for(retry_i=0; retry_i < MAX_RETRIES; retry_i++){ \
++#define RETRY_IEEE1275_OFDISK_OPEN(device, last_ihandle) \
++ unsigned max_retries = MAX_RETRIES; \
++ if(grub_env_get("ofdisk_retries") != NULL) \
++ max_retries = grub_strtoul(grub_env_get("ofdisk_retries"), 0, 10)+1; \
++ grub_dprintf("ofdisk","MAX_RETRIES set to %u\n",max_retries); \
++ unsigned retry_i=0;for(retry_i=0; retry_i < max_retries; retry_i++){ \
+ if(!grub_ieee1275_open(device, last_ihandle)) \
+ break; \
+ grub_dprintf("ofdisk","Opening disk %s failed. Retrying...\n",device); }
diff --git a/SOURCES/0232-loader-efi-chainloader-grub_load_and_start_image-doe.patch b/SOURCES/0232-loader-efi-chainloader-grub_load_and_start_image-doe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fcd8e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0232-loader-efi-chainloader-grub_load_and_start_image-doe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 21:53:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/efi/chainloader: grub_load_and_start_image doesn't
+ load and start
+
+grub_load_and_start_image only loads an image - it still requires the
+caller to start it. This renames it to grub_load_image.
+
+It's called from 2 places:
+- grub_cmd_chainloader when not using the shim protocol.
+- grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot if handle_image returns an error.
+In this case, the image is loaded and then nothing else happens which
+seems strange. I assume the intention is that it falls back to LoadImage
+and StartImage if handle_image fails, so I've made it do that.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b4d70820a65c00561045856b7b8355461a9545f6)
+(cherry picked from commit 05b16a6be50b1910609740a66b561276fa490538)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+index 3af6b12292..39158e679e 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload (void)
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_load_and_start_image(void *boot_image)
++grub_load_image(void *boot_image)
+ {
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ grub_efi_status_t status;
+@@ -883,13 +883,23 @@ grub_load_and_start_image(void *boot_image)
+ static grub_err_t
+ grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot (void)
+ {
++ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ int rc;
++
+ rc = handle_image ((void *)(unsigned long)address, fsize);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ {
+- grub_load_and_start_image((void *)(unsigned long)address);
++ /* We weren't able to attempt to execute the image, so fall back
++ * to LoadImage / StartImage.
++ */
++ rc = grub_load_image((void *)(unsigned long)address);
++ if (rc == 0)
++ grub_chainloader_boot ();
+ }
+
++ b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
++ efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
++
+ grub_loader_unset ();
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+@@ -1094,7 +1104,7 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ }
+ else if (rc == 0)
+ {
+- grub_load_and_start_image(boot_image);
++ grub_load_image(boot_image);
+ grub_file_close (file);
+ grub_device_close (dev);
+ grub_loader_set (grub_chainloader_boot, grub_chainloader_unload, 0);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0233-loader-efi-chainloader-simplify-the-loader-state.patch b/SOURCES/0233-loader-efi-chainloader-simplify-the-loader-state.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76c3d58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0233-loader-efi-chainloader-simplify-the-loader-state.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 21:13:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/efi/chainloader: simplify the loader state
+
+When not using the shim lock protocol, the chainloader command retains
+the source buffer and device path passed to LoadImage, requiring the
+unload hook passed to grub_loader_set to free them. It isn't required
+to retain this state though - they aren't required by StartImage or
+anything else in the boot hook, so clean them up before
+grub_cmd_chainloader finishes.
+
+This also wraps the loader state when using the shim lock protocol
+inside a struct.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fa39862933b3be1553a580a3a5c28073257d8046)
+(cherry picked from commit 0333343ee99c4e88f062789263c94291c057251b)
+[rharwood: double-frees and uninitialized, verifying twice]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+index 39158e679e..0717ce0478 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+@@ -48,38 +48,21 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+ static grub_dl_t my_mod;
+
+-static grub_efi_physical_address_t address;
+-static grub_efi_uintn_t pages;
+-static grub_ssize_t fsize;
+-static grub_efi_device_path_t *file_path;
+ static grub_efi_handle_t image_handle;
+-static grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline;
+-static grub_ssize_t cmdline_len;
+-static grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle;
+
+-static grub_efi_status_t (*entry_point) (grub_efi_handle_t image_handle, grub_efi_system_table_t *system_table);
++struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context {
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t address;
++ grub_efi_uintn_t pages;
++ grub_ssize_t fsize;
++ grub_efi_device_path_t *file_path;
++ grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline;
++ grub_ssize_t cmdline_len;
++ grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle;
++};
++static struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *sb_context;
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_chainloader_unload (void)
+-{
+- grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+-
+- b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+- efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
+- grub_efi_free_pages (address, pages);
+-
+- grub_free (file_path);
+- grub_free (cmdline);
+- cmdline = 0;
+- file_path = 0;
+- dev_handle = 0;
+-
+- grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+- return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+-}
+-
+-static grub_err_t
+-grub_chainloader_boot (void)
++grub_start_image (grub_efi_handle_t handle)
+ {
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ grub_efi_status_t status;
+@@ -87,7 +70,7 @@ grub_chainloader_boot (void)
+ grub_efi_char16_t *exit_data = NULL;
+
+ b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+- status = efi_call_3 (b->start_image, image_handle, &exit_data_size, &exit_data);
++ status = efi_call_3 (b->start_image, handle, &exit_data_size, &exit_data);
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ if (exit_data)
+@@ -111,11 +94,37 @@ grub_chainloader_boot (void)
+ if (exit_data)
+ grub_efi_free_pool (exit_data);
+
+- grub_loader_unset ();
+-
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
++static grub_err_t
++grub_chainloader_unload (void)
++{
++ grub_efi_loaded_image_t *loaded_image;
++ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
++
++ loaded_image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (image_handle);
++ if (loaded_image != NULL)
++ grub_free (loaded_image->load_options);
++
++ b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
++ efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
++
++ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++grub_chainloader_boot (void)
++{
++ grub_err_t err;
++
++ err = grub_start_image (image_handle);
++
++ grub_loader_unset ();
++ return err;
++}
++
+ static grub_err_t
+ copy_file_path (grub_efi_file_path_device_path_t *fp,
+ const char *str, grub_efi_uint16_t len)
+@@ -150,7 +159,7 @@ make_file_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp, const char *filename)
+ char *dir_start;
+ char *dir_end;
+ grub_size_t size;
+- grub_efi_device_path_t *d;
++ grub_efi_device_path_t *d, *file_path;
+
+ dir_start = grub_strchr (filename, ')');
+ if (! dir_start)
+@@ -526,10 +535,12 @@ grub_efi_get_media_file_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp)
+ }
+
+ static grub_efi_boolean_t
+-handle_image (void *data, grub_efi_uint32_t datasize)
++handle_image (struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *load_context)
+ {
+ grub_efi_loaded_image_t *li, li_bak;
+ grub_efi_status_t efi_status;
++ void *data = (void *)(unsigned long)load_context->address;
++ grub_efi_uint32_t datasize = load_context->fsize;
+ void *buffer = NULL;
+ char *buffer_aligned = NULL;
+ grub_efi_uint32_t i;
+@@ -540,6 +551,7 @@ handle_image (void *data, grub_efi_uint32_t datasize)
+ grub_uint32_t buffer_size;
+ int found_entry_point = 0;
+ int rc;
++ grub_efi_status_t (*entry_point) (grub_efi_handle_t image_handle, grub_efi_system_table_t *system_table);
+
+ rc = read_header (data, datasize, &context);
+ if (rc < 0)
+@@ -797,10 +809,10 @@ handle_image (void *data, grub_efi_uint32_t datasize)
+ grub_memcpy (&li_bak, li, sizeof (grub_efi_loaded_image_t));
+ li->image_base = buffer_aligned;
+ li->image_size = context.image_size;
+- li->load_options = cmdline;
+- li->load_options_size = cmdline_len;
+- li->file_path = grub_efi_get_media_file_path (file_path);
+- li->device_handle = dev_handle;
++ li->load_options = load_context->cmdline;
++ li->load_options_size = load_context->cmdline_len;
++ li->file_path = grub_efi_get_media_file_path (load_context->file_path);
++ li->device_handle = load_context->dev_handle;
+ if (!li->file_path)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "no matching file path found");
+@@ -829,19 +841,22 @@ error_exit:
+ static grub_err_t
+ grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload (void)
+ {
+- grub_efi_free_pages (address, pages);
+- grub_free (file_path);
+- grub_free (cmdline);
+- cmdline = 0;
+- file_path = 0;
+- dev_handle = 0;
++ grub_efi_free_pages (sb_context->address, sb_context->pages);
++ grub_free (sb_context->file_path);
++ grub_free (sb_context->cmdline);
++ grub_free (sb_context);
++
++ sb_context = 0;
+
+ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_load_image(void *boot_image)
++grub_load_image(grub_efi_device_path_t *file_path, void *boot_image,
++ grub_efi_uintn_t image_size, grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle,
++ grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline, grub_ssize_t cmdline_len,
++ grub_efi_handle_t *image_handle_out)
+ {
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ grub_efi_status_t status;
+@@ -850,7 +865,7 @@ grub_load_image(void *boot_image)
+ b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+
+ status = efi_call_6 (b->load_image, 0, grub_efi_image_handle, file_path,
+- boot_image, fsize, &image_handle);
++ boot_image, image_size, image_handle_out);
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ if (status == GRUB_EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES)
+@@ -863,7 +878,7 @@ grub_load_image(void *boot_image)
+ /* LoadImage does not set a device handler when the image is
+ loaded from memory, so it is necessary to set it explicitly here.
+ This is a mess. */
+- loaded_image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (image_handle);
++ loaded_image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (*image_handle_out);
+ if (! loaded_image)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, "no loaded image available");
+@@ -885,20 +900,25 @@ grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot (void)
+ {
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ int rc;
++ grub_efi_handle_t handle = 0;
+
+- rc = handle_image ((void *)(unsigned long)address, fsize);
++ rc = handle_image (sb_context);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ {
+ /* We weren't able to attempt to execute the image, so fall back
+ * to LoadImage / StartImage.
+ */
+- rc = grub_load_image((void *)(unsigned long)address);
++ rc = grub_load_image(sb_context->file_path,
++ (void *)(unsigned long)sb_context->address,
++ sb_context->fsize, sb_context->dev_handle,
++ sb_context->cmdline, sb_context->cmdline_len,
++ &handle);
+ if (rc == 0)
+- grub_chainloader_boot ();
++ grub_start_image (handle);
+ }
+
+ b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+- efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
++ efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, handle);
+
+ grub_loader_unset ();
+ return grub_errno;
+@@ -913,10 +933,16 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ grub_device_t dev = 0;
+ grub_device_t orig_dev = 0;
+- grub_efi_device_path_t *dp = 0;
++ grub_efi_device_path_t *dp = 0, *file_path = 0;
+ char *filename;
+ void *boot_image = 0;
+ int rc;
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t address = 0;
++ grub_ssize_t fsize;
++ grub_efi_uintn_t pages = 0;
++ grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline = 0;
++ grub_ssize_t cmdline_len = 0;
++ grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle = 0;
+
+ if (argc == 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("filename expected"));
+@@ -924,12 +950,6 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+
+ grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
+
+- /* Initialize some global variables. */
+- address = 0;
+- image_handle = 0;
+- file_path = 0;
+- dev_handle = 0;
+-
+ b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+
+ if (argc > 1)
+@@ -1096,17 +1116,35 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_dprintf ("chain", "linuxefi_secure_validate: %d\n", rc);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ {
++ sb_context = grub_malloc (sizeof (*sb_context));
++ if (sb_context == NULL)
++ goto fail;
++ sb_context->address = address;
++ sb_context->fsize = fsize;
++ sb_context->pages = pages;
++ sb_context->file_path = file_path;
++ sb_context->cmdline = cmdline;
++ sb_context->cmdline_len = cmdline_len;
++ sb_context->dev_handle = dev_handle;
++
+ grub_file_close (file);
+ grub_device_close (dev);
++
+ grub_loader_set (grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot,
+ grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload, 0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (rc == 0)
+ {
+- grub_load_image(boot_image);
++ grub_load_image(file_path, boot_image, fsize, dev_handle, cmdline,
++ cmdline_len, &image_handle);
+ grub_file_close (file);
+ grub_device_close (dev);
++
++ /* We're finished with the source image buffer and file path now */
++ efi_call_2 (b->free_pages, address, pages);
++ grub_free (file_path);
++
+ grub_loader_set (grub_chainloader_boot, grub_chainloader_unload, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -1134,6 +1172,12 @@ fail:
+ if (cmdline)
+ grub_free (cmdline);
+
++ if (image_handle != 0)
++ {
++ efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
++ image_handle = 0;
++ }
++
+ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+
+ return grub_errno;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0234-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch b/SOURCES/0234-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65aac76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0234-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 21:16:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] commands/boot: Add API to pass context to loader
+
+Loaders rely on global variables for saving context which is consumed
+in the boot hook and freed in the unload hook. In the case where a loader
+command is executed twice, calling grub_loader_set a second time executes
+the unload hook, but in some cases this runs when the loader's global
+context has already been updated, resulting in the updated context being
+freed and potential use-after-free bugs when the boot hook is subsequently
+called.
+
+This adds a new API (grub_loader_set_ex) which allows a loader to specify
+context that is passed to its boot and unload hooks. This is an alternative
+to requiring that loaders call grub_loader_unset before mutating their
+global context.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4322a64dde7e8fedb58e50b79408667129d45dd3)
+(cherry picked from commit 937ad0e2159b6b8cb0d2ce3515da3a8b797c7927)
+---
+ grub-core/commands/boot.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ include/grub/loader.h | 5 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/boot.c b/grub-core/commands/boot.c
+index bbca81e947..53691a62d9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/boot.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/boot.c
+@@ -27,10 +27,20 @@
+
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+-static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_boot_func) (void);
+-static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_unload_func) (void);
++static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_boot_func) (void *);
++static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_unload_func) (void *);
++static void *grub_loader_context;
+ static int grub_loader_flags;
+
++struct grub_simple_loader_hooks
++{
++ grub_err_t (*boot) (void);
++ grub_err_t (*unload) (void);
++};
++
++/* Don't heap allocate this to avoid making grub_loader_set fallible. */
++static struct grub_simple_loader_hooks simple_loader_hooks;
++
+ struct grub_preboot
+ {
+ grub_err_t (*preboot_func) (int);
+@@ -44,6 +54,29 @@ static int grub_loader_loaded;
+ static struct grub_preboot *preboots_head = 0,
+ *preboots_tail = 0;
+
++static grub_err_t
++grub_simple_boot_hook (void *context)
++{
++ struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *hooks;
++
++ hooks = (struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *) context;
++ return hooks->boot ();
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++grub_simple_unload_hook (void *context)
++{
++ struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *hooks;
++ grub_err_t ret;
++
++ hooks = (struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *) context;
++
++ ret = hooks->unload ();
++ grub_memset (hooks, 0, sizeof (*hooks));
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
+ int
+ grub_loader_is_loaded (void)
+ {
+@@ -110,28 +143,45 @@ grub_loader_unregister_preboot_hook (struct grub_preboot *hnd)
+ }
+
+ void
+-grub_loader_set (grub_err_t (*boot) (void),
+- grub_err_t (*unload) (void),
+- int flags)
++grub_loader_set_ex (grub_err_t (*boot) (void *),
++ grub_err_t (*unload) (void *),
++ void *context,
++ int flags)
+ {
+ if (grub_loader_loaded && grub_loader_unload_func)
+- grub_loader_unload_func ();
++ grub_loader_unload_func (grub_loader_context);
+
+ grub_loader_boot_func = boot;
+ grub_loader_unload_func = unload;
++ grub_loader_context = context;
+ grub_loader_flags = flags;
+
+ grub_loader_loaded = 1;
+ }
+
++void
++grub_loader_set (grub_err_t (*boot) (void),
++ grub_err_t (*unload) (void),
++ int flags)
++{
++ grub_loader_set_ex (grub_simple_boot_hook,
++ grub_simple_unload_hook,
++ &simple_loader_hooks,
++ flags);
++
++ simple_loader_hooks.boot = boot;
++ simple_loader_hooks.unload = unload;
++}
++
+ void
+ grub_loader_unset(void)
+ {
+ if (grub_loader_loaded && grub_loader_unload_func)
+- grub_loader_unload_func ();
++ grub_loader_unload_func (grub_loader_context);
+
+ grub_loader_boot_func = 0;
+ grub_loader_unload_func = 0;
++ grub_loader_context = 0;
+
+ grub_loader_loaded = 0;
+ }
+@@ -158,7 +208,7 @@ grub_loader_boot (void)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+- err = (grub_loader_boot_func) ();
++ err = (grub_loader_boot_func) (grub_loader_context);
+
+ for (cur = preboots_tail; cur; cur = cur->prev)
+ if (! err)
+diff --git a/include/grub/loader.h b/include/grub/loader.h
+index b208642821..1846fa6c5f 100644
+--- a/include/grub/loader.h
++++ b/include/grub/loader.h
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_loader_set) (grub_err_t (*boot) (void),
+ grub_err_t (*unload) (void),
+ int flags);
+
++void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_loader_set_ex) (grub_err_t (*boot) (void *),
++ grub_err_t (*unload) (void *),
++ void *context,
++ int flags);
++
+ /* Unset current loader, if any. */
+ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_loader_unset) (void);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0235-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch b/SOURCES/0235-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a41992
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0235-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 21:30:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/efi/chainloader: Use grub_loader_set_ex
+
+This ports the EFI chainloader to use grub_loader_set_ex in order to fix
+a use-after-free bug that occurs when grub_cmd_chainloader is executed
+more than once before a boot attempt is performed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4b7f0402b7cb0f67a93be736f2b75b818d7f44c9)
+(cherry picked from commit fc1a79bf0e0bc019362ace46d908a92b48dcd55b)
+[rharwood: context sludge from previous commit]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+index 0717ce0478..8ef508beca 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+ static grub_dl_t my_mod;
+
+-static grub_efi_handle_t image_handle;
+-
+ struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context {
+ grub_efi_physical_address_t address;
+ grub_efi_uintn_t pages;
+@@ -59,7 +57,6 @@ struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context {
+ grub_ssize_t cmdline_len;
+ grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle;
+ };
+-static struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *sb_context;
+
+ static grub_err_t
+ grub_start_image (grub_efi_handle_t handle)
+@@ -98,11 +95,14 @@ grub_start_image (grub_efi_handle_t handle)
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_chainloader_unload (void)
++grub_chainloader_unload (void *context)
+ {
++ grub_efi_handle_t image_handle;
+ grub_efi_loaded_image_t *loaded_image;
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+
++ image_handle = (grub_efi_handle_t) context;
++
+ loaded_image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (image_handle);
+ if (loaded_image != NULL)
+ grub_free (loaded_image->load_options);
+@@ -115,10 +115,12 @@ grub_chainloader_unload (void)
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_chainloader_boot (void)
++grub_chainloader_boot (void *context)
+ {
++ grub_efi_handle_t image_handle;
+ grub_err_t err;
+
++ image_handle = (grub_efi_handle_t) context;
+ err = grub_start_image (image_handle);
+
+ grub_loader_unset ();
+@@ -839,15 +841,17 @@ error_exit:
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload (void)
++grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload (void *context)
+ {
++ struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *sb_context;
++
++ sb_context = (struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *) context;
++
+ grub_efi_free_pages (sb_context->address, sb_context->pages);
+ grub_free (sb_context->file_path);
+ grub_free (sb_context->cmdline);
+ grub_free (sb_context);
+
+- sb_context = 0;
+-
+ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+@@ -896,12 +900,15 @@ grub_load_image(grub_efi_device_path_t *file_path, void *boot_image,
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot (void)
++grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot (void *context)
+ {
++ struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *sb_context;
+ grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ int rc;
+ grub_efi_handle_t handle = 0;
+
++ sb_context = (struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *) context;
++
+ rc = handle_image (sb_context);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ {
+@@ -943,6 +950,8 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline = 0;
+ grub_ssize_t cmdline_len = 0;
+ grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle = 0;
++ grub_efi_handle_t image_handle = 0;
++ struct grub_secureboot_chainloader_context *sb_context = 0;
+
+ if (argc == 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("filename expected"));
+@@ -1130,8 +1139,8 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_file_close (file);
+ grub_device_close (dev);
+
+- grub_loader_set (grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot,
+- grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload, 0);
++ grub_loader_set_ex (grub_secureboot_chainloader_boot,
++ grub_secureboot_chainloader_unload, sb_context, 0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (rc == 0)
+@@ -1145,7 +1154,7 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ efi_call_2 (b->free_pages, address, pages);
+ grub_free (file_path);
+
+- grub_loader_set (grub_chainloader_boot, grub_chainloader_unload, 0);
++ grub_loader_set_ex (grub_chainloader_boot, grub_chainloader_unload, image_handle, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1173,10 +1182,7 @@ fail:
+ grub_free (cmdline);
+
+ if (image_handle != 0)
+- {
+- efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
+- image_handle = 0;
+- }
++ efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
+
+ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0236-loader-i386-efi-linux-Avoid-a-use-after-free-in-the-.patch b/SOURCES/0236-loader-i386-efi-linux-Avoid-a-use-after-free-in-the-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4be2008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0236-loader-i386-efi-linux-Avoid-a-use-after-free-in-the-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 14:39:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/i386/efi/linux: Avoid a use-after-free in the linuxefi
+ loader
+
+In some error paths in grub_cmd_linux, the pointer to lh may be
+dereferenced after the buffer it points to has been freed. There aren't
+any security implications from this because nothing else uses the
+allocator after the buffer is freed and before the pointer is
+dereferenced, but fix it anyway.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8224f5a71af94bec8697de17e7e579792db9f9e2)
+(cherry picked from commit 4744b62e20d07674017213ac54d7442d679f9d1a)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+index 3cf0f9b330..08c9fe6b0e 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+@@ -478,9 +478,6 @@ fail:
+ if (file)
+ grub_file_close (file);
+
+- if (kernel)
+- grub_free (kernel);
+-
+ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+@@ -496,6 +493,8 @@ fail:
+ kernel_free (params, sizeof(*params));
+ }
+
++ grub_free (kernel);
++
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0237-loader-i386-efi-linux-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch b/SOURCES/0237-loader-i386-efi-linux-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f5c491
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0237-loader-i386-efi-linux-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 17:04:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/i386/efi/linux: Use grub_loader_set_ex
+
+This ports the linuxefi loader to use grub_loader_set_ex in order to fix
+a use-after-fre bug that occurs when grub_cmd_linux is executed more than
+once before a boot attempt is performed.
