diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index f8e3060..5dd3f0b 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz +SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2 diff --git a/.openssh.metadata b/.openssh.metadata index 29d7f11..a78a9c0 100644 --- a/.openssh.metadata +++ b/.openssh.metadata @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -cf5fe0eb118d7e4f9296fbc5d6884965885fc55d SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz +b850fd1af704942d9b3c2eff7ef6b3a59b6a6b6e SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz 5761a2d5e3ea29e0b415424338d27deaabdd75f4 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2 diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 96aaab1..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts 2009-02-14 06:28:21.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c 2009-09-01 15:31:29.000000000 +0200 -@@ -169,12 +169,27 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr) - option_size = sizeof(options); - if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options, - &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { -- text[0] = '\0'; -- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) -- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, -- " %2.2x", options[i]); -- fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", -- ipaddr, text); -+ i = 0; -+ do { -+ switch (options[i]) { -+ case 0: -+ case 1: -+ ++i; -+ break; -+ case 131: -+ case 137: -+ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict -+ * source routing options. */ -+ text[0] = '\0'; -+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) -+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, -+ " %2.2x", options[i]); -+ fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", -+ ipaddr, text); -+ default: -+ i += options[i + 1]; -+ } -+ } while (i < option_size); - } - #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ - } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch index cac5d5e..70a3c85 100644 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch @@ -28,16 +28,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c return -1; } -@@ -3207,8 +3210,21 @@ static int +@@ -3207,8 +3210,18 @@ static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); - return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); -+ int len; -+#ifdef linux -+ int ret; -+#endif ++ int len, ret; + len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); +#ifdef linux + /* try abstract socket first */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 278dfa1..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock openssh-5.6p1/channels.c ---- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock 2010-08-05 15:09:48.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c 2010-08-23 12:41:43.000000000 +0200 -@@ -1647,6 +1647,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *r - u_int dlen, olen = 0; - int len; - -+ if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { -+ debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self); -+ FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); -+ } - /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ - if (c->wfd != -1 && - FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6167c14..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c ---- openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm 2010-12-01 02:03:39.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c 2011-04-21 16:43:36.859648916 +0200 -@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "cipher.h" -@@ -600,6 +612,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename - #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN - if (check_ntsec(filename)) - #endif -+ if (st.st_mode & 040) { -+ struct group *gr; -+ -+ if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) -+ st.st_mode &= ~040; -+ } -+ - if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2f21658..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain 2011-04-22 11:37:49.273648812 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config 2011-04-22 11:39:31.758648401 +0200 -@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ X11Forwarding yes - # override default of no subsystems - Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server - -+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain -+#Host *.local -+# CheckHostIP no -+ - # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis - #Match User anoncvs - # X11Forwarding no diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4a25d9e..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale openssh-5.8p2/mux.c ---- openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale 2011-01-14 02:01:32.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.8p2/mux.c 2011-06-09 15:27:42.556360291 +0200 -@@ -1867,6 +1867,9 @@ muxclient(const char *path) - unlink(path); - } else if (errno == ENOENT) { - debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); -+ } else if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) { -+ debug("Removing stale control socket \"%.100s\"", path); -+ unlink(path); - } else { - error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, - strerror(errno)); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 34f3851..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/dns.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/dns.c 2011-09-09 08:05:27.782440497 +0200 -@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname - { - u_int counter; - int result; -+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0; - struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; - - u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; -@@ -200,8 +201,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname - return -1; - } - -+ /* -+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example, -+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in -+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf. -+ * -+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag. -+ */ -+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME -+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0; -+#endif - result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, -- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); -+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints); -+ - if (result) { - verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); - return -1; -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns 2009-07-13 03:38:23.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c 2011-09-09 15:03:39.930500801 +0200 -@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns - goto fail; - } - -- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ -- if (flags) { -+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */ -+ if ((flags & ~RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) { - result = ERRSET_INVAL; - goto fail; - } -@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns - #endif /* DEBUG */ - - #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC -- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */ -- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0) -- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC; -+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */ -+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) -+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC); - #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */ - - /* make query */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns 2007-10-26 08:26:50.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h 2011-09-09 08:05:27.965438689 +0200 -@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ - #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED - # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1 - #endif -+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 -+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001 -+#endif - - /* - * Return codes for getrrsetbyname() diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a2c5d33..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c ---- openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean 2011-08-30 13:52:45.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c 2011-08-30 13:57:44.630111338 +0200 -@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void) - fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " - "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); - -+ /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */ -+ atexit(RAND_cleanup); -+ - #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY - if (RAND_status() == 1) { - debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44da114 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +From 5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damien Miller +Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2014 13:44:47 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c + version.h] OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the + curve25519 key exchange incorrectly, causing connection failures about + 0.2% of the time when this method is used against a peer that implements + the method properly. + + Fix the problem and disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to + OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6. This version will identify itself as 6.6.1 + to enable the compatability code. +--- + ChangeLog | 11 +++++++++++ + bufaux.c | 5 ++++- + compat.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- + compat.h | 2 ++ + sshconnect2.c | 2 ++ + sshd.c | 3 +++ + version.h | 2 +- + 7 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index 1603a07..928999d 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@ + 20140420 +- - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10 +- [sshconnect.c] +- When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any +- certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. +- +- Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey +- dialog by offering only certificate keys. +- +- Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk ++ - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h] ++ OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519 ++ key exchange incorrectly, causing connection failures about 0.2% of ++ the time when this method is used against a peer that implements ++ the method properly. ++ ++ Fix the problem and disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to ++ OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6. This version will identify itself as 6.6.1 ++ to enable the compatability code. ++ ++ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10 ++ [sshconnect.c] ++ When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any ++ certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. ++ ++ Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey ++ dialog by offering only certificate keys. ++ ++ Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk + + 20140313 + - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6 +diff --git a/bufaux.c b/bufaux.c +index e24b5fc..f6a6f2a 100644 +--- a/bufaux.c ++++ b/bufaux.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +@@ -372,6 +372,9 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l) + + if (l > 8 * 1024) + fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l); ++ /* Skip leading zero bytes */ ++ for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++) ++ ; + p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1); + /* + * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to +diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c +index 9d9fabe..2709dc5 100644 +--- a/compat.c ++++ b/compat.c +@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) + { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF}, + { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 }, + { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT}, ++ { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH}, ++ { "OpenSSH_6.5*," ++ "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD}, + { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, + { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, + { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| +@@ -251,7 +254,6 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) + return cipher_prop; + } + +- + char * + compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) + { +@@ -265,3 +267,16 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) + return pkalg_prop; + } + ++char * ++compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop) ++{ ++ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD)) ++ return kex_prop; ++ debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); ++ kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); ++ debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); ++ if (*kex_prop == '\0') ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); ++ return kex_prop; ++} ++ +diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h +index b174fa1..a6c3f3d 100644 +--- a/compat.h ++++ b/compat.h +@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ + #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000 + #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 + #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 ++#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 + + void enable_compat13(void); + void enable_compat20(void); +@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ void compat_datafellows(const char *); + int proto_spec(const char *); + char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); + char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); ++char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); + + extern int compat13; + extern int compat20; +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index bb9292f..b00658b 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + } + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + + #ifdef GSSAPI + /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index e4e406e..512c7ed 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -2488,6 +2488,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; + ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); ++ + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, + (time_t)options.rekey_interval); +diff --git a/version.h b/version.h +index a1579ac..a33e77c 100644 +--- a/version.h ++++ b/version.h +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */ + +-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6" ++#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6.1" + + #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" + #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7361a18..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no 2012-09-14 20:54:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c 2012-09-14 20:55:42.289477749 +0200 -@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, - &cfg, NULL); - -+ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux */ -+ if (! options.use_pam) -+ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several problems."); -+ - seed_rng(); - - /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ -diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no 2012-09-14 20:54:58.514255748 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config 2012-09-14 20:54:58.551255954 +0200 -@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes - # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without - # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication - # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. -+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several -+# problems. - #UsePAM no - UsePAM yes - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4553422..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,271 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c ---- openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.737611051 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c 2013-03-25 19:31:42.797611433 +0100 -@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ seed_rng(void) - memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); - - #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ -+#ifdef __linux__ -+ linux_seed(); -+#endif /* __linux__ */ - if (RAND_status() != 1) - fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); - } -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 19:33:02.042116876 +0100 -@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport - - COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o - --PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o -+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o - - .c.o: - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c ---- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c 2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ -+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima -+ * -+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+ * -+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "log.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+#include "port-linux.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "hostfile.h" -+#include "auth.h" -+ -+void -+linux_seed(void) -+{ -+ int len; -+ char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"); -+ char *random = "/dev/random"; -+ size_t ienv, randlen = 14; -+ -+ if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0")) -+ random = "/dev/urandom"; -+ else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen) -+ randlen = ienv; -+ -+ errno = 0; -+ if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) { -+ if (errno) -+ fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno)); -+ else -+ fatal ("EOF reading %s", random); -+ } -+} -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy 2013-03-22 00:38:29.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0 2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100 -@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT - Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate - with the agent. - -+ SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+ The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done -+ from /dev/urandom. If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari- -+ able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is -+ reseeded from /dev/random. The number of bytes read is defined -+ by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. Minimum is 14 bytes. This set- -+ ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+ random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec- -+ tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available. -+ - FILES - ~/.ssh/identity - Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy 2012-12-07 03:06:13.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100 -@@ -160,6 +160,20 @@ to make this work.) - Identifies the path of a - .Ux Ns -domain - socket used to communicate with the agent. -+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from -+.Cm /dev/urandom . -+If the -+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+environment variable is set to value other than -+.Cm 0 -+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from -+.Cm /dev/random . -+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. -+Minimum is 14 bytes. -+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to -+be blocked until enough entropy is available. - .El - .Sh FILES - .Bl -tag -width Ds -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy 2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100 -@@ -198,6 +198,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t - These sockets should only be readable by the owner. - The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. - .El -+.Sh ENVIRONMENT -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -+.Pp -+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from -+.Cm /dev/urandom . -+If the -+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+environment variable is set to value other than -+.Cm 0 -+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from -+.Cm /dev/random . -+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. -+Minimum is 14 bytes. -+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to -+be blocked until enough entropy is available. -+.El - .Sh SEE ALSO - .Xr ssh 1 , - .Xr ssh-add 1 , -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8 ---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8 2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100 -@@ -945,6 +945,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c - started last). - The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. - .El -+.Sh ENVIRONMENT -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -+.Pp -+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from -+.Cm /dev/urandom . -+If the -+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+environment variable is set to value other than -+.Cm 0 -+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from -+.Cm /dev/random . -+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. -+Minimum is 14 bytes. -+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to -+be blocked until enough entropy is available. -+.El - .Sh IPV6 - IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. - .Sh SEE ALSO -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy 2013-01-20 12:35:06.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100 -@@ -806,6 +806,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for - The file format is described in - .Xr moduli 5 . - .El -+.Sh ENVIRONMENT -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -+.Pp -+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from -+.Cm /dev/urandom . -+If the -+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+environment variable is set to value other than -+.Cm 0 -+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from -+.Cm /dev/random . -+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. -+Minimum is 14 bytes. -+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to -+be blocked until enough entropy is available. -+.El - .Sh SEE ALSO - .Xr ssh 1 , - .Xr ssh-add 1 , -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8 2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100 -@@ -78,6 +78,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe - If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate - information corresponding with the private keys above. - .El -+.Sh ENVIRONMENT -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -+.Pp -+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from -+.Cm /dev/urandom . -+If the -+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+environment variable is set to value other than -+.Cm 0 -+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from -+.Cm /dev/random . -+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. -+Minimum is 14 bytes. -+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to -+be blocked until enough entropy is available. -+.El - .Sh SEE ALSO - .Xr ssh 1 , - .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy 2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1 2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100 -@@ -1277,6 +1277,23 @@ For more information, see the - .Cm PermitUserEnvironment - option in - .Xr sshd_config 5 . -+.Sh ENVIRONMENT -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from -+.Cm /dev/urandom . -+If the -+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG -+environment variable is set to value other than -+.Cm 0 -+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from -+.Cm /dev/random . -+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. -+Minimum is 14 bytes. -+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware -+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to -+be blocked until enough entropy is available. -+.El - .Sh FILES - .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact - .It Pa ~/.rhosts diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 69bcb81..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,788 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.288298063 +0200 -@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void * - if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) - return (sshpam_thread_status); - signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); -- waitpid(thread, &status, 0); -+ while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINTR) -+ continue; -+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, -+ strerror(errno)); -+ } - return (status); - } - #endif -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/channels.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity 2013-09-13 08:19:31.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/channels.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200 -@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd - channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); - channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); - -- if (rfd != -1) -+ if (rfd >= 0) - fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); -- if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) -+ if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd) - fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); -- if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) -+ if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) - fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); - - c->rfd = rfd; -@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd - - /* enable nonblocking mode */ - if (nonblock) { -- if (rfd != -1) -+ if (rfd >= 0) - set_nonblock(rfd); -- if (wfd != -1) -+ if (wfd >= 0) - set_nonblock(wfd); -- if (efd != -1) -+ if (efd >= 0) - set_nonblock(efd); - } - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity 2013-06-10 05:07:12.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200 -@@ -2068,14 +2068,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_ - char *rtype; - int want_reply; - int success = 0; -+/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */ - - rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); - want_reply = packet_get_char(); - debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", - rtype, want_reply); - if (want_reply) { -- packet_start(success ? -- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); -+ packet_start(/*success ? -+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity 2013-06-01 23:41:51.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.290298054 +0200 -@@ -807,8 +807,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) - success = 1; - /*XXXX*/ - key_free(k); -+/*XXXX - if (success != 1) - break; -+XXXX*/ - /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */ - while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') - cp++; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-07 13:54:36.761314042 +0200 -@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); - - /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ -- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) -+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) - ; - - close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); -@@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m - break; - } - } -+ -+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s", -+ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); -+ - if (key != NULL) - key_free(key); - -@@ -1223,9 +1227,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m - free(chost); - } - -- debug3("%s: key %p is %s", -- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); -- - buffer_clear(m); - buffer_put_int(m, allowed); - buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200 -@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, - if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || - (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { - error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); -- if (tmp1 > 0) -+ if (tmp1 >= 0) - close(tmp1); -- if (tmp2 > 0) -- close(tmp2); -+ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0) -+ close(tmp2);*/ - return 0; - } - close(tmp1); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2010-12-03 00:50:26.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200 -@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr - struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; - u_int16_t *portp; - u_int16_t port; -- socklen_t salen; -+ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); - int i; - - if (sa == NULL) { -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/packet.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity 2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200 -@@ -1199,6 +1199,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void) - case DEATTACK_DETECTED: - packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: " - "network attack detected"); -+ break; - case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: - packet_disconnect("deattack denial of " - "service detected"); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity 2013-06-02 15:46:24.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c 2013-10-07 13:42:32.377850691 +0200 -@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int); - - static time_t start; /* start progress */ - static time_t last_update; /* last progress update */ --static char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ -+static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ - static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ - static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ - static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */ -@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore) - } - - void --start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) -+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) - { - start = last_update = monotime(); - file = f; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity 2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h 2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200 -@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - --void start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *); -+void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *); - void stop_progress_meter(void); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/scp.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity 2013-07-18 08:11:25.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/scp.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200 -@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo) - { - if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { - kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); -- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); -+ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); - } - - if (signo) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.293298039 +0200 -@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", - filename, linenum); - if (!