+
+This is more complicated than for the chainloader command, as the initrd
+command needs access to the loader state. To solve this, the linuxefi
+module registers a dummy initrd command at startup that returns an error.
+The linuxefi command then registers a proper initrd command with a higher
+priority that is passed the loader state.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7cf736436b4c934df5ddfa6f44b46a7e07d99fdc)
+[rharwood/pjones: set kernel_size in context]
+(cherry picked from commit 9c056391f7a36ea480de9a759c12e55a90f2040a)
+[rharwood: verifying twice]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+index 08c9fe6b0e..9e25e51ccf 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+@@ -35,13 +35,19 @@
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+ static grub_dl_t my_mod;
+-static int loaded;
+-static void *kernel_mem;
+-static grub_uint64_t kernel_size;
+-static void *initrd_mem;
+-static grub_uint32_t handover_offset;
+-struct linux_kernel_params *params;
+-static char *linux_cmdline;
++
++static grub_command_t cmd_linux, cmd_initrd;
++static grub_command_t cmd_linuxefi, cmd_initrdefi;
++
++struct grub_linuxefi_context {
++ void *kernel_mem;
++ grub_uint64_t kernel_size;
++ grub_uint32_t handover_offset;
++ struct linux_kernel_params *params;
++ char *cmdline;
++
++ void *initrd_mem;
++};
+
+ #define MIN(a, b) \
+ ({ typeof (a) _a = (a); \
+@@ -124,25 +130,32 @@ kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size, const char * const errmsg)
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_linuxefi_boot (void)
++grub_linuxefi_boot (void *data)
+ {
++ struct grub_linuxefi_context *context = (struct grub_linuxefi_context *) data;
++
+ asm volatile ("cli");
+
+- return grub_efi_linux_boot ((char *)kernel_mem,
+- handover_offset,
+- params);
++ return grub_efi_linux_boot ((char *)context->kernel_mem,
++ context->handover_offset,
++ context->params);
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_linuxefi_unload (void)
++grub_linuxefi_unload (void *data)
+ {
++ struct grub_linuxefi_context *context = (struct grub_linuxefi_context *) data;
++ struct linux_kernel_params *params = context->params;
++
+ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+- loaded = 0;
+
+- kernel_free(initrd_mem, params->ramdisk_size);
+- kernel_free(linux_cmdline, params->cmdline_size + 1);
+- kernel_free(kernel_mem, kernel_size);
+- kernel_free(params, sizeof(*params));
++ kernel_free (context->initrd_mem, params->ramdisk_size);
++ kernel_free (context->cmdline, params->cmdline_size + 1);
++ kernel_free (context->kernel_mem, context->kernel_size);
++ kernel_free (params, sizeof(*params));
++ cmd_initrd->data = 0;
++ cmd_initrdefi->data = 0;
++ grub_free (context);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+@@ -189,13 +202,14 @@ read(grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t *bufp, grub_size_t len)
+ #define HIGH_U32(val) ((grub_uint32_t)(((grub_addr_t)(val) >> 32) & 0xffffffffull))
+
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+- int argc, char *argv[])
++grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ grub_file_t *files = 0;
+ int i, nfiles = 0;
+ grub_size_t size = 0;
+ grub_uint8_t *ptr;
++ struct grub_linuxefi_context *context = (struct grub_linuxefi_context *) cmd->data;
++ struct linux_kernel_params *params;
+
+ if (argc == 0)
+ {
+@@ -203,12 +217,14 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+- if (!loaded)
++ if (!context)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("you need to load the kernel first"));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
++ params = context->params;
++
+ files = grub_calloc (argc, sizeof (files[0]));
+ if (!files)
+ goto fail;
+@@ -226,19 +242,19 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ }
+ }
+
+- initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, N_("can't allocate initrd"));
+- if (initrd_mem == NULL)
++ context->initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, N_("can't allocate initrd"));
++ if (context->initrd_mem == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+- grub_dprintf ("linux", "initrd_mem = %p\n", initrd_mem);
++ grub_dprintf ("linux", "initrd_mem = %p\n", context->initrd_mem);
+
+ params->ramdisk_size = LOW_U32(size);
+- params->ramdisk_image = LOW_U32(initrd_mem);
++ params->ramdisk_image = LOW_U32(context->initrd_mem);
+ #if defined(__x86_64__)
+ params->ext_ramdisk_size = HIGH_U32(size);
+- params->ext_ramdisk_image = HIGH_U32(initrd_mem);
++ params->ext_ramdisk_image = HIGH_U32(context->initrd_mem);
+ #endif
+
+- ptr = initrd_mem;
++ ptr = context->initrd_mem;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nfiles; i++)
+ {
+@@ -262,8 +278,8 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_file_close (files[i]);
+ grub_free (files);
+
+- if (initrd_mem && grub_errno)
+- grub_efi_free_pages ((grub_efi_physical_address_t)(grub_addr_t)initrd_mem,
++ if (context->initrd_mem && grub_errno)
++ grub_efi_free_pages ((grub_efi_physical_address_t)(grub_addr_t)context->initrd_mem,
+ BYTES_TO_PAGES(size));
+
+ return grub_errno;
+@@ -279,6 +295,12 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ void *kernel = NULL;
+ int setup_header_end_offset;
+ int rc;
++ void *kernel_mem = 0;
++ grub_uint64_t kernel_size = 0;
++ grub_uint32_t handover_offset;
++ struct linux_kernel_params *params = 0;
++ char *cmdline = 0;
++ struct grub_linuxefi_context *context = 0;
+
+ grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
+
+@@ -403,27 +425,27 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "new lh is at %p\n", lh);
+
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting up cmdline\n");
+- linux_cmdline = kernel_alloc (lh->cmdline_size + 1, N_("can't allocate cmdline"));
+- if (!linux_cmdline)
++ cmdline = kernel_alloc (lh->cmdline_size + 1, N_("can't allocate cmdline"));
++ if (!cmdline)
+ goto fail;
+- grub_dprintf ("linux", "linux_cmdline = %p\n", linux_cmdline);
++ grub_dprintf ("linux", "cmdline = %p\n", cmdline);
+
+- grub_memcpy (linux_cmdline, LINUX_IMAGE, sizeof (LINUX_IMAGE));
++ grub_memcpy (cmdline, LINUX_IMAGE, sizeof (LINUX_IMAGE));
+ grub_create_loader_cmdline (argc, argv,
+- linux_cmdline + sizeof (LINUX_IMAGE) - 1,
++ cmdline + sizeof (LINUX_IMAGE) - 1,
+ lh->cmdline_size - (sizeof (LINUX_IMAGE) - 1),
+ GRUB_VERIFY_KERNEL_CMDLINE);
+
+- grub_dprintf ("linux", "cmdline:%s\n", linux_cmdline);
++ grub_dprintf ("linux", "cmdline:%s\n", cmdline);
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting lh->cmd_line_ptr to 0x%08x\n",
+- LOW_U32(linux_cmdline));
+- lh->cmd_line_ptr = LOW_U32(linux_cmdline);
++ LOW_U32(cmdline));
++ lh->cmd_line_ptr = LOW_U32(cmdline);
+ #if defined(__x86_64__)
+- if ((grub_efi_uintn_t)linux_cmdline > 0xffffffffull)
++ if ((grub_efi_uintn_t)cmdline > 0xffffffffull)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting params->ext_cmd_line_ptr to 0x%08x\n",
+- HIGH_U32(linux_cmdline));
+- params->ext_cmd_line_ptr = HIGH_U32(linux_cmdline);
++ HIGH_U32(cmdline));
++ params->ext_cmd_line_ptr = HIGH_U32(cmdline);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+@@ -448,16 +470,13 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ }
+ max_addresses[1].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
+ max_addresses[2].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
+- kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (lh->init_size, N_("can't allocate kernel"));
++ kernel_size = lh->init_size;
++ kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (kernel_size, N_("can't allocate kernel"));
+ restore_addresses();
+ if (!kernel_mem)
+ goto fail;
+ grub_dprintf("linux", "kernel_mem = %p\n", kernel_mem);
+
+- grub_loader_set (grub_linuxefi_boot, grub_linuxefi_unload, 0);
+-
+- loaded = 1;
+-
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting lh->code32_start to 0x%08x\n",
+ LOW_U32(kernel_mem));
+ lh->code32_start = LOW_U32(kernel_mem);
+@@ -474,33 +493,42 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ "setting lh->ext_loader_{type,ver} = {0x%02x,0x%02x}\n",
+ params->ext_loader_type, params->ext_loader_ver);
+
++ context = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*context));
++ if (!context)
++ goto fail;
++ context->kernel_mem = kernel_mem;
++ context->kernel_size = kernel_size;
++ context->handover_offset = handover_offset;
++ context->params = params;
++ context->cmdline = cmdline;
++
++ grub_loader_set_ex (grub_linuxefi_boot, grub_linuxefi_unload, context, 0);
++
++ cmd_initrd->data = context;
++ cmd_initrdefi->data = context;
++
++ grub_file_close (file);
++ grub_free (kernel);
++ return 0;
++
+ fail:
+ if (file)
+ grub_file_close (file);
+
+- if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+- {
+- grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+- loaded = 0;
+- }
++ grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+
+- if (!loaded)
+- {
+- if (lh)
+- kernel_free (linux_cmdline, lh->cmdline_size + 1);
++ if (lh)
++ kernel_free (cmdline, lh->cmdline_size + 1);
+
+- kernel_free (kernel_mem, kernel_size);
+- kernel_free (params, sizeof(*params));
+- }
++ kernel_free (kernel_mem, kernel_size);
++ kernel_free (params, sizeof(*params));
+
++ grub_free (context);
+ grub_free (kernel);
+
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
+-static grub_command_t cmd_linux, cmd_initrd;
+-static grub_command_t cmd_linuxefi, cmd_initrdefi;
+-
+ GRUB_MOD_INIT(linux)
+ {
+ cmd_linux =
diff --git a/SOURCES/0238-loader-i386-efi-linux-Fix-a-memory-leak-in-the-initr.patch b/SOURCES/0238-loader-i386-efi-linux-Fix-a-memory-leak-in-the-initr.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe329e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0238-loader-i386-efi-linux-Fix-a-memory-leak-in-the-initr.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 09:47:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/i386/efi/linux: Fix a memory leak in the initrd
+ command
+
+Subsequent invocations of the initrd command result in the previous
+initrd being leaked, so fix that.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d98af31ce1e31bb22163960d53f5eb28c66582a0)
+(cherry picked from commit 62234d6a00e6d1dd8e017ff161d359feb5234082)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+index 9e25e51ccf..d24553a79d 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
+ grub_uint8_t *ptr;
+ struct grub_linuxefi_context *context = (struct grub_linuxefi_context *) cmd->data;
+ struct linux_kernel_params *params;
++ void *initrd_mem = 0;
+
+ if (argc == 0)
+ {
+@@ -242,19 +243,19 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+ }
+
+- context->initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, N_("can't allocate initrd"));
+- if (context->initrd_mem == NULL)
++ initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, N_("can't allocate initrd"));
++ if (initrd_mem == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+- grub_dprintf ("linux", "initrd_mem = %p\n", context->initrd_mem);
++ grub_dprintf ("linux", "initrd_mem = %p\n", initrd_mem);
+
+ params->ramdisk_size = LOW_U32(size);
+- params->ramdisk_image = LOW_U32(context->initrd_mem);
++ params->ramdisk_image = LOW_U32(initrd_mem);
+ #if defined(__x86_64__)
+ params->ext_ramdisk_size = HIGH_U32(size);
+- params->ext_ramdisk_image = HIGH_U32(context->initrd_mem);
++ params->ext_ramdisk_image = HIGH_U32(initrd_mem);
+ #endif
+
+- ptr = context->initrd_mem;
++ ptr = initrd_mem;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nfiles; i++)
+ {
+@@ -271,6 +272,9 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
+ ptr += ALIGN_UP_OVERHEAD (cursize, 4);
+ }
+
++ kernel_free(context->initrd_mem, params->ramdisk_size);
++
++ context->initrd_mem = initrd_mem;
+ params->ramdisk_size = size;
+
+ fail:
+@@ -278,9 +282,8 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
+ grub_file_close (files[i]);
+ grub_free (files);
+
+- if (context->initrd_mem && grub_errno)
+- grub_efi_free_pages ((grub_efi_physical_address_t)(grub_addr_t)context->initrd_mem,
+- BYTES_TO_PAGES(size));
++ if (initrd_mem && grub_errno)
++ kernel_free (initrd_mem, size);
+
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/0239-kern-efi-sb-Reject-non-kernel-files-in-the-shim_lock.patch b/SOURCES/0239-kern-efi-sb-Reject-non-kernel-files-in-the-shim_lock.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..716d1f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0239-kern-efi-sb-Reject-non-kernel-files-in-the-shim_lock.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 15:03:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi/sb: Reject non-kernel files in the shim_lock
+ verifier
+
+We must not allow other verifiers to pass things like the GRUB modules.
+Instead of maintaining a blocklist, maintain an allowlist of things
+that we do not care about.
+
+This allowlist really should be made reusable, and shared by the
+lockdown verifier, but this is the minimal patch addressing
+security concerns where the TPM verifier was able to mark modules
+as verified (or the OpenPGP verifier for that matter), when it
+should not do so on shim-powered secure boot systems.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28735
+
+Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fa61ad69861c1cb3f68bf853d78fae7fd93986a0)
+(cherry picked from commit f418191e01b38a635319a26925cf345523d4440c)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ include/grub/verify.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+index c52ec6226a..89c4bb3fd1 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+@@ -119,10 +119,11 @@ shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
+ {
+- *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE;
+
+ switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
+ {
++ /* Files we check. */
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
+@@ -130,11 +131,43 @@ shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE:
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+- /* Fall through. */
++ /* Files that do not affect secureboot state. */
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOOPBACK:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_INITRD:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_OPENBSD_RAMDISK:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_RAMDISK:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TESTLOAD:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GET_SIZE:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CAT:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HEXCAT:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CMP:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PIXMAP:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE_LIST:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CONFIG:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_THEME:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GETTEXT_CATALOG:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FS_SEARCH:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOADENV:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SAVEENV:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE:
++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
++ /* Other files. */
+ default:
+- return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("prohibited by secure boot policy"));
+ }
+ }
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/verify.h b/include/grub/verify.h
+index cd129c398f..672ae16924 100644
+--- a/include/grub/verify.h
++++ b/include/grub/verify.h
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+
+ enum grub_verify_flags
+ {
++ GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE = 0,
+ GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION = 1,
+ GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK = 2,
+ /* Defer verification to another authority. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/0240-kern-file-Do-not-leak-device_name-on-error-in-grub_f.patch b/SOURCES/0240-kern-file-Do-not-leak-device_name-on-error-in-grub_f.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f75512c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0240-kern-file-Do-not-leak-device_name-on-error-in-grub_f.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2021 02:19:05 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/file: Do not leak device_name on error in
+ grub_file_open()
+
+If we have an error in grub_file_open() before we free device_name, we
+will leak it.
+
+Free device_name in the error path and null out the pointer in the good
+path once we free it there.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1499a5068839fa37cb77ecef4b5bdacbd1ed12ea)
+(cherry picked from commit 2ec50b289d8b24922433439533113087f111f110)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/file.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/file.c b/grub-core/kern/file.c
+index e19aea3e51..ed69fc0f0f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/file.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/file.c
+@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type)
+
+ device = grub_device_open (device_name);
+ grub_free (device_name);
++ device_name = NULL;
+ if (! device)
+ goto fail;
+
+@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type)
+ return file;
+
+ fail:
++ grub_free (device_name);
+ if (device)
+ grub_device_close (device);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0241-video-readers-png-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-f.patch b/SOURCES/0241-video-readers-png-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-f.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..870f462
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0241-video-readers-png-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-f.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 14:02:55 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/png: Abort sooner if a read operation fails
+
+Fuzzing revealed some inputs that were taking a long time, potentially
+forever, because they did not bail quickly upon encountering an I/O error.
+
+Try to catch I/O errors sooner and bail out.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 882be97d1df6449b9fd4d593f0cb70005fde3494)
+(cherry picked from commit 3f6fc3ebfd58fcdb3fe6c2f7a5a4fa05772ae786)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index 0157ff7420..e2a6b1cf3c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static grub_uint8_t
+ grub_png_get_byte (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ {
+ grub_uint8_t r;
++ grub_ssize_t bytes_read = 0;
+
+ if ((data->inside_idat) && (data->idat_remain == 0))
+ {
+@@ -175,7 +176,14 @@ grub_png_get_byte (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+- grub_file_read (data->file, &r, 1);
++ bytes_read = grub_file_read (data->file, &r, 1);
++
++ if (bytes_read != 1)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "png: unexpected end of data");
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ if (data->inside_idat)
+ data->idat_remain--;
+@@ -231,15 +239,16 @@ grub_png_decode_image_palette (struct grub_png_data *data,
+ if (len == 0)
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+- for (i = 0; 3 * i < len && i < 256; i++)
++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ for (i = 0; 3 * i < len && i < 256 && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < 3; j++)
+ data->palette[i][j] = grub_png_get_byte (data);
+- for (i *= 3; i < len; i++)
++ for (i *= 3; i < len && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE; i++)
+ grub_png_get_byte (data);
+
+ grub_png_get_dword (data);
+
+- return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+@@ -256,9 +265,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "png: invalid image size");
+
+ color_bits = grub_png_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ data->is_16bit = (color_bits == 16);
+
+ color_type = grub_png_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ /* According to PNG spec, no other types are valid. */
+ if ((color_type & ~(PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA | PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
+@@ -340,14 +353,20 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ if (grub_png_get_byte (data) != PNG_COMPRESSION_BASE)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "png: compression method not supported");
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ if (grub_png_get_byte (data) != PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "png: filter method not supported");
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ if (grub_png_get_byte (data) != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "png: interlace method not supported");
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ /* Skip crc checksum. */
+ grub_png_get_dword (data);
+@@ -449,7 +468,7 @@ grub_png_get_huff_code (struct grub_png_data *data, struct huff_table *ht)
+ int code, i;
+
+ code = 0;
+- for (i = 0; i < ht->max_length; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < ht->max_length && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE; i++)
+ {
+ code = (code << 1) + grub_png_get_bits (data, 1);
+ if (code < ht->maxval[i])
+@@ -504,8 +523,14 @@ grub_png_init_dynamic_block (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ grub_uint8_t lens[DEFLATE_HCLEN_MAX];
+
+ nl = DEFLATE_HLIT_BASE + grub_png_get_bits (data, 5);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ nd = DEFLATE_HDIST_BASE + grub_png_get_bits (data, 5);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ nb = DEFLATE_HCLEN_BASE + grub_png_get_bits (data, 4);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ if ((nl > DEFLATE_HLIT_MAX) || (nd > DEFLATE_HDIST_MAX) ||
+ (nb > DEFLATE_HCLEN_MAX))
+@@ -533,7 +558,7 @@ grub_png_init_dynamic_block (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ data->dist_offset);
+
+ prev = 0;
+- for (i = 0; i < nl + nd; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < nl + nd && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE; i++)
+ {
+ int n, code;
+ struct huff_table *ht;
+@@ -721,17 +746,21 @@ grub_png_read_dynamic_block (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ len = cplens[n];
+ if (cplext[n])
+ len += grub_png_get_bits (data, cplext[n]);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ n = grub_png_get_huff_code (data, &data->dist_table);
+ dist = cpdist[n];
+ if (cpdext[n])
+ dist += grub_png_get_bits (data, cpdext[n]);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ pos = data->wp - dist;
+ if (pos < 0)
+ pos += WSIZE;
+
+- while (len > 0)
++ while (len > 0 && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ data->slide[data->wp] = data->slide[pos];
+ grub_png_output_byte (data, data->slide[data->wp]);
+@@ -759,7 +788,11 @@ grub_png_decode_image_data (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ int final;
+
+ cmf = grub_png_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ flg = grub_png_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ if ((cmf & 0xF) != Z_DEFLATED)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+@@ -774,7 +807,11 @@ grub_png_decode_image_data (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ int block_type;
+
+ final = grub_png_get_bits (data, 1);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ block_type = grub_png_get_bits (data, 2);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ switch (block_type)
+ {
+@@ -790,7 +827,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_data (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ grub_png_get_byte (data);
+ grub_png_get_byte (data);
+
+- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < len && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE; i++)
+ grub_png_output_byte (data, grub_png_get_byte (data));
+
+ break;
+@@ -1045,6 +1082,8 @@ grub_png_decode_png (struct grub_png_data *data)
+
+ len = grub_png_get_dword (data);
+ type = grub_png_get_dword (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ break;
+ data->next_offset = data->file->offset + len + 4;
+
+ switch (type)
diff --git a/SOURCES/0242-video-readers-png-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-image-he.patch b/SOURCES/0242-video-readers-png-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-image-he.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52832da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0242-video-readers-png-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-image-he.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 14:13:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/png: Refuse to handle multiple image headers
+
+This causes the bitmap to be leaked. Do not permit multiple image headers.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8ce433557adeadbc46429aabb9f850b02ad2bdfb)
+(cherry picked from commit 6e10bba6a4cbfd6c7bf116f41fd4e037465e19d8)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index e2a6b1cf3c..8955b8ecfd 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ int color_bits;
+ enum grub_video_blit_format blt;
+
++ if (data->image_width || data->image_height)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "png: two image headers found");
++
+ data->image_width = grub_png_get_dword (data);
+ data->image_height = grub_png_get_dword (data);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0243-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch b/SOURCES/0243-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c639780
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0243-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:51:35 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap
+ out-of-bounds write
+
+A 16-bit greyscale PNG without alpha is processed in the following loop:
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+ i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
+ {
+ d1[R3] = d2[1];
+ d1[G3] = d2[1];
+ d1[B3] = d2[1];
+ }
+
+The increment of d1 is wrong. d1 is incremented by 4 bytes per iteration,
+but there are only 3 bytes allocated for storage. This means that image
+data will overwrite somewhat-attacker-controlled parts of memory - 3 bytes
+out of every 4 following the end of the image.
+
+This has existed since greyscale support was added in 2013 in commit
+3ccf16dff98f (grub-core/video/readers/png.c: Support grayscale).
+
+Saving starfield.png as a 16-bit greyscale image without alpha in the gimp
+and attempting to load it causes grub-emu to crash - I don't think this code
+has ever worked.
+
+Delete all PNG greyscale support.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3695
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0e1d163382669bd734439d8864ee969616d971d9)
+[rharwood: context conflict]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4c631c8119206b3178912df2905434d967661c3d)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 85 +++----------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index 8955b8ecfd..a3161e25b6 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct grub_png_data
+
+ unsigned image_width, image_height;
+ int bpp, is_16bit;
+- int raw_bytes, is_gray, is_alpha, is_palette;
++ int raw_bytes, is_alpha, is_palette;
+ int row_bytes, color_bits;
+ grub_uint8_t *image_data;
+
+@@ -296,13 +296,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ data->bpp = 3;
+ else
+ {
+- data->is_gray = 1;
+- data->bpp = 1;
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "png: color type not supported");
+ }
+
+ if ((color_bits != 8) && (color_bits != 16)
+ && (color_bits != 4
+- || !(data->is_gray || data->is_palette)))
++ || !data->is_palette))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "png: bit depth must be 8 or 16");
+
+@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ }
+
+ #ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+- if (data->is_16bit || data->is_gray || data->is_palette)
++ if (data->is_16bit || data->is_palette)
+ #endif
+ {
+ data->image_data = grub_calloc (data->image_height, data->row_bytes);
+@@ -899,27 +899,8 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ int shift;
+ int mask = (1 << data->color_bits) - 1;
+ unsigned j;
+- if (data->is_gray)
+- {
+- /* Generic formula is
+- (0xff * i) / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)
+- but for allowed bit depth of 1, 2 and for it's
+- equivalent to
+- (0xff / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)) * i
+- Precompute the multipliers to avoid division.
+- */
+
+- const grub_uint8_t multipliers[5] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0x55, 0x24, 0x11 };
+- for (i = 0; i < (1U << data->color_bits); i++)
+- {
+- grub_uint8_t col = multipliers[data->color_bits] * i;
+- palette[i][0] = col;
+- palette[i][1] = col;
+- palette[i][2] = col;
+- }
+- }
+- else
+- grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
++ grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
+ d1c = d1;
+ d2c = d2;
+ for (j = 0; j < data->image_height; j++, d1c += data->image_width * 3,
+@@ -956,60 +937,6 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+-
+- if (data->is_gray)
+- {
+- switch (data->bpp)
+- {
+- case 4:
+- /* 16-bit gray with alpha. */
+- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 4)
+- {
+- d1[R4] = d2[3];
+- d1[G4] = d2[3];
+- d1[B4] = d2[3];
+- d1[A4] = d2[1];
+- }
+- break;
+- case 2:
+- if (data->is_16bit)
+- /* 16-bit gray without alpha. */
+- {
+- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
+- {
+- d1[R3] = d2[1];
+- d1[G3] = d2[1];
+- d1[B3] = d2[1];
+- }
+- }
+- else
+- /* 8-bit gray with alpha. */
+- {
+- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
+- {
+- d1[R4] = d2[1];
+- d1[G4] = d2[1];
+- d1[B4] = d2[1];
+- d1[A4] = d2[0];
+- }
+- }
+- break;
+- /* 8-bit gray without alpha. */
+- case 1:
+- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+- i++, d1 += 3, d2++)
+- {
+- d1[R3] = d2[0];
+- d1[G3] = d2[0];
+- d1[B3] = d2[0];
+- }
+- break;
+- }
+- return;
+- }
+
+ {
+ /* Only copy the upper 8 bit. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/0244-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch b/SOURCES/0244-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1e232e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0244-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 23:25:07 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff table
+ items
+
+In fuzzing we observed crashes where a code would attempt to be inserted
+into a huffman table before the start, leading to a set of heap OOB reads
+and writes as table entries with negative indices were shifted around and
+the new code written in.
+
+Catch the case where we would underflow the array and bail.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3696
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1ae9a91d42cb40da8a6f11fac65541858e340afa)
+(cherry picked from commit 132ccc681cf642ad748580f26b54c9259a7f43fd)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index a3161e25b6..d7ed5aa6cf 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -438,6 +438,13 @@ grub_png_insert_huff_item (struct huff_table *ht, int code, int len)
+ for (i = len; i < ht->max_length; i++)
+ n += ht->maxval[i];
+
++ if (n > ht->num_values)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "png: out of range inserting huffman table item");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ ht->values[ht->num_values - i] = ht->values[ht->num_values - i - 1];
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0245-video-readers-png-Sanity-check-some-huffman-codes.patch b/SOURCES/0245-video-readers-png-Sanity-check-some-huffman-codes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01d6333
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0245-video-readers-png-Sanity-check-some-huffman-codes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 19:19:11 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/png: Sanity check some huffman codes
+
+ASAN picked up two OOB global reads: we weren't checking if some code
+values fit within the cplens or cpdext arrays. Check and throw an error
+if not.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c3a8ab0cbd24153ec7b1f84a96ddfdd72ef8d117)
+(cherry picked from commit 5d09addf58086aa11d5f9a91af5632ff87c2d2ee)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index d7ed5aa6cf..7f2ba7849b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -753,6 +753,9 @@ grub_png_read_dynamic_block (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ int len, dist, pos;
+
+ n -= 257;
++ if (((unsigned int) n) >= ARRAY_SIZE (cplens))
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "png: invalid huff code");
+ len = cplens[n];
+ if (cplext[n])
+ len += grub_png_get_bits (data, cplext[n]);
+@@ -760,6 +763,9 @@ grub_png_read_dynamic_block (struct grub_png_data *data)
+ return grub_errno;
+
+ n = grub_png_get_huff_code (data, &data->dist_table);
++ if (((unsigned int) n) >= ARRAY_SIZE (cpdist))
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "png: invalid huff code");
+ dist = cpdist[n];
+ if (cpdext[n])
+ dist += grub_png_get_bits (data, cpdext[n]);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0246-video-readers-jpeg-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-.patch b/SOURCES/0246-video-readers-jpeg-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e03b6d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0246-video-readers-jpeg-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:16:14 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Abort sooner if a read operation fails
+
+Fuzzing revealed some inputs that were taking a long time, potentially
+forever, because they did not bail quickly upon encountering an I/O error.
+
+Try to catch I/O errors sooner and bail out.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ab2e5d2e4bff488bbb557ed435a61ae102ef9f0c)
+(cherry picked from commit 1ff8df0d2dea8ec7c8575241d5e7d6622c204ec3)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index e31602f766..10225abd53 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -109,9 +109,17 @@ static grub_uint8_t
+ grub_jpeg_get_byte (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ {
+ grub_uint8_t r;
++ grub_ssize_t bytes_read;
+
+ r = 0;
+- grub_file_read (data->file, &r, 1);
++ bytes_read = grub_file_read (data->file, &r, 1);
++
++ if (bytes_read != 1)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: unexpected end of data");
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ return r;
+ }
+@@ -120,9 +128,17 @@ static grub_uint16_t
+ grub_jpeg_get_word (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ {
+ grub_uint16_t r;
++ grub_ssize_t bytes_read;
+
+ r = 0;
+- grub_file_read (data->file, &r, sizeof (grub_uint16_t));
++ bytes_read = grub_file_read (data->file, &r, sizeof (grub_uint16_t));
++
++ if (bytes_read != sizeof (grub_uint16_t))
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: unexpected end of data");
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ return grub_be_to_cpu16 (r);
+ }
+@@ -135,6 +151,11 @@ grub_jpeg_get_bit (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ if (data->bit_mask == 0)
+ {
+ data->bit_save = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: file read error");
++ return 0;
++ }
+ if (data->bit_save == JPEG_ESC_CHAR)
+ {
+ if (grub_jpeg_get_byte (data) != 0)
+@@ -143,6 +164,11 @@ grub_jpeg_get_bit (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ "jpeg: invalid 0xFF in data stream");
+ return 0;
+ }
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: file read error");
++ return 0;
++ }
+ }
+ data->bit_mask = 0x80;
+ }
+@@ -161,7 +187,7 @@ grub_jpeg_get_number (struct grub_jpeg_data *data, int num)
+ return 0;
+
+ msb = value = grub_jpeg_get_bit (data);
+- for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
++ for (i = 1; i < num && grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE; i++)
+ value = (value << 1) + (grub_jpeg_get_bit (data) != 0);
+ if (!msb)
+ value += 1 - (1 << num);
+@@ -202,6 +228,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_huff_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ while (data->file->offset + sizeof (count) + 1 <= next_marker)
+ {
+ id = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ ac = (id >> 4) & 1;
+ id &= 0xF;
+ if (id > 1)
+@@ -252,6 +280,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_quan_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+
+ next_marker = data->file->offset;
+ next_marker += grub_jpeg_get_word (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+
+ if (next_marker > data->file->size)
+ {
+@@ -263,6 +293,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_quan_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ <= next_marker)
+ {
+ id = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ if (id >= 0x10) /* Upper 4-bit is precision. */
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: only 8-bit precision is supported");
+@@ -294,6 +326,9 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sof (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ next_marker = data->file->offset;
+ next_marker += grub_jpeg_get_word (data);
+
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
++
+ if (grub_jpeg_get_byte (data) != 8)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: only 8-bit precision is supported");
+@@ -319,6 +354,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sof (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid index");
+
+ ss = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data); /* Sampling factor. */
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ if (!id)
+ {
+ grub_uint8_t vs, hs;
+@@ -498,7 +535,7 @@ grub_jpeg_idct_transform (jpeg_data_unit_t du)
+ }
+ }
+
+-static void
++static grub_err_t
+ grub_jpeg_decode_du (struct grub_jpeg_data *data, int id, jpeg_data_unit_t du)
+ {
+ int h1, h2, qt;
+@@ -513,6 +550,9 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_du (struct grub_jpeg_data *data, int id, jpeg_data_unit_t du)
+ data->dc_value[id] +=
+ grub_jpeg_get_number (data, grub_jpeg_get_huff_code (data, h1));
+
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
++
+ du[0] = data->dc_value[id] * (int) data->quan_table[qt][0];
+ pos = 1;
+ while (pos < ARRAY_SIZE (data->quan_table[qt]))
+@@ -527,11 +567,13 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_du (struct grub_jpeg_data *data, int id, jpeg_data_unit_t du)
+ num >>= 4;
+ pos += num;
+
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
++
+ if (pos >= ARRAY_SIZE (jpeg_zigzag_order))
+ {
+- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+- "jpeg: invalid position in zigzag order!?");
+- return;
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: invalid position in zigzag order!?");
+ }
+
+ du[jpeg_zigzag_order[pos]] = val * (int) data->quan_table[qt][pos];
+@@ -539,6 +581,7 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_du (struct grub_jpeg_data *data, int id, jpeg_data_unit_t du)
+ }
+
+ grub_jpeg_idct_transform (du);
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+ static void
+@@ -597,7 +640,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sos (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ data_offset += grub_jpeg_get_word (data);
+
+ cc = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
+-
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ if (cc != 3 && cc != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: component count must be 1 or 3");
+@@ -610,7 +654,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sos (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ id = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data) - 1;
+ if ((id < 0) || (id >= 3))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid index");
+-
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ ht = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
+ data->comp_index[id][1] = (ht >> 4);
+ data->comp_index[id][2] = (ht & 0xF) + 2;
+@@ -618,11 +663,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sos (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ if ((data->comp_index[id][1] < 0) || (data->comp_index[id][1] > 3) ||
+ (data->comp_index[id][2] < 0) || (data->comp_index[id][2] > 3))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid hufftable index");
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
+ grub_jpeg_get_byte (data); /* Skip 3 unused bytes. */
+ grub_jpeg_get_word (data);
+-
++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return grub_errno;
+ if (data->file->offset != data_offset)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: extra byte in sos");
+
+@@ -640,6 +688,7 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ {
+ unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1;
+ int rst = data->dri;
++ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ vb = 8 << data->log_vs;
+ hb = 8 << data->log_hs;
+@@ -660,17 +709,22 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+
+ for (r2 = 0; r2 < (1U << data->log_vs); r2++)
+ for (c2 = 0; c2 < (1U << data->log_hs); c2++)
+- grub_jpeg_decode_du (data, 0, data->ydu[r2 * 2 + c2]);
++ {
++ err = grub_jpeg_decode_du (data, 0, data->ydu[r2 * 2 + c2]);
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return err;
++ }
+
+ if (data->color_components >= 3)
+ {
+- grub_jpeg_decode_du (data, 1, data->cbdu);
+- grub_jpeg_decode_du (data, 2, data->crdu);
++ err = grub_jpeg_decode_du (data, 1, data->cbdu);
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return err;
++ err = grub_jpeg_decode_du (data, 2, data->crdu);
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return err;
+ }
+
+- if (grub_errno)
+- return grub_errno;
+-
+ nr2 = (data->r1 == nr1 - 1) ? (data->image_height - data->r1 * vb) : vb;
+ nc2 = (c1 == nc1 - 1) ? (data->image_width - c1 * hb) : hb;
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0247-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-reallocate-a-given-huff-ta.patch b/SOURCES/0247-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-reallocate-a-given-huff-ta.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ee92d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0247-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-reallocate-a-given-huff-ta.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:16:58 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Do not reallocate a given huff table
+
+Fix a memory leak where an invalid file could cause us to reallocate
+memory for a huffman table we had already allocated memory for.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit bc06e12b4de55cc6f926af9f064170c82b1403e9)
+(cherry picked from commit 5298bf758ea39a90537f9a1c76541ff2f21b970b)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index 10225abd53..caa211f06d 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_huff_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ n += count[i];
+
+ id += ac * 2;
++ if (data->huff_value[id] != NULL)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: attempt to reallocate huffman table");
+ data->huff_value[id] = grub_malloc (n);
+ if (grub_errno)
+ return grub_errno;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0248-video-readers-jpeg-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-start-o.patch b/SOURCES/0248-video-readers-jpeg-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-start-o.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed20cda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0248-video-readers-jpeg-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-start-o.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:25:17 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Refuse to handle multiple start of
+ streams
+
+An invalid file could contain multiple start of stream blocks, which
+would cause us to reallocate and leak our bitmap. Refuse to handle
+multiple start of streams.
+
+Additionally, fix a grub_error() call formatting.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f3a854def3e281b7ad4bbea730cd3046de1da52f)
+(cherry picked from commit db0154828989a0a52ee59a4dda8c3803752bc827)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index caa211f06d..1df1171d78 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -677,6 +677,9 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sos (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ if (data->file->offset != data_offset)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: extra byte in sos");
+
++ if (*data->bitmap)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: too many start of scan blocks");
++
+ if (grub_video_bitmap_create (data->bitmap, data->image_width,
+ data->image_height,
+ GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_RGB_888))
+@@ -699,8 +702,8 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ nc1 = (data->image_width + hb - 1) >> (3 + data->log_hs);
+
+ if (data->bitmap_ptr == NULL)
+- return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+- "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
+
+ for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
diff --git a/SOURCES/0249-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch b/SOURCES/0249-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed39a71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0249-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 15:38:19 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer write
+
+Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in
+grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(),
+we have the following loop:
+
+for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
+
+We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1.
+
+On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow,
+be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so
+we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.:
+
+0x6180_0000_0480 to
+0x6181_0000_0498
+ ^
+ ~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from
+ any object.
+
+On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer
+that won't crash but will overwrite random data.
+
+Catch the underflow and error out.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3697
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 41aeb2004db9924fecd9f2dd64bc2a5a5594a4b5)
+(cherry picked from commit 5f9582490792108306d047379fed2371bee286f8)
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index 1df1171d78..2da04094b3 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -705,6 +705,10 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
+
++ if (vb * data->image_width <= hb * nc1)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++ "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions");
++
+ for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
+ for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0250-normal-charset-Fix-array-out-of-bounds-formatting-un.patch b/SOURCES/0250-normal-charset-Fix-array-out-of-bounds-formatting-un.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e51d293
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0250-normal-charset-Fix-array-out-of-bounds-formatting-un.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 13:24:38 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] normal/charset: Fix array out-of-bounds formatting unicode
+ for display
+
+In some cases attempting to display arbitrary binary strings leads
+to ASAN splats reading the widthspec array out of bounds.
+
+Check the index. If it would be out of bounds, return a width of 1.
+I don't know if that's strictly correct, but we're not really expecting
+great display of arbitrary binary data, and it's certainly not worse than
+an OOB read.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fdf32abc7a3928852422c0f291d8cd1dd6b34a8d)
+(cherry picked from commit f2c10aaf335b88a69885375c4d68ffab2429df77)
+---
+ grub-core/normal/charset.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/normal/charset.c b/grub-core/normal/charset.c
+index 4dfcc31078..7a5a7c153c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/normal/charset.c
++++ b/grub-core/normal/charset.c
+@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ grub_unicode_estimate_width (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *c)
+ {
+ if (grub_unicode_get_comb_type (c->base))
+ return 0;
++ if (((unsigned long) (c->base >> 3)) >= ARRAY_SIZE (widthspec))
++ return 1;
+ if (widthspec[c->base >> 3] & (1 << (c->base & 7)))
+ return 2;
+ else
diff --git a/SOURCES/0251-net-netbuff-Block-overly-large-netbuff-allocs.patch b/SOURCES/0251-net-netbuff-Block-overly-large-netbuff-allocs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e74df27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0251-net-netbuff-Block-overly-large-netbuff-allocs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 23:47:46 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/netbuff: Block overly large netbuff allocs
+
+A netbuff shouldn't be too huge. It's bounded by MTU and TCP segment
+reassembly.
+
+This helps avoid some bugs (and provides a spot to instrument to catch
+them at their source).
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ee9591103004cd13b4efadda671536090ca7fd57)
+(cherry picked from commit acde668bb9d9fa862a1a63e3bbd5fa47fdfa9183)
+---
+ grub-core/net/netbuff.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/netbuff.c b/grub-core/net/netbuff.c
+index dbeeefe478..d5e9e9a0d7 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/netbuff.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/netbuff.c
+@@ -79,10 +79,23 @@ grub_netbuff_alloc (grub_size_t len)
+
+ COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (NETBUFF_ALIGN % sizeof (grub_properly_aligned_t) == 0);
+
++ /*
++ * The largest size of a TCP packet is 64 KiB, and everything else
++ * should be a lot smaller - most MTUs are 1500 or less. Cap data
++ * size at 64 KiB + a buffer.
++ */
++ if (len > 0xffffUL + 0x1000UL)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG,
++ "attempted to allocate a packet that is too big");
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ if (len < NETBUFFMINLEN)
+ len = NETBUFFMINLEN;
+
+ len = ALIGN_UP (len, NETBUFF_ALIGN);
++
+ #ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EMU
+ data = grub_malloc (len + sizeof (*nb));
+ #else
diff --git a/SOURCES/0252-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch b/SOURCES/0252-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ba8455
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0252-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 19:41:21 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely
+
+This avoids an underflow and subsequent unpleasantness.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28733
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit eb74e5743ca7e18a5e75c392fe0b21d1549a1936)
+(cherry picked from commit 552ad34583e788542e9ca08524a0d4bc8f98c297)
+---
+ grub-core/net/ip.c | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/ip.c b/grub-core/net/ip.c
+index ce6bdc75c6..cf74f1f794 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/ip.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/ip.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <grub/net/netbuff.h>
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/priority_queue.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ #include <grub/time.h>
+
+ struct iphdr {
+@@ -551,7 +552,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb,
+ {
+ rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK)
+ + (nb->tail - nb->data));
+- rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
++
++ if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t),
++ &rsm->total_len))
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n");
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ }
++
+ rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len);
+ if (!rsm->asm_netbuff)
+ {
diff --git a/SOURCES/0253-net-dns-Fix-double-free-addresses-on-corrupt-DNS-res.patch b/SOURCES/0253-net-dns-Fix-double-free-addresses-on-corrupt-DNS-res.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96c5361
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0253-net-dns-Fix-double-free-addresses-on-corrupt-DNS-res.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 01:29:54 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] net/dns: Fix double-free addresses on corrupt DNS response
+
+grub_net_dns_lookup() takes as inputs a pointer to an array of addresses
+("addresses") for the given name, and pointer to a number of addresses
+("naddresses"). grub_net_dns_lookup() is responsible for allocating
+"addresses", and the caller is responsible for freeing it if
+"naddresses" > 0.