*activep) { -- arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp); - break; - } - for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) -@@ -1414,8 +1414,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { - *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); - /* increase optional counter */ -- if (intptr != NULL) -- *intptr = *intptr + 1; -+ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;) -+ if (intptr != NULL) -+ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */ - } - break; - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity 2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c 2013-10-07 13:43:36.620537138 +0200 -@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void) - static void - notify_parent(void) - { -- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) -+ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0) - (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); - } - static void - notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) - { -- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) -+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0) - FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); - } - static void -@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset) - { - char c; - -- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) -- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) -+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) -+ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0) - debug2("notify_done: reading"); - } - -@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **rea - * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data - * to the program. - */ -- if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) -+ if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) - FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp); - } - notify_prepare(*readsetp); -@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset) - int len; - - /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */ -- if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { -+ if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { - data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer); - dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); - len = write(fdin, data, dlen); -@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int - set_nonblock(fdin); - set_nonblock(fdout); - /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */ -- if (fderr != -1) -+ if (fderr >= 0) - set_nonblock(fderr); - - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin)) -@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int - max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); - max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); - max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); -- if (fderr != -1) -+ if (fderr >= 0) - max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); - #endif - -@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int - * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending - * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin. - */ -- if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { -+ if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { - if (fdin != fdout) - close(fdin); - else -@@ -739,15 +739,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int - buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); - - /* Close the file descriptors. */ -- if (fdout != -1) -+ if (fdout >= 0) - close(fdout); - fdout = -1; - fdout_eof = 1; -- if (fderr != -1) -+ if (fderr >= 0) - close(fderr); - fderr = -1; - fderr_eof = 1; -- if (fdin != -1) -+ if (fdin >= 0) - close(fdin); - fdin = -1; - -@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int - - debug("Window change received."); - packet_check_eom(); -- if (fdin != -1) -+ if (fdin >= 0) - pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel); - } - -@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ server_request_tun(void) - } - - tun = packet_get_int(); -- if (forced_tun_device != -1) { -+ if (forced_tun_device >= 0) { - if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun) - goto done; - tun = forced_tun_device; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity 2013-07-26 00:40:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c 2013-10-07 13:48:45.885027420 +0200 -@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer * - } - - static void --send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, -+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, - u_int len) - { - Buffer msg; -@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *co - - static void - send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, -- char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) -+ const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) - { - Buffer msg; - -@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *con - } - - int --do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) -+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len) - { - u_int id, status; - Buffer msg; -@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h - - - static int --do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag, -+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int printflag, - SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) - { - Buffer msg; -@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha - } - - int --do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) -+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) - { - return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); - } -@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) - } - - int --do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) -+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) - { - u_int status, id; - -@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path - } - - int --do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag) -+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag) - { - u_int status, id; - -@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p - } - - int --do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) -+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) - { - u_int status, id; - -@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p - } - - Attrib * --do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) -+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) - { - u_int id; - -@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *pa - } - - Attrib * --do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) -+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) - { - u_int id; - -@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h - #endif - - int --do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a) -+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) - { - u_int status, id; - -@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char - } - - int --do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, -+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, - Attrib *a) - { - u_int status, id; -@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char - } - - char * --do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) -+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) - { - Buffer msg; - u_int type, expected_id, count, id; -@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char - } - - int --do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) -+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) - { - Buffer msg; - u_int status, id; -@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char * - } - - int --do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) -+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) - { - Buffer msg; - u_int status, id; -@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char - } - - int --do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) -+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) - { - Buffer msg; - u_int status, id; -@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn - } - - int --do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path, -+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, - Attrib *a, int pflag, int resume) - { - Attrib junk; -@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char - } - - static int --download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, -+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, - Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int depth, int resume) - { - int i, ret = 0; -@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn * - } - - int --download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, -+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, - Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int resume) - { - char *src_canon; -@@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha - } - - int --do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path, -+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, - int pflag) - { - int local_fd; -@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char * - } - - static int --upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, -+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, - int pflag, int printflag, int depth) - { - int ret = 0, status; -@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co - } - - int --upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int printflag, -+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int printflag, - int pflag) - { - char *dst_canon; -@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char - } - - char * --path_append(char *p1, char *p2) -+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) - { - char *ret; - size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity 2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h 2013-10-07 13:45:10.108080813 +0200 -@@ -56,49 +56,49 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_in - u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); - - /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ --int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int); -+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int); - - /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ --int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); -+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); - - /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ - void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); - - /* Delete file 'path' */ --int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *); -+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); - - /* Create directory 'path' */ --int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int); -+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); - - /* Remove directory 'path' */ --int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *); -+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); - - /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ --Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); -+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); - - /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ --Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); -+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); - - /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ --int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *); -+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); - - /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ --int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *); -+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *); - - /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ --char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *); -+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); - - /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ - int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); - - /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ --int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); -+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); - - /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ --int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); -+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); - --/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ --int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); -+/* Symlink 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ -+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); - - /* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */ - -@@ -106,27 +106,27 @@ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char - * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times - * if 'pflag' is set - */ --int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int); -+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int); - - /* - * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve - * times if 'pflag' is set - */ --int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); -+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); - - /* - * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times - * if 'pflag' is set - */ --int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int); -+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int); - - /* - * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve - * times if 'pflag' is set - */ --int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int); -+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int); - - /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ --char *path_append(char *, char *); -+char *path_append(const char *, const char *); - - #endif -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity 2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c 2013-10-07 13:49:47.322727449 +0200 -@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ killchild(int signo) - { - if (sshpid > 1) { - kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); -- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); -+ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); - } - - _exit(1); -@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args) - - /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ - static char * --path_strip(char *path, char *strip) -+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) - { - size_t len; - -@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip) - } - - static char * --make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd) -+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) - { - char *abs_str; - -@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **a - } - - static int --is_dir(char *path) -+is_dir(const char *path) - { - struct stat sb; - -@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ is_dir(char *path) - } - - static int --remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) -+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) - { - Attrib *a; - -@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch - - /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ - static int --pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) -+pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname) - { - size_t l = strlen(pathname); - -@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) - } - - static int --process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, -+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, - int pflag, int rflag, int resume) - { - char *abs_src = NULL; -@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out: - } - - static int --process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, -+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, - int pflag, int rflag) - { - char *tmp_dst = NULL; -@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void - - /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ - static int --do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) -+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) - { - int n; - u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; -@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char * - - /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ - static int --do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, -+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, - int lflag) - { - char *fname, *lname; -@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch - } - - static int --do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag) -+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) - { - struct sftp_statvfs st; - char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:22:49.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200 -@@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - sanitise_stdfd(); - - /* drop */ -- setegid(getgid()); -- setgid(getgid()); -+ (void) setegid(getgid()); -+ (void) setgid(getgid()); - - #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) - /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200 -@@ -699,8 +699,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) - privsep_preauth_child(); - setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); -- if (box != NULL) -+ if (box != NULL) { - ssh_sandbox_child(box); -+ free(box); -+ } - - return 0; - } -@@ -1345,6 +1347,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so - if (num_listen_socks < 0) - break; - } -+ -+ if (fdset != NULL) -+ free(fdset); - } - - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5cd9997..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,250 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c ---- openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs 2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c 2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ -+/* -+ * -+ * invocation (all of the following are equal): -+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 -+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000 -+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+ -+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ -+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" -+ -+void usage(void) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo \n" -+ " --key --mode \n" -+ " [--iv ] --data \n\n" -+ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n" -+ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n"); -+ exit(1); -+} -+ -+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len) -+{ -+ unsigned char *bin; -+ char *p; -+ size_t n = 0; -+ int shift = 4; -+ unsigned char out = 0; -+ unsigned char *optr; -+ -+ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2); -+ optr = bin; -+ -+ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) { -+ unsigned char c; -+ -+ c = *p; -+ if (isspace(c)) -+ continue; -+ -+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { -+ c = c - '0'; -+ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') { -+ c = c - 'A' + 10; -+ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') { -+ c = c - 'a' + 10; -+ } else { -+ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */ -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ out |= c << shift; -+ shift = (shift + 4) % 8; -+ -+ if (shift) { -+ *(optr++) = out; -+ out = 0; -+ ++n; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ *len = n; -+ return bin; -+} -+ -+#define READ_CHUNK 4096 -+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100 -+char *read_stdin(void) -+{ -+ char *buf; -+ size_t n, total = 0; -+ -+ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK); -+ -+ do { -+ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin); -+ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */ -+ break; -+ -+ total += n; -+ buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1); -+ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE); -+ return buf; -+} -+ -+int main (int argc, char *argv[]) -+{ -+ -+ Cipher *c; -+ CipherContext cc; -+ char *algo = "aes128-ctr"; -+ char *hexkey = NULL; -+ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; -+ char *hexdata = NULL; -+ char *p; -+ int i; -+ int encrypt = 1; -+ void *key; -+ size_t keylen; -+ void *iv; -+ size_t ivlen; -+ void *data; -+ size_t datalen; -+ void *outdata; -+ -+ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { -+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) { -+ algo = argv[++i]; -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) { -+ hexkey = argv[++i]; -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) { -+ ++i; -+ if (argv[i] == NULL) { -+ usage(); -+ } -+ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) { -+ encrypt = 1; -+ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) { -+ encrypt = 0; -+ } else { -+ usage(); -+ } -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) { -+ hexiv = argv[++i]; -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) { -+ hexdata = argv[++i]; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) { -+ usage(); -+ } -+ -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ -+ c = cipher_by_name(algo); -+ if (c == NULL) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ if (hexdata == NULL) { -+ hexdata = read_stdin(); -+ } else { -+ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata); -+ } -+ -+ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen); -+ -+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen); -+ -+ if (ivlen != 16) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen); -+ -+ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt); -+ -+ free(key); -+ free(iv); -+ -+ outdata = malloc(datalen); -+ if(outdata == NULL) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ cipher_crypt(&cc, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0); -+ -+ free(data); -+ -+ cipher_cleanup(&cc); -+ -+ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) { -+ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p); -+ } -+ -+ free(outdata); -+ -+ printf("\n"); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs 2013-03-25 21:35:52.451586280 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 21:37:14.956114584 +0100 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign - SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper - SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper - SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat -+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest - SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MANFMT=@MANFMT@ - INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ - --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) - - LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ - canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ -@@ -174,6 +175,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l - ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) - -+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) -+ - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - -@@ -281,6 +285,7 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ - fi - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b9cfbdb..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,406 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.c 2013-10-07 15:42:05.243812405 +0200 -@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) - case 1: - revoked: - /* Key revoked */ -- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); - error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked " -- "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp); -+ "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp); - free(key_fp); - return 1; - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2013-10-07 15:43:49.747355927 +0200 -@@ -200,16 +200,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, - - if (host_status == HOST_OK) { - if (key_is_cert(key)) { -- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, -- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, -+ SSH_FP_HEX); - verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " -- "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, -- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, -+ "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, -+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, - cuser, lookup); - } else { -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", -- key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s", -+ key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), -+ fp, cuser, lookup); - } - free(fp); - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint 2013-07-18 08:10:10.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-07 15:50:44.617495624 +0200 -@@ -359,10 +359,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, - continue; - if (!key_is_cert_authority) - continue; -- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, -- SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", -- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s", -+ file, linenum, key_type(found), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - /* - * If the user has specified a list of principals as - * a key option, then prefer that list to matching -@@ -400,9 +400,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, - if (key_is_cert_authority) - continue; - found_key = 1; -- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", -- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s", -+ key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - free(fp); - break; - } -@@ -425,13 +425,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, - if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) - return 0; - -- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, -- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); - - if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, - options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) { -- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, -- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, -+ debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, -+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp, - options.trusted_user_ca_keys); - goto out; - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.971968285 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200 -@@ -598,6 +598,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty - return retval; - } - -+enum fp_type -+key_fingerprint_selection(void) -+{ -+ static enum fp_type rv; -+ static char rv_defined = 0; -+ char *env; -+ -+ if (!rv_defined) { -+ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); -+ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? -+ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ rv_defined = 1; -+ } -+ return rv; -+} -+ -+char * -+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) -+{ -+ return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep); -+} -+ -+char * -+key_fingerprint_prefix(void) -+{ -+ return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : ""; -+} -+ - /* - * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances - * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h 2013-10-07 15:44:17.574233450 +0200 -@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ int key_equal_public(const Key *, cons - int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *); - char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); - u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); -+enum fp_type key_fingerprint_selection(void); -+char *key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep); -+char *key_fingerprint_prefix(void); - const char *key_type(const Key *); - const char *key_cert_type(const Key *); - int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c 2013-10-07 14:44:57.466515766 +0200 -@@ -326,10 +326,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection - key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { - had_identities = 1; - if (do_fp) { -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, -- SSH_FP_HEX); -- printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", -- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n", -+ key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), -+ fp, comment, key_type(key)); - free(fp); - } else { - if (!key_write(key, stdout)) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2013-10-07 15:41:11.627044336 +0200 -@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id) - char *p; - int ret = -1; - -- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", -- id->comment, p)) -+ p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.", -+ id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p)) - ret = 0; - free(p); - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint 2013-07-20 05:22:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2013-10-07 14:25:52.864145038 +0200 -@@ -767,13 +767,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) - { - FILE *f; - Key *public; -- char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra; -+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx; - int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1; - enum fp_rep rep; - enum fp_type fptype; - struct stat st; - -- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); -+ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix(); - rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; - - if (!have_identity) -@@ -785,8 +786,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) - public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment); - if (public != NULL) { - fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); -- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment, -+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment, - key_type(public)); - if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) - printf("%s\n", ra); -@@ -851,8 +852,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) - } - comment = *cp ? cp : comment; - fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); -- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, -+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, - comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public)); - if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) - printf("%s\n", ra); -@@ -970,13 +971,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key - if (print_fingerprint) { - enum fp_rep rep; - enum fp_type fptype; -- char *fp, *ra; -+ char *fp, *ra, *pfx; - -- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); -+ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix(); - rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; -+ - fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); -- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name, -+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name, - key_type(public)); - if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) - printf("%s\n", ra); -@@ -1855,16 +1858,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) - fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); - v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00; - -- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, -- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); - - printf("%s:\n", identity_file); - printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key), - key_cert_type(key)); -- printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp); -- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", -- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); -+ printf(" Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp); -+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s%s\n", -+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp); - printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); - if (!v00) { - printf(" Serial: %llu\n", -@@ -2655,13 +2659,12 @@ passphrase_again: - fclose(f); - - if (!quiet) { -- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, -- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", - identity_file); - printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); -- printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); -+ printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment); - printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); - printf("%s\n", ra); - free(ra); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint 2013-06-01 23:31:19.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c 2013-10-07 14:43:54.859822036 +0200 -@@ -830,10 +830,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so - "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " - "of known hosts.", type, ip); - } else if (options.visual_host_key) { -- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, -- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -- logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n", -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra); - free(ra); - free(fp); - } -@@ -871,9 +871,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so - else - snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); - /* The default */ -- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, -- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - msg2[0] = '\0'; - if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { - if (matching_host_key_dns) -@@ -888,10 +887,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so - snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), - "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " - "established%s\n" -- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" -+ "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s" - "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " - "(yes/no)? ", -- host, ip, msg1, type, fp, -+ host, ip, msg1, type, -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, - options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", - options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", - msg2); -@@ -1136,8 +1136,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka - int flags = 0; - char *fp; - -- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - free(fp); - - /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ -@@ -1238,14 +1239,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey - continue; - if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) - continue; -- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" - "in %s:%lu\n" -- "%s key fingerprint %s.", -+ "%s key fingerprint %s%s.", - key_type(found->key), - found->host, found->file, found->line, -- key_type(found->key), fp); -+ key_type(found->key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - if (options.visual_host_key) - logit("%s", ra); - free(ra); -@@ -1260,7 +1262,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) - { - char *fp; - -- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); - - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); -@@ -1268,8 +1270,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) - error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); - error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); - error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); -- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", -- key_type(host_key), fp); -+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.", -+ key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - error("Please contact your system administrator."); - - free(fp); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint 2013-10-07 14:02:37.001968139 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2013-10-07 15:20:09.403234714 +0200 -@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t - key->type, pktype); - goto done; - } -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s", -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - free(fp); - - /* -@@ -1202,8 +1203,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, - int have_sig = 1; - char *fp; - -- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key), -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); - free(fp); - - if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6a5a332..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,611 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.850031186 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200 -@@ -147,25 +147,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) - $(RANLIB) $@ - - ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) -- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) - - sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) -- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) - - scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o - $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - - ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) - - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o - $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips 2013-10-24 15:43:46.019999906 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c 2013-10-24 15:44:09.262890686 +0200 -@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p - "actual %d vs. announced %d.", - file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); - -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", - file, linenum, key_type(key), fp); - free(fp); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips 2013-10-24 15:39:05.008319990 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-24 15:39:05.029319892 +0200 -@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con - - if (key_is_cert(key)) { - fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, -- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", - key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, - (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, -@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con - extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); - free(fp); - } else { -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp, - extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); - free(fp); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.857031153 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200 -@@ -148,8 +148,14 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffe - /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ - cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); - -- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -- CIPHER_ENCRYPT); -+ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -+ CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) { -+ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); -+ buffer_free(&encrypted); -+ buffer_free(&buffer); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, - buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0); - cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); -@@ -472,8 +478,13 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, con - cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(©)); - - /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ -- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -- CIPHER_DECRYPT); -+ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -+ CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) { -+ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); -+ buffer_free(&decrypted); -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ - cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, - buffer_ptr(©), buffer_len(©), 0, 0); - cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200 -@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) - aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; - #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP - aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | -- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; -+ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | -+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; - #endif - return (&aes_ctr); - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200 -@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -86,6 +87,27 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { - { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } - }; - -+static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = { -+ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, -+ { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, -+ { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, -+ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, -+ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, -+ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, -+ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, -+ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", -+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, -+ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, -+ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, -+ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM -+ { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", -+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, -+ { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", -+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, -+#endif -+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } -+}; - /*--*/ - - /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ -@@ -96,7 +118,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(void) - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const Cipher *c; - -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { - if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) - continue; - if (ret != NULL) -@@ -161,7 +183,7 @@ const Cipher * - cipher_by_name(const char *name) - { - const Cipher *c; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) - return c; - return NULL; -@@ -171,7 +193,7 @@ const Cipher * - cipher_by_number(int id) - { - const Cipher *c; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (c->number == id) - return c; - return NULL; -@@ -215,7 +237,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name) - const Cipher *c; - if (name == NULL) - return -1; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) - return c->number; - return -1; -@@ -374,14 +396,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc) - * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. - */ - --void -+int - cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher, - const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) - { - MD5_CTX md; - u_char digest[16]; - -- MD5_Init(&md); -+ if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0) -+ return -1; - MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); - MD5_Final(digest, &md); - -@@ -389,6 +412,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, - - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); - memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); -+ return 0; - } - - /* -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h 2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200 -@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void cipher_init(CipherContext *, const - void cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, - u_int, u_int, u_int); - void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *); --void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int); -+int cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int); - u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_authlen(const Cipher *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200 -@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - #include - - #include -@@ -606,9 +607,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void) - char *env; - - if (!rv_defined) { -- env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); -- rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? -- SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ if (FIPS_mode()) -+ rv = SSH_FP_SHA1; -+ else { -+ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); -+ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? -+ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ } - rv_defined = 1; - } - return rv; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/mac.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.c 2013-10-11 22:25:35.394737186 +0200 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ struct macalg { - int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ - }; - --static const struct macalg macs[] = { -+static const struct macalg all_macs[] = { - /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ - { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, - { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, -@@ -91,6 +92,18 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { - { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } - }; - -+static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = { -+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -+ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -+ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -+ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -+ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -+#endif -+ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } -+}; -+ - /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported MACs. */ - char * - mac_alg_list(void) -@@ -99,7 +112,7 @@ mac_alg_list(void) - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const struct macalg *m; - -- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { -+ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { - if (ret != NULL) - ret[rlen++] = '\n'; - nlen = strlen(m->name); -@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name) - { - const struct macalg *m; - -- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { -+ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { - if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) - continue; - if (mac != NULL) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips 2013-06-11 04:10:02.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h 2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200 -@@ -114,6 +114,19 @@ - #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" - #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" - -+#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ -+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ -+ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ -+ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ -+ "hmac-sha1," \ -+ "hmac-sha2-256," \ -+ "hmac-sha2-512" -+#else -+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ -+ "hmac-sha1" -+#endif - - static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { - KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips 2010-03-25 22:52:02.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200 -@@ -37,25 +37,18 @@ - #define REKEY_BYTES (1 << 24) - - static int rc4_ready = 0; --static RC4_KEY rc4; - - unsigned int - arc4random(void) - { - unsigned int r = 0; -- static int first_time = 1; -+ void *rp = &r; - -- if (rc4_ready <= 0) { -- if (first_time) -- seed_rng(); -- first_time = 0; -+ if (!rc4_ready) { - arc4random_stir(); - } -+ RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r)); - -- RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r); -- -- rc4_ready -= sizeof(r); -- - return(r); - } - -@@ -63,24 +56,11 @@ void - arc4random_stir(void) - { - unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE]; -- int i; - -- memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4)); - if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0) - fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", - ERR_get_error()); -- RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf); -- -- /* -- * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in: -- * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps -- */ -- for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf)) -- RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf); -- -- memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf)); -- -- rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES; -+ rc4_ready = 1; - } - #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2013-10-24 15:45:06.055623916 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2013-10-24 15:45:36.906478986 +0200 -@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) - enum fp_type fptype; - char *fp, *ra; - -- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : (FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5); - rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; - - pkcs11_init(0); -@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) - for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { - if (print_fingerprint) { - fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); -- ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5, -+ ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, - SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]), - fp, key_type(keys[i])); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips 2013-07-25 03:55:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200 -@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - -@@ -253,6 +255,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - sanitise_stdfd(); - - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) -+ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) -+ if (FIPS_mode()) -+ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ else -+ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); - - #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE - /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ -@@ -330,6 +339,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { - switch (opt) { - case '1': -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode."); -+ } - options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; - break; - case '2': -@@ -647,7 +659,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - if (!host) - usage(); - -- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - ERR_load_crypto_strings(); - - /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ -@@ -748,6 +759,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - - seed_rng(); - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); -+ } -+ - if (options.user == NULL) - options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); - -@@ -816,6 +831,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - - timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2; -+ if (options.protocol == 0) -+ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode."); -+ } -+ - /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ - if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, - options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2013-10-11 22:24:32.810031374 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2013-10-11 22:24:32.873031077 +0200 -@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ - #include - #endif - -+#include -+ - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - - #include "xmalloc.h" -@@ -170,6 +172,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.ciphers != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; -+ - } - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); -@@ -185,7 +191,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.macs != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; - } -+ - if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - options.hostkeyalgorithms; -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c.fips 2014-01-27 16:20:12.751358484 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c 2014-01-27 16:21:12.961052163 +0100 -@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - - #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE -@@ -1450,6 +1452,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - #endif - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); - -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) -+ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { -+ openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV); -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ cleanup_exit(255); -+ } -+ else -+ syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ closelog(); -+ } - /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ - saved_argc = ac; - rexec_argc = ac; -@@ -1601,8 +1615,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - else - closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); - -- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); -- - /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ - if (logfile != NULL) { - log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); -@@ -1773,6 +1785,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype, - key_type(key ? key : pubkey)); - } -+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); -+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; -+ } - if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { - logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; -@@ -1936,6 +1952,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - /* Initialize the random number generator. */ - arc4random_stir(); - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); -+ } -+ - /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be - unmounted if desired. */ - if (chdir("/") == -1) -@@ -2498,6 +2518,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - if (options.ciphers != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; - } - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); -@@ -2507,6 +2530,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - if (options.macs != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; - } - if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 695c0eb..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,279 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.553948159 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2013-10-11 21:40:49.972337025 +0200 -@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - #include -+#include - - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "key.h" -@@ -40,10 +42,12 @@ - #include "auth.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "servconf.h" -+#include "misc.h" - - #include "buffer.h" - #include "ssh-gss.h" - -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; - extern ServerOptions options; - - #ifdef HEIMDAL -@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options; - # include - #endif - -+/* all commands are allowed by default */ -+char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; -+ -+static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); -+static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *, -+ int); -+ - static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; - - /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ -@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client - krb5_principal princ; - int retval; - const char *errmsg; -+ int k5login_exists; - - if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) - return 0; -@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client - krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); - return 0; - } -- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { -+ /* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login. -+ * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */ -+ k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); -+ /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, -+ * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials -+ * to access these files aren't available yet. */ -+ if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { - retval = 1; - logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", - name, (char *)client->displayname.value); -+ } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value, -+ name, k5login_exists)) { -+ retval = 1; -+ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s " -+ "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)", -+ name, (char *)client->displayname.value); - } else - retval = 0; - -@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client - return retval; - } - -+/* Test for existence of .k5login. -+ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok() -+ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself. -+ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence -+ * of .k5login to authorize self-login. (absence of both is required) -+ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise. -+ */ -+static int -+ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() -+{ -+ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; -+ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; -+ -+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); -+ return access(file, F_OK) == 0; -+} -+ -+/* check .k5users for login or command authorization -+ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise. -+ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated. -+ */ -+static int -+ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, -+ const char *luser, int k5login_exists) -+{ -+ FILE *fp; -+ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; -+ char line[BUFSIZ]; -+ char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */ -+ struct stat st; -+ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; -+ int found_principal = 0; -+ int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0; -+ u_long linenum; -+ -+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); -+ /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ -+ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { -+ return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal, -+ sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) && -+ (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0); -+ } -+ if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { -+ int saved_errno = errno; -+ /* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong. -+ * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */ -+ if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) { -+ logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s", -+ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno)); -+ } -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */ -+ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) { -+ /* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */ -+ logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s", -+ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno)); -+ fclose(fp); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) { -+ logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user", -+ pw->pw_name, file); -+ fclose(fp); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* .k5users must be a regular file. krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this -+ * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */ -+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { -+ logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file); -+ fclose(fp); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */ -+ k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands, -+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); -+ -+ /* Check each line. ksu allows unlimited length lines. We don't. */ -+ while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line), -+ &linenum) != -1) { -+ char *token; -+ -+ /* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */ -+ if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL) -+ continue; -+ if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) { -+ /* we matched on client principal */ -+ found_principal = 1; -+ if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) { -+ /* only shell is allowed */ -+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = -+ xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); -+ k5users_allowed_cmds = -+ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, -+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); -+ break; -+ } -+ /* process the allowed commands */ -+ while (token) { -+ if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) { -+ allcommands = 1; -+ break; -+ } -+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = -+ xstrdup(token); -+ k5users_allowed_cmds = -+ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, -+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); -+ token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n"); -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { -+ /* terminate vector */ -+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL; -+ /* if all commands are allowed, free vector */ -+ if (allcommands) { -+ int i; -+ for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) { -+ free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]); -+ } -+ free(k5users_allowed_cmds); -+ k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ fclose(fp); -+ return found_principal; -+} -+ - - /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated - * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/session.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.487948468 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c 2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200 -@@ -823,6 +823,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) - debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command); - } - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */ -+ else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { -+ const char *match = command; -+ int allowed = 0, i = 0; -+ -+ if (!match) -+ match = s->pw->pw_shell; -+ while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) { -+ if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) { -+ debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match); -+ allowed = 1; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ if (!allowed) { -+ debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match); -+ return 1; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+#endif -+ - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) - fatal("do_exec: command already set"); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.558948136 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h 2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200 -@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ - # endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */ - - # endif /* !HEIMDAL */ -+ -+/* .k5users support */ -+extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; -+ - #endif /* KRB5 */ - - /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8 ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb 2013-10-11 18:58:51.537948234 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8 2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200 -@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter - The client tries to authenticate itself using - host-based authentication, - public key authentication, -+GSSAPI authentication, - challenge-response authentication, - or password authentication. - .Pp -@@ -797,6 +798,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same wa - but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with - rlogin/rsh. - .Pp -+.It Pa ~/.k5login -+.It Pa ~/.k5users -+These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control. -+Further details are described in -+.Xr ksu 1 . -+.Pp - .It Pa ~/.ssh/ - This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration - and authentication information. diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch deleted file mode 100644 index eefd792..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2900 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi ---- openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.284216176 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2013-10-11 15:15:17.284216176 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ -+20110101 -+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1 -+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney -+ -+20100308 -+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ] -+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1 -+ - [ servconf.c ] -+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag -+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin -+ Watson. -+ - -+ -+20100124 -+ - [ sshconnect2.c ] -+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to -+ Colin Watson -+ -+20090615 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c -+ sshd.c ] -+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review -+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs -+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled -+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange -+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value -+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust -+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled -+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list -+ Cast data.length before printing -+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL -+ -+20090201 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h -+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] -+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user -+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server -+ -+20080404 -+ - [ gss-serv.c ] -+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow -+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav -+ Stoichkov -+ -+20070317 -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a -+ function -+ -+20061220 -+ - [ servconf.c ] -+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and -+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. -+ -+20060910 -+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c -+ ssh-gss.h ] -+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms -+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] -+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of -+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. -+ -+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] -+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample -+ configuration files -+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] -+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() -+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client -+ -+20060909 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] -+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server -+ only, where they belong -+ -+ -+20060829 -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment -+ variable -+ -+20060828 -+ - [ gss-genr.c ] -+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem -+ -+ -+20060818 -+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] -+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled -+ -+ -+20060421 -+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] -+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to -+ fix compiler errors/warnings -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] -+ fix uninitialized variable warnings -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ gssgenr.c ] -+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c -+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ sshconnect2.c ] -+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.281216190 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-11 15:15:17.289216153 +0200 -@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o - atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ - kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ -+ kexgssc.o \ - msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ - jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o auditstub.o - -@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw - auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \ - monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ - auth-krb5.o \ -- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ -+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\ - loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ - sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ - roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.213216506 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.283216181 +0200 -@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u - static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); - static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); - -+/* -+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. -+ */ -+static int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ int authenticated = 0; -+ Buffer b; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); -+ mic.length = len; -+ -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); -+ -+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, -+ &gssbuf, &mic)))) -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); -+ -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ free(mic.value); -+ -+ return (authenticated); -+} -+ - /* - * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know - * how to check local user kuserok and the like) -@@ -240,7 +274,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, - - packet_check_eom(); - -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); - - authctxt->postponed = 0; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); -@@ -282,7 +317,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); - - if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); - else - logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); - -@@ -299,6 +335,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); - } - -+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { -+ "gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ &options.gss_authentication -+}; -+ - Authmethod method_gssapi = { - "gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.214216502 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.283216181 +0200 -@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; - extern Authmethod method_kbdint; - extern Authmethod method_hostbased; - #ifdef GSSAPI -+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; - extern Authmethod method_gssapi; - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE -@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { - &method_none, - &method_pubkey, - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ &method_gsskeyex, - &method_gssapi, - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.178216669 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.284216176 +0200 -@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ - #include "msg.h" - #include "roaming.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - /* import options */ - extern Options options; - -@@ -1608,6 +1612,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha - /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ - if (!rekeying) { - channel_after_select(readset, writeset); -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { -+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); -+ need_rekeying = 1; -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { - debug("need rekeying"); - xxx_kex->done = 0; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.273216227 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/configure.ac 2013-10-11 15:15:17.285216171 +0200 -@@ -548,6 +548,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" - [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) - AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], - [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], -+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" -+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, -+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include ], -+ [cc_context_t c; -+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], -+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, -+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) -+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) -+ fi], -+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] -+ ) - m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) - AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], - AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2013-06-01 23:31:18.