+
+The DNS recv_hook will sometimes set and free the addresses array,
+for example if the packet is too short:
+
+ if (ptr + 10 >= nb->tail)
+ {
+ if (!*data->naddresses)
+ grub_free (*data->addresses);
+ grub_netbuff_free (nb);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+Later on the nslookup command code unconditionally frees the "addresses"
+array. Normally this is fine: the array is either populated with valid
+data or is NULL. But in these sorts of error cases it is neither NULL
+nor valid and we get a double-free.
+
+Only free "addresses" if "naddresses" > 0.
+
+It looks like the other use of grub_net_dns_lookup() is not affected.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit eb2e69fcf51307757e43f55ee8c9354d1ee42dd1)
+(cherry picked from commit d801a27e7acec6c1a83067fab0bb975877eaf704)
+---
+ grub-core/net/dns.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/dns.c b/grub-core/net/dns.c
+index 906ec7d678..135faac035 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/dns.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/dns.c
+@@ -667,9 +667,11 @@ grub_cmd_nslookup (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_net_addr_to_str (&addresses[i], buf);
+ grub_printf ("%s\n", buf);
+ }
+- grub_free (addresses);
+ if (naddresses)
+- return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ {
++ grub_free (addresses);
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ }
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NET_NO_DOMAIN, N_("no DNS record found"));
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0254-net-dns-Don-t-read-past-the-end-of-the-string-we-re-.patch b/SOURCES/0254-net-dns-Don-t-read-past-the-end-of-the-string-we-re-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8451c19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0254-net-dns-Don-t-read-past-the-end-of-the-string-we-re-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 21:55:43 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/dns: Don't read past the end of the string we're checking
+ against
+
+I don't really understand what's going on here but fuzzing found
+a bug where we read past the end of check_with. That's a C string,
+so use grub_strlen() to make sure we don't overread it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6a97b3f4b1d5173aa516edc6dedbc63de7306d21)
+(cherry picked from commit e0589624e86bc96666cbdb62f6e55cafec2871b3)
+---
+ grub-core/net/dns.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/dns.c b/grub-core/net/dns.c
+index 135faac035..17961a9f18 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/dns.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/dns.c
+@@ -146,11 +146,18 @@ check_name_real (const grub_uint8_t *name_at, const grub_uint8_t *head,
+ int *length, char *set)
+ {
+ const char *readable_ptr = check_with;
++ int readable_len;
+ const grub_uint8_t *ptr;
+ char *optr = set;
+ int bytes_processed = 0;
+ if (length)
+ *length = 0;
++
++ if (readable_ptr != NULL)
++ readable_len = grub_strlen (readable_ptr);
++ else
++ readable_len = 0;
++
+ for (ptr = name_at; ptr < tail && bytes_processed < tail - head + 2; )
+ {
+ /* End marker. */
+@@ -172,13 +179,16 @@ check_name_real (const grub_uint8_t *name_at, const grub_uint8_t *head,
+ ptr = head + (((ptr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | ptr[1]);
+ continue;
+ }
+- if (readable_ptr && grub_memcmp (ptr + 1, readable_ptr, *ptr) != 0)
++ if (readable_ptr != NULL && (*ptr > readable_len || grub_memcmp (ptr + 1, readable_ptr, *ptr) != 0))
+ return 0;
+ if (grub_memchr (ptr + 1, 0, *ptr)
+ || grub_memchr (ptr + 1, '.', *ptr))
+ return 0;
+ if (readable_ptr)
+- readable_ptr += *ptr;
++ {
++ readable_ptr += *ptr;
++ readable_len -= *ptr;
++ }
+ if (readable_ptr && *readable_ptr != '.' && *readable_ptr != 0)
+ return 0;
+ bytes_processed += *ptr + 1;
+@@ -192,7 +202,10 @@ check_name_real (const grub_uint8_t *name_at, const grub_uint8_t *head,
+ if (optr)
+ *optr++ = '.';
+ if (readable_ptr && *readable_ptr)
+- readable_ptr++;
++ {
++ readable_ptr++;
++ readable_len--;
++ }
+ ptr += *ptr + 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0255-net-tftp-Prevent-a-UAF-and-double-free-from-a-failed.patch b/SOURCES/0255-net-tftp-Prevent-a-UAF-and-double-free-from-a-failed.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dba4ca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0255-net-tftp-Prevent-a-UAF-and-double-free-from-a-failed.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 01:12:24 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Prevent a UAF and double-free from a failed seek
+
+A malicious tftp server can cause UAFs and a double free.
+
+An attempt to read from a network file is handled by grub_net_fs_read(). If
+the read is at an offset other than the current offset, grub_net_seek_real()
+is invoked.
+
+In grub_net_seek_real(), if a backwards seek cannot be satisfied from the
+currently received packets, and the underlying transport does not provide
+a seek method, then grub_net_seek_real() will close and reopen the network
+protocol layer.
+
+For tftp, the ->close() call goes to tftp_close() and frees the tftp_data_t
+file->data. The file->data pointer is not nulled out after the free.
+
+If the ->open() call fails, the file->data will not be reallocated and will
+continue point to a freed memory block. This could happen from a server
+refusing to send the requisite ack to the new tftp request, for example.
+
+The seek and the read will then fail, but the grub_file continues to exist:
+the failed seek does not necessarily cause the entire file to be thrown
+away (e.g. where the file is checked to see if it is gzipped/lzio/xz/etc.,
+a read failure is interpreted as a decompressor passing on the file, not as
+an invalidation of the entire grub_file_t structure).
+
+This means subsequent attempts to read or seek the file will use the old
+file->data after free. Eventually, the file will be close()d again and
+file->data will be freed again.
+
+Mark a net_fs file that doesn't reopen as broken. Do not permit read() or
+close() on a broken file (seek is not exposed directly to the file API -
+it is only called as part of read, so this blocks seeks as well).
+
+As an additional defence, null out the ->data pointer if tftp_open() fails.
+That would have lead to a simple null pointer dereference rather than
+a mess of UAFs.
+
+This may affect other protocols, I haven't checked.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dada1dda695439bb55b2848dddc2d89843552f81)
+(cherry picked from commit 352c5ae8a9fc715712e6ecbd7ccb6218122c748f)
+---
+ grub-core/net/net.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ grub-core/net/tftp.c | 1 +
+ include/grub/net.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
+index 55aed92722..1001c611d1 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
+@@ -1625,7 +1625,8 @@ grub_net_fs_close (grub_file_t file)
+ grub_netbuff_free (file->device->net->packs.first->nb);
+ grub_net_remove_packet (file->device->net->packs.first);
+ }
+- file->device->net->protocol->close (file);
++ if (!file->device->net->broken)
++ file->device->net->protocol->close (file);
+ grub_free (file->device->net->name);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+@@ -1847,7 +1848,10 @@ grub_net_seek_real (struct grub_file *file, grub_off_t offset)
+ file->device->net->stall = 0;
+ err = file->device->net->protocol->open (file, file->device->net->name);
+ if (err)
+- return err;
++ {
++ file->device->net->broken = 1;
++ return err;
++ }
+ grub_net_fs_read_real (file, NULL, offset);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+@@ -1856,6 +1860,9 @@ grub_net_seek_real (struct grub_file *file, grub_off_t offset)
+ static grub_ssize_t
+ grub_net_fs_read (grub_file_t file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
+ {
++ if (file->device->net->broken)
++ return -1;
++
+ if (file->offset != file->device->net->offset)
+ {
+ grub_err_t err;
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+index d54b13f09f..788ad1dc44 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ tftp_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *filename)
+ {
+ grub_net_udp_close (data->sock);
+ grub_free (data);
++ file->data = NULL;
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/net.h b/include/grub/net.h
+index 42af7de250..9e4898cc6b 100644
+--- a/include/grub/net.h
++++ b/include/grub/net.h
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ typedef struct grub_net
+ grub_fs_t fs;
+ int eof;
+ int stall;
++ int broken;
+ } *grub_net_t;
+
+ extern grub_net_t (*EXPORT_VAR (grub_net_open)) (const char *name);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0256-net-tftp-Avoid-a-trivial-UAF.patch b/SOURCES/0256-net-tftp-Avoid-a-trivial-UAF.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09a583a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0256-net-tftp-Avoid-a-trivial-UAF.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 14:29:20 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Avoid a trivial UAF
+
+Under tftp errors, we print a tftp error message from the tftp header.
+However, the tftph pointer is a pointer inside nb, the netbuff. Previously,
+we were freeing the nb and then dereferencing it. Don't do that, use it
+and then free it later.
+
+This isn't really _bad_ per se, especially as we're single-threaded, but
+it trips up fuzzers.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 956f4329cec23e4375182030ca9b2be631a61ba5)
+(cherry picked from commit dbe9abcdee6ce796811111b67e3f24eefe2135d1)
+---
+ grub-core/net/tftp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+index 788ad1dc44..a95766dcbd 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+@@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ tftp_receive (grub_net_udp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ case TFTP_ERROR:
+ data->have_oack = 1;
+- grub_netbuff_free (nb);
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO, "%s", tftph->u.err.errmsg);
+ grub_error_save (&data->save_err);
++ grub_netbuff_free (nb);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ default:
+ grub_netbuff_free (nb);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0257-net-http-Do-not-tear-down-socket-if-it-s-already-bee.patch b/SOURCES/0257-net-http-Do-not-tear-down-socket-if-it-s-already-bee.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbc7162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0257-net-http-Do-not-tear-down-socket-if-it-s-already-bee.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 23:14:15 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/http: Do not tear down socket if it's already been torn
+ down
+
+It's possible for data->sock to get torn down in tcp error handling.
+If we unconditionally tear it down again we will end up doing writes
+to an offset of the NULL pointer when we go to tear it down again.
+
+Detect if it has been torn down and don't do it again.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ec233d3ecf995293304de443579aab5c46c49e85)
+(cherry picked from commit d39cf87ed701b9f0900daed7f672e07994d37ce8)
+---
+ grub-core/net/http.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
+index 7f878b5615..19cb8768e3 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
+@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ http_establish (struct grub_file *file, grub_off_t offset, int initial)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+- for (i = 0; !data->headers_recv && i < 100; i++)
++ for (i = 0; data->sock && !data->headers_recv && i < 100; i++)
+ {
+ grub_net_tcp_retransmit ();
+ grub_net_poll_cards (300, &data->headers_recv);
+@@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ http_establish (struct grub_file *file, grub_off_t offset, int initial)
+
+ if (!data->headers_recv)
+ {
+- grub_net_tcp_close (data->sock, GRUB_NET_TCP_ABORT);
++ if (data->sock)
++ grub_net_tcp_close (data->sock, GRUB_NET_TCP_ABORT);
+ if (data->err)
+ {
+ char *str = data->errmsg;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0258-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch b/SOURCES/0258-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..367a827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0258-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 18:17:03 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers
+
+GRUB has special code for handling an http header that is split
+across two packets.
+
+The code tracks the end of line by looking for a "\n" byte. The
+code for split headers has always advanced the pointer just past the
+end of the line, whereas the code that handles unsplit headers does
+not advance the pointer. This extra advance causes the length to be
+one greater, which breaks an assumption in parse_line(), leading to
+it writing a NUL byte one byte past the end of the buffer where we
+reconstruct the line from the two packets.
+
+It's conceivable that an attacker controlled set of packets could
+cause this to zero out the first byte of the "next" pointer of the
+grub_mm_region structure following the current_line buffer.
+
+Do not advance the pointer in the split header case.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit e9fb459638811c12b0989dbf64e3e124974ef617)
+(cherry picked from commit b604916beb6c39e8ed27f72851eb16f3eaa293c5)
+---
+ grub-core/net/http.c | 4 +---
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
+index 19cb8768e3..58546739a2 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
+@@ -193,9 +193,7 @@ http_receive (grub_net_tcp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ int have_line = 1;
+ char *t;
+ ptr = grub_memchr (nb->data, '\n', nb->tail - nb->data);
+- if (ptr)
+- ptr++;
+- else
++ if (ptr == NULL)
+ {
+ have_line = 0;
+ ptr = (char *) nb->tail;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0259-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch b/SOURCES/0259-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea8ce37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0259-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 19:04:40 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] net/http: Error out on headers with LF without CR
+
+In a similar vein to the previous patch, parse_line() would write
+a NUL byte past the end of the buffer if there was an HTTP header
+with a LF rather than a CRLF.
+
+RFC-2616 says:
+
+ Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words separated by LWS
+ or special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted
+ string to be used within a parameter value (as defined in section 3.6).
+
+We don't support quoted sections or continuation lines, etc.
+
+If we see an LF that's not part of a CRLF, bail out.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d232ad41ac4979a9de4d746e5fdff9caf0e303de)
+(cherry picked from commit 8960e6d6137090a7e8c6592077da6e387a4ef972)
+---
+ grub-core/net/http.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
+index 58546739a2..57d2721719 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
+@@ -69,7 +69,15 @@ parse_line (grub_file_t file, http_data_t data, char *ptr, grub_size_t len)
+ char *end = ptr + len;
+ while (end > ptr && *(end - 1) == '\r')
+ end--;
++
++ /* LF without CR. */
++ if (end == ptr + len)
++ {
++ data->errmsg = grub_strdup (_("invalid HTTP header - LF without CR"));
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ }
+ *end = 0;
++
+ /* Trailing CRLF. */
+ if (data->in_chunk_len == 1)
+ {
diff --git a/SOURCES/0260-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-journal-entr.patch b/SOURCES/0260-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-journal-entr.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0292c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0260-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-journal-entr.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 18:03:37 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/f2fs: Do not read past the end of nat journal entries
+
+A corrupt f2fs file system could specify a nat journal entry count
+that is beyond the maximum NAT_JOURNAL_ENTRIES.
+
+Check if the specified nat journal entry count before accessing the
+array, and throw an error if it is too large.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a3988cb3f0a108dd67ac127a79a4c8479d23334e)
+(cherry picked from commit 7125978aa7d6068812ef6da0ab38ce521ae7eba1)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+index 8a9992ca9e..63702214b0 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+@@ -632,23 +632,27 @@ get_nat_journal (struct grub_f2fs_data *data)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+-static grub_uint32_t
+-get_blkaddr_from_nat_journal (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, grub_uint32_t nid)
++static grub_err_t
++get_blkaddr_from_nat_journal (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, grub_uint32_t nid,
++ grub_uint32_t *blkaddr)
+ {
+ grub_uint16_t n = grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->nat_j.n_nats);
+- grub_uint32_t blkaddr = 0;
+ grub_uint16_t i;
+
++ if (n >= NAT_JOURNAL_ENTRIES)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
++ "invalid number of nat journal entries");
++
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ {
+ if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->nat_j.entries[i].nid) == nid)
+ {
+- blkaddr = grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->nat_j.entries[i].ne.block_addr);
++ *blkaddr = grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->nat_j.entries[i].ne.block_addr);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+- return blkaddr;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+ static grub_uint32_t
+@@ -656,10 +660,13 @@ get_node_blkaddr (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, grub_uint32_t nid)
+ {
+ struct grub_f2fs_nat_block *nat_block;
+ grub_uint32_t seg_off, block_off, entry_off, block_addr;
+- grub_uint32_t blkaddr;
++ grub_uint32_t blkaddr = 0;
+ grub_err_t err;
+
+- blkaddr = get_blkaddr_from_nat_journal (data, nid);
++ err = get_blkaddr_from_nat_journal (data, nid, &blkaddr);
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return 0;
++
+ if (blkaddr)
+ return blkaddr;
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0261-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-bitmap.patch b/SOURCES/0261-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-bitmap.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d59fb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0261-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-bitmap.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 18:49:09 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/f2fs: Do not read past the end of nat bitmap
+
+A corrupt f2fs filesystem could have a block offset or a bitmap
+offset that would cause us to read beyond the bounds of the nat
+bitmap.
+
+Introduce the nat_bitmap_size member in grub_f2fs_data which holds
+the size of nat bitmap.
+
+Set the size when loading the nat bitmap in nat_bitmap_ptr(), and
+catch when an invalid offset would create a pointer past the end of
+the allocated space.
+
+Check against the bitmap size in grub_f2fs_test_bit() test bit to avoid
+reading past the end of the nat bitmap.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 62d63d5e38c67a6e349148bf7cb87c560e935a7e)
+(cherry picked from commit 92219e6d379b5b4d30b05361830b72ab1d95d281)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+index 63702214b0..8898b235e0 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+ #define F2FS_INLINE_DOTS 0x10 /* File having implicit dot dentries. */
+
+ #define MAX_VOLUME_NAME 512
++#define MAX_NAT_BITMAP_SIZE 3900
+
+ enum FILE_TYPE
+ {
+@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ struct grub_f2fs_checkpoint
+ grub_uint32_t checksum_offset;
+ grub_uint64_t elapsed_time;
+ grub_uint8_t alloc_type[MAX_ACTIVE_LOGS];
+- grub_uint8_t sit_nat_version_bitmap[3900];
++ grub_uint8_t sit_nat_version_bitmap[MAX_NAT_BITMAP_SIZE];
+ grub_uint32_t checksum;
+ } GRUB_PACKED;
+
+@@ -302,6 +303,7 @@ struct grub_f2fs_data
+
+ struct grub_f2fs_nat_journal nat_j;
+ char *nat_bitmap;
++ grub_uint32_t nat_bitmap_size;
+
+ grub_disk_t disk;
+ struct grub_f2fs_node *inode;
+@@ -377,15 +379,20 @@ sum_blk_addr (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, int base, int type)
+ }
+
+ static void *
+-nat_bitmap_ptr (struct grub_f2fs_data *data)
++nat_bitmap_ptr (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, grub_uint32_t *nat_bitmap_size)
+ {
+ struct grub_f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = &data->ckpt;
+ grub_uint32_t offset;
++ *nat_bitmap_size = MAX_NAT_BITMAP_SIZE;
+
+ if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->sblock.cp_payload) > 0)
+ return ckpt->sit_nat_version_bitmap;
+
+ offset = grub_le_to_cpu32 (ckpt->sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize);
++ if (offset >= MAX_NAT_BITMAP_SIZE)
++ return NULL;
++
++ *nat_bitmap_size = *nat_bitmap_size - offset;
+
+ return ckpt->sit_nat_version_bitmap + offset;
+ }
+@@ -438,11 +445,15 @@ grub_f2fs_crc_valid (grub_uint32_t blk_crc, void *buf, const grub_uint32_t len)
+ }
+
+ static int
+-grub_f2fs_test_bit (grub_uint32_t nr, const char *p)
++grub_f2fs_test_bit (grub_uint32_t nr, const char *p, grub_uint32_t len)
+ {
+ int mask;
++ grub_uint32_t shifted_nr = (nr >> 3);
+
+- p += (nr >> 3);
++ if (shifted_nr >= len)
++ return -1;
++
++ p += shifted_nr;
+ mask = 1 << (7 - (nr & 0x07));
+
+ return mask & *p;
+@@ -662,6 +673,7 @@ get_node_blkaddr (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, grub_uint32_t nid)
+ grub_uint32_t seg_off, block_off, entry_off, block_addr;
+ grub_uint32_t blkaddr = 0;
+ grub_err_t err;
++ int result_bit;
+
+ err = get_blkaddr_from_nat_journal (data, nid, &blkaddr);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+@@ -682,8 +694,15 @@ get_node_blkaddr (struct grub_f2fs_data *data, grub_uint32_t nid)
+ ((seg_off * data->blocks_per_seg) << 1) +
+ (block_off & (data->blocks_per_seg - 1));
+
+- if (grub_f2fs_test_bit (block_off, data->nat_bitmap))
++ result_bit = grub_f2fs_test_bit (block_off, data->nat_bitmap,
++ data->nat_bitmap_size);
++ if (result_bit > 0)
+ block_addr += data->blocks_per_seg;
++ else if (result_bit == -1)
++ {
++ grub_free (nat_block);
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ err = grub_f2fs_block_read (data, block_addr, nat_block);
+ if (err)
+@@ -833,7 +852,9 @@ grub_f2fs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
+ if (err)
+ goto fail;
+
+- data->nat_bitmap = nat_bitmap_ptr (data);
++ data->nat_bitmap = nat_bitmap_ptr (data, &data->nat_bitmap_size);
++ if (data->nat_bitmap == NULL)
++ goto fail;
+
+ err = get_nat_journal (data);
+ if (err)
diff --git a/SOURCES/0262-fs-f2fs-Do-not-copy-file-names-that-are-too-long.patch b/SOURCES/0262-fs-f2fs-Do-not-copy-file-names-that-are-too-long.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c454897
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0262-fs-f2fs-Do-not-copy-file-names-that-are-too-long.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 18:17:43 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/f2fs: Do not copy file names that are too long
+
+A corrupt f2fs file system might specify a name length which is greater
+than the maximum name length supported by the GRUB f2fs driver.
+
+We will allocate enough memory to store the overly long name, but there
+are only F2FS_NAME_LEN bytes in the source, so we would read past the end
+of the source.