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-genr.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.286216167 +0200 -@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ - #include "buffer.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "ssh2.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include - - #include "ssh-gss.h" - - extern u_char *session_id2; - extern u_int session_id2_len; - -+typedef struct { -+ char *encoded; -+ gss_OID oid; -+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; -+ -+/* -+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the -+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines -+ */ -+ -+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; -+ -+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { -+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program -+ * -+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting -+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism -+ */ -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { -+ gss_OID_set gss_supported; -+ OM_uint32 min_status; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, -+ host, client)); -+} -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, -+ const char *host, const char *client) { -+ Buffer buf; -+ size_t i; -+ int oidpos, enclen; -+ char *mechs, *encoded; -+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ char deroid[2]; -+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); -+ EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { -+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) -+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); -+ free(gss_enc2oid); -+ } -+ -+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * -+ (gss_supported->count + 1)); -+ -+ buffer_init(&buf); -+ -+ oidpos = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { -+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && -+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { -+ -+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; -+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; -+ -+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].length); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); -+ -+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), -+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ -+ if (oidpos != 0) -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; -+ oidpos++; -+ } -+ } -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; -+ -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); -+ -+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); -+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); -+ buffer_free(&buf); -+ -+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { -+ free(mechs); -+ mechs = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (mechs); -+} -+ -+gss_OID -+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ switch (kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ } -+ -+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && -+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) -+ i++; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) -+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); -+ -+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; -+} -+ - /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ - int - ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) -@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de - } - - ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, -+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, - GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, - 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); - -@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con - } - - OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_name_t gssname; -+ OM_uint32 status; -+ gss_OID_set oidset; -+ -+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; -+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); -+ -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, -+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); -+ -+ if (!ctx->major) -+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, -+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ -+ if (ctx->major) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ -+ return(ctx->major); -+} -+ -+OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) - { -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, - GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer - return (ctx->major); - } - -+/* Priviledged when used by server */ -+OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+{ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ -+ return (ctx->major); -+} -+ - void - ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, - const char *context) -@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha - } - - int --ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) -+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, -+ const char *client) - { - gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - OM_uint32 major, minor; - gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; -+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; -+ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ ctx = &intctx; - - /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ - if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && -@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); - ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); - major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) -+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); -+ - if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { - major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, - NULL); -@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); - } - -- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) - ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); - - return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { -+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; -+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ static gss_name_t name; -+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; -+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; -+ int equal; -+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; -+ -+ now = time(NULL); -+ -+ if (ctxt) { -+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); -+ -+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { -+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; -+ saved_lifetime+= now; -+ } else { -+ /* Handle the error */ -+ } -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (now - last_call < 10) -+ return 0; -+ -+ last_call = now; -+ -+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) -+ return 0; -+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) -+ return 1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2013-07-20 05:35:45.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2013-10-23 21:48:20.558346236 +0200 -@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - krb5_error_code problem; - krb5_principal princ; - OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -- int len; -+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; - const char *errmsg; - - if (client->creds == NULL) { -@@ -174,11 +174,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - return; - } - -- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); -+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); -+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); -+ - client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; -- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); -- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); -+ client->store.filename = NULL; -+#else -+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') -+ new_ccname++; -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); -+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { -+ char *p; -+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); -+ if (p) -+ *p = '\0'; -+ } -+ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) -+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -187,9 +202,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - - krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); - -+ client->store.data = krb_context; -+ - return; - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, -+ ssh_gssapi_client *client) -+{ -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_principal principal = NULL; -+ char *name = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, -+ &principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { -+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ -+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { -+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ -+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ -+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, -+ ccache))) { -+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", - "Kerberos", -@@ -197,7 +279,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, - NULL, -- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds - }; - - #endif /* KRB5 */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2013-07-20 05:35:45.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv.c 2013-10-23 21:51:52.212347754 +0200 -@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ - #include "channels.h" - #include "session.h" - #include "misc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+#include "uidswap.h" - - #include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; - - static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = - { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; -+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; - - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = -- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; -+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; - - #ifdef KRB5 - extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; -@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) - char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - gss_OID_set oidset; - -- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ return (-1); -+ } - -- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { -- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- return (-1); -- } -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, -+ NULL, NULL))) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (ctx->major); -+ } else { -+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; - } -- -- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) -- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -- -- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- return (ctx->major); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; - } - - /* Privileged */ -@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss - } - - /* Unprivileged */ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { -+ gss_OID_set supported; -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); -+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, -+ NULL, NULL)); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, -+ const char *dummy) { -+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; -+ int res; -+ -+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); -+ -+ return (res); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ - void - ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) - { -@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o - gss_OID_set supported; - - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) -+ return; - - while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { - if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, -@@ -249,8 +286,48 @@ OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) - { - int i = 0; -+ int equal = 0; -+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { -+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || -+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, -+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, -+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, -+ new_name, &equal); - -- gss_buffer_desc ename; -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if (!equal) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); -+ -+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); -+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); -+ client->name = new_name; -+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; -+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -+ client->updated = 1; -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } - - client->mech = NULL; - -@@ -265,6 +342,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - if (client->mech == NULL) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - -+ if (ctx->client_creds && -+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, - &client->displayname, NULL))) { - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -282,6 +366,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - return (ctx->major); - } - -+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); -+ - /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ - client->creds = ctx->client_creds; - ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -@@ -292,11 +378,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - void - ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) - { -- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { -- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ -- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", -- gssapi_client.store.filename); -- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) { -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) { -+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, -+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); -+ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) { -+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, -+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); -+ } else { -+ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data); -+ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; -+ } - } - } - -@@ -329,7 +424,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int - - /* Privileged */ - int --ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - OM_uint32 lmin; - -@@ -339,9 +434,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return 0; - } - if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) -- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) -+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { -+ gssapi_client.used = 1; -+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; - return 1; -- else { -+ } else { - /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); -@@ -354,14 +451,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return (0); - } - --/* Privileged */ --OM_uint32 --ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running -+ * as the user, the monitor is root. -+ * -+ * In the child, we want to : -+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify -+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update -+ */ -+ -+/* Stuff for PAM */ -+ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, -+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) - { -- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); -+} -+#endif - -- return (ctx->major); -+void -+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { -+ int ok; -+ int ret; -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; -+ char *envstr; -+#endif -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); -+ -+ if (!ok) -+ return; -+ -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); -+ -+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will -+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options -+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) -+ */ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ if (!use_privsep) { -+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, -+ &pamconv, &pamh); -+ if (ret) -+ return; -+ -+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, -+ gssapi_client.store.envval); -+ -+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); -+ if (!ret) -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); -+#endif -+} -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { -+ int ok = 0; -+ -+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ -+ if (!gssapi_client.updated) -+ return 0; -+ -+ gssapi_client.updated = 0; -+ -+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); -+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) -+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); -+ else -+ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); -+ -+ restore_uid(); -+ -+ return ok; - } - - #endif -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kex.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.gsskex 2013-10-30 15:26:39.339608716 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.c 2013-10-31 10:50:41.254535382 +0100 -@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ - #include "roaming.h" - #include "audit.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) - # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 -@@ -81,6 +85,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, EVP_sha384 }, - { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, EVP_sha512 }, - #endif -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, -+#endif - { NULL, -1, -1, NULL}, - }; - -@@ -110,6 +119,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) - for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { - if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) - return k; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) { -+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) -+ return k; -+ } -+#endif - } - return NULL; - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kex.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.197216581 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.h 2013-10-11 15:43:21.757429309 +0200 -@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ enum kex_exchange { - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, - KEX_ECDH_SHA2, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, - KEX_MAX - }; - -@@ -133,6 +136,12 @@ struct Kex { - int flags; - const EVP_MD *evp_md; - int ec_nid; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ int gss_deleg_creds; -+ int gss_trust_dns; -+ char *gss_host; -+ char *gss_client; -+#endif - char *client_version_string; - char *server_version_string; - int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); -@@ -162,6 +171,11 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); - void kexecdh_client(Kex *); - void kexecdh_server(Kex *); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+void kexgss_client(Kex *); -+void kexgss_server(Kex *); -+#endif -+ - void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); - - void -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/kexgssc.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "buffer.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+ -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+ -+void -+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; -+ DH *dh; -+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ u_char *kbuf, *hash; -+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; -+ u_char *empty = ""; -+ char *msg; -+ char *lang; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -+ -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -+ -+ if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); -+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ packet_put_int(min); -+ packet_put_int(nbits); -+ packet_put_int(max); -+ -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ -+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(p); -+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(g); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) -+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); -+ -+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ -+ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); -+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ free(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = packet_read(); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ serverhostkey = -+ packet_get_string(&slen); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -+ -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); -+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ msg_tok.length = strlen; -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if (packet_get_char()) { -+ recv_tok.value= -+ packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ maj_status = packet_get_int(); -+ min_status = packet_get_int(); -+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ /* -+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ */ -+ -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ -+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); -+ -+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); -+ if ((int)kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ free(kbuf); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ dh->pub_key, /* e */ -+ dh_server_pub, /* f */ -+ shared_secret, /* K */ -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ kex->evp_md, -+ kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ dh_server_pub, -+ shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); -+ -+ free(msg_tok.value); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ free(serverhostkey); -+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); -+ -+ /* save session id */ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_finish(kex); -+} -+ -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/kexgsss.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.287216162 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "buffer.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; -+ -+void -+kexgss_server(Kex *kex) -+{ -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; -+ u_char *kbuf, *hash; -+ DH *dh; -+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; -+ int type = 0; -+ gss_OID oid; -+ char *mechs; -+ -+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ -+ -+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures -+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back -+ * into life -+ */ -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -+ free(mechs); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); -+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); -+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) -+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ min = packet_get_int(); -+ nbits = packet_get_int(); -+ max = packet_get_int(); -+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); -+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, nbits, max); -+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); -+ if (dh == NULL) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_write_wait(); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -+ type = packet_read(); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ -+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ break; -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect( -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ -+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); -+ -+ free(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ } -+ fatal("accept_ctx died"); -+ } -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); -+ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); -+ if ((int)kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ free(kbuf); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash( -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ -+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ kex->evp_md, -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh_client_pub, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) -+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); -+ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ } else { -+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_finish(kex); -+ -+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we -+ * just exchanged. */ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey) -+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+} -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.288216158 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-11 15:41:44.982868222 +0200 -@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = - KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, - { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", - KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, -+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 }, - { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } - }; - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/key.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.198216576 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.289216153 +0200 -@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum types { - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, - KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, - KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, -+ KEY_NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC - }; - enum fp_type { -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.214216502 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 -@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer - int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); - #endif - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -@@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE - {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, -@@ -283,6 +286,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - }; - - struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, -+#endif - {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, - {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, - {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, -@@ -405,6 +414,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - } else { - mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; - -@@ -519,6 +532,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - } else { - mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -@@ -1968,6 +1985,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); - kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); -@@ -2192,6 +2216,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer - OM_uint32 major; - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - goid.length = len; - -@@ -2219,6 +2246,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe - OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - in.length = len; - major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); -@@ -2236,6 +2266,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); - } - return (0); - } -@@ -2247,6 +2278,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer - OM_uint32 ret; - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - gssbuf.length = len; - mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -@@ -2273,7 +2307,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m - { - int authenticated; - -- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && -+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); - - buffer_clear(m); - buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); -@@ -2286,6 +2324,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m - /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc data; -+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 major, minor; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ data.length = len; -+ if (data.length != 20) -+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, -+ (int) data.length); -+ -+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ -+ if (session_id2_len == 0) { -+ session_id2_len = data.length; -+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); -+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); -+ } -+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); -+ -+ free(data.value); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, major); -+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); -+ -+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); -+ -+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { -+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int ok; -+ -+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ -+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); -+ -+ free(store.filename); -+ free(store.envvar); -+ free(store.envval); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, ok); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); -+ -+ return(0); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.215216497 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 -@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX - MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, - #endif -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83, -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85, - - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.215216497 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 -@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss - } - - int --mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - Buffer m; - int authenticated = 0; -@@ -1346,6 +1346,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+OM_uint32 -+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ OM_uint32 major; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); -+ -+ major = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); -+ hash->length = len; -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return(major); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ int ok; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); -+ -+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return (ok); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.215216497 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.290216148 +0200 -@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, - gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); --int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); - #endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2013-07-18 08:09:05.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/readconf.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.291216143 +0200 -@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ typedef enum { - oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, -+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, -+ oGssServerIdentity, - oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, - oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, - oHashKnownHosts, -@@ -172,10 +174,19 @@ static struct { - { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, - #if defined(GSSAPI) - { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, -+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, - #endif - { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, - { "usersh", oDeprecated }, -@@ -516,10 +527,30 @@ parse_flag: - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oGssDelegateCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssTrustDns: -+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case oGssClientIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssServerIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssRenewalRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oBatchMode: - intptr = &options->batch_mode; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1168,7 +1199,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->pubkey_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; - options->gss_authentication = -1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; -+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; -+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -1268,8 +1304,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) - options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; -+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) -+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; -+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2013-05-16 12:30:03.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/readconf.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.291216143 +0200 -@@ -48,7 +48,12 @@ typedef struct { - int challenge_response_authentication; - /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ - int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ - int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ -+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ -+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ -+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ -+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ - int password_authentication; /* Try password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.273216227 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 -@@ -107,7 +107,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; - options->gss_authentication=-1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; -+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; -@@ -241,8 +244,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) - options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; -+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) -+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; -+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -342,7 +351,9 @@ typedef enum { - sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, - sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, - sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, -- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, -+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, -+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, -+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, - sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, -@@ -409,10 +420,20 @@ static struct { - #ifdef GSSAPI - { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #endif -+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1078,10 +1099,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sGssCleanupCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssStrictAcceptor: -+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case sGssStoreRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sPasswordAuthentication: - intptr = &options->password_authentication; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1994,6 +2027,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - #ifdef GSSAPI - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE - dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.273216227 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 -@@ -111,7 +111,10 @@ typedef struct { - int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if - * authenticated with Kerberos. */ - int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ - int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ -+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ -+ int gss_store_rekey; - int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2013-02-25 01:24:44.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@ - - #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 - -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" -+ - typedef struct { - char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; -+ struct passwd *owner; - void *data; - } ssh_gssapi_ccache; - -@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_buffer_desc displayname; - gss_buffer_desc exportedname; - gss_cred_id_t creds; -+ gss_name_t name; - struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int used; -+ int updated; - } ssh_gssapi_client; - - typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { -@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { - int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); - int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); - void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); -+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); - } ssh_gssapi_mech; - - typedef struct { -@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_OID oid; /* client */ - gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ - gss_name_t client; /* server */ -- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ -+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ - } Gssctxt; - - extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; -+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; - - int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); - void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); -@@ -117,16 +134,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); - void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); --int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); -+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); - - /* In the server */ -+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, -+ const char *); -+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); -+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); --int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); -+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); - void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); - void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); - -+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); -+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); -+ -+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2013-07-18 08:11:50.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.5 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 -@@ -529,11 +529,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba - The default is - .Dq no . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using -+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default -+identity will be used. -+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the -+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target -+hostname. - .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials - Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. - The default is - .Dq no . --Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. -+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey -+If set to -+.Dq yes -+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the -+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed -+credentials to a session on the server. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns -+Set to -+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize -+the name of the host being connected to. If -+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the -+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HashKnownHosts - Indicates that - .Xr ssh 1 -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.265216264 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config 2013-10-11 15:15:17.292216139 +0200 -@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ - # HostbasedAuthentication no - # GSSAPIAuthentication no - # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no -+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no -+# GSSAPITrustDNS no - # BatchMode no - # CheckHostIP yes - # AddressFamily any -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.251216330 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2013-10-11 15:28:22.617529416 +0200 -@@ -162,9 +162,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - { - Kex *kex; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; -+ char *gss_host = NULL; -+#endif -+ - xxx_host = host; - xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this -+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ else -+ gss_host = host; -+ -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); -+ if (gss) { -+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], -+ "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { - logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); - options.ciphers = NULL; -@@ -207,6 +232,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the -+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ -+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], -+ "%s,null", orig); -+ free(gss); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, - (time_t)options.rekey_interval); -@@ -218,10 +254,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ } -+#endif - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; - kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; -+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; -+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; -+ if (options.gss_server_identity) { -+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -+ } else { -+ kex->gss_host = gss_host; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - xxx_kex = kex; - - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); -@@ -317,6 +373,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3 - void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); - void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); - void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); -+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); - #endif - - void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); -@@ -332,6 +389,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); - - Authmethod authmethods[] = { - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ {"gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ NULL, -+ &options.gss_authentication, -+ NULL}, - {"gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, - NULL, -@@ -636,19 +698,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - static u_int mech = 0; - OM_uint32 min; - int ok = 0; -+ const char *gss_host; -+ -+ if (options.gss_server_identity) -+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ else -+ gss_host = authctxt->host; - - /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at - * once. */ - - if (gss_supported == NULL) -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { -+ gss_supported = NULL; -+ return 0; -+ } - - /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ - while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { - /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ - if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && - ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, -- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { -+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, -+ options.gss_client_identity)) { - ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ - } else { - mech++; -@@ -745,8 +819,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_ - { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Gssctxt *gssctxt; -- int oidlen; -- char *oidv; -+ u_int oidlen; -+ u_char *oidv; - - if (authctxt == NULL) - fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); -@@ -855,6 +929,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p - free(msg); - free(lang); - } -+ -+int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ Buffer b; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ms; -+ -+ static int attempt = 0; -+ if (attempt++ >= 1) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { -+ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); -+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); -+ -+ return (1); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - int -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.277216209 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 -@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ - #include "ssh-sandbox.h" - #include "version.h" - -+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API -+#include -+#endif -+ - #ifdef LIBWRAP - #include - #include -@@ -1794,10 +1798,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; - } -+#ifndef GSSAPI -+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ - if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { - logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; - } -+#endif - if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { - logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); - exit(1); -@@ -2130,6 +2137,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - /* Log the connection. */ - verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); - -+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API -+ /* -+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if -+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched -+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not -+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from -+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. -+ * -+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an -+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating -+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the -+ * same session (bad). -+ * -+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us -+ * automatically. -+ * -+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored -+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). -+ */ -+ { -+ OSStatus err = 0; -+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; -+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; -+ -+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ else -+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", -+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); -+ -+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) -+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " -+ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); -+ else { -+ debug("Creating new security session..."); -+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ -+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, -+ &sattrs); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ else -+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", -+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* - * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side - * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is -@@ -2551,6 +2612,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { -+ char *orig; -+ char *gss = NULL; -+ char *newstr = NULL; -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising -+ * the other key exchange algorithms -+ */ -+ -+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) -+ orig = NULL; -+ -+ if (options.gss_keyex) -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ else -+ gss = NULL; -+ -+ if (gss && orig) -+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ else if (gss) -+ newstr = gss; -+ else if (orig) -+ newstr = orig; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host -+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only -+ * host key algorithm we support -+ */ -+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; -+ -+ if (newstr) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; -+ else -+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* start key exchange */ - kex = kex_setup(myproposal); - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; -@@ -2558,6 +2661,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.274216223 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 -@@ -484,12 +484,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba - The default is - .Dq no . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange -+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. - .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials - Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache - on logout. - The default is - .Dq yes . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck -+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor -+a client authenticates against. If -+.Dq yes -+then the client must authenticate against the -+.Pa host -+service on the current hostname. If -+.Dq no -+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the -+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation -+on multi homed machines. -+The default is -+.Dq yes . -+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, -+and setting it to -+.Dq no -+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. -+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey -+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a -+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed -+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication - Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together - with successful public key client host authentication is allowed -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2013-10-11 15:15:17.277216209 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config 2013-10-11 15:15:17.294216130 +0200 -@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - GSSAPIAuthentication yes - #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes - GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes -+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes -+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 941aa72..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -diff -U0 openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog ---- openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df 2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog 2013-10-23 22:39:46.051788366 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ -+20131010 -+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13 -+ [dh.c dh.h] -+ Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each -+ symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with -+ the upper limit specified by RFC4419. Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok -+ djm@. -+ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df 2013-07-18 08:12:07.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.c 2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.51 2013/07/02 12:31:43 markus Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.52 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */ - /* - * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. - * -@@ -352,17 +352,20 @@ dh_new_group14(void) - - /* - * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an -- * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). Estimate -- * with: O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3))) -+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). -+ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key -+ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value -+ * from RFC4419 section 3. - */ - - int - dh_estimate(int bits) - { -- -+ if (bits <= 112) -+ return 2048; - if (bits <= 128) -- return (1024); /* O(2**86) */ -+ return 3072; - if (bits <= 192) -- return (2048); /* O(2**116) */ -- return (4096); /* O(2**156) */ -+ return 7680; -+ return 8192; - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df 2008-06-29 14:47:04.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.h 2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.10 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */ - - /* - * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. -@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); - - int dh_estimate(int); - -+/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */ - #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 - #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6105d09..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,371 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat ---- openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ -+The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys -+of an user in any environment. This includes environments with -+polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled. -+ -+To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: -+ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat -+ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root -+ -+Do not forget to enable public key authentication: -+ PubkeyAuthentication yes -+ -+ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.442566930 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 -@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server - SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign - SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper - SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper -+SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat - SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MANFMT=@MANFMT@ - INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ - --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) - - LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ - canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ -@@ -172,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) - ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o - $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - -+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) -+ - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) - -@@ -279,6 +283,7 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ - $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ - fi -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.429566992 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200 -@@ -606,6 +606,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd - _exit(1); - } - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { -+ error ("failed to copy environment: %s", -+ strerror(errno)); -+ _exit(127); -+ } -+#endif -+ - execl(options.authorized_keys_command, - options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL); - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.435566964 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2013-10-10 15:32:19.946065189 +0200 -@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, - - /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ - static int --ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) -+ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *)) - { - const char *reqlvl; - char *role; -@@ -324,16 +324,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) - - ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); - -- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); -+ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); - - if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { - use_current = "1"; - } else { - use_current = ""; -- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); -+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); - } - -- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); -+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); - - if (role != NULL) - free(role); -@@ -341,6 +341,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) - return rv; - } - -+static int -+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) -+{ -+ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); -+} -+ -+static int -+do_setenv(char *name, char *value) -+{ -+ return setenv(name, value, 1); -+} -+ -+int -+ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) -+{ -+ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); -+} -+ - /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ - void - ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c 2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ -+/* -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, -+ * including the disclaimer of warranties. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote -+ * products derived from this software without specific prior -+ * written permission. -+ * -+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of -+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are -+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is -+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and -+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, -+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES -+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR -+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. -+ * Written by Tomas Mraz -+*/ -+ -+#define _GNU_SOURCE -+ -+#include "config.h" -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include "uidswap.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+ -+#define ERR_USAGE 1 -+#define ERR_PAM_START 2 -+#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3 -+#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4 -+#define ERR_PAM_END 5 -+#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6 -+#define ERR_MEMORY 7 -+#define ERR_OPEN 8 -+#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9 -+#define ERR_FDOPEN 10 -+#define ERR_STAT 11 -+#define ERR_WRITE 12 -+#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13 -+#define BUFLEN 4096 -+ -+/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */ -+static int -+dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm, -+ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr) -+{ -+ struct pam_response *rsp; -+ -+ (void)msgm; -+ (void)appdata_ptr; -+ -+ if (num_msg <= 0) -+ return PAM_CONV_ERR; -+ -+ /* Just allocate the array as empty responses */ -+ rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response)); -+ if (rsp == NULL) -+ return PAM_CONV_ERR; -+ -+ *response = rsp; -+ return PAM_SUCCESS; -+} -+ -+static struct pam_conv conv = { -+ dummy_conv, -+ NULL -+}; -+ -+char * -+make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd) -+{ -+ char *fname; -+ -+ if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ return fname; -+} -+ -+int -+dump_keys(const char *user) -+{ -+ struct passwd *pwd; -+ int fd = -1; -+ FILE *f = NULL; -+ char *fname = NULL; -+ int rv = 0; -+ char buf[BUFLEN]; -+ size_t len; -+ struct stat st; -+ -+ if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { -+ return ERR_GETPWNAM; -+ } -+ -+ if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) { -+ return ERR_MEMORY; -+ } -+ -+ temporarily_use_uid(pwd); -+ -+ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) { -+ rv = ERR_OPEN; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ -+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { -+ rv = ERR_STAT; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ -+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || -+ (st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) { -+ rv = ERR_FILE_MODE; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ -+ unset_nonblock(fd); -+ -+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { -+ rv = ERR_FDOPEN; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ -+ fd = -1; -+ -+ while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) { -+ rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0; -+ } -+ -+fail: -+ if (fd != -1) -+ close(fd); -+ if (f != NULL) -+ fclose(f); -+ free(fname); -+ restore_uid(); -+ return rv; -+} -+ -+static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", -+ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", -+ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE" -+}; -+ -+extern char **environ; -+ -+int -+set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh) -+{ -+ int i; -+ size_t j; -+ -+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) { -+ int len = strlen(env_names[j]); -+ -+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) { -+ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 && -+ environ[i][len] == '=') { -+ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS) -+ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+main(int argc, char *argv[]) -+{ -+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+ int retval; -+ int ev = 0; -+ -+ if (argc != 2) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s \n", argv[0]); -+ return ERR_USAGE; -+ } -+ -+ retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ return ERR_PAM_START; -+ } -+ -+ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh); -+ if (ev != 0) -+ goto finish; -+ -+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION; -+ goto finish; -+ } -+ -+ ev = dump_keys(argv[1]); -+ -+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION; -+ } -+ -+finish: -+ retval = pam_end (pamh,retval); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ ev = ERR_PAM_END; -+ } -+ return ev; -+} diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch index b9c8000..dd201a4 100644 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c + if (authctxt->krb5_ticket_file[0] == ':') + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file++; + -+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type); ++ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type) + 2; authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); - snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 60688db..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,167 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.889087613 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2013-10-11 21:41:42.905087537 +0200 -@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ - - extern ServerOptions options; - -+int -+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client) -+{ -+ if (options.use_kuserok) -+ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client); -+ else { -+ char kuser[65]; -+ -+ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser)) -+ return 0; -+ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0; -+ } -+} -+ - static int - krb5_init(void *context) - { -@@ -159,7 +173,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c - if (problem) - goto out; - -- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) { -+ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) { - problem = -1; - goto out; - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.901087556 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2013-10-11 21:46:42.898673597 +0200 -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr - int); - - static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; -+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *); - - /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ - -@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client - /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, - * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials - * to access these files aren't available yet. */ -- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { -+ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { - retval = 1; - logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", - name, (char *)client->displayname.value); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c 2013-10-11 21:48:24.664194016 +0200 -@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; - options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; - options->version_addendum = NULL; -+ options->use_kuserok = -1; - } - - void -@@ -310,6 +311,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); - if (options->show_patchlevel == -1) - options->show_patchlevel = 0; -+ if (options->use_kuserok == -1) -+ options->use_kuserok = 1; - - /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ - if (use_privsep == -1) -@@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ typedef enum { - sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, - sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, - sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, -- sKerberosGetAFSToken, -+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok, - sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, - sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, - sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, -@@ -409,11 +412,13 @@ static struct { - #else - { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #endif -+ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL }, - #else - { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - #endif - { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1515,6 +1520,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - *activep = value; - break; - -+ case sKerberosUseKuserok: -+ intptr = &options->use_kuserok; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sPermitOpen: - arg = strdelim(&cp); - if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -@@ -1815,6 +1824,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d - M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); - M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); - M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); -+ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); - M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); - M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); - -@@ -2055,6 +2065,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); - - /* string arguments */ - dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h 2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200 -@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct { - - int num_permitted_opens; - -+ int use_kuserok; - char *chroot_directory; - char *revoked_keys_file; - char *trusted_user_ca_keys; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200 -@@ -675,6 +675,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr - file on logout. - The default is - .Dq yes . -+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok -+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases. -+The default is -+.Dq yes . - .It Cm KexAlgorithms - Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. - Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -@@ -833,6 +837,7 @@ Available keywords are - .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , - .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , - .Cm KerberosAuthentication , -+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok , - .Cm MaxAuthTries , - .Cm MaxSessions , - .Cm PasswordAuthentication , -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok 2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config 2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200 -@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes - #KerberosTicketCleanup yes - #KerberosGetAFSToken no -+#KerberosUseKuserok yes - - # GSSAPI options - #GSSAPIAuthentication no diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 052973c..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2637 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.ldap openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.ldap 2013-03-20 02:55:15.