+
+While checking directory entries, do not copy a file name with an invalid
+length.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9a891f638509e031d322c94e3cbcf38d36f3993a)
+(cherry picked from commit 13f9160ae0d2806baed459884999356817096cd7)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+index 8898b235e0..df6beb544c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c
+@@ -1003,6 +1003,10 @@ grub_f2fs_check_dentries (struct grub_f2fs_dir_iter_ctx *ctx)
+
+ ftype = ctx->dentry[i].file_type;
+ name_len = grub_le_to_cpu16 (ctx->dentry[i].name_len);
++
++ if (name_len >= F2FS_NAME_LEN)
++ return 0;
++
+ filename = grub_malloc (name_len + 1);
+ if (!filename)
+ return 0;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0263-fs-btrfs-Fix-several-fuzz-issues-with-invalid-dir-it.patch b/SOURCES/0263-fs-btrfs-Fix-several-fuzz-issues-with-invalid-dir-it.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e8cd4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0263-fs-btrfs-Fix-several-fuzz-issues-with-invalid-dir-it.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 10:49:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/btrfs: Fix several fuzz issues with invalid dir item
+ sizing
+
+According to the btrfs code in Linux, the structure of a directory item
+leaf should be of the form:
+
+ |struct btrfs_dir_item|name|data|
+
+in GRUB the name len and data len are in the grub_btrfs_dir_item
+structure's n and m fields respectively.
+
+The combined size of the structure, name and data should be less than
+the allocated memory, a difference to the Linux kernel's struct
+btrfs_dir_item is that the grub_btrfs_dir_item has an extra field for
+where the name is stored, so we adjust for that too.
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6d3f06c0b6a8992b9b1bb0e62af93ac5ff2781f0)
+[rharwood: we've an extra variable here]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit e3e21b9a81aea09dd43368cf097c1029a8380d82)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+index 4cc86e9b79..f3ab64e098 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+@@ -2254,6 +2254,7 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path,
+ grub_uint64_t tree;
+ grub_uint8_t type;
+ char *new_path = NULL;
++ grub_size_t est_size = 0;
+
+ if (!data)
+ return grub_errno;
+@@ -2320,6 +2321,18 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path,
+ break;
+ }
+
++ if (direl == NULL ||
++ grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu16 (direl->n),
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (direl->m), &est_size) ||
++ grub_add (est_size, sizeof (*direl), &est_size) ||
++ grub_sub (est_size, sizeof (direl->name), &est_size) ||
++ est_size > allocated)
++ {
++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
++ r = -grub_errno;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ for (cdirel = direl;
+ (grub_uint8_t *) cdirel - (grub_uint8_t *) direl
+ < (grub_ssize_t) elemsize;
+@@ -2330,6 +2343,19 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path,
+ char c;
+ struct grub_btrfs_inode inode;
+ struct grub_dirhook_info info;
++
++ if (cdirel == NULL ||
++ grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu16 (cdirel->n),
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (cdirel->m), &est_size) ||
++ grub_add (est_size, sizeof (*cdirel), &est_size) ||
++ grub_sub (est_size, sizeof (cdirel->name), &est_size) ||
++ est_size > allocated)
++ {
++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
++ r = -grub_errno;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ err = grub_btrfs_read_inode (data, &inode, cdirel->key.object_id,
+ tree);
+ grub_memset (&info, 0, sizeof (info));
diff --git a/SOURCES/0264-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-ASAN-and-SEGV-issues-found-with-fu.patch b/SOURCES/0264-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-ASAN-and-SEGV-issues-found-with-fu.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2a8815
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0264-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-ASAN-and-SEGV-issues-found-with-fu.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 15:52:46 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/btrfs: Fix more ASAN and SEGV issues found with fuzzing
+
+The fuzzer is generating btrfs file systems that have chunks with
+invalid combinations of stripes and substripes for the given RAID
+configurations.
+
+After examining the Linux kernel fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c code, it
+appears that sub-stripes should only be applied to RAID10, and in that
+case there should only ever be 2 of them.
+
+Similarly, RAID single should only have 1 stripe, and RAID1/1C3/1C4
+should have 2. 3 or 4 stripes respectively, which is what redundancy
+corresponds.
+
+Some of the chunks ended up with a size of 0, which grub_malloc() still
+returned memory for and in turn generated ASAN errors later when
+accessed.
+
+While it would be possible to specifically limit the number of stripes,
+a more correct test was on the combination of the chunk item, and the
+number of stripes by the size of the chunk stripe structure in
+comparison to the size of the chunk itself.
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3849647b4b98a4419366708fc4b7f339c6f55ec7)
+(cherry picked from commit fa5a02a8930bbd8a3b5ae6ed9612307611f18500)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+index f3ab64e098..b104da085c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+@@ -941,6 +941,12 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
+ "couldn't find the chunk descriptor");
+
++ if (!chsize)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "zero-size chunk\n");
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
++ "got an invalid zero-size chunk");
++ }
+ chunk = grub_malloc (chsize);
+ if (!chunk)
+ return grub_errno;
+@@ -999,6 +1005,16 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ stripe_length = grub_divmod64 (grub_le_to_cpu64 (chunk->size),
+ nstripes,
+ NULL);
++
++ /* For single, there should be exactly 1 stripe. */
++ if (grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes) != 1)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "invalid RAID_SINGLE: nstripes != 1 (%u)\n",
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
++ "invalid RAID_SINGLE: nstripes != 1 (%u)",
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes));
++ }
+ if (stripe_length == 0)
+ stripe_length = 512;
+ stripen = grub_divmod64 (off, stripe_length, &stripe_offset);
+@@ -1018,6 +1034,19 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ stripen = 0;
+ stripe_offset = off;
+ csize = grub_le_to_cpu64 (chunk->size) - off;
++
++ /*
++ * Redundancy, and substripes only apply to RAID10, and there
++ * should be exactly 2 sub-stripes.
++ */
++ if (grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes) != redundancy)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "invalid RAID1: nstripes != %u (%u)\n",
++ redundancy, grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
++ "invalid RAID1: nstripes != %u (%u)",
++ redundancy, grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes));
++ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case GRUB_BTRFS_CHUNK_TYPE_RAID0:
+@@ -1054,6 +1083,20 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ stripe_offset = low + chunk_stripe_length
+ * high;
+ csize = chunk_stripe_length - low;
++
++ /*
++ * Substripes only apply to RAID10, and there
++ * should be exactly 2 sub-stripes.
++ */
++ if (grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nsubstripes) != 2)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "invalid RAID10: nsubstripes != 2 (%u)",
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nsubstripes));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
++ "invalid RAID10: nsubstripes != 2 (%u)",
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nsubstripes));
++ }
++
+ break;
+ }
+ case GRUB_BTRFS_CHUNK_TYPE_RAID5:
+@@ -1153,6 +1196,8 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++)
+ {
++ grub_size_t est_chunk_alloc = 0;
++
+ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "chunk 0x%" PRIxGRUB_UINT64_T
+ "+0x%" PRIxGRUB_UINT64_T
+ " (%d stripes (%d substripes) of %"
+@@ -1165,6 +1210,16 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "reading laddr 0x%" PRIxGRUB_UINT64_T "\n",
+ addr);
+
++ if (grub_mul (sizeof (struct grub_btrfs_chunk_stripe),
++ grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes), &est_chunk_alloc) ||
++ grub_add (est_chunk_alloc,
++ sizeof (struct grub_btrfs_chunk_item), &est_chunk_alloc) ||
++ est_chunk_alloc > chunk->size)
++ {
++ err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS;
++ break;
++ }
++
+ if (is_raid56)
+ {
+ err = btrfs_read_from_chunk (data, chunk, stripen,
diff --git a/SOURCES/0265-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-fuzz-issues-related-to-chunks.patch b/SOURCES/0265-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-fuzz-issues-related-to-chunks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01294d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0265-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-fuzz-issues-related-to-chunks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 15:18:12 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/btrfs: Fix more fuzz issues related to chunks
+
+The corpus we generating issues in grub_btrfs_read_logical() when
+attempting to iterate over nstripes entries in the boot mapping.
+
+In most cases the reason for the failure was that the number of strips
+exceeded the possible space statically allocated in superblock bootmapping
+space. Each stripe entry in the bootmapping block consists of
+a grub_btrfs_key followed by a grub_btrfs_chunk_stripe.
+
+Another issue that came up was that while calculating the chunk size,
+in an earlier piece of code in that function, depending on the data
+provided in the btrfs file system, it would end up calculating a size
+that was too small to contain even 1 grub_btrfs_chunk_item, which is
+obviously invalid too.
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit e00cd76cbadcc897a9cc4087cb2fcb5dbe15e596)
+(cherry picked from commit b74a6fc95b0839937acf4f2b7445ae9d179f49ec)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+index b104da085c..8ec885a93b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+@@ -947,6 +947,17 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
+ "got an invalid zero-size chunk");
+ }
++
++ /*
++ * The space being allocated for a chunk should at least be able to
++ * contain one chunk item.
++ */
++ if (chsize < sizeof (struct grub_btrfs_chunk_item))
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("btrfs", "chunk-size too small\n");
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
++ "got an invalid chunk size");
++ }
+ chunk = grub_malloc (chsize);
+ if (!chunk)
+ return grub_errno;
+@@ -1194,6 +1205,13 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ if (csize > (grub_uint64_t) size)
+ csize = size;
+
++ /*
++ * The space for a chunk stripe is limited to the space provide in the super-block's
++ * bootstrap mapping with an initial btrfs key at the start of each chunk.
++ */
++ grub_size_t avail_stripes = sizeof (data->sblock.bootstrap_mapping) /
++ (sizeof (struct grub_btrfs_key) + sizeof (struct grub_btrfs_chunk_stripe));
++
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++)
+ {
+ grub_size_t est_chunk_alloc = 0;
+@@ -1220,6 +1238,12 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
+ break;
+ }
+
++ if (grub_le_to_cpu16 (chunk->nstripes) > avail_stripes)
++ {
++ err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS;
++ break;
++ }
++
+ if (is_raid56)
+ {
+ err = btrfs_read_from_chunk (data, chunk, stripen,
diff --git a/SOURCES/0266-misc-Make-grub_min-and-grub_max-more-resilient.patch b/SOURCES/0266-misc-Make-grub_min-and-grub_max-more-resilient.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d34a0e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0266-misc-Make-grub_min-and-grub_max-more-resilient.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 16:06:10 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] misc: Make grub_min() and grub_max() more resilient.
+
+grub_min(a,b) and grub_max(a,b) use a relatively naive implementation
+which leads to several problems:
+- they evaluate their parameters more than once
+- the naive way to address this, to declare temporary variables in a
+ statement-expression, isn't resilient against nested uses, because
+ MIN(a,MIN(b,c)) results in the temporary variables being declared in
+ two nested scopes, which may result in a build warning depending on
+ your build options.
+
+This patch changes our implementation to use a statement-expression
+inside a helper macro, and creates the symbols for the temporary
+variables with __COUNTER__ (A GNU C cpp extension) and token pasting to
+create uniquely named internal variables.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2d6800450fa731d7b3ef9893986806e88e819eb6)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/multiboot_elfxx.c | 4 +---
+ include/grub/misc.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/multiboot_elfxx.c b/grub-core/loader/multiboot_elfxx.c
+index f2318e0d16..87f6e31aa6 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/multiboot_elfxx.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/multiboot_elfxx.c
+@@ -35,9 +35,7 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #include <grub/i386/relocator.h>
+-
+-#define CONCAT(a,b) CONCAT_(a, b)
+-#define CONCAT_(a,b) a ## b
++#include <grub/misc.h>
+
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h
+index 6c4aa85ac5..cf84aec1db 100644
+--- a/include/grub/misc.h
++++ b/include/grub/misc.h
+@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@
+ #define ARRAY_SIZE(array) (sizeof (array) / sizeof (array[0]))
+ #define COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT(cond) switch (0) { case 1: case !(cond): ; }
+
++#ifndef CONCAT_
++#define CONCAT_(a, b) a ## b
++#endif
++
++#ifndef CONCAT
++#define CONCAT(a, b) CONCAT_(a, b)
++#endif
++
+ #define grub_dprintf(condition, ...) grub_real_dprintf(GRUB_FILE, __LINE__, condition, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+ void *EXPORT_FUNC(grub_memmove) (void *dest, const void *src, grub_size_t n);
+@@ -498,8 +506,21 @@ void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_real_boot_time) (const char *file,
+ #define grub_boot_time(...)
+ #endif
+
+-#define grub_max(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+-#define grub_min(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
++#define _grub_min(a, b, _a, _b) \
++ ({ typeof (a) _a = (a); \
++ typeof (b) _b = (b); \
++ _a < _b ? _a : _b; })
++#define grub_min(a, b) _grub_min(a, b, \
++ CONCAT(_a_,__COUNTER__), \
++ CONCAT(_b_,__COUNTER__))
++
++#define _grub_max(a, b, _a, _b) \
++ ({ typeof (a) _a = (a); \
++ typeof (b) _b = (b); \
++ _a > _b ? _a : _b; })
++#define grub_max(a, b) _grub_max(a, b, \
++ CONCAT(_a_,__COUNTER__), \
++ CONCAT(_b_,__COUNTER__))
+
+ #define grub_log2ull(n) (GRUB_TYPE_BITS (grub_uint64_t) - __builtin_clzll (n) - 1)
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0267-ReiserFS-switch-to-using-grub_min-grub_max.patch b/SOURCES/0267-ReiserFS-switch-to-using-grub_min-grub_max.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e604215
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0267-ReiserFS-switch-to-using-grub_min-grub_max.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:31:17 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] ReiserFS: switch to using grub_min()/grub_max()
+
+This is a minor cleanup patch to remove the bespoke MIN() and MAX()
+definitions from the reiserfs driver, and uses grub_min() / grub_max()
+instead.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5fc601574fce99b32fe4dfb55bd8f3ab0175fd6a)
+---
+ grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c | 28 +++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
+index af6a226a7f..b8253da7fe 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c
+@@ -42,16 +42,6 @@
+
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+-#define MIN(a, b) \
+- ({ typeof (a) _a = (a); \
+- typeof (b) _b = (b); \
+- _a < _b ? _a : _b; })
+-
+-#define MAX(a, b) \
+- ({ typeof (a) _a = (a); \
+- typeof (b) _b = (b); \
+- _a > _b ? _a : _b; })
+-
+ #define REISERFS_SUPER_BLOCK_OFFSET 0x10000
+ #define REISERFS_MAGIC_LEN 12
+ #define REISERFS_MAGIC_STRING "ReIsEr"
+@@ -1076,7 +1066,7 @@ grub_reiserfs_read_real (struct grub_fshelp_node *node,
+ grub_reiserfs_set_key_type (&key, GRUB_REISERFS_ANY, 2);
+ initial_position = off;
+ current_position = 0;
+- final_position = MIN (len + initial_position, node->size);
++ final_position = grub_min (len + initial_position, node->size);
+ grub_dprintf ("reiserfs",
+ "Reading from %lld to %lld (%lld instead of requested %ld)\n",
+ (unsigned long long) initial_position,
+@@ -1115,8 +1105,8 @@ grub_reiserfs_read_real (struct grub_fshelp_node *node,
+ grub_dprintf ("reiserfs_blocktype", "D: %u\n", (unsigned) block);
+ if (initial_position < current_position + item_size)
+ {
+- offset = MAX ((signed) (initial_position - current_position), 0);
+- length = (MIN (item_size, final_position - current_position)
++ offset = grub_max ((signed) (initial_position - current_position), 0);
++ length = (grub_min (item_size, final_position - current_position)
+ - offset);
+ grub_dprintf ("reiserfs",
+ "Reading direct block %u from %u to %u...\n",
+@@ -1161,9 +1151,9 @@ grub_reiserfs_read_real (struct grub_fshelp_node *node,
+ grub_dprintf ("reiserfs_blocktype", "I: %u\n", (unsigned) block);
+ if (current_position + block_size >= initial_position)
+ {
+- offset = MAX ((signed) (initial_position - current_position),
+- 0);
+- length = (MIN (block_size, final_position - current_position)
++ offset = grub_max ((signed) (initial_position - current_position),
++ 0);
++ length = (grub_min (block_size, final_position - current_position)
+ - offset);
+ grub_dprintf ("reiserfs",
+ "Reading indirect block %u from %u to %u...\n",
+@@ -1205,7 +1195,7 @@ grub_reiserfs_read_real (struct grub_fshelp_node *node,
+ switch (found.type)
+ {
+ case GRUB_REISERFS_DIRECT:
+- read_length = MIN (len, item_size - file->offset);
++ read_length = grub_min (len, item_size - file->offset);
+ grub_disk_read (found.data->disk,
+ (found.block_number * block_size) / GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE,
+ grub_le_to_cpu16 (found.header.item_location) + file->offset,
+@@ -1224,12 +1214,12 @@ grub_reiserfs_read_real (struct grub_fshelp_node *node,
+ item_size, (char *) indirect_block_ptr);
+ if (grub_errno)
+ goto fail;
+- len = MIN (len, file->size - file->offset);
++ len = grub_min (len, file->size - file->offset);
+ for (indirect_block = file->offset / block_size;
+ indirect_block < indirect_block_count && read_length < len;
+ indirect_block++)
+ {
+- read = MIN (block_size, len - read_length);
++ read = grub_min (block_size, len - read_length);
+ grub_disk_read (found.data->disk,
+ (grub_le_to_cpu32 (indirect_block_ptr[indirect_block]) * block_size) / GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE,
+ file->offset % block_size, read,
diff --git a/SOURCES/0268-misc-make-grub_boot_time-also-call-grub_dprintf-boot.patch b/SOURCES/0268-misc-make-grub_boot_time-also-call-grub_dprintf-boot.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64bbe31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0268-misc-make-grub_boot_time-also-call-grub_dprintf-boot.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 14:40:01 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] misc: make grub_boot_time() also call
+ grub_dprintf("boot",...)
+
+Currently grub_boot_time() includes valuable debugging messages, but if
+you build without BOOT_TIME_STATS enabled, they are silently and
+confusingly compiled away.
+
+This patch changes grub_boot_time() to also log when "boot" is enabled
+in DEBUG, regardless of BOOT_TIME_STATS.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4fd282de00df05ce289467861deb7a0e186cfbd7)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/misc.c | 3 ++-
+ include/grub/misc.h | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/misc.c b/grub-core/kern/misc.c
+index a186ad3dd4..cb45461402 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/misc.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/misc.c
+@@ -1334,7 +1334,8 @@ grub_real_boot_time (const char *file,
+ n->next = 0;
+
+ va_start (args, fmt);
+- n->msg = grub_xvasprintf (fmt, args);
++ n->msg = grub_xvasprintf (fmt, args);
++ grub_dprintf ("boot", "%s\n", n->msg);
+ va_end (args);
+
+ *boot_time_last = n;
+diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h
+index cf84aec1db..faae0ae860 100644
+--- a/include/grub/misc.h
++++ b/include/grub/misc.h
+@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_real_boot_time) (const char *file,
+ const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__ ((format (GNU_PRINTF, 3, 4)));
+ #define grub_boot_time(...) grub_real_boot_time(GRUB_FILE, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define grub_boot_time(...)
++#define grub_boot_time(fmt, ...) grub_dprintf("boot", fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #endif
+
+ #define _grub_min(a, b, _a, _b) \
diff --git a/SOURCES/0269-modules-make-.module_license-read-only.patch b/SOURCES/0269-modules-make-.module_license-read-only.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51281a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0269-modules-make-.module_license-read-only.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 16:32:51 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] modules: make .module_license read-only
+
+Currently .module_license is set writable (that is, the section has the
+SHF_WRITE flag set) in the module's ELF headers. This probably never
+actually matters, but it can't possibly be correct.
+
+This patch sets that data as "const", which causes that flag not to be
+set.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2eff3e2c9d9e6b75daa81b840c96f112ef7d5de6)
+---
+ include/grub/dl.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h
+index 20d870f2a4..618ae6f474 100644
+--- a/include/grub/dl.h
++++ b/include/grub/dl.h
+@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ grub_mod_fini (void)
+ #define ATTRIBUTE_USED __unused__
+ #endif
+ #define GRUB_MOD_LICENSE(license) \
+- static char grub_module_license[] __attribute__ ((section (GRUB_MOD_SECTION (module_license)), ATTRIBUTE_USED)) = "LICENSE=" license;
++ static const char grub_module_license[] __attribute__ ((section (GRUB_MOD_SECTION (module_license)), ATTRIBUTE_USED)) = "LICENSE=" license;
+ #define GRUB_MOD_DEP(name) \
+ static const char grub_module_depend_##name[] \
+ __attribute__((section(GRUB_MOD_SECTION(moddeps)), ATTRIBUTE_USED)) = #name
diff --git a/SOURCES/0270-modules-strip-.llvm_addrsig-sections-and-similar.patch b/SOURCES/0270-modules-strip-.llvm_addrsig-sections-and-similar.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16528e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0270-modules-strip-.llvm_addrsig-sections-and-similar.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 16:40:11 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] modules: strip .llvm_addrsig sections and similar.
+
+Currently grub modules built with clang or gcc have several sections
+which we don't actually need or support.
+
+We already have a list of section to skip in genmod.sh, and this patch
+adds the following sections to that list (as well as a few newlines):
+
+.note.gnu.property
+.llvm*
+
+Note that the glob there won't work without a new enough linker, but the
+failure is just reversion to the status quo, so that's not a big problem.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit e85d1c4d795f8135ad0acfa36d64760d12d6fed1)
+---
+ grub-core/genmod.sh.in | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/genmod.sh.in b/grub-core/genmod.sh.in
+index 1250589b3f..c2c5280d75 100644
+--- a/grub-core/genmod.sh.in
++++ b/grub-core/genmod.sh.in
+@@ -57,8 +57,11 @@ if test x@TARGET_APPLE_LINKER@ != x1; then
+ @TARGET_STRIP@ --strip-unneeded \
+ -K grub_mod_init -K grub_mod_fini \
+ -K _grub_mod_init -K _grub_mod_fini \
+- -R .note.gnu.gold-version -R .note.GNU-stack \
++ -R .note.GNU-stack \
++ -R .note.gnu.gold-version \
++ -R .note.gnu.property \
+ -R .gnu.build.attributes \
++ -R '.llvm*' \
+ -R .rel.gnu.build.attributes \
+ -R .rela.gnu.build.attributes \
+ -R .eh_frame -R .rela.eh_frame -R .rel.eh_frame \
diff --git a/SOURCES/0271-modules-Don-t-allocate-space-for-non-allocable-secti.patch b/SOURCES/0271-modules-Don-t-allocate-space-for-non-allocable-secti.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6599406
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0271-modules-Don-t-allocate-space-for-non-allocable-secti.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 16:56:10 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] modules: Don't allocate space for non-allocable sections.
+
+Currently when loading grub modules, we allocate space for all sections,
+including those without SHF_ALLOC set. We then copy the sections that
+/do/ have SHF_ALLOC set into the allocated memory, leaving some of our
+allocation untouched forever. Additionally, on platforms with GOT
+fixups and trampolines, we currently compute alignment round-ups for the
+sections and sections with sh_size = 0.
+
+This patch removes the extra space from the allocation computation, and
+makes the allocation computation loop skip empty sections as the loading
+loop does.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 03215e342f552396ab08125ea769b1e166417ec1)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/dl.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+index f304494574..aef8af8aa7 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+@@ -289,6 +289,9 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ i < e->e_shnum;
+ i++, s = (const Elf_Shdr *)((const char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
+ {
++ if (s->sh_size == 0 || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
++ continue;
++
+ tsize = ALIGN_UP (tsize, s->sh_addralign) + s->sh_size;
+ if (talign < s->sh_addralign)
+ talign = s->sh_addralign;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0272-pe-add-the-DOS-header-struct-and-fix-some-bad-naming.patch b/SOURCES/0272-pe-add-the-DOS-header-struct-and-fix-some-bad-naming.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3f2e0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0272-pe-add-the-DOS-header-struct-and-fix-some-bad-naming.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 15:40:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] pe: add the DOS header struct and fix some bad naming.
+
+In order to properly validate a loaded kernel's support for being loaded
+without a writable stack or executable, we need to be able to properly
+parse arbitrary PE headers.
+
+Currently, pe32.h is written in such a way that the MS-DOS header that
+tells us where to find the PE header in the binary can't be accessed.
+Further, for some reason it calls the DOS MZ magic "GRUB_PE32_MAGIC".
+
+This patch adds the structure for the DOS header, renames the DOS magic
+define, and adds defines for the actual PE magic.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 955f47aa8300387eecf18b0866d21dde7720593d)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c | 2 +-
+ include/grub/efi/pe32.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c
+index f18d90bd74..bcc6ef46e9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ grub_arch_efi_linux_check_image (struct linux_arch_kernel_header * lh)
+ if (lh->magic != GRUB_LINUX_ARMXX_MAGIC_SIGNATURE)
+ return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, "invalid magic number");
+
+- if ((lh->code0 & 0xffff) != GRUB_PE32_MAGIC)
++ if ((lh->code0 & 0xffff) != GRUB_DOS_MAGIC)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+ N_("plain image kernel not supported - rebuild with CONFIG_(U)EFI_STUB enabled"));
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/pe32.h b/include/grub/efi/pe32.h
+index a43adf2746..2a5e1ee003 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/pe32.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/pe32.h
+@@ -46,7 +46,30 @@
+
+ #define GRUB_PE32_MSDOS_STUB_SIZE 0x80
+
+-#define GRUB_PE32_MAGIC 0x5a4d
++#define GRUB_DOS_MAGIC 0x5a4d
++
++struct grub_dos_header
++{
++ grub_uint16_t magic;
++ grub_uint16_t cblp;
++ grub_uint16_t cp;
++ grub_uint16_t crlc;
++ grub_uint16_t cparhdr;
++ grub_uint16_t minalloc;
++ grub_uint16_t maxalloc;
++ grub_uint16_t ss;
++ grub_uint16_t sp;
++ grub_uint16_t csum;
++ grub_uint16_t ip;
++ grub_uint16_t cs;
++ grub_uint16_t lfarlc;
++ grub_uint16_t ovno;
++ grub_uint16_t res0[4];
++ grub_uint16_t oemid;
++ grub_uint16_t oeminfo;
++ grub_uint16_t res1[10];
++ grub_uint32_t lfanew;
++};
+
+ /* According to the spec, the minimal alignment is 512 bytes...
+ But some examples (such as EFI drivers in the Intel
+@@ -280,7 +303,8 @@ struct grub_pe32_section_table
+
+
+
+-#define GRUB_PE32_SIGNATURE_SIZE 4
++#define GRUB_PE32_SIGNATURE_SIZE 4
++#define GRUB_PE32_SIGNATURE "PE\0\0"
+
+ struct grub_pe32_header
+ {
diff --git a/SOURCES/0273-EFI-allocate-kernel-in-EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE-ins.patch b/SOURCES/0273-EFI-allocate-kernel-in-EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE-ins.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b306f15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0273-EFI-allocate-kernel-in-EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE-ins.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 16:08:20 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] EFI: allocate kernel in EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE instead of
+ EFI_LOADER_DATA.
+
+On some of the firmwares with more security mitigations, EFI_LOADER_DATA
+doesn't get you executable memory, and we take a fault and reboot when
+we enter kernel.
+
+This patch correctly allocates the kernel code as EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE
+rather than EFI_LOADER_DATA.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+[rharwood: use kernel_size]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8b31058a12d3e85f0f0180ac90b98d6465fccbb7)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+index d24553a79d..b832c85728 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+@@ -87,7 +87,9 @@ kernel_free(void *addr, grub_efi_uintn_t size)
+ }
+
+ static void *
+-kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size, const char * const errmsg)
++kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size,
++ grub_efi_memory_type_t memtype,
++ const char * const errmsg)
+ {
+ void *addr = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+@@ -113,7 +115,7 @@ kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size, const char * const errmsg)
+ prev_max = max;
+ addr = grub_efi_allocate_pages_real (max, pages,
+ max_addresses[i].alloc_type,
+- GRUB_EFI_LOADER_DATA);
++ memtype);
+ if (addr)
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "Allocated at %p\n", addr);
+ }
+@@ -243,7 +245,8 @@ grub_cmd_initrd (grub_command_t cmd, int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+ }
+
+- initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, N_("can't allocate initrd"));
++ initrd_mem = kernel_alloc(size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
++ N_("can't allocate initrd"));
+ if (initrd_mem == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "initrd_mem = %p\n", initrd_mem);
+@@ -406,7 +409,8 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ }
+ #endif
+
+- params = kernel_alloc (sizeof(*params), "cannot allocate kernel parameters");
++ params = kernel_alloc (sizeof(*params), GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
++ "cannot allocate kernel parameters");
+ if (!params)
+ goto fail;
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "params = %p\n", params);
+@@ -428,7 +432,9 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "new lh is at %p\n", lh);
+
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "setting up cmdline\n");
+- cmdline = kernel_alloc (lh->cmdline_size + 1, N_("can't allocate cmdline"));
++ cmdline = kernel_alloc (lh->cmdline_size + 1,
++ GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
++ N_("can't allocate cmdline"));
+ if (!cmdline)
+ goto fail;
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "cmdline = %p\n", cmdline);
+@@ -474,7 +480,8 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ max_addresses[1].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
+ max_addresses[2].addr = GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS;
+ kernel_size = lh->init_size;
+- kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (kernel_size, N_("can't allocate kernel"));
++ kernel_mem = kernel_alloc (kernel_size, GRUB_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE,
++ N_("can't allocate kernel"));
+ restore_addresses();
+ if (!kernel_mem)
+ goto fail;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0274-modules-load-module-sections-at-page-aligned-address.patch b/SOURCES/0274-modules-load-module-sections-at-page-aligned-address.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c703d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0274-modules-load-module-sections-at-page-aligned-address.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 17:45:40 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] modules: load module sections at page-aligned addresses
+
+Currently we load module sections at whatever alignment gcc+ld happened
+to dump into the ELF section header, which is often pretty useless. For
+example, by default time.mod has these sections on a current x86_64
+build:
+
+$ eu-readelf -a grub-core/time.mod |& grep ^Section -A13
+Section Headers:
+[Nr] Name Type Addr Off Size ES Flags Lk Inf Al
+[ 0] NULL 0 00000000 00000000 0 0 0 0
+[ 1] .text PROGBITS 0 00000040 0000015e 0 AX 0 0 1
+[ 2] .rela.text RELA 0 00000458 000001e0 24 I 8 1 8
+[ 3] .rodata.str1.1 PROGBITS 0 0000019e 000000a1 1 AMS 0 0 1
+[ 4] .module_license PROGBITS 0 00000240 0000000f 0 A 0 0 8
+[ 5] .data PROGBITS 0 0000024f 00000000 0 WA 0 0 1
+[ 6] .bss NOBITS 0 00000250 00000008 0 WA 0 0 8
+[ 7] .modname PROGBITS 0 00000250 00000005 0 0 0 1
+[ 8] .symtab SYMTAB 0 00000258 00000150 24 9 6 8
+[ 9] .strtab STRTAB 0 000003a8 000000ab 0 0 0 1
+[10] .shstrtab STRTAB 0 00000638 00000059 0 0 0 1
+
+With NX protections being page based, loading sections with either a 1
+or 8 *byte* alignment does absolutely nothing to help us out.
+
+This patch switches most EFI platforms to load module sections at 4kB
+page-aligned addresses. To do so, it adds an new per-arch function,
+grub_arch_dl_min_alignment(), which returns the alignment needed for
+dynamically loaded sections (in bytes). Currently it sets it to 4096
+when GRUB_MACHINE_EFI is true on x86_64, i386, arm, arm64, and emu, and
+1-byte alignment on everything else.
+
+It then changes the allocation size computation and the loader code in
+grub_dl_load_segments() to align the locations and sizes up to these
+boundaries, and fills any added padding with zeros.
+
+All of this happens before relocations are applied, so the relocations
+factor that in with no change.
+
+As an aside, initially Daniel Kiper and I thought that it might be a
+better idea to split the modules up into top-level sections as
+.text.modules, .rodata.modules, .data.modules, etc., so that their page
+permissions would get set by the loader that's loading grub itself.
+This turns out to have two significant downsides: 1) either in mkimage
+or in grub_dl_relocate_symbols(), you wind up having to dynamically
+process the relocations to accommodate the moved module sections, and 2)
+you then need to change the permissions on the modules and change them
+back while relocating them in grub_dl_relocate_symbols(), which means
+that any loader that /does/ honor the section flags but does /not/
+generally support NX with the memory attributes API will cause grub to
+fail.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 31d52500b281619d92b03b2c2d30fe15aedaf326)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/arm/dl.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/arm64/dl.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/dl.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ grub-core/kern/emu/full.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/i386/dl.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/ia64/dl.c | 9 +++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/mips/dl.c | 8 ++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/powerpc/dl.c | 9 +++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/riscv/dl.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/sparc64/dl.c | 9 +++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/x86_64/dl.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ include/grub/dl.h | 2 ++
+ docs/grub-dev.texi | 6 +++---
+ 13 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/arm/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/arm/dl.c
+index eab9d17ff2..9260737936 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/arm/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/arm/dl.c
+@@ -278,3 +278,16 @@ grub_arch_dl_check_header (void *ehdr)
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++ return 4096;
++#else
++ return 1;
++#endif
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/arm64/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/arm64/dl.c
+index 512e5a80b0..0d4a26857f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/arm64/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/arm64/dl.c
+@@ -196,3 +196,16 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++ return 4096;
++#else
++ return 1;
++#endif
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+index aef8af8aa7..8c7aacef39 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ {
+ unsigned i;
+ const Elf_Shdr *s;
+- grub_size_t tsize = 0, talign = 1;
++ grub_size_t tsize = 0, talign = 1, arch_addralign = 1;
+ #if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
+ grub_size_t tramp;
+ grub_size_t got;
+@@ -285,16 +285,24 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ #endif
+ char *ptr;
+
++ arch_addralign = grub_arch_dl_min_alignment ();
++
+ for (i = 0, s = (const Elf_Shdr *)((const char *) e + e->e_shoff);
+ i < e->e_shnum;
+ i++, s = (const Elf_Shdr *)((const char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
+ {
++ grub_size_t sh_addralign;
++ grub_size_t sh_size;
++
+ if (s->sh_size == 0 || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
+ continue;
+
+- tsize = ALIGN_UP (tsize, s->sh_addralign) + s->sh_size;
+- if (talign < s->sh_addralign)
+- talign = s->sh_addralign;
++ sh_addralign = ALIGN_UP(s->sh_addralign, arch_addralign);
++ sh_size = ALIGN_UP(s->sh_size, sh_addralign);
++
++ tsize = ALIGN_UP (tsize, sh_addralign) + sh_size;
++ if (talign < sh_addralign)
++ talign = sh_addralign;
+ }
+
+ #if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
+@@ -323,6 +331,9 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ i < e->e_shnum;
+ i++, s = (Elf_Shdr *)((char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
+ {
++ grub_size_t sh_addralign = ALIGN_UP(s->sh_addralign, arch_addralign);
++ grub_size_t sh_size = ALIGN_UP(s->sh_size, sh_addralign);
++
+ if (s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)
+ {
+ grub_dl_segment_t seg;
+@@ -335,17 +346,19 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ {
+ void *addr;
+
+- ptr = (char *) ALIGN_UP ((grub_addr_t) ptr, s->sh_addralign);
++ ptr = (char *) ALIGN_UP ((grub_addr_t) ptr, sh_addralign);
+ addr = ptr;
+- ptr += s->sh_size;
++ ptr += sh_size;
+
+ switch (s->sh_type)
+ {
+ case SHT_PROGBITS:
+ grub_memcpy (addr, (char *) e + s->sh_offset, s->sh_size);
++ grub_memset ((char *)addr + s->sh_size, 0,
++ sh_size - s->sh_size);
+ break;
+ case SHT_NOBITS:
+- grub_memset (addr, 0, s->sh_size);
++ grub_memset (addr, 0, sh_size);
+ break;
+ }
+
+@@ -354,7 +367,7 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ else
+ seg->addr = 0;
+
+- seg->size = s->sh_size;
++ seg->size = sh_size;
+ seg->section = i;
+ seg->next = mod->segment;
+ mod->segment = seg;
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/emu/full.c b/grub-core/kern/emu/full.c
+index e8d63b1f5f..1de1c28eb0 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/emu/full.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/emu/full.c
+@@ -67,3 +67,16 @@ grub_arch_dl_init_linker (void)
+ }
+ #endif
+
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++ return 4096;
++#else
++ return 1;
++#endif
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/i386/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/i386/dl.c
+index 1346da5cc9..d6b4681fc9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/i386/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/i386/dl.c
+@@ -79,3 +79,16 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++ return 4096;
++#else
++ return 1;
++#endif
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ia64/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/ia64/dl.c
+index db59300fea..92d82c5750 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ia64/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/ia64/dl.c
+@@ -148,3 +148,12 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+ }
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/mips/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/mips/dl.c
+index 5d7d299c74..6d83bd71e9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/mips/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/mips/dl.c
+@@ -272,3 +272,11 @@ grub_arch_dl_init_linker (void)
+ grub_dl_register_symbol ("_gp_disp", &_gp_disp_dummy, 0, 0);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/dl.c
+index cdd61b305f..5d9ba2e158 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/dl.c
+@@ -167,3 +167,12 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/riscv/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/riscv/dl.c
+index f26b12aaa4..aa18f9e990 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/riscv/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/riscv/dl.c
+@@ -343,3 +343,16 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++ return 4096;
++#else
++ return 1;
++#endif
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/sparc64/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/sparc64/dl.c
+index f3d960186b..f054f08241 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/sparc64/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/sparc64/dl.c
+@@ -189,3 +189,12 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/x86_64/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/x86_64/dl.c
+index e5a8bdcf4f..a105dc50ce 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/x86_64/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/x86_64/dl.c
+@@ -119,3 +119,16 @@ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Tell the loader what our minimum section alignment is.
++ */
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void)
++{
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++ return 4096;
++#else
++ return 1;
++#endif
++}
+diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h
+index 618ae6f474..f36ed5cb17 100644
+--- a/include/grub/dl.h
++++ b/include/grub/dl.h
+@@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ grub_err_t grub_arch_dl_check_header (void *ehdr);
+ grub_err_t
+ grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr,
+ Elf_Shdr *s, grub_dl_segment_t seg);
++grub_size_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void);
+ #endif
+
+ #if defined (_mips)
+diff --git a/docs/grub-dev.texi b/docs/grub-dev.texi
+index 90083772c8..c23ba313dc 100644
+--- a/docs/grub-dev.texi
++++ b/docs/grub-dev.texi
+@@ -755,9 +755,9 @@ declare startup asm file ($cpu_$platform_startup) as well as any other files
+ (e.g. init.c and callwrap.S) (e.g. $cpu_$platform = kern/$cpu/$platform/init.c).
+ At this stage you will also need to add dummy dl.c and cache.S with functions
+ grub_err_t grub_arch_dl_check_header (void *ehdr), grub_err_t
+-grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr) (dl.c) and
+-void grub_arch_sync_caches (void *address, grub_size_t len) (cache.S). They
+-won't be used for now.
++grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr) (dl.c), grub_uint32_t
++grub_arch_dl_min_alignment (void), and void grub_arch_sync_caches (void
++*address, grub_size_t len) (cache.S). They won't be used for now.
+
+ You will need to create directory include/$cpu/$platform and a file
+ include/$cpu/types.h. The later folowing this template:
diff --git a/SOURCES/0275-nx-add-memory-attribute-get-set-API.patch b/SOURCES/0275-nx-add-memory-attribute-get-set-API.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9146ba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0275-nx-add-memory-attribute-get-set-API.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 10:56:21 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] nx: add memory attribute get/set API
+
+For NX, we need to set the page access permission attributes for write
+and execute permissions.
+
+This patch adds two new primitives, grub_set_mem_attrs() and
+grub_clear_mem_attrs(), and associated constant definitions, to be used
+for that purpose.
+
+For most platforms, it adds a dummy implementation that returns
+GRUB_ERR_NONE. On EFI platforms, it adds a common helper function,
+grub_efi_status_to_err(), which translates EFI error codes to grub error
+codes, adds headers for the EFI Memory Attribute Protocol (still pending
+standardization), and an implementation of the grub nx primitives using
+it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+[rharwood: add pjones's none/nyi fixup]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 35de78a8d32b9fad5291ec96fd3cbb9cf2f4a80b)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 36 +++++++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/efi/api.h | 25 +++++++++
+ include/grub/efi/efi.h | 2 +
+ include/grub/mm.h | 32 ++++++++++++
+ 5 files changed, 226 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+index 7fcca69c17..4ac2b2754e 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+@@ -1096,3 +1096,39 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1,
+
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++grub_err_t
++grub_efi_status_to_err (grub_efi_status_t status)
++{
++ grub_err_t err;
++ switch (status)
++ {
++ case GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
++ default:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_IO;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_WRITE_ERROR;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_EFI_ABORTED:
++ err = GRUB_ERR_WAIT;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ return err;
++}
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+index e84961d078..2c33758ed7 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+@@ -738,3 +738,134 @@ grub_efi_get_ram_base(grub_addr_t *base_addr)
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ #endif
++
++static inline grub_uint64_t
++grub_mem_attrs_to_uefi_mem_attrs (grub_uint64_t attrs)
++{
++ grub_uint64_t ret = GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_RP |
++ GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_RO |
++ GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_XP;
++
++ if (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R)
++ ret &= ~GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_RP;
++
++ if (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W)
++ ret &= ~GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_RO;
++
++ if (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X)
++ ret &= ~GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_XP;
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
++static inline grub_uint64_t
++uefi_mem_attrs_to_grub_mem_attrs (grub_uint64_t attrs)
++{
++ grub_uint64_t ret = GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R |
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W |
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++
++ if (attrs & GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_RP)
++ ret &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R;
++
++ if (attrs & GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_RO)
++ ret &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W;
++
++ if (attrs & GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_XP)
++ ret &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
++grub_err_t
++grub_get_mem_attrs (grub_addr_t addr, grub_size_t size, grub_uint64_t *attrs)
++{
++ grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol_t *proto;
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t physaddr = addr;
++ grub_efi_guid_t protocol_guid = GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
++ grub_efi_status_t efi_status;
++
++ proto = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&protocol_guid, 0);
++ if (!proto)
++ return GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET;
++
++ if (physaddr & 0xfff || size & 0xfff || size == 0 || attrs == NULL)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "%s called on 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR"-0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" and attrs %p\n",
++ __func__, physaddr, physaddr+size-1, attrs);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ efi_status = efi_call_4(proto->get_memory_attributes,
++ proto, physaddr, size, attrs);
++ *attrs = uefi_mem_attrs_to_grub_mem_attrs (*attrs);
++
++ return grub_efi_status_to_err (efi_status);
++}
++
++grub_err_t
++grub_update_mem_attrs (grub_addr_t addr, grub_size_t size,
++ grub_uint64_t set_attrs, grub_uint64_t clear_attrs)
++{
++ grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol_t *proto;
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t physaddr = addr;
++ grub_efi_guid_t protocol_guid = GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
++ grub_efi_status_t efi_status = GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS;
++ grub_uint64_t before = 0, after = 0, uefi_set_attrs, uefi_clear_attrs;
++ grub_err_t err;
++
++ proto = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&protocol_guid, 0);
++ if (!proto)
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++ err = grub_get_mem_attrs (addr, size, &before);
++ if (err)
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "grub_get_mem_attrs(0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR", %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE", %p) -> 0x%x\n",
++ addr, size, &before, err);
++
++ if (physaddr & 0xfff || size & 0xfff || size == 0)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "%s called on 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR"-0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" +%s%s%s -%s%s%s\n",
++ __func__, physaddr, physaddr + size - 1,
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ uefi_set_attrs = grub_mem_attrs_to_uefi_mem_attrs (set_attrs);
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "translating set_attrs from 0x%lx to 0x%lx\n", set_attrs, uefi_set_attrs);
++ uefi_clear_attrs = grub_mem_attrs_to_uefi_mem_attrs (clear_attrs);
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "translating clear_attrs from 0x%lx to 0x%lx\n", clear_attrs, uefi_clear_attrs);
++ if (uefi_set_attrs)
++ efi_status = efi_call_4(proto->set_memory_attributes,
++ proto, physaddr, size, uefi_set_attrs);
++ if (efi_status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS && uefi_clear_attrs)
++ efi_status = efi_call_4(proto->clear_memory_attributes,
++ proto, physaddr, size, uefi_clear_attrs);
++
++ err = grub_get_mem_attrs (addr, size, &after);
++ if (err)
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "grub_get_mem_attrs(0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR", %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE", %p) -> 0x%x\n",
++ addr, size, &after, err);
++
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "set +%s%s%s -%s%s%s on 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR"-0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" before:%c%c%c after:%c%c%c\n",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
++ addr, addr + size - 1,
++ (before & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'r' : '-',
++ (before & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? 'w' : '-',
++ (before & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? 'x' : '-',
++ (after & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'r' : '-',
++ (after & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? 'w' : '-',
++ (after & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? 'x' : '-');
++
++ return grub_efi_status_to_err (efi_status);
++}
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h
+index f431f49973..464842ba37 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h
+@@ -363,6 +363,11 @@
+ { 0x89, 0x29, 0x48, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0x0a, 0xd3, 0x1a } \
+ }
+
++#define GRUB_EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL_GUID \
++ { 0xf4560cf6, 0x40ec, 0x4b4a, \
++ { 0xa1, 0x92, 0xbf, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x89 } \
++ }
++
+ struct grub_efi_sal_system_table
+ {
+ grub_uint32_t signature;
+@@ -2102,6 +2107,26 @@ struct grub_efi_ip6_config_manual_address {
+ };
+ typedef struct grub_efi_ip6_config_manual_address grub_efi_ip6_config_manual_address_t;
+
++struct grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol
++{
++ grub_efi_status_t (*get_memory_attributes) (
++ struct grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t base_address,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t length,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t *attributes);
++ grub_efi_status_t (*set_memory_attributes) (
++ struct grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t base_address,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t length,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t attributes);
++ grub_efi_status_t (*clear_memory_attributes) (
++ struct grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t base_address,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t length,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t attributes);
++};
++typedef struct grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol grub_efi_memory_attribute_protocol_t;
++
+ #if (GRUB_TARGET_SIZEOF_VOID_P == 4) || defined (__ia64__) \
+ || defined (__aarch64__) || defined (__MINGW64__) || defined (__CYGWIN__) \
+ || defined(__riscv)
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/efi.h b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+index ec52083c49..34825c4adc 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/efi.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+@@ -164,4 +164,6 @@ struct grub_net_card;
+ grub_efi_handle_t
+ grub_efinet_get_device_handle (struct grub_net_card *card);
+
++grub_err_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_status_to_err) (grub_efi_status_t status);
++
+ #endif /* ! GRUB_EFI_EFI_HEADER */
+diff --git a/include/grub/mm.h b/include/grub/mm.h
+index 9c38dd3ca5..d81623d226 100644
+--- a/include/grub/mm.h
++++ b/include/grub/mm.h
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+
+ #include <grub/types.h>
+ #include <grub/symbol.h>
++#include <grub/err.h>
+ #include <config.h>
+
+ #ifndef NULL
+@@ -38,6 +39,37 @@ void *EXPORT_FUNC(grub_realloc) (void *ptr, grub_size_t size);
+ void *EXPORT_FUNC(grub_memalign) (grub_size_t align, grub_size_t size);
+ #endif
+
++#define GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R 0x0000000000000004LLU
++#define GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W 0x0000000000000002LLU
++#define GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X 0x0000000000000001LLU
++
++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
++grub_err_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_get_mem_attrs) (grub_addr_t addr,
++ grub_size_t size,
++ grub_uint64_t *attrs);
++grub_err_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_update_mem_attrs) (grub_addr_t addr,
++ grub_size_t size,
++ grub_uint64_t set_attrs,
++ grub_uint64_t clear_attrs);
++#else /* !GRUB_MACHINE_EFI */
++static inline grub_err_t
++grub_get_mem_attrs (grub_addr_t addr __attribute__((__unused__)),
++ grub_size_t size __attribute__((__unused__)),
++ grub_uint64_t *attrs __attribute__((__unused__)))
++{
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++static inline grub_err_t
++grub_update_mem_attrs (grub_addr_t addr __attribute__((__unused__)),
++ grub_size_t size __attribute__((__unused__)),
++ grub_uint64_t set_attrs __attribute__((__unused__)),
++ grub_uint64_t clear_attrs __attribute__((__unused__)))
++{
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++#endif /* GRUB_MACHINE_EFI */
++
+ void grub_mm_check_real (const char *file, int line);
+ #define grub_mm_check() grub_mm_check_real (GRUB_FILE, __LINE__);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0276-nx-set-page-permissions-for-loaded-modules.patch b/SOURCES/0276-nx-set-page-permissions-for-loaded-modules.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad3c2aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0276-nx-set-page-permissions-for-loaded-modules.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 17:46:35 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] nx: set page permissions for loaded modules.
+
+For NX, we need to set write and executable permissions on the sections
+of grub modules when we load them.
+
+On sections with SHF_ALLOC set, which is typically everything except
+.modname and the symbol and string tables, this patch clears the Read
+Only flag on sections that have the ELF flag SHF_WRITE set, and clears
+the No eXecute flag on sections with SHF_EXECINSTR set. In all other
+cases it sets both flags.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+[rharwood: arm tgptr -> tgaddr]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+(cherry-picked from commit ca74904ede0406b594cbedc52ce8e38a6633d2ae)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/dl.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ include/grub/dl.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+index 8c7aacef39..d5de80186f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+@@ -285,6 +285,8 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ #endif
+ char *ptr;
+
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "loading segments for \"%s\"\n", mod->name);
++
+ arch_addralign = grub_arch_dl_min_alignment ();
+
+ for (i = 0, s = (const Elf_Shdr *)((const char *) e + e->e_shoff);
+@@ -384,6 +386,7 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ ptr += got;
+ #endif
+
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "done loading segments for \"%s\"\n", mod->name);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+@@ -517,23 +520,6 @@ grub_dl_find_section (Elf_Ehdr *e, const char *name)
+ return s;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+-static long
+-grub_dl_find_section_index (Elf_Ehdr *e, const char *name)
+-{
+- Elf_Shdr *s;
+- const char *str;
+- unsigned i;
+-
+- s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) e + e->e_shoff + e->e_shstrndx * e->e_shentsize);
+- str = (char *) e + s->sh_offset;
+-
+- for (i = 0, s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) e + e->e_shoff);
+- i < e->e_shnum;
+- i++, s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
+- if (grub_strcmp (str + s->sh_name, name) == 0)
+- return (long)i;
+- return -1;
+-}
+
+ /* Me, Vladimir Serbinenko, hereby I add this module check as per new
+ GNU module policy. Note that this license check is informative only.
+@@ -662,6 +648,7 @@ grub_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
+ Elf_Shdr *s;
+ unsigned i;
+
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "relocating symbols for \"%s\"\n", mod->name);
+ for (i = 0, s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) e + e->e_shoff);
+ i < e->e_shnum;
+ i++, s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
+@@ -670,24 +657,95 @@ grub_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
+ grub_dl_segment_t seg;
+ grub_err_t err;
+
+- /* Find the target segment. */
+- for (seg = mod->segment; seg; seg = seg->next)
+- if (seg->section == s->sh_info)
+- break;
++ seg = grub_dl_find_segment(mod, s->sh_info);
++ if (!seg)
++ continue;
+
+- if (seg)
+- {
+- if (!mod->symtab)
+- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "relocation without symbol table");
++ if (!mod->symtab)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "relocation without symbol table");
+
+- err = grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (mod, ehdr, s, seg);
+- if (err)
+- return err;
+- }
++ err = grub_arch_dl_relocate_symbols (mod, ehdr, s, seg);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
+ }
+
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "done relocating symbols for \"%s\"\n", mod->name);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
++
++static grub_err_t
++grub_dl_set_mem_attrs (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
++{
++ unsigned i;
++ const Elf_Shdr *s;
++ const Elf_Ehdr *e = ehdr;
++#if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
++ grub_size_t arch_addralign = grub_arch_dl_min_alignment ();
++ grub_addr_t tgaddr;
++ grub_uint64_t tgsz;
++#endif
++
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "updating memory attributes for \"%s\"\n",
++ mod->name);
++ for (i = 0, s = (const Elf_Shdr *)((const char *) e + e->e_shoff);
++ i < e->e_shnum;
++ i++, s = (const Elf_Shdr *)((const char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
++ {
++ grub_dl_segment_t seg;
++ grub_uint64_t set_attrs = GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R;
++ grub_uint64_t clear_attrs = GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++
++ seg = grub_dl_find_segment(mod, i);
++ if (!seg)
++ continue;
++
++ if (seg->size == 0 || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
++ continue;
++
++ if (s->sh_flags & SHF_WRITE)
++ {
++ set_attrs |= GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W;
++ clear_attrs &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W;
++ }
++
++ if (s->sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)
++ {
++ set_attrs |= GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++ clear_attrs &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++ }
++
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "setting memory attrs for section \"%s\" to -%s%s%s+%s%s%s\n",
++ grub_dl_get_section_name(e, s),
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
++ (clear_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
++ (set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "");
++ grub_update_mem_attrs ((grub_addr_t)(seg->addr), seg->size, set_attrs, clear_attrs);
++ }
++
++#if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
++ tgaddr = grub_min((grub_addr_t)mod->tramp, (grub_addr_t)mod->got);
++ tgsz = grub_max((grub_addr_t)mod->trampptr, (grub_addr_t)mod->gotptr) - tgaddr;
++
++ if (tgsz)
++ {
++ tgsz = ALIGN_UP(tgsz, arch_addralign);
++
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "updating attributes for GOT and trampolines\n",
++ mod->name);
++ grub_update_mem_attrs (tgaddr, tgsz, GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X,
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W);
++ }
++#endif
++
++ grub_dprintf ("modules", "done updating module memory attributes for \"%s\"\n",
++ mod->name);
++
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
+ static void
+ grub_dl_print_gdb_info (grub_dl_t mod, Elf_Ehdr *e)
+ {
+@@ -753,6 +811,7 @@ grub_dl_load_core_noinit (void *addr, grub_size_t size)
+ mod->ref_count = 1;
+
+ grub_dprintf ("modules", "relocating to %p\n", mod);
++
+ /* Me, Vladimir Serbinenko, hereby I add this module check as per new
+ GNU module policy. Note that this license check is informative only.
+ Modules have to be licensed under GPLv3 or GPLv3+ (optionally
+@@ -766,7 +825,8 @@ grub_dl_load_core_noinit (void *addr, grub_size_t size)
+ || grub_dl_resolve_dependencies (mod, e)
+ || grub_dl_load_segments (mod, e)
+ || grub_dl_resolve_symbols (mod, e)
+- || grub_dl_relocate_symbols (mod, e))
++ || grub_dl_relocate_symbols (mod, e)
++ || grub_dl_set_mem_attrs (mod, e))
+ {
+ mod->fini = 0;
+ grub_dl_unload (mod);
+diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h
+index f36ed5cb17..45ac8e339f 100644
+--- a/include/grub/dl.h
++++ b/include/grub/dl.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <grub/elf.h>
+ #include <grub/list.h>
+ #include <grub/misc.h>
++#include <grub/mm.h>
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+@@ -268,6 +269,49 @@ grub_dl_is_persistent (grub_dl_t mod)
+ return mod->persistent;
+ }
+
++static inline const char *
++grub_dl_get_section_name (const Elf_Ehdr *e, const Elf_Shdr *s)
++{
++ Elf_Shdr *str_s;
++ const char *str;
++
++ str_s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) e + e->e_shoff + e->e_shstrndx * e->e_shentsize);
++ str = (char *) e + str_s->sh_offset;
++
++ return str + s->sh_name;
++}
++
++static inline long
++grub_dl_find_section_index (Elf_Ehdr *e, const char *name)
++{
++ Elf_Shdr *s;
++ const char *str;
++ unsigned i;
++
++ s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) e + e->e_shoff + e->e_shstrndx * e->e_shentsize);
++ str = (char *) e + s->sh_offset;
++
++ for (i = 0, s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) e + e->e_shoff);
++ i < e->e_shnum;
++ i++, s = (Elf_Shdr *) ((char *) s + e->e_shentsize))
++ if (grub_strcmp (str + s->sh_name, name) == 0)
++ return (long)i;
++ return -1;
++}
++
++/* Return the segment for a section of index N */
++static inline grub_dl_segment_t
++grub_dl_find_segment (grub_dl_t mod, unsigned n)
++{
++ grub_dl_segment_t seg;
++
++ for (seg = mod->segment; seg; seg = seg->next)
++ if (seg->section == n)
++ return seg;
++
++ return NULL;
++}
++
+ #endif
+
+ void * EXPORT_FUNC(grub_resolve_symbol) (const char *name);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0277-nx-set-attrs-in-our-kernel-loaders.patch b/SOURCES/0277-nx-set-attrs-in-our-kernel-loaders.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9beee6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0277-nx-set-attrs-in-our-kernel-loaders.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 10:57:07 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] nx: set attrs in our kernel loaders
+
+For NX, our kernel loaders need to set write and execute page
+permissions on allocated pages and the stack.
+
+This patch adds those calls.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+[rharwood: fix aarch64 callsites]
+(cherry-picked from commit a9f79a997f01a83b36cdfa89ef2e72ac2a17c06c)
+[rharwood: uninitialized stack_attrs, double verification]
+Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++
+ grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c | 16 +++-
+ grub-core/loader/arm64/xen_boot.c | 4 +-
+ grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 11 +++
+ grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 26 +++++-
+ grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c | 5 ++
+ include/grub/efi/efi.h | 6 +-
+ include/grub/efi/linux.h | 17 +++-
+ include/grub/efi/pe32.h | 2 +
+ 10 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+index 2c33758ed7..88364d764c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+@@ -610,6 +610,82 @@ print_memory_map (grub_efi_memory_descriptor_t *memory_map,
+ }
+ #endif
+
++grub_addr_t grub_stack_addr = (grub_addr_t)-1ll;
++grub_size_t grub_stack_size = 0;
++
++static void
++grub_nx_init (void)
++{
++ grub_uint64_t attrs, stack_attrs;
++ grub_err_t err;
++ grub_addr_t stack_current, stack_end;
++ const grub_uint64_t page_size = 4096;
++ const grub_uint64_t page_mask = ~(page_size - 1);
++
++ /*
++ * These are to confirm that the flags are working as expected when
++ * debugging.
++ */
++ attrs = 0;
++ stack_current = (grub_addr_t)grub_nx_init & page_mask;
++ err = grub_get_mem_attrs (stack_current, page_size, &attrs);
++ if (err)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("nx",
++ "grub_get_mem_attrs(0x%"PRIxGRUB_UINT64_T", ...) -> 0x%x\n",
++ stack_current, err);
++ grub_error_pop ();
++ }
++ else
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "page attrs for grub_nx_init (%p) are %c%c%c\n",
++ grub_dl_load_core,
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'r' : '-',
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'w' : '-',
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'x' : '-');
++
++ stack_current = (grub_addr_t)&stack_current & page_mask;
++ err = grub_get_mem_attrs (stack_current, page_size, &stack_attrs);
++ if (err)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("nx",
++ "grub_get_mem_attrs(0x%"PRIxGRUB_UINT64_T", ...) -> 0x%x\n",
++ stack_current, err);
++ grub_error_pop ();
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ attrs = stack_attrs;
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "page attrs for stack (%p) are %c%c%c\n",
++ &attrs,
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'r' : '-',
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'w' : '-',
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'x' : '-');
++ }
++
++ for (stack_end = stack_current + page_size ;
++ !(attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R);
++ stack_end += page_size)
++ {
++ err = grub_get_mem_attrs (stack_current, page_size, &attrs);
++ if (err)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("nx",
++ "grub_get_mem_attrs(0x%"PRIxGRUB_UINT64_T", ...) -> 0x%x\n",
++ stack_current, err);
++ grub_error_pop ();
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ if (stack_end > stack_current)
++ {
++ grub_stack_addr = stack_current;
++ grub_stack_size = stack_end - stack_current;
++ grub_dprintf ("nx",
++ "detected stack from 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" to 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR"\n",
++ grub_stack_addr, grub_stack_addr + grub_stack_size - 1);
++ }
++}
++
+ void
+ grub_efi_mm_init (void)
+ {
+@@ -623,6 +699,8 @@ grub_efi_mm_init (void)
+ grub_efi_uint64_t required_pages;
+ int mm_status;
+
++ grub_nx_init ();
++
+ /* Prepare a memory region to store two memory maps. */
+ memory_map = grub_efi_allocate_any_pages (2 * BYTES_TO_PAGES (MEMORY_MAP_SIZE));
+ if (! memory_map)
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c
+index bcc6ef46e9..70db5a6e0b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c
+@@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ free_params (void)
+ }
+
+ grub_err_t
+-grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image (grub_addr_t addr, char *args)
++grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image (grub_addr_t addr, grub_size_t size, char *args,
++ int nx_supported)
+ {
+ grub_err_t retval;
+
+@@ -183,7 +184,8 @@ grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image (grub_addr_t addr, char *args)
+
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "linux command line: '%s'\n", args);
+
+- retval = grub_efi_linux_boot ((char *)addr, handover_offset, (void *)addr);
++ retval = grub_efi_linux_boot (addr, size, handover_offset,
++ (void *)addr, nx_supported);
+
+ /* Never reached... */
+ free_params();
+@@ -193,7 +195,10 @@ grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image (grub_addr_t addr, char *args)
+ static grub_err_t
+ grub_linux_boot (void)
+ {
+- return (grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image((grub_addr_t)kernel_addr, linux_args));
++ return grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image((grub_addr_t)kernel_addr,
++ (grub_size_t)kernel_size,
++ linux_args,
++ 0);
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+@@ -342,6 +347,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_uint32_t align;
+ void *kernel = NULL;
+ int rc;
++ int nx_supported = 1;
+
+ grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
+
+@@ -389,6 +395,10 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "kernel entry offset : %d\n", handover_offset);
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "kernel alignment : 0x%x\n", align);
+
++ err = grub_efi_check_nx_image_support((grub_addr_t)kernel, filelen, &nx_supported);
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ goto fail;
++
+ grub_loader_unset();
+
+ kernel_alloc_pages = GRUB_EFI_BYTES_TO_PAGES (kernel_size + align - 1);
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/arm64/xen_boot.c b/grub-core/loader/arm64/xen_boot.c
+index d9b7a9ba40..6e7e920416 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/arm64/xen_boot.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/arm64/xen_boot.c
+@@ -266,7 +266,9 @@ xen_boot (void)
+ return err;
+
+ return grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image (xen_hypervisor->start,
+- xen_hypervisor->cmdline);
++ xen_hypervisor->size,
++ xen_hypervisor->cmdline,
++ 0);
+ }
+
+ static void
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+index 8ef508beca..6ac69f0f59 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+@@ -1071,6 +1071,17 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * The OS kernel is going to set its own permissions when it takes over
++ * paging a few million instructions from now, and load_image() will set up
++ * anything that's needed based on the section headers, so there's no point
++ * in doing anything but clearing the protection bits here.