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac 2013-03-25 21:27:15.888248071 +0100 -@@ -1509,6 +1509,106 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([audit], - esac ] - ) - -+# Check whether user wants LDAP support -+LDAP_MSG="no" -+INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="" -+AC_ARG_WITH(ldap, -+ [ --with-ldap[[=PATH]] Enable LDAP pubkey support (optionally in PATH)], -+ [ -+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then -+ -+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="yes" -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DLDAP_DEPRECATED" -+ -+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" -+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" -+ fi -+ -+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_LDAP_PUBKEY], 1, [Enable LDAP pubkey support]) -+ LDAP_MSG="yes" -+ -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(lber.h) -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate )) -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap_ssl.h) -+ -+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldap-lib, -+ [ --with-ldap-lib=type select ldap library [auto|netscape5|netscape4|netscape3|umich|openldap]]) -+ -+ if test -z "$with_ldap_lib"; then -+ with_ldap_lib=auto -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = umich -o $with_ldap_lib = openldap \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(lber, main, LIBS="-llber $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap, main, LIBS="-lldap $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape5 \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap50, main, LIBS="-lldap50 -lssldap50 -lssl3 -lnss3 -lnspr4 -lprldap50 -lplc4 -lplds4 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape4 \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl41, main, LIBS="-lldapssl41 -lplc3 -lplds3 -lnspr3 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl40, main, LIBS="-lldapssl40 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap41, main, LIBS="-lldap41 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap40, main, LIBS="-lldap40 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape3 \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl30, main, LIBS="-lldapssl30 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate a valid LDAP library) -+ fi -+ -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working LDAP support]) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include -+ #include ], -+ [(void)ldap_init(0, 0);], -+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], -+ [ -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) -+ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldap libraries **]) -+ ]) -+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \ -+ ldap_init \ -+ ldap_get_lderrno \ -+ ldap_set_lderrno \ -+ ldap_parse_result \ -+ ldap_memfree \ -+ ldap_controls_free \ -+ ldap_set_option \ -+ ldap_get_option \ -+ ldapssl_init \ -+ ldap_start_tls_s \ -+ ldap_pvt_tls_set_option \ -+ ldap_initialize \ -+ ) -+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(ldap_set_rebind_proc, -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include -+ #include ], -+ [ldap_set_rebind_proc(0, 0, 0);], -+ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=3], -+ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=2]) -+ AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc) -+ AC_DEFINE(LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS, $ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc, [number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) -+ ) -+ fi -+ ] -+) -+AC_SUBST(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER) -+ - dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ - arc4random \ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys ---- openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ -+ -+HOW TO START -+ -+1) configure LDAP server -+ * Use LDAP server documentation -+2) add appropriate LDAP schema -+ * For OpenLDAP or SunONE Use attached schema, otherwise you have to create it. -+ * LDAP user entry -+ User entry: -+ - attached to the 'ldapPublicKey' objectclass -+ - attached to the 'posixAccount' objectclass -+ - with a filled 'sshPublicKey' attribute -+3) insert users into LDAP -+ * Use LDAP Tree management tool as useful -+ * Entry in the LDAP server must respect 'posixAccount' and 'ldapPublicKey' which are defined in core.schema and the additionnal lpk.schema. -+ * Example: -+ dn: uid=captain,ou=commanders,dc=enterprise,dc=universe -+ objectclass: top -+ objectclass: person -+ objectclass: organizationalPerson -+ objectclass: posixAccount -+ objectclass: ldapPublicKey -+ description: Jonathan Archer -+ userPassword: Porthos -+ cn: onathan Archer -+ sn: onathan Archer -+ uid: captain -+ uidNumber: 1001 -+ gidNumber: 1001 -+ homeDirectory: /home/captain -+ sshPublicKey: ssh-rss AAAAB3.... =captain@universe -+ sshPublicKey: command="kill -9 1" ssh-rss AAAAM5... -+4) on the ssh side set in sshd_config -+ * Set up the backend -+ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-wrapper -+ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser -+ * Do not forget to set -+ PubkeyAuthentication yes -+ * Swith off unnecessary auth methods -+5) confugure ldap.conf -+ * Default ldap.conf is placed in /etc/ssh -+ * The configuration style is the same as other ldap based aplications -+6) if necessary edit ssh-ldap-wrapper -+ * There is a possibility to change ldap.conf location -+ * There are some debug options -+ * Example -+ /usr/libexec/openssh -s -f /etc/ldap.conf -w -d >> /tmp/ldapdebuglog.txt -+ -+HOW TO MIGRATE FROM LPK -+ -+1) goto HOW TO START 4) .... the ldap schema is the same -+ -+2) convert the group requests to the appropriate LDAP requests -+ -+HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS -+ -+1) use debug in sshd -+ * /usr/sbin/sshd -d -d -d -d -+2) use debug in ssh-ldap-helper -+ * ssh-ldap-helper -d -d -d -d -s -+3) use tcpdump ... other ldap client etc. -+ -+ADVANTAGES -+ -+1) Blocking an user account can be done directly from LDAP (if sshd is using PubkeyAuthentication + AuthorizedKeysCommand with ldap only). -+ -+DISADVANTAGES -+ -+1) LDAP must be well configured, getting the public key of some user is not a problem, but if anonymous LDAP -+ allows write to users dn, somebody could replace some user's public key by his own and impersonate some -+ of your users in all your server farm -- be VERY CAREFUL. -+2) With incomplete PKI the MITM attack when sshd is requesting the public key, could lead to a compromise of your servers allowing login -+ as the impersonated user. -+3) If LDAP server is down there may be no fallback on passwd auth. -+ -+MISC. -+ -+1) todo -+ * Possibility to reuse the ssh-ldap-helper. -+ * Tune the LDAP part to accept all possible LDAP configurations. -+ -+2) differences from original lpk -+ * No LDAP code in sshd. -+ * Support for various LDAP platforms and configurations. -+ * LDAP is configured in separate ldap.conf file. -+ -+3) docs/link -+ * http://pacsec.jp/core05/psj05-barisani-en.pdf -+ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/openssh-lpk/ -+ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/sshgate/ -+ * http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/openssh-lpk -+ * http://lam.sf.net/ ( http://lam.sourceforge.net/documentation/supportedSchemas.htm ) -+ -+4) contributors/ideas/greets -+ - Eric AUGE -+ - Andrea Barisani -+ - Falk Siemonsmeier. -+ - Jacob Rief. -+ - Michael Durchgraf. -+ - frederic peters. -+ - Finlay dobbie. -+ - Stefan Fisher. -+ - Robin H. Johnson. -+ - Adrian Bridgett. -+ -+5) Author -+ Jan F. Chadima -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.c 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "ldapconf.h" -+#include "ldapmisc.h" -+#include "ldapbody.h" -+#include -+#include -+ -+#define LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT "(&(objectclass=%s)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%s)%s)" -+#define PUBKEYATTR "sshPublicKey" -+#define LDAP_LOGFILE "%s/ldap.%d" -+ -+static FILE *logfile = NULL; -+static LDAP *ld; -+ -+static char *attrs[] = { -+ PUBKEYATTR, -+ NULL -+}; -+ -+void -+ldap_checkconfig (void) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE -+ if (options.host == NULL && options.uri == NULL) -+#else -+ if (options.host == NULL) -+#endif -+ fatal ("missing \"host\" in config file"); -+} -+ -+#if defined(LDAP_API_FEATURE_X_OPENLDAP) && (LDAP_API_VERSION > 2000) -+static int -+_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, LDAP_CONST char *url, int request, ber_int_t msgid) -+{ -+ struct timeval timeout; -+ int rc; -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ LDAPMessage *result; -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ -+ -+ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind to %s", options.binddn); -+ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ error ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#if !defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) || !defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ return ldap_simple_bind_s (ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw); -+#else -+ if (ldap_simple_bind(ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw) < 0) -+ fatal ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); -+ -+ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; -+ timeout.tv_usec = 0; -+ result = NULL; -+ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, FALSE, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { -+ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); -+ ldap_msgfree (result); -+ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; -+ } -+ debug3 ("LDAP rebind to %s succesfull", options.binddn); -+ return rc; -+#endif -+} -+#else -+ -+static int -+_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, char **whop, char **credp, int *methodp, int freeit) -+{ -+ if (freeit) -+ return LDAP_SUCCESS; -+ -+ *whop = strdup (options.binddn); -+ *credp = strdup (options.bindpw); -+ *methodp = LDAP_AUTH_SIMPLE; -+ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind for %s", *whop); -+ return LDAP_SUCCESS; -+} -+#endif -+ -+void -+ldap_do_connect(void) -+{ -+ int rc, msgid, ld_errno = 0; -+ struct timeval timeout; -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ int parserc; -+ LDAPMessage *result; -+ LDAPControl **controls; -+ int reconnect = 0; -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ -+ -+ debug ("LDAP do connect"); -+ -+retry: -+ if (reconnect) { -+ debug3 ("Reconnecting with ld_errno %d", ld_errno); -+ if (options.bind_policy == 0 || -+ (ld_errno != LDAP_SERVER_DOWN && ld_errno != LDAP_TIMEOUT) || -+ reconnect > 5) -+ fatal ("Cannot connect to LDAP server"); -+ -+ if (reconnect > 1) -+ sleep (reconnect - 1); -+ -+ if (ld != NULL) { -+ ldap_unbind (ld); -+ ld = NULL; -+ } -+ logit("reconnecting to LDAP server..."); -+ } -+ -+ if (ld == NULL) { -+ int rc; -+ struct timeval tv; -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION -+ if (options.debug > 0) { -+#ifdef LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE -+ if (options.logdir) { -+ char *logfilename; -+ int logfilenamelen; -+ -+ logfilenamelen = strlen (LDAP_LOGFILE) + strlen ("000000") + strlen (options.logdir); -+ logfilename = xmalloc (logfilenamelen); -+ snprintf (logfilename, logfilenamelen, LDAP_LOGFILE, options.logdir, (int) getpid ()); -+ logfilename[logfilenamelen - 1] = 0; -+ if ((logfile = fopen (logfilename, "a")) == NULL) -+ fatal ("cannot append to %s: %s", logfilename, strerror (errno)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP debug into %s", logfilename); -+ free (logfilename); -+ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE, logfile); -+ } -+#endif -+ if (options.debug) { -+#ifdef LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL -+ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); -+#endif /* LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ -+#ifdef LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL -+ (void) ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); -+#endif /* LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ -+ debug3 ("Set LDAP debug to %d", options.debug); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION */ -+ -+ ld = NULL; -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT -+ if (options.host != NULL) { -+ if (options.ssl_on == SSL_LDAPS) { -+ if ((rc = ldapssl_client_init (options.sslpath, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldapssl_client_init %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAPssl client init"); -+ } -+ -+ if (options.ssl_on != SSL_OFF) { -+ if ((ld = ldapssl_init (options.host, options.port, TRUE)) == NULL) -+ fatal ("ldapssl_init failed"); -+ debug3 ("LDAPssl init"); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT */ -+ -+ /* continue with opening */ -+ if (ld == NULL) { -+#if defined (HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S) || (defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS)) -+ /* Some global TLS-specific options need to be set before we create our -+ * session context, so we set them here. */ -+ -+#ifdef LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE -+ /* rand file */ -+ if (options.tls_randfile != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE, -+ options.tls_randfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS random file %s", options.tls_randfile); -+ } -+#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE */ -+ -+ /* ca cert file */ -+ if (options.tls_cacertfile != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, -+ options.tls_cacertfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ error ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert file %s ", options.tls_cacertfile); -+ } -+ -+ /* ca cert directory */ -+ if (options.tls_cacertdir != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR, -+ options.tls_cacertdir)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert dir %s ", options.tls_cacertdir); -+ } -+ -+ /* require cert? */ -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, -+ &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS check peer to %d ", options.tls_checkpeer); -+ -+ /* set cipher suite, certificate and private key: */ -+ if (options.tls_ciphers != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE, -+ options.tls_ciphers)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS ciphers to %s ", options.tls_ciphers); -+ } -+ -+ /* cert file */ -+ if (options.tls_cert != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE, -+ options.tls_cert)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS cert file %s ", options.tls_cert); -+ } -+ -+ /* key file */ -+ if (options.tls_key != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE, -+ options.tls_key)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS key file %s ", options.tls_key); -+ } -+#endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE -+ if (options.uri != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_initialize (&ld, options.uri)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_initialize %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP initialize %s", options.uri); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INTITIALIZE */ -+ -+ /* continue with opening */ -+ if ((ld == NULL) && (options.host != NULL)) { -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INIT -+ if ((ld = ldap_init (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) -+ fatal ("ldap_init failed"); -+ debug3 ("LDAP init %s:%d", options.host, options.port); -+#else -+ if ((ld = ldap_open (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) -+ fatal ("ldap_open failed"); -+ debug3 ("LDAP open %s:%d", options.host, options.port); -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INIT */ -+ } -+ -+ if (ld == NULL) -+ fatal ("no way to open ldap"); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) -+ if (options.ssl == SSL_LDAPS) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS, &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_%d", options.tls_checkpeer); -+ } -+#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS */ -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, -+ &options.ldap_version); -+#else -+ ld->ld_version = options.ldap_version; -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", options.ldap_version); -+ -+#if LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 3 -+ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc, NULL); -+#elif LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 2 -+ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc); -+#else -+#warning unknown LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set rebind proc"); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_DEREF) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_DEREF, &options.deref); -+#else -+ ld->ld_deref = options.deref; -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set deref to %d", options.deref); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT, -+ &options.timelimit); -+#else -+ ld->ld_timelimit = options.timelimit; -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set timelimit to %d", options.timelimit); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT) -+ /* -+ * This is a new option in the Netscape SDK which sets -+ * the TCP connect timeout. For want of a better value, -+ * we use the bind_timelimit to control this. -+ */ -+ timeout = options.bind_timelimit * 1000; -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, &timeout); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set opt connect timeout to %d", timeout); -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT) -+ tv.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; -+ tv.tv_usec = 0; -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &tv); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set opt network timeout to %ld.0", tv.tv_sec); -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, -+ options.referrals ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set referrals to %d", options.referrals); -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_RESTART) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESTART, -+ options.restart ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set restart to %d", options.restart); -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S -+ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { -+ int version; -+ -+ if (ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &version) -+ == LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ if (version < LDAP_VERSION3) { -+ version = LDAP_VERSION3; -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, -+ &version); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", version); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP start TLS"); -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S */ -+ } -+ -+ if ((msgid = ldap_simple_bind (ld, options.binddn, -+ options.bindpw)) == -1) { -+ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); -+ -+ error ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); -+ reconnect++; -+ goto retry; -+ } -+ debug3 ("LDAP simple bind (%s)", options.binddn); -+ -+ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; -+ timeout.tv_usec = 0; -+ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, FALSE, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { -+ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); -+ -+ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); -+ reconnect++; -+ goto retry; -+ } -+ debug3 ("LDAP result in time"); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ controls = NULL; -+ if ((parserc = ldap_parse_result (ld, result, &rc, 0, 0, 0, &controls, TRUE)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_parse_result %s", ldap_err2string (parserc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP parse result OK"); -+ -+ if (controls != NULL) { -+ ldap_controls_free (controls); -+ } -+#else -+ rc = ldap_result2error (session->ld, result, TRUE); -+#endif -+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("error trying to bind as user \"%s\" (%s)", -+ options.binddn, ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ -+ debug2 ("LDAP do connect OK"); -+} -+ -+void -+process_user (const char *user, FILE *output) -+{ -+ LDAPMessage *res, *e; -+ char *buffer; -+ int bufflen, rc, i; -+ struct timeval timeout; -+ -+ debug ("LDAP process user"); -+ -+ /* quick check for attempts to be evil */ -+ if ((strchr(user, '(') != NULL) || (strchr(user, ')') != NULL) || -+ (strchr(user, '*') != NULL) || (strchr(user, '\\') != NULL)) { -+ logit ("illegal user name %s not processed", user); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* build filter for LDAP request */ -+ bufflen = strlen (LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT) + strlen(options.account_class) + strlen (user); -+ if (options.ssh_filter != NULL) -+ bufflen += strlen (options.ssh_filter); -+ buffer = xmalloc (bufflen); -+ snprintf(buffer, bufflen, LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT, options.account_class, user, (options.ssh_filter != NULL) ? options.ssh_filter : NULL); -+ buffer[bufflen - 1] = 0; -+ -+ debug3 ("LDAP search scope = %d %s", options.scope, buffer); -+ -+ timeout.tv_sec = options.timelimit; -+ timeout.tv_usec = 0; -+ if ((rc = ldap_search_st(ld, options.base, options.scope, buffer, attrs, 0, &timeout, &res)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ error ("ldap_search_st(): %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ free (buffer); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* free */ -+ free (buffer); -+ -+ for (e = ldap_first_entry(ld, res); e != NULL; e = ldap_next_entry(ld, e)) { -+ int num; -+ struct berval **keys; -+ -+ keys = ldap_get_values_len(ld, e, PUBKEYATTR); -+ num = ldap_count_values_len(keys); -+ for (i = 0 ; i < num ; i++) { -+ char *cp; //, *options = NULL; -+ -+ for (cp = keys[i]->bv_val; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); -+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') -+ continue; -+ -+ /* We have found the desired key. */ -+ fprintf (output, "%s\n", keys[i]->bv_val); -+ } -+ -+ ldap_value_free_len(keys); -+ } -+ -+ ldap_msgfree(res); -+ debug2 ("LDAP process user finished"); -+} -+ -+void -+ldap_do_close(void) -+{ -+ int rc; -+ -+ debug ("LDAP do close"); -+ if ((rc = ldap_unbind_ext(ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_unbind_ext: %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ -+ ld = NULL; -+ debug2 ("LDAP do close OK"); -+ return; -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapbody.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.889248078 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPBODY_H -+#define LDAPBODY_H -+ -+#include -+ -+void ldap_checkconfig(void); -+void ldap_do_connect(void); -+void process_user(const char *, FILE *); -+void ldap_do_close(void); -+ -+#endif /* LDAPBODY_H */ -+ ---- openssh-6.4p1/ldapconf.c.ldap 2013-11-26 10:31:03.513794385 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/ldapconf.c 2013-11-26 10:38:15.474635149 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "ldap-helper.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "ldapconf.h" -+#include -+#include -+ -+/* Keyword tokens. */ -+ -+typedef enum { -+ lBadOption, -+ lHost, lURI, lBase, lBindDN, lBindPW, lRootBindDN, -+ lScope, lDeref, lPort, lTimeLimit, lBind_TimeLimit, -+ lLdap_Version, lBind_Policy, lSSLPath, lSSL, lReferrals, -+ lRestart, lTLS_CheckPeer, lTLS_CaCertFile, -+ lTLS_CaCertDir, lTLS_Ciphers, lTLS_Cert, lTLS_Key, -+ lTLS_RandFile, lLogDir, lDebug, lSSH_Filter, -+ lAccountClass, lDeprecated, lUnsupported -+} OpCodes; -+ -+/* Textual representations of the tokens. */ -+ -+static struct { -+ const char *name; -+ OpCodes opcode; -+} keywords[] = { -+ { "URI", lURI }, -+ { "Base", lBase }, -+ { "BindDN", lBindDN }, -+ { "BindPW", lBindPW }, -+ { "RootBindDN", lRootBindDN }, -+ { "Host", lHost }, -+ { "Port", lPort }, -+ { "Scope", lScope }, -+ { "Deref", lDeref }, -+ { "TimeLimit", lTimeLimit }, -+ { "TimeOut", lTimeLimit }, -+ { "Bind_Timelimit", lBind_TimeLimit }, -+ { "Network_TimeOut", lBind_TimeLimit }, -+/* -+ * Todo -+ * SIZELIMIT -+ */ -+ { "Ldap_Version", lLdap_Version }, -+ { "Version", lLdap_Version }, -+ { "Bind_Policy", lBind_Policy }, -+ { "SSLPath", lSSLPath }, -+ { "SSL", lSSL }, -+ { "Referrals", lReferrals }, -+ { "Restart", lRestart }, -+ { "TLS_CheckPeer", lTLS_CheckPeer }, -+ { "TLS_ReqCert", lTLS_CheckPeer }, -+ { "TLS_CaCertFile", lTLS_CaCertFile }, -+ { "TLS_CaCert", lTLS_CaCertFile }, -+ { "TLS_CaCertDir", lTLS_CaCertDir }, -+ { "TLS_Ciphers", lTLS_Ciphers }, -+ { "TLS_Cipher_Suite", lTLS_Ciphers }, -+ { "TLS_Cert", lTLS_Cert }, -+ { "TLS_Certificate", lTLS_Cert }, -+ { "TLS_Key", lTLS_Key }, -+ { "TLS_RandFile", lTLS_RandFile }, -+/* -+ * Todo -+ * TLS_CRLCHECK -+ * TLS_CRLFILE -+ */ -+ { "LogDir", lLogDir }, -+ { "Debug", lDebug }, -+ { "SSH_Filter", lSSH_Filter }, -+ { "AccountClass", lAccountClass }, -+ { NULL, lBadOption } -+}; -+ -+/* Configuration ptions. */ -+ -+Options options; -+ -+/* -+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. -+ */ -+ -+static OpCodes -+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) -+ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) -+ return keywords[i].opcode; -+ -+ if (config_warning_config_file) -+ logit("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", -+ filename, linenum, cp); -+ return lBadOption; -+} -+ -+/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ -+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" -+ -+/* return next token in configuration line */ -+static char * -+ldap_strdelim(char **s) -+{ -+ char *old; -+ int wspace = 0; -+ -+ if (*s == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ old = *s; -+ -+ *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE); -+ if (*s == NULL) -+ return (old); -+ -+ *s[0] = '\0'; -+ -+ /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ -+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; -+ if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) -+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; -+ -+ return (old); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This -+ * only sets those values that have not already been set. -+ */ -+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" -+ -+static int -+process_config_line(char *line, const char *filename, int linenum) -+{ -+ char *s, **charptr, **xstringptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg; -+ char *rootbinddn = NULL; -+ int opcode, *intptr, value; -+ size_t len; -+ -+ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ -+ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { -+ if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) -+ break; -+ line[len] = '\0'; -+ } -+ -+ s = line; -+ /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ -+ if ((keyword = ldap_strdelim(&s)) == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ -+ if (*keyword == '\0') -+ keyword = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') -+ return 0; -+ -+ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum); -+ -+ switch (opcode) { -+ case lBadOption: -+ /* don't panic, but count bad options */ -+ return -1; -+ /* NOTREACHED */ -+ -+ case lHost: -+ xstringptr = &options.host; -+parse_xstring: -+ if (!s || *s == '\0') -+ fatal("%s line %d: missing dn",filename,linenum); -+ if (*xstringptr == NULL) -+ *xstringptr = xstrdup(s); -+ return 0; -+ -+ case lURI: -+ xstringptr = &options.uri; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lBase: -+ xstringptr = &options.base; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lBindDN: -+ xstringptr = &options.binddn; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lBindPW: -+ charptr = &options.bindpw; -+parse_string: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*charptr == NULL) -+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); -+ break; -+ -+ case lRootBindDN: -+ xstringptr = &rootbinddn; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lScope: -+ intptr = &options.scope; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp (arg, "sub") == 0 || strcasecmp (arg, "subtree") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; -+ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "one") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; -+ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "base") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lDeref: -+ intptr = &options.scope; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (!strcasecmp (arg, "never")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "searching")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "finding")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_FINDING; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "always")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lPort: -+ intptr = &options.port; -+parse_int: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); -+ -+ /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ -+ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); -+ if (arg == endofnumber) -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lTimeLimit: -+ intptr = &options.timelimit; -+parse_time: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) -+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lBind_TimeLimit: -+ intptr = &options.bind_timelimit; -+ goto parse_time; -+ -+ case lLdap_Version: -+ intptr = &options.ldap_version; -+ goto parse_int; -+ -+ case lBind_Policy: -+ intptr = &options.bind_policy; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_open") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_init") == 0) -+ value = 1; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "soft") == 0) -+ value = 0; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ break; -+ -+ case lSSLPath: -+ charptr = &options.sslpath; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lSSL: -+ intptr = &options.ssl; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) -+ value = SSL_LDAPS; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) -+ value = SSL_OFF; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "start_tls")) -+ value = SSL_START_TLS; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lReferrals: -+ intptr = &options.referrals; -+parse_flag: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) -+ value = 1; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) -+ value = 0; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lRestart: -+ intptr = &options.restart; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case lTLS_CheckPeer: -+ intptr = &options.tls_checkpeer; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "never") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "demand") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "allow") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "try") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ break; -+ -+ case lTLS_CaCertFile: -+ charptr = &options.tls_cacertfile; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_CaCertDir: -+ charptr = &options.tls_cacertdir; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_Ciphers: -+ xstringptr = &options.tls_ciphers; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lTLS_Cert: -+ charptr = &options.tls_cert; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_Key: -+ charptr = &options.tls_key; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_RandFile: -+ charptr = &options.tls_randfile; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lLogDir: -+ charptr = &options.logdir; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lDebug: -+ intptr = &options.debug; -+ goto parse_int; -+ -+ case lSSH_Filter: -+ xstringptr = &options.ssh_filter; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lAccountClass: -+ charptr = &options.account_class; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lDeprecated: -+ debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", -+ filename, linenum, keyword); -+ return 0; -+ -+ case lUnsupported: -+ error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", -+ filename, linenum, keyword); -+ return 0; -+ -+ default: -+ fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode); -+ } -+ -+ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ -+ if ((arg = ldap_strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", -+ filename, linenum, arg); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options -+ * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if -+ * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. -+ */ -+ -+void -+read_config_file(const char *filename) -+{ -+ FILE *f; -+ char line[1024]; -+ int active, linenum; -+ int bad_options = 0; -+ struct stat sb; -+ -+ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) -+ fatal("fopen %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); -+ -+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) -+ fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); -+ if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || -+ (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) -+ fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); -+ -+ debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); -+ -+ /* -+ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned -+ * on/off by Host specifications. -+ */ -+ active = 1; -+ linenum = 0; -+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { -+ /* Update line number counter. */ -+ linenum++; -+ if (process_config_line(line, filename, linenum) != 0) -+ bad_options++; -+ } -+ fclose(f); -+ if ((bad_options > 0) && config_exclusive_config_file) -+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", -+ filename, bad_options); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet -+ * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options -+ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, -+ * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. -+ */ -+ -+void -+initialize_options(void) -+{ -+ memset(&options, 'X', sizeof(options)); -+ options.host = NULL; -+ options.uri = NULL; -+ options.base = NULL; -+ options.binddn = NULL; -+ options.bindpw = NULL; -+ options.scope = -1; -+ options.deref = -1; -+ options.port = -1; -+ options.timelimit = -1; -+ options.bind_timelimit = -1; -+ options.ldap_version = -1; -+ options.bind_policy = -1; -+ options.sslpath = NULL; -+ options.ssl = -1; -+ options.referrals = -1; -+ options.restart = -1; -+ options.tls_checkpeer = -1; -+ options.tls_cacertfile = NULL; -+ options.tls_cacertdir = NULL; -+ options.tls_ciphers = NULL; -+ options.tls_cert = NULL; -+ options.tls_key = NULL; -+ options.tls_randfile = NULL; -+ options.logdir = NULL; -+ options.debug = -1; -+ options.ssh_filter = NULL; -+ options.account_class = NULL; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those -+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. -+ */ -+ -+void -+fill_default_options(void) -+{ -+ if (options.uri != NULL) { -+ LDAPURLDesc *ludp; -+ -+ if (ldap_url_parse(options.uri, &ludp) == LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ if (options.ssl == -1) { -+ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap") == 0) -+ options.ssl = 2; -+ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldapi") == 0) -+ options.ssl = 0; -+ else if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldaps") == 0) -+ options.ssl = 1; -+ } -+ if (options.host == NULL) -+ options.host = xstrdup (ludp->lud_host); -+ if (options.port == -1) -+ options.port = ludp->lud_port; -+ -+ ldap_free_urldesc (ludp); -+ } -+ } -+ if (options.ssl == -1) -+ options.ssl = SSL_START_TLS; -+ if (options.port == -1) -+ options.port = (options.ssl == 0) ? 