++ */
++ grub_dprintf("nx", "setting attributes for %p (%lu bytes) to %llx\n",
++ (void *)(grub_addr_t)address, fsize, 0llu);
++ grub_update_mem_attrs (address, fsize,
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X, 0);
++
+ #if defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)
+ if (fsize >= (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (struct grub_macho_fat_header))
+ {
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c
+index 9260731c10..dcc9ea40ea 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c
+@@ -66,16 +66,127 @@ grub_linuxefi_secure_validate (void *data, grub_uint32_t size)
+
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic push
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wint-to-pointer-cast"
++
++grub_err_t
++grub_efi_check_nx_image_support (grub_addr_t kernel_addr,
++ grub_size_t kernel_size,
++ int *nx_supported)
++{
++ struct grub_dos_header *doshdr;
++ grub_size_t sz = sizeof (*doshdr);
++
++ struct grub_pe32_header_32 *pe32;
++ struct grub_pe32_header_64 *pe64;
++
++ int image_is_compatible = 0;
++ int is_64_bit;
++
++ if (kernel_size < sz)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("kernel is too small"));
++
++ doshdr = (void *)kernel_addr;
++
++ if ((doshdr->magic & 0xffff) != GRUB_DOS_MAGIC)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("kernel DOS magic is invalid"));
++
++ sz = doshdr->lfanew + sizeof (*pe32);
++ if (kernel_size < sz)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("kernel is too small"));
++
++ pe32 = (struct grub_pe32_header_32 *)(kernel_addr + doshdr->lfanew);
++ pe64 = (struct grub_pe32_header_64 *)pe32;
++
++ if (grub_memcmp (pe32->signature, GRUB_PE32_SIGNATURE,
++ GRUB_PE32_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("kernel PE magic is invalid"));
++
++ switch (pe32->coff_header.machine)
++ {
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_ARMTHUMB_MIXED:
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_I386:
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_RISCV32:
++ is_64_bit = 0;
++ break;
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_ARM64:
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_IA64:
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_RISCV64:
++ case GRUB_PE32_MACHINE_X86_64:
++ is_64_bit = 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("PE machine type 0x%04hx unknown"),
++ pe32->coff_header.machine);
++ }
++
++ if (is_64_bit)
++ {
++ sz = doshdr->lfanew + sizeof (*pe64);
++ if (kernel_size < sz)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("kernel is too small"));
++
++ if (pe64->optional_header.dll_characteristics & GRUB_PE32_NX_COMPAT)
++ image_is_compatible = 1;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ if (pe32->optional_header.dll_characteristics & GRUB_PE32_NX_COMPAT)
++ image_is_compatible = 1;
++ }
++
++ *nx_supported = image_is_compatible;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++grub_err_t
++grub_efi_check_nx_required (int *nx_required)
++{
++ grub_efi_status_t status;
++ grub_efi_guid_t guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
++ grub_size_t mok_policy_sz = 0;
++ char *mok_policy = NULL;
++ grub_uint32_t mok_policy_attrs = 0;
++
++ status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokPolicy", &guid,
++ &mok_policy_sz,
++ (void **)&mok_policy,
++ &mok_policy_attrs);
++ if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND ||
++ mok_policy_sz == 0 ||
++ mok_policy == NULL)
++ {
++ *nx_required = 0;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ }
++
++ *nx_required = 0;
++ if (mok_policy_sz < 1 ||
++ mok_policy_attrs != (GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
++ GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) ||
++ (mok_policy[mok_policy_sz-1] & GRUB_MOK_POLICY_NX_REQUIRED))
++ *nx_required = 1;
++
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
+
+ typedef void (*handover_func) (void *, grub_efi_system_table_t *, void *);
+
+ grub_err_t
+-grub_efi_linux_boot (void *kernel_addr, grub_off_t handover_offset,
+- void *kernel_params)
++grub_efi_linux_boot (grub_addr_t kernel_addr, grub_size_t kernel_size,
++ grub_off_t handover_offset, void *kernel_params,
++ int nx_supported)
+ {
+ grub_efi_loaded_image_t *loaded_image = NULL;
+ handover_func hf;
+ int offset = 0;
++ grub_uint64_t stack_set_attrs = GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R |
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W |
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++ grub_uint64_t stack_clear_attrs = 0;
++ grub_uint64_t kernel_set_attrs = stack_set_attrs;
++ grub_uint64_t kernel_clear_attrs = stack_clear_attrs;
++ grub_uint64_t attrs;
++ int nx_required = 0;
+
+ #ifdef __x86_64__
+ offset = 512;
+@@ -88,12 +199,57 @@ grub_efi_linux_boot (void *kernel_addr, grub_off_t handover_offset,
+ */
+ loaded_image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (grub_efi_image_handle);
+ if (loaded_image)
+- loaded_image->image_base = kernel_addr;
++ loaded_image->image_base = (void *)kernel_addr;
+ else
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "Loaded Image base address could not be set\n");
+
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "kernel_addr: %p handover_offset: %p params: %p\n",
+- kernel_addr, (void *)(grub_efi_uintn_t)handover_offset, kernel_params);
++ (void *)kernel_addr, (void *)handover_offset, kernel_params);
++
++
++ if (nx_required && !nx_supported)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_OS, N_("kernel does not support NX loading required by policy"));
++
++ if (nx_supported)
++ {
++ kernel_set_attrs &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W;
++ kernel_clear_attrs |= GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W;
++ stack_set_attrs &= ~GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++ stack_clear_attrs |= GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X;
++ }
++
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "Setting attributes for 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR"-0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" to r%cx\n",
++ kernel_addr, kernel_addr + kernel_size - 1,
++ (kernel_set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? 'w' : '-');
++ grub_update_mem_attrs (kernel_addr, kernel_size,
++ kernel_set_attrs, kernel_clear_attrs);
++
++ grub_get_mem_attrs (kernel_addr, 4096, &attrs);
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "permissions for 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" are %s%s%s\n",
++ (grub_addr_t)kernel_addr,
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "-",
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "-",
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "-");
++ if (grub_stack_addr != (grub_addr_t)-1ll)
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "Setting attributes for stack at 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR"-0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" to rw%c\n",
++ grub_stack_addr, grub_stack_addr + grub_stack_size - 1,
++ (stack_set_attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? 'x' : '-');
++ grub_update_mem_attrs (grub_stack_addr, grub_stack_size,
++ stack_set_attrs, stack_clear_attrs);
++
++ grub_get_mem_attrs (grub_stack_addr, 4096, &attrs);
++ grub_dprintf ("nx", "permissions for 0x%"PRIxGRUB_ADDR" are %s%s%s\n",
++ grub_stack_addr,
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "-",
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "-",
++ (attrs & GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "-");
++ }
++
++#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
++ asm volatile ("cli");
++#endif
++
+ hf = (handover_func)((char *)kernel_addr + handover_offset + offset);
+ hf (grub_efi_image_handle, grub_efi_system_table, kernel_params);
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+index b832c85728..dc98077378 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct grub_linuxefi_context {
+ grub_uint32_t handover_offset;
+ struct linux_kernel_params *params;
+ char *cmdline;
+-
++ int nx_supported;
+ void *initrd_mem;
+ };
+
+@@ -111,13 +111,19 @@ kernel_alloc(grub_efi_uintn_t size,
+ pages = BYTES_TO_PAGES(size);
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "Trying to allocate %lu pages from %p\n",
+ (unsigned long)pages, (void *)(unsigned long)max);
++ size = pages * GRUB_EFI_PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ prev_max = max;
+ addr = grub_efi_allocate_pages_real (max, pages,
+ max_addresses[i].alloc_type,
+ memtype);
+ if (addr)
+- grub_dprintf ("linux", "Allocated at %p\n", addr);
++ {
++ grub_dprintf ("linux", "Allocated at %p\n", addr);
++ grub_update_mem_attrs ((grub_addr_t)addr, size,
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W,
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X);
++ }
+ }
+
+ while (grub_error_pop ())
+@@ -138,9 +144,11 @@ grub_linuxefi_boot (void *data)
+
+ asm volatile ("cli");
+
+- return grub_efi_linux_boot ((char *)context->kernel_mem,
++ return grub_efi_linux_boot ((grub_addr_t)context->kernel_mem,
++ context->kernel_size,
+ context->handover_offset,
+- context->params);
++ context->params,
++ context->nx_supported);
+ }
+
+ static grub_err_t
+@@ -306,7 +314,9 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ grub_uint32_t handover_offset;
+ struct linux_kernel_params *params = 0;
+ char *cmdline = 0;
++ int nx_supported = 1;
+ struct grub_linuxefi_context *context = 0;
++ grub_err_t err;
+
+ grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
+
+@@ -347,6 +357,13 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ }
+ }
+
++ err = grub_efi_check_nx_image_support ((grub_addr_t)kernel, filelen,
++ &nx_supported);
++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
++ return err;
++ grub_dprintf ("linux", "nx is%s supported by this kernel\n",
++ nx_supported ? "" : " not");
++
+ lh = (struct linux_i386_kernel_header *)kernel;
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "original lh is at %p\n", kernel);
+
+@@ -511,6 +528,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ context->handover_offset = handover_offset;
+ context->params = params;
+ context->cmdline = cmdline;
++ context->nx_supported = nx_supported;
+
+ grub_loader_set_ex (grub_linuxefi_boot, grub_linuxefi_unload, context, 0);
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
+index 4aeb0e4b9a..3c1ff64763 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
+@@ -805,6 +805,11 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ kernel_offset += len;
+ }
+
++ grub_dprintf("efi", "setting attributes for %p (%zu bytes) to +rw-x\n",
++ &linux_params, sizeof (lh) + len);
++ grub_update_mem_attrs ((grub_addr_t)&linux_params, sizeof (lh) + len,
++ GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W, GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X);
++
+ linux_params.code32_start = prot_mode_target + lh.code32_start - GRUB_LINUX_BZIMAGE_ADDR;
+ linux_params.kernel_alignment = (1 << align);
+ linux_params.ps_mouse = linux_params.padding11 = 0;
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/efi.h b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+index 34825c4adc..449e55269f 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/efi.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+@@ -140,12 +140,16 @@ extern void (*EXPORT_VAR(grub_efi_net_config)) (grub_efi_handle_t hnd,
+ char **device,
+ char **path);
+
++extern grub_addr_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_stack_addr);
++extern grub_size_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_stack_size);
++
+ #if defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__riscv)
+ void *EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_get_firmware_fdt)(void);
+ grub_err_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_get_ram_base)(grub_addr_t *);
+ #include <grub/cpu/linux.h>
+ grub_err_t grub_arch_efi_linux_check_image(struct linux_arch_kernel_header *lh);
+-grub_err_t grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image(grub_addr_t addr, char *args);
++grub_err_t grub_arch_efi_linux_boot_image(grub_addr_t addr, grub_size_t size,
++ char *args, int nx_enabled);
+ #endif
+
+ grub_addr_t grub_efi_section_addr (const char *section);
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/linux.h b/include/grub/efi/linux.h
+index 0033d9305a..8130b19590 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/linux.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/linux.h
+@@ -22,10 +22,23 @@
+ #include <grub/err.h>
+ #include <grub/symbol.h>
+
++#define GRUB_MOK_POLICY_NX_REQUIRED 0x1
++
+ int
+ EXPORT_FUNC(grub_linuxefi_secure_validate) (void *data, grub_uint32_t size);
++
+ grub_err_t
+-EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_linux_boot) (void *kernel_address, grub_off_t offset,
+- void *kernel_param);
++EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_linux_boot) (grub_addr_t kernel_address,
++ grub_size_t kernel_size,
++ grub_off_t handover_offset,
++ void *kernel_param, int nx_enabled);
++
++grub_err_t
++EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_check_nx_image_support) (grub_addr_t kernel_addr,
++ grub_size_t kernel_size,
++ int *nx_supported);
++
++grub_err_t
++EXPORT_FUNC(grub_efi_check_nx_required) (int *nx_required);
+
+ #endif /* ! GRUB_EFI_LINUX_HEADER */
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/pe32.h b/include/grub/efi/pe32.h
+index 2a5e1ee003..a5e623eb04 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/pe32.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/pe32.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ struct grub_pe32_optional_header
+ struct grub_pe32_data_directory reserved_entry;
+ };
+
++#define GRUB_PE32_NX_COMPAT 0x0100
++
+ struct grub_pe64_optional_header
+ {
+ grub_uint16_t magic;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0278-nx-set-the-nx-compatible-flag-in-EFI-grub-images.patch b/SOURCES/0278-nx-set-the-nx-compatible-flag-in-EFI-grub-images.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b5075b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0278-nx-set-the-nx-compatible-flag-in-EFI-grub-images.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 10:57:20 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] nx: set the nx compatible flag in EFI grub images
+
+For NX, we need the grub binary to announce that it is compatible with
+the NX feature. This implies that when loading the executable grub
+image, several attributes are true:
+
+- the binary doesn't need an executable stack
+- the binary doesn't need sections to be both executable and writable
+- the binary knows how to use the EFI Memory Attributes protocol on code
+ it is loading.
+
+This patch adds a definition for the PE DLL Characteristics flag
+GRUB_PE32_NX_COMPAT, and changes grub-mkimage to set that flag.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0c7f1aed5a87f75051b421903a900ccb4bbd795a)
+---
+ util/mkimage.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/mkimage.c b/util/mkimage.c
+index 8319e8dfbd..c3d33aaac8 100644
+--- a/util/mkimage.c
++++ b/util/mkimage.c
+@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
+ section = (struct grub_pe32_section_table *)(o64 + 1);
+ }
+
++ PE_OHDR (o32, o64, dll_characteristics) = grub_host_to_target16 (GRUB_PE32_NX_COMPAT);
+ PE_OHDR (o32, o64, header_size) = grub_host_to_target32 (header_size);
+ PE_OHDR (o32, o64, entry_addr) = grub_host_to_target32 (layout.start_address);
+ PE_OHDR (o32, o64, image_base) = 0;
diff --git a/SOURCES/grub.macros b/SOURCES/grub.macros
index 8af0d61..6036760 100755
--- a/SOURCES/grub.macros
+++ b/SOURCES/grub.macros
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
%endif
%ifarch ppc64le
-%global platform_modules " appendedsig "
+%global platform_modules " appendedsig tpm "
%endif
%ifarch aarch64 %{arm} riscv64
@@ -367,13 +367,13 @@ install -m 644 %{1}.conf ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/etc/dnf/protected.d/ \
rm -f %{1}.conf \
%{nil}
-%global grub_modules " all_video boot blscfg btrfs \\\
+%global grub_modules " all_video boot blscfg \\\
cat configfile cryptodisk \\\
echo ext2 f2fs fat font \\\
gcry_rijndael gcry_rsa gcry_serpent \\\
gcry_sha256 gcry_twofish gcry_whirlpool \\\
gfxmenu gfxterm gzio \\\
- halt hfsplus http increment iso9660 \\\
+ halt http increment iso9660 \\\
jpeg loadenv loopback linux lvm luks \\\
luks2 mdraid09 mdraid1x minicmd net \\\
normal part_apple part_msdos part_gpt \\\
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ ln -s ../boot/%{name}/grub.cfg \\\
%{expand:%%files %{1}} \
%defattr(-,root,root,-) \
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}.cfg \
-%ghost %config(noreplace) /boot/%{name}/grub.cfg \
+%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg \
%dir %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/loader/entries \
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/dnf/protected.d/%{name}-%{1}.conf \
%ifarch ppc64le \
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ ln -s ../boot/%{name}/grub.cfg \\\
%endif \
%attr(0700,root,root)/boot/%{name}/fonts \
%dir %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/loader/entries \
-%ghost %config(noreplace) /boot/%{name}/grub.cfg \
+%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0700,root,root)/boot/%{name}/grub.cfg \
%ghost %config(noreplace) %attr(0700,root,root)%{efi_esp_dir}/grub.cfg \
%config(noreplace) %verify(not size mode md5 mtime) /boot/%{name}/grubenv \
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/dnf/protected.d/%{name}-%{1}.conf \
diff --git a/SOURCES/grub.patches b/SOURCES/grub.patches
index e43a03c..82cf0e2 100644
--- a/SOURCES/grub.patches
+++ b/SOURCES/grub.patches
@@ -225,3 +225,54 @@ Patch0224: 0224-grub-mkconfig-restore-umask-for-grub.cfg.patch
Patch0225: 0225-commands-search-Fix-bug-stopping-iteration-when-no-f.patch
Patch0226: 0226-search-new-efidisk-only-option-on-EFI-systems.patch
Patch0227: 0227-efi-new-connectefi-command.patch
+Patch0228: 0228-powerpc-do-CAS-in-a-more-compatible-way.patch
+Patch0229: 0229-powerpc-prefix-detection-support-device-names-with-c.patch
+Patch0230: 0230-ibmvtpm-Add-support-for-trusted-boot-using-a-vTPM-2..patch
+Patch0231: 0231-make-ofdisk_retries-optional.patch
+Patch0232: 0232-loader-efi-chainloader-grub_load_and_start_image-doe.patch
+Patch0233: 0233-loader-efi-chainloader-simplify-the-loader-state.patch
+Patch0234: 0234-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
+Patch0235: 0235-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
+Patch0236: 0236-loader-i386-efi-linux-Avoid-a-use-after-free-in-the-.patch
+Patch0237: 0237-loader-i386-efi-linux-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
+Patch0238: 0238-loader-i386-efi-linux-Fix-a-memory-leak-in-the-initr.patch
+Patch0239: 0239-kern-efi-sb-Reject-non-kernel-files-in-the-shim_lock.patch
+Patch0240: 0240-kern-file-Do-not-leak-device_name-on-error-in-grub_f.patch
+Patch0241: 0241-video-readers-png-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-f.patch
+Patch0242: 0242-video-readers-png-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-image-he.patch
+Patch0243: 0243-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch
+Patch0244: 0244-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch
+Patch0245: 0245-video-readers-png-Sanity-check-some-huffman-codes.patch
+Patch0246: 0246-video-readers-jpeg-Abort-sooner-if-a-read-operation-.patch
+Patch0247: 0247-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-reallocate-a-given-huff-ta.patch
+Patch0248: 0248-video-readers-jpeg-Refuse-to-handle-multiple-start-o.patch
+Patch0249: 0249-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch
+Patch0250: 0250-normal-charset-Fix-array-out-of-bounds-formatting-un.patch
+Patch0251: 0251-net-netbuff-Block-overly-large-netbuff-allocs.patch
+Patch0252: 0252-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch
+Patch0253: 0253-net-dns-Fix-double-free-addresses-on-corrupt-DNS-res.patch
+Patch0254: 0254-net-dns-Don-t-read-past-the-end-of-the-string-we-re-.patch
+Patch0255: 0255-net-tftp-Prevent-a-UAF-and-double-free-from-a-failed.patch
+Patch0256: 0256-net-tftp-Avoid-a-trivial-UAF.patch
+Patch0257: 0257-net-http-Do-not-tear-down-socket-if-it-s-already-bee.patch
+Patch0258: 0258-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch
+Patch0259: 0259-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch
+Patch0260: 0260-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-journal-entr.patch
+Patch0261: 0261-fs-f2fs-Do-not-read-past-the-end-of-nat-bitmap.patch
+Patch0262: 0262-fs-f2fs-Do-not-copy-file-names-that-are-too-long.patch
+Patch0263: 0263-fs-btrfs-Fix-several-fuzz-issues-with-invalid-dir-it.patch
+Patch0264: 0264-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-ASAN-and-SEGV-issues-found-with-fu.patch
+Patch0265: 0265-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-fuzz-issues-related-to-chunks.patch
+Patch0266: 0266-misc-Make-grub_min-and-grub_max-more-resilient.patch
+Patch0267: 0267-ReiserFS-switch-to-using-grub_min-grub_max.patch
+Patch0268: 0268-misc-make-grub_boot_time-also-call-grub_dprintf-boot.patch
+Patch0269: 0269-modules-make-.module_license-read-only.patch
+Patch0270: 0270-modules-strip-.llvm_addrsig-sections-and-similar.patch
+Patch0271: 0271-modules-Don-t-allocate-space-for-non-allocable-secti.patch
+Patch0272: 0272-pe-add-the-DOS-header-struct-and-fix-some-bad-naming.patch
+Patch0273: 0273-EFI-allocate-kernel-in-EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE-ins.patch
+Patch0274: 0274-modules-load-module-sections-at-page-aligned-address.patch
+Patch0275: 0275-nx-add-memory-attribute-get-set-API.patch
+Patch0276: 0276-nx-set-page-permissions-for-loaded-modules.patch
+Patch0277: 0277-nx-set-attrs-in-our-kernel-loaders.patch
+Patch0278: 0278-nx-set-the-nx-compatible-flag-in-EFI-grub-images.patch
diff --git a/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in b/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in
index 61aa093..55b3d10 100755
--- a/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in
+++ b/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
-grub,1,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
-grub.rhel,1,Red Hat Enterprise Linux,grub2,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,mail:secalert@redhat.com
+grub,2,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
+grub.rh,2,Red Hat,grub2,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,mailto:secalert@redhat.com
diff --git a/SPECS/grub2.spec b/SPECS/grub2.spec
index 900a2b2..da265b2 100644
--- a/SPECS/grub2.spec
+++ b/SPECS/grub2.spec
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
Name: grub2
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.06
-Release: 27%{?dist}
+Release: 38%{?dist}
Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
License: GPLv3+
URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/grub/
@@ -530,13 +530,39 @@ mv ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg.stb ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg
%endif
%changelog
+* Tue Jun 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-38
+- Bless the TPM module on ppc64le
+- Resolves: #2051314
+
+* Fri Jun 03 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-37
+- CVE fixes for 2022-06-07
+- CVE-2022-28736 CVE-2022-28735 CVE-2022-28734 CVE-2022-28733
+- CVE-2021-3697 CVE-2021-3696 CVE-2021-3695
+- Resolves: #2070688
+
+* Tue May 17 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-32
+- ppc64le: make ofdisk_retries optional
+- Resolves: #2070725
+
+* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-30
+- ppc64le: CAS improvements, prefix detection, and vTPM support
+- Resolves: #2068281
+- Resolves: #2051314
+- Resolves: #2076798
+
+* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-29
+- Fix rpm verification report on grub.cfg permissions
+- Resolves: #2076322
+
+* Wed May 04 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-28
+- First 9.1 build; no changes from 9.0
+- Resolves: #2062874
+
* Wed Mar 09 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-27
- Fix initialization on efidisk patch
-- Resolves: #2060948
* Tue Mar 08 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-26
- Re-run signing with updated redhat-release
-- Resolves: #1873860
* Mon Feb 28 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-25
- Enable connectefi module