389 : 636; -+ if (options.uri == NULL) { -+ int len; -+#define MAXURILEN 4096 -+ -+ options.uri = xmalloc (MAXURILEN); -+ len = snprintf (options.uri, MAXURILEN, "ldap%s://%s:%d", -+ (options.ssl == 0) ? "" : "s", options.host, options.port); -+ options.uri[MAXURILEN - 1] = 0; -+ options.uri = xrealloc (options.uri, len + 1, 1); -+ } -+ if (options.binddn == NULL) -+ options.binddn = ""; -+ if (options.bindpw == NULL) -+ options.bindpw = ""; -+ if (options.scope == -1) -+ options.scope = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; -+ if (options.deref == -1) -+ options.deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; -+ if (options.timelimit == -1) -+ options.timelimit = 10; -+ if (options.bind_timelimit == -1) -+ options.bind_timelimit = 10; -+ if (options.ldap_version == -1) -+ options.ldap_version = 3; -+ if (options.bind_policy == -1) -+ options.bind_policy = 1; -+ if (options.referrals == -1) -+ options.referrals = 1; -+ if (options.restart == -1) -+ options.restart = 1; -+ if (options.tls_checkpeer == -1) -+ options.tls_checkpeer = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; -+ if (options.debug == -1) -+ options.debug = 0; -+ if (options.ssh_filter == NULL) -+ options.ssh_filter = ""; -+ if (options.account_class == NULL) -+ options.account_class = "posixAccount"; -+} -+ -+static const char * -+lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) -+ if (keywords[i].opcode == code) -+ return(keywords[i].name); -+ return "UNKNOWN"; -+} -+ -+static void -+dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) -+{ -+ if (val == NULL) -+ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); -+ else -+ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); -+} -+ -+static void -+dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) -+{ -+ if (val == -1) -+ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); -+ else -+ debug3("%s %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); -+} -+ -+struct names { -+ int value; -+ char *name; -+}; -+ -+static void -+dump_cfg_namedint(OpCodes code, int val, struct names *names) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ if (val == -1) -+ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); -+ else { -+ for (i = 0; names[i].value != -1; i++) -+ if (names[i].value == val) { -+ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), names[i].name); -+ return; -+ } -+ debug3("%s unknown: %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); -+ } -+} -+ -+static struct names _yesnotls[] = { -+ { 0, "No" }, -+ { 1, "Yes" }, -+ { 2, "Start_TLS" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _scope[] = { -+ { LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "Base" }, -+ { LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "One" }, -+ { LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE, "Sub"}, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _deref[] = { -+ { LDAP_DEREF_NEVER, "Never" }, -+ { LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING, "Searching" }, -+ { LDAP_DEREF_FINDING, "Finding" }, -+ { LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS, "Always" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _yesno[] = { -+ { 0, "No" }, -+ { 1, "Yes" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _bindpolicy[] = { -+ { 0, "Soft" }, -+ { 1, "Hard" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _checkpeer[] = { -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER, "Never" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD, "Hard" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND, "Demand" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW, "Allow" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY, "TRY" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+void -+dump_config(void) -+{ -+ dump_cfg_string(lURI, options.uri); -+ dump_cfg_string(lHost, options.host); -+ dump_cfg_int(lPort, options.port); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lSSL, options.ssl, _yesnotls); -+ dump_cfg_int(lLdap_Version, options.ldap_version); -+ dump_cfg_int(lTimeLimit, options.timelimit); -+ dump_cfg_int(lBind_TimeLimit, options.bind_timelimit); -+ dump_cfg_string(lBase, options.base); -+ dump_cfg_string(lBindDN, options.binddn); -+ dump_cfg_string(lBindPW, options.bindpw); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lScope, options.scope, _scope); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lDeref, options.deref, _deref); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lReferrals, options.referrals, _yesno); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lRestart, options.restart, _yesno); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lBind_Policy, options.bind_policy, _bindpolicy); -+ dump_cfg_string(lSSLPath, options.sslpath); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lTLS_CheckPeer, options.tls_checkpeer, _checkpeer); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertFile, options.tls_cacertfile); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertDir, options.tls_cacertdir); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Ciphers, options.tls_ciphers); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Cert, options.tls_cert); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Key, options.tls_key); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_RandFile, options.tls_randfile); -+ dump_cfg_string(lLogDir, options.logdir); -+ dump_cfg_int(lDebug, options.debug); -+ dump_cfg_string(lSSH_Filter, options.ssh_filter); -+ dump_cfg_string(lAccountClass, options.logdir); -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h.ldap openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h ---- openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h.ldap 2013-06-07 15:10:05.602942689 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.2p2/ldapconf.h 2013-06-07 15:10:24.928857566 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPCONF_H -+#define LDAPCONF_H -+ -+#define SSL_OFF 0 -+#define SSL_LDAPS 1 -+#define SSL_START_TLS 2 -+ -+/* Data structure for representing option data. */ -+ -+typedef struct { -+ char *host; -+ char *uri; -+ char *base; -+ char *binddn; -+ char *bindpw; -+ int scope; -+ int deref; -+ int port; -+ int timelimit; -+ int bind_timelimit; -+ int ldap_version; -+ int bind_policy; -+ char *sslpath; -+ int ssl; -+ int referrals; -+ int restart; -+ int tls_checkpeer; -+ char *tls_cacertfile; -+ char *tls_cacertdir; -+ char *tls_ciphers; -+ char *tls_cert; -+ char *tls_key; -+ char *tls_randfile; -+ char *logdir; -+ int debug; -+ char *ssh_filter; -+ char *account_class; -+} Options; -+ -+extern Options options; -+ -+void read_config_file(const char *); -+void initialize_options(void); -+void fill_default_options(void); -+void dump_config(void); -+ -+#endif /* LDAPCONF_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.891248091 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldap.conf 2013-03-25 21:27:15.891248091 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ -+# $Id: openssh-5.5p1-ldap.patch,v 1.3 2010/07/07 13:48:36 jfch2222 Exp $ -+# -+# This is the example configuration file for the OpenSSH -+# LDAP backend -+# -+# see ssh-ldap.conf(5) -+# -+ -+# URI with your LDAP server name. This allows to use -+# Unix Domain Sockets to connect to a local LDAP Server. -+#uri ldap://127.0.0.1/ -+#uri ldaps://127.0.0.1/ -+#uri ldapi://%2fvar%2frun%2fldapi_sock/ -+# Note: %2f encodes the '/' used as directory separator -+ -+# Another way to specify your LDAP server is to provide an -+# host name and the port of our LDAP server. Host name -+# must be resolvable without using LDAP. -+# Multiple hosts may be specified, each separated by a -+# space. How long nss_ldap takes to failover depends on -+# whether your LDAP client library supports configurable -+# network or connect timeouts (see bind_timelimit). -+#host 127.0.0.1 -+ -+# The port. -+# Optional: default is 389. -+#port 389 -+ -+# The distinguished name to bind to the server with. -+# Optional: default is to bind anonymously. -+#binddn cn=openssh_keys,dc=example,dc=org -+ -+# The credentials to bind with. -+# Optional: default is no credential. -+#bindpw TopSecret -+ -+# The distinguished name of the search base. -+#base dc=example,dc=org -+ -+# The LDAP version to use (defaults to 3 -+# if supported by client library) -+#ldap_version 3 -+ -+# The search scope. -+#scope sub -+#scope one -+#scope base -+ -+# Search timelimit -+#timelimit 30 -+ -+# Bind/connect timelimit -+#bind_timelimit 30 -+ -+# Reconnect policy: hard (default) will retry connecting to -+# the software with exponential backoff, soft will fail -+# immediately. -+#bind_policy hard -+ -+# SSL setup, may be implied by URI also. -+#ssl no -+#ssl on -+#ssl start_tls -+ -+# OpenLDAP SSL options -+# Require and verify server certificate (yes/no) -+# Default is to use libldap's default behavior, which can be configured in -+# /etc/openldap/ldap.conf using the TLS_REQCERT setting. The default for -+# OpenLDAP 2.0 and earlier is "no", for 2.1 and later is "yes". -+#tls_checkpeer hard -+ -+# CA certificates for server certificate verification -+# At least one of these are required if tls_checkpeer is "yes" -+#tls_cacertfile /etc/ssl/ca.cert -+#tls_cacertdir /etc/pki/tls/certs -+ -+# Seed the PRNG if /dev/urandom is not provided -+#tls_randfile /var/run/egd-pool -+ -+# SSL cipher suite -+# See man ciphers for syntax -+#tls_ciphers TLSv1 -+ -+# Client certificate and key -+# Use these, if your server requires client authentication. -+#tls_cert -+#tls_key -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.c 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pka-ldap.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "ldapconf.h" -+#include "ldapbody.h" -+#include -+#include -+ -+static int config_debug = 0; -+int config_exclusive_config_file = 0; -+static char *config_file_name = "/etc/ssh/ldap.conf"; -+static char *config_single_user = NULL; -+static int config_verbose = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; -+int config_warning_config_file = 0; -+extern char *__progname; -+ -+static void -+usage(void) -+{ -+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", -+ __progname); -+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -d Output the log messages to stderr.\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -e Check the config file for unknown commands.\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Use alternate config file (default is /etc/ssh/ldap.conf).\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -s user Do not demonize, send the user's key to stdout.\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -v Increase verbosity of the debug output (implies -d).\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -w Warn on unknown commands in the config file.\n"); -+ exit(1); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Main program for the ssh pka ldap agent. -+ */ -+ -+int -+main(int ac, char **av) -+{ -+ int opt; -+ FILE *outfile = NULL; -+ -+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+ -+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); -+ -+ /* -+ * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been -+ * set. -+ */ -+ initialize_options(); -+ -+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */ -+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "def:s:vw")) != -1) { -+ switch (opt) { -+ case 'd': -+ config_debug = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case 'e': -+ config_exclusive_config_file = 1; -+ config_warning_config_file = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case 'f': -+ config_file_name = optarg; -+ break; -+ -+ case 's': -+ config_single_user = optarg; -+ outfile = fdopen (dup (fileno (stdout)), "w"); -+ break; -+ -+ case 'v': -+ config_debug = 1; -+ if (config_verbose < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) -+ config_verbose++; -+ break; -+ -+ case 'w': -+ config_warning_config_file = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case '?': -+ default: -+ usage(); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Initialize loging */ -+ log_init(__progname, config_verbose, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, config_debug); -+ -+ if (ac != optind) -+ fatal ("illegal extra parameter %s", av[1]); -+ -+ /* Ensure that fds 0 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ -+ if (config_debug == 0) -+ sanitise_stdfd(); -+ -+ /* Read config file */ -+ read_config_file(config_file_name); -+ fill_default_options(); -+ if (config_verbose == SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { -+ debug3 ("=== Configuration ==="); -+ dump_config(); -+ debug3 ("=== *** ==="); -+ } -+ -+ ldap_checkconfig(); -+ ldap_do_connect(); -+ -+ if (config_single_user) { -+ process_user (config_single_user, outfile); -+ } else { -+ usage(); -+ fatal ("Not yet implemented"); -+/* TODO -+ * open unix socket a run the loop on it -+ */ -+ } -+ -+ ldap_do_close(); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* Ugly hack */ -+void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *b, u_int *l) { return NULL; } -+void buffer_put_string(Buffer *b, const void *f, u_int l) {} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldap-helper.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldap-helper.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAP_HELPER_H -+#define LDAP_HELPER_H -+ -+extern int config_exclusive_config_file; -+extern int config_warning_config_file; -+ -+#endif /* LDAP_HELPER_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapincludes.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.892248097 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPINCLUDES_H -+#define LDAPINCLUDES_H -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LBER_H -+#include -+#endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_H -+#include -+#endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SSL_H -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* LDAPINCLUDES_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.c 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "ldapmisc.h" -+ -+#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_GET_LDERRNO -+int -+ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP * ld, char **m, char **s) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION -+ int rc; -+#endif -+ int lderrno; -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) -+ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ lderrno = ld->ld_errno; -+#endif -+ -+ if (s != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) -+ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ *s = ld->ld_error; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ if (m != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) -+ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ *m = ld->ld_matched; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ return lderrno; -+} -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_SET_LDERRNO -+int -+ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP * ld, int lderrno, const char *m, const char *s) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION -+ int rc; -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ ld->ld_errno = lderrno; -+#endif -+ -+ if (s != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ ld->ld_error = s; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ if (m != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ ld->ld_matched = m; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ return LDAP_SUCCESS; -+} -+#endif -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h ---- openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ldapmisc.h 2013-03-25 21:27:15.893248104 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPMISC_H -+#define LDAPMISC_H -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+ -+int ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP *, char **, char **); -+int ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP *, int, const char *, const char *); -+ -+#endif /* LDAPMISC_H */ -+ -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ldap openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.850247822 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 21:27:57.356518817 +0100 -@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh - ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass - SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server - SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign -+SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper -+SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper - SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -60,8 +62,9 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ - LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ - EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MANFMT=@MANFMT@ -+INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ - --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) - - LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ - canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ -@@ -95,8 +98,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw - sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ - sandbox-seccomp-filter.o - --MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out --MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 -+MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-ldap-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out ssh-ldap.conf.5.out -+MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-ldap-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 ssh-ldap.conf.5 - MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ - - CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out -@@ -164,6 +167,9 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss - ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - -+ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) -+ - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) - -@@ -266,6 +272,10 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -+ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ -+ fi - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -@@ -282,6 +292,10 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -+ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \ -+ fi - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin - ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 -@@ -311,6 +325,13 @@ install-sysconf: - else \ - echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ - fi -+ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ -+ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf ]; then \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ldap.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf; \ -+ else \ -+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ -+ fi ; \ -+ fi - - host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) - @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ -@@ -368,6 +389,8 @@ uninstall: - -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER)$(EXEEXT) - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 -@@ -379,6 +402,7 @@ uninstall: - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 - - regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema ---- openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ -+# -+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey -+# useful with PKA-LDAP also -+# -+# Author: Eric AUGE -+# -+# Based on the proposal of : Mark Ruijter -+# -+ -+ -+# octetString SYNTAX -+attributetype ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' -+ EQUALITY octetStringMatch -+ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) -+ -+# printableString SYNTAX yes|no -+objectclass ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' -+ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) -+ ) -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema ---- openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema 2013-03-25 21:27:15.894248110 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ -+# -+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey -+# useful with PKA-LDAP also -+# -+# Author: Eric AUGE -+# -+# Schema for Sun Directory Server. -+# Based on the original schema, modified by Stefan Fischer. -+# -+ -+dn: cn=schema -+ -+# octetString SYNTAX -+attributeTypes: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' -+ EQUALITY octetStringMatch -+ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) -+ -+# printableString SYNTAX yes|no -+objectClasses: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' -+ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) -+ ) -diff -up openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ---- openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap 2013-06-07 15:10:05.604942680 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.2p2/ssh-ldap.conf.5 2013-06-07 15:10:24.928857566 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ -+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap.conf.5,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ -+.\" -+.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+.\" -+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+.\" -+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+.\" -+.Dd $Mdocdate: may 12 2010 $ -+.Dt SSH-LDAP.CONF 5 -+.Os -+.Sh NAME -+.Nm ssh-ldap.conf -+.Nd configuration file for ssh-ldap-helper -+.Sh SYNOPSIS -+.Nm /etc/ssh/ldap.conf -+.Sh DESCRIPTION -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+reads configuration data from -+.Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf -+(or the file specified with -+.Fl f -+on the command line). -+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. -+Lines starting with -+.Ql # -+and empty lines are interpreted as comments. -+.Pp -+The value starts with the first non-blank character after -+the keyword's name, and terminates at the end of the line, -+or at the last sequence of blanks before the end of the line. -+Quoting values that contain blanks -+may be incorrect, as the quotes would become part of the value. -+The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that -+keywords are case-insensitive, and arguments, on a case by case basis, may be case-sensitive). -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -+.It Cm URI -+The argument(s) are in the form -+.Pa ldap[si]://[name[:port]] -+and specify the URI(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+should connect. The URI scheme may be any of -+.Dq ldap , -+.Dq ldaps -+or -+.Dq ldapi , -+which refer to LDAP over TCP, LDAP over SSL (TLS) and LDAP -+over IPC (UNIX domain sockets), respectively. -+Each server's name can be specified as a -+domain-style name or an IP address literal. Optionally, the -+server's name can followed by a ':' and the port number the LDAP -+server is listening on. If no port number is provided, the default -+port for the scheme is used (389 for ldap://, 636 for ldaps://). -+For LDAP over IPC, name is the name of the socket, and no port -+is required, nor allowed; note that directory separators must be -+URL-encoded, like any other characters that are special to URLs; -+A space separated list of URIs may be provided. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm Base -+Specifies the default base Distinguished Name (DN) to use when performing ldap operations. -+The base must be specified as a DN in LDAP format. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm BindDN -+Specifies the default BIND DN to use when connecting to the ldap server. -+The bind DN must be specified as a Distinguished Name in LDAP format. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm BindPW -+Specifies the default password to use when connecting to the ldap server via -+.Cm BindDN . -+There is no default. -+.It Cm RootBindDN -+Intentionaly does nothing. Recognized for compatibility reasons. -+.It Cm Host -+The argument(s) specifies the name(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+should connect. Each server's name can be specified as a -+domain-style name or an IP address and optionally followed by a ':' and -+the port number the ldap server is listening on. A space-separated -+list of hosts may be provided. -+There is no default. -+.Cm Host -+is deprecated in favor of -+.Cm URI . -+.It Cm Port -+Specifies the default port used when connecting to LDAP servers(s). -+The port may be specified as a number. -+The default port is 389 for ldap:// or 636 for ldaps:// respectively. -+.Cm Port -+is deprecated in favor of -+.Cm URI . -+.It Cm Scope -+Specifies the starting point of an LDAP search and the depth from the base DN to which the search should descend. -+There are three options (values) that can be assigned to the -+.Cm Scope parameter: -+.Dq base , -+.Dq one -+and -+.Dq subtree . -+Alias for the subtree is -+.Dq sub . -+The value -+.Dq base -+is used to indicate searching only the entry at the base DN, resulting in only that entry being returned (keeping in mind that it also has to meet the search filter criteria!). -+The value -+.Dq one -+is used to indicate searching all entries one level under the base DN, but not including the base DN and not including any entries under that one level under the base DN. -+The value -+.Dq subtree -+is used to indicate searching of all entries at all levels under and including the specified base DN. -+The default is -+.Dq subtree . -+.It Cm Deref -+Specifies how alias dereferencing is done when performing a search. There are four -+possible values that can be assigned to the -+.Cm Deref -+parameter: -+.Dq never , -+.Dq searching , -+.Dq finding , -+and -+.Dq always . -+The value -+.Dq never -+means that the aliases are never dereferenced. -+The value -+.Dq searching -+means that the aliases are dereferenced in subordinates of the base object, but -+not in locating the base object of the search. -+The value -+.Dq finding -+means that the aliases are only dereferenced when locating the base object of the search. -+The value -+.Dq always -+means that the aliases are dereferenced both in searching and in locating the base object -+of the search. -+The default is -+.Dq never . -+.It Cm TimeLimit -+Specifies a time limit (in seconds) to use when performing searches. -+The number should be a non-negative integer. A -+.Cm TimeLimit -+of zero (0) specifies that the search time is unlimited. Please note that the server -+may still apply any server-side limit on the duration of a search operation. -+The default value is 10. -+.It Cm TimeOut -+Is an aliast to -+.Cm TimeLimit . -+.It Cm Bind_TimeLimit -+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) after which the poll(2)/select(2) -+following a connect(2) returns in case of no activity. -+The default value is 10. -+.It Cm Network_TimeOut -+Is an alias to -+.Cm Bind_TimeLimit . -+.It Cm Ldap_Version -+Specifies what version of the LDAP protocol should be used. -+The allowed values are 2 or 3. The default is 3. -+.It Cm Version -+Is an alias to -+.Cm Ldap_Version . -+.It Cm Bind_Policy -+Specifies the policy to use for reconnecting to an unavailable LDAP server. There are 2 available values: -+.Dq hard -+and -+.Dq soft. -+.Dq hard has 2 aliases -+.Dq hard_open -+and -+.Dq hard_init . -+The value -+.Dq hard -+means that reconects that the -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+tries to reconnect to the LDAP server 5 times before failure. There is exponential backoff before retrying. -+The value -+.Dq soft -+means that -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+fails immediately when it cannot connect to the LDAP seerver. -+The deault is -+.Dq hard . -+.It Cm SSLPath -+Specifies the path to the X.509 certificate database. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm SSL -+Specifies whether to use SSL/TLS or not. -+There are three allowed values: -+.Dq yes , -+.Dq no -+and -+.Dq start_tls -+Both -+.Dq true -+and -+.Dq on -+are the aliases for -+.Dq yes . -+.Dq false -+and -+.Dq off -+are the aliases for -+.Dq no . -+If -+.Dq start_tls -+is specified then StartTLS is used rather than raw LDAP over SSL. -+The default for ldap:// is -+.Dq start_tls , -+for ldaps:// -+.Dq yes -+and -+.Dq no -+for the ldapi:// . -+In case of host based configuration the default is -+.Dq start_tls . -+.It Cm Referrals -+Specifies if the client should automatically follow referrals returned -+by LDAP servers. -+The value can be or -+.Dq yes -+or -+.Dq no . -+.Dq true -+and -+.Dq on -+are the aliases for -+.Dq yes . -+.Dq false -+and -+.Dq off -+are the aliases for -+.Dq no . -+The default is yes. -+.It Cm Restart -+Specifies whether the LDAP client library should restart the select(2) system call when interrupted. -+The value can be or -+.Dq yes -+or -+.Dq no . -+.Dq true -+and -+.Dq on -+are the aliases for -+.Dq yes . -+.Dq false -+and -+.Dq off -+are the aliases for -+.Dq no . -+The default is yes. -+.It Cm TLS_CheckPeer -+Specifies what checks to perform on server certificates in a TLS session, -+if any. The value -+can be specified as one of the following keywords: -+.Dq never , -+.Dq hard , -+.Dq demand , -+.Dq allow -+and -+.Dq try . -+.Dq true , -+.Dq on -+and -+.Dq yes -+are aliases for -+.Dq hard . -+.Dq false , -+.Dq off -+and -+.Dq no -+are the aliases for -+.Dq never . -+The value -+.Dq never -+means that the client will not request or check any server certificate. -+The value -+.Dq allow -+means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, -+the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, it will -+be ignored and the session proceeds normally. -+The value -+.Dq try -+means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, -+the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, -+the session is immediately terminated. -+The value -+.Dq demand -+means that the server certificate is requested. If no -+certificate is provided, or a bad certificate is provided, the session -+is immediately terminated. -+The value -+.Dq hard -+is the same as -+.Dq demand . -+It requires an SSL connection. In the case of the plain conection the -+session is immediately terminated. -+The default is -+.Dq hard . -+.It Cm TLS_ReqCert -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_CheckPeer . -+.It Cm TLS_CACertFile -+Specifies the file that contains certificates for all of the Certificate -+Authorities the client will recognize. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_CACert -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_CACertFile . -+.It Cm TLS_CACertDIR -+Specifies the path of a directory that contains Certificate Authority -+certificates in separate individual files. The -+.Cm TLS_CACert -+is always used before -+.Cm TLS_CACertDir . -+The specified directory must be managed with the OpenSSL c_rehash utility. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_Ciphers -+Specifies acceptable cipher suite and preference order. -+The value should be a cipher specification for OpenSSL, -+e.g., -+.Dq HIGH:MEDIUM:+SSLv2 . -+The default is -+.Dq ALL . -+.It Cm TLS_Cipher_Suite -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_Ciphers . -+.It Cm TLS_Cert -+Specifies the file that contains the client certificate. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_Certificate -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_Cert . -+.It Cm TLS_Key -+Specifies the file that contains the private key that matches the certificate -+stored in the -+.Cm TLS_Cert -+file. Currently, the private key must not be protected with a password, so -+it is of critical importance that the key file is protected carefully. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_RandFile -+Specifies the file to obtain random bits from when /dev/[u]random is -+not available. Generally set to the name of the EGD/PRNGD socket. -+The environment variable RANDFILE can also be used to specify the filename. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm LogDir -+Specifies the directory used for logging by the LDAP client library. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm Debug -+Specifies the debug level used for logging by the LDAP client library. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm SSH_Filter -+Specifies the user filter applied on the LDAP serch. -+The default is no filter. -+.It Cm AccountClass -+Specifies the LDAP class used to find user accounts. -+The default is posixAccount. -+.El -+.Sh FILES -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf -+Ldap configuration file for -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 . -+.El -+.Sh "SEE ALSO" -+.Xr ldap.conf 5 , -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+.Sh HISTORY -+.Nm -+first appeared in -+OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . -+.Sh AUTHORS -+.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.895248117 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 2013-03-25 21:27:15.895248117 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ -+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap-helper.8,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ -+.\" -+.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+.\" -+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+.\" -+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+.\" -+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2010 $ -+.Dt SSH-LDAP-HELPER 8 -+.Os -+.Sh NAME -+.Nm ssh-ldap-helper -+.Nd sshd helper program for ldap support -+.Sh SYNOPSIS -+.Nm ssh-ldap-helper -+.Op Fl devw -+.Op Fl f Ar file -+.Op Fl s Ar user -+.Sh DESCRIPTION -+.Nm -+is used by -+.Xr sshd 1 -+to access keys provided by an LDAP. -+.Nm -+is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the -+sshd configuration file -+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config -+by setting -+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand -+to -+.Dq /usr/libexec/ssh-ldap-wrapper . -+.Pp -+.Nm -+is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from -+.Xr sshd 8 via -+.Xr ssh-ldap-wrapper . -+.Pp -+The options are as follows: -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -+.It Fl d -+Set the debug mode; -+.Nm -+prints all logs to stderr instead of syslog. -+.It Fl e -+Implies \-w; -+.Nm -+halts if it encounters an unknown item in the ldap.conf file. -+.It Fl f -+.Nm -+uses this file as the ldap configuration file instead of /etc/ssh/ldap.conf (default). -+.It Fl s -+.Nm -+prints out the user's keys to stdout and exits. -+.It Fl v -+Implies \-d; -+increases verbosity. -+.It Fl w -+.Nm -+writes warnings about unknown items in the ldap.conf configuration file. -+.El -+.Sh SEE ALSO -+.Xr sshd 8 , -+.Xr sshd_config 5 , -+.Xr ssh-ldap.conf 5 , -+.Sh HISTORY -+.Nm -+first appeared in -+OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . -+.Sh AUTHORS -+.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com -diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper ---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap 2013-03-25 21:27:15.896248124 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper 2013-03-25 21:27:15.896248124 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ -+#!/bin/sh -+ -+exec /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-helper -s "$1" -+ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 529468c..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,104 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux 2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2013-10-10 15:13:57.864306950 +0200 -@@ -503,6 +503,25 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n - free(newctx); - } - -+void -+ssh_selinux_copy_context(void) -+{ -+ security_context_t *ctx; -+ -+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -+ return; -+ -+ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { -+ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ return; -+ } -+ if (ctx != NULL) { -+ if (setcon(ctx) != 0) -+ logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ freecon(ctx); -+ } -+} -+ - #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ - - #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux 2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200 -@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); - void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); - void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); - void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); -+void ssh_selinux_copy_context(void); - void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); - #endif - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/session.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux 2013-10-10 14:58:20.617762326 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c 2013-10-10 15:13:16.520503590 +0200 -@@ -1522,6 +1522,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) - pw->pw_uid); - chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, - "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ ssh_selinux_copy_context(); -+#endif - safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); - free(tmp); - free(chroot_path); -@@ -1544,6 +1547,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) - /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ - permanently_set_uid(pw); - #endif -+ -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || -+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) -+ ssh_selinux_copy_context(); -+#endif - } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && - strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { - fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); -@@ -1808,9 +1817,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - argv[i] = NULL; - optind = optreset = 1; - __progname = argv[0]; --#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); --#endif - exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); - } - -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2013-10-10 14:58:20.632762255 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-10 14:58:20.635762241 +0200 -@@ -668,6 +668,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) - /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ - demote_sensitive_data(); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); -+#endif -+ - /* Change our root directory */ - if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) - fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, -@@ -811,6 +815,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); - - skip: -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ /* switch SELinux content for root too */ -+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { -+ ssh_selinux_copy_context(); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ - monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d85244d..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.redhat 2013-10-11 14:51:18.345876648 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config 2013-10-11 15:13:05.429829266 +0200 -@@ -46,3 +46,14 @@ - # VisualHostKey no - # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com - # RekeyLimit 1G 1h -+Host * -+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes -+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access -+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted -+# mode correctly we set this to yes. -+ ForwardX11Trusted yes -+# Send locale-related environment variables -+ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES -+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT -+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE -+ SendEnv XMODIFIERS -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0 ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2013-09-13 08:20:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0 2013-10-11 14:51:18.345876648 +0200 -@@ -653,9 +653,9 @@ DESCRIPTION - - SyslogFacility - Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from -- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, -- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The -- default is AUTH. -+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, -+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. -+ The default is AUTH. - - TCPKeepAlive - Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5 2013-10-11 14:51:18.346876643 +0200 -@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco - .It Cm SyslogFacility - Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from - .Xr sshd 8 . --The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, -+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, - LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. - The default is AUTH. - .It Cm TCPKeepAlive -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.redhat 2013-10-11 14:51:18.343876657 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config 2013-10-11 14:51:18.346876643 +0200 -@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ - # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the - # default value. - -+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell -+# SELinux about this change. -+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER -+# - #Port 22 - #AddressFamily any - #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 -@@ -21,9 +25,9 @@ - # HostKey for protocol version 1 - #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key - # HostKeys for protocol version 2 --#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key - #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key --#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key - - # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key - #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h -@@ -35,6 +39,7 @@ - # Logging - # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging - #SyslogFacility AUTH -+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV - #LogLevel INFO - - # Authentication: -@@ -70,9 +75,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! - #PasswordAuthentication yes - #PermitEmptyPasswords no -+PasswordAuthentication yes - - # Change to no to disable s/key passwords - #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes -+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - - # Kerberos options - #KerberosAuthentication no -@@ -82,7 +89,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - - # GSSAPI options - #GSSAPIAuthentication no -+GSSAPIAuthentication yes - #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes -+GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -@@ -94,11 +103,13 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication - # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. - #UsePAM no -+UsePAM yes - - #AllowAgentForwarding yes - #AllowTcpForwarding yes - #GatewayPorts no - #X11Forwarding no -+X11Forwarding yes - #X11DisplayOffset 10 - #X11UseLocalhost yes - #PrintMotd yes -@@ -120,6 +131,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Defaul - # no default banner path - #Banner none - -+# Accept locale-related environment variables -+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES -+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT -+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE -+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS -+ - # override default of no subsystems - Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 89d54b3..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,931 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.799494546 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 -@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) - * during the ssh authentication process. - */ - int --do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) -+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) - { - int ret = 1; - #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls 2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.h 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 -@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void); - void do_pam_set_tty(const char *); - void do_pam_setcred(int ); - void do_pam_chauthtok(void); --int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); -+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); - char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); - char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); - void free_pam_environment(char **); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.834494379 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.h 2013-10-10 14:38:45.060348227 +0200 -@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt { - char *service; - struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ - char *style; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role; -+#endif - void *kbdintctxt; - char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ - void *jpake_ctx; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c.role-mls 2013-06-02 00:01:24.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth1.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 -@@ -381,6 +381,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) - { - u_int ulen; - char *user, *style = NULL; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role=NULL; -+#endif - - /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ - packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER); -@@ -389,11 +392,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) - user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen); - packet_check_eom(); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) -+ *role++ = '\0'; -+#endif -+ - if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) - *style++ = '\0'; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ else -+ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL) -+ *style++ = '\0'; -+#endif - - authctxt->user = user; - authctxt->style = style; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ authctxt->role = role; -+#endif - - /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ - if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2013-06-01 23:31:18.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 -@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Gssctxt *gssctxt; - int authenticated = 0; -+ char *micuser; - Buffer b; - gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; - u_int len; -@@ -268,7 +269,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); - mic.length = len; - -- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0)) -+ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); -+ else -+#endif -+ micuser = authctxt->user; -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service, - "gssapi-with-mic"); - - gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -@@ -280,6 +287,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); - - buffer_free(&b); -+ if (micuser != authctxt->user) -+ free(micuser); - free(mic.value); - - authctxt->postponed = 0; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.818494455 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 -@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) - buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - /* reconstruct packet */ - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (authctxt->role) { -+ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); -+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); -+ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); -+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); -+ } else -+#endif -+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); - buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-10 14:57:17.452062486 +0200 -@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) - } - /* reconstruct packet */ - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, -+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user, - authctxt->style ? ":" : "", -- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); -+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "", -+ authctxt->role ? "/" : "", -+ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); - free(userstyle); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.819494451 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.835494375 +0200 -@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Authmethod *m = NULL; - char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role = NULL; -+#endif - int authenticated = 0; - - if (authctxt == NULL) -@@ -232,6 +235,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); - debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) -+ *role++ = 0; -+#endif -+ - if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) - *style++ = 0; - -@@ -254,8 +262,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); - authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); - authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; -- if (use_privsep) -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; -+#endif -+ if (use_privsep) { - mm_inform_authserv(service, style); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ mm_inform_authrole(role); -+#endif -+ } - userauth_banner(); - if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) - packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/misc.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/misc.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/misc.c.role-mls 2013-08-08 04:50:06.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/misc.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.836494370 +0200 -@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ char * - colon(char *cp) - { - int flag = 0; -+ int start = 1; - - if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ - return NULL; -@@ -444,6 +445,13 @@ colon(char *cp) - return (cp); - if (*cp == '/') - return NULL; -+ if (start) { -+ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */ -+ if (*cp == '/') -+ return (0); -+ if (*cp != '.') -+ start = 0; -+ } - } - return NULL; - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.821494441 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-10 14:54:57.933725463 +0200 -@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *); -+#endif - int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); -@@ -233,6 +236,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, - {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, -+#endif - {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, - #ifdef USE_PAM -@@ -853,6 +859,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m - else { - /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1); -+#endif - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); - } - #ifdef USE_PAM -@@ -894,6 +903,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) - return (0); - } - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+int -+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ monitor_permit_authentications(1); -+ -+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ debug3("%s: role=%s", -+ __func__, authctxt->role); -+ -+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { -+ free(authctxt->role); -+ authctxt->role = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+#endif -+ - int - mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) - { -@@ -1269,7 +1297,7 @@ static int - monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) - { - Buffer b; -- char *p, *userstyle; -+ char *p, *r, *userstyle; - u_int len; - int fail = 0; - -@@ -1295,6 +1323,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i - if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) - fail++; - p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); -+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) -+ *r = '\0'; - xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, - authctxt->style ? ":" : "", - authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); -@@ -1330,7 +1360,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data - char *chost) - { - Buffer b; -- char *p, *userstyle; -+ char *p, *r, *userstyle; - u_int len; - int fail = 0; - -@@ -1347,6 +1377,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data - if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) - fail++; - p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); -+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) -+ *r = '\0'; - xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, - authctxt->style ? ":" : "", - authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.821494441 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h 2013-10-10 14:34:43.837494365 +0200 -@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2 = 56, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2 = 57, - MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 58, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 59, - MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 60, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 61, -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, -+#endif - - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.822494436 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.838494360 +0200 -@@ -338,6 +338,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char * - buffer_free(&m); - } - -+/* Inform the privileged process about role */ -+ -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+void -+mm_inform_authrole(char *role) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ debug3("%s entering", __func__); -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : ""); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+#endif -+ - /* Do the password authentication */ - int - mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.822494436 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-10-10 14:34:43.838494360 +0200 -@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void); - DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); - int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); - void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+void mm_inform_authrole(char *); -+#endif - struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); - char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); - int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls 2013-05-10 08:28:56.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2013-10-10 14:34:43.838494360 +0200 -@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport - - COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o - --PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o -+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o - - .c.o: - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls 2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2013-10-10 14:40:41.841793347 +0200 -@@ -31,68 +31,271 @@ - - #include "log.h" - #include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" - #include "port-linux.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "hostfile.h" -+#include "auth.h" - - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX - #include - #include -+#include - #include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT -+#include -+#include -+#endif - - #ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE - # define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:" - #endif - --/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ --int --ssh_selinux_enabled(void) -+extern ServerOptions options; -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+extern int inetd_flag; -+extern int rexeced_flag; -+ -+/* Send audit message */ -+static int -+send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, -+ security_context_t selected_context) - { -- static int enabled = -1; -+ int rc=0; -+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT -+ char *msg = NULL; -+ int audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ security_context_t default_raw=NULL; -+ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL; -+ rc = -1; -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ error("Error connecting to audit system."); -+ return rc; -+ } -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) { -+ error("Error translating default context."); -+ default_raw = NULL; -+ } -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) { -+ error("Error translating selected context."); -+ selected_raw = NULL; -+ } -+ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s", -+ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"), -+ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) { -+ error("Error allocating memory."); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, -+ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) { -+ error("Error sending audit message."); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ rc = 0; -+ out: -+ free(msg); -+ freecon(default_raw); -+ freecon(selected_raw); -+ close(audit_fd); -+#endif -+ return rc; -+} -+ -+static int -+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) -+{ -+ struct av_decision avd; -+ int retval; -+ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS; -+ -+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst); -+ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd); -+ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+static int -+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, -+ security_context_t *sc) { -+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -+ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) { -+ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his -+ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the -+ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */ -+#endif -+ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) { -+ *sc = NULL; -+ return -1; -+ } -+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -+ } -+#endif -+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { -+ context_t con; -+ char *type=NULL; -+ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) { -+ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'", -+ role); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ con = context_new(*sc); -+ if (!con) { -+ goto out; -+ } -+ context_role_set(con, role); -+ context_type_set(con, type); -+ freecon(*sc); -+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); -+ context_free(con); -+ if (!*sc) -+ return -1; -+ } -+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -+ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) { -+ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */ -+ context_t con; -+ security_context_t obtained_raw; -+ security_context_t requested_raw; -+ con = context_new(*sc); -+ if (!con) { -+ goto out; -+ } -+ context_range_set(con, lvl); -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) { -+ context_free(con); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) { -+ freecon(obtained_raw); -+ context_free(con); -+ goto out; -+ } - -- if (enabled == -1) { -- enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); -- debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); -+ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'", -+ obtained_raw, requested_raw); -+ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) { -+ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */ -+ freecon(requested_raw); -+ freecon(obtained_raw); -+ freecon(*sc); -+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); -+ context_free(con); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ freecon(requested_raw); -+ freecon(obtained_raw); -+ context_free(con); - } -+#endif -+ return 0; -+ out: -+ freecon(*sc); -+ *sc = NULL; -+ return -1; -+} - -- return (enabled); -+static void -+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) -+{ -+ *role = NULL; -+ *level = NULL; -+ if (the_authctxt) { -+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { -+ char *slash; -+ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); -+ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) { -+ *slash = '\0'; -+ *level = slash + 1; -+ } -+ } -+ } - } - - /* Return the default security context for the given username */ - static security_context_t --ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) -+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, -+ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) - { -- security_context_t sc = NULL; -- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL; -- int r; -+ char *sename, *lvl; -+ char *role; -+ const char *reqlvl; -+ int r = 0; -+ context_t con = NULL; -+ -+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); - - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME -- if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0) -- return NULL; -+ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { -+ sename = NULL; -+ lvl = NULL; -+ } - #else - sename = pwname; -- lvl = NULL; -+ lvl = ""; - #endif - -+ if (r == 0) { - #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); -+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc); - #else -- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); -+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc); - #endif -+ } -+ -+ if (r == 0) { -+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ -+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { -+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; -+ -+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) -+ fatal("failed to allocate security context"); -+ -+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL) -+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context"); -+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con); -+ freecon(sshdsc); -+ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0) -+ /* we actually don't change level */ -+ reqlvl = ""; -+ -+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl); - -- if (r != 0) { -- switch (security_getenforce()) { -- case -1: -- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: " -- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__); -- case 0: -- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); -- sc = NULL; -- break; -- default: -- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)", -- __func__, pwname); - } -+ -+ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) { -+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc); -+ -+ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) { -+ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc; -+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { -+ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0) -+ default_level_sc = *default_sc; -+ } -+ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */ -+ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) { -+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); -+ } else { -+ r = -1; -+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); -+ } -+ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc) -+ freecon(default_level_sc); -+ } -+ } else { -+ *user_sc = *default_sc; -+ } -+ } -+ if (r != 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname); - } - - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME -@@ -100,7 +303,42 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) - free(lvl); - #endif - -- return sc; -+ if (role != NULL) -+ free(role); -+ if (con) -+ context_free(con); -+ -+ return (r); -+} -+ -+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ -+static int -+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) -+{ -+ const char *reqlvl; -+ char *role; -+ char *use_current; -+ int rv; -+ -+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); -+ -+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); -+ -+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); -+ -+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { -+ use_current = "1"; -+ } else { -+ use_current = ""; -+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); -+ } -+ -+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); -+ -+ if (role != NULL) -+ free(role); -+ -+ return rv; - } - - /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ -@@ -108,28 +346,71 @@ void - ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) - { - security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; -+ int r = 0; -+ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; - - if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) - return; - -+ if (options.use_pam) { -+ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ -+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { -+ switch (security_getenforce()) { -+ case -1: -+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); -+ case 0: -+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", -+ __func__); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.", -+ __func__); -+ } -+ } -+ return; -+ } -+ - debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); - -- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); -- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { -+ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); -+ if (r >= 0) { -+ r = setexeccon(user_ctx); -+ if (r < 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", -+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); -+ } -+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON -+ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", -+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ if (user_ctx == NULL) { -+ user_ctx = default_ctx; -+ } -+ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) { -+ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was -+ a failure */ -+ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx); -+ } -+ if (r < 0) { - switch (security_getenforce()) { - case -1: - fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); - case 0: -- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " -- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); -+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", -+ __func__); - break; - default: -- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " -- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); -+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.", -+ __func__); - } - } -- if (user_ctx != NULL) -+ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) - freecon(user_ctx); -+ if (default_ctx != NULL) -+ freecon(default_ctx); - - debug3("%s: done", __func__); - } -@@ -147,7 +428,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons - - debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); - -- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); -+ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) { -+ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); -+ goto out; -+ } - - /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ - -@@ -219,21 +503,6 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n - free(newctx); - } - --void --ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path) --{ -- security_context_t context; -- -- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -- return; -- if (path == NULL) { -- setfscreatecon(NULL); -- return; -- } -- if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0) -- setfscreatecon(context); --} -- - #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ - - #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.839494355 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.839494355 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ -+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh -+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller -+ * -+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+ * -+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST) -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "log.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "port-linux.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "hostfile.h" -+#include "auth.h" -+ -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ -+int -+ssh_selinux_enabled(void) -+{ -+ static int enabled = -1; -+ -+ if (enabled == -1) { -+ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); -+ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); -+ } -+ -+ return (enabled); -+} -+ -+void -+ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path) -+{ -+ security_context_t context; -+ -+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -+ return; -+ if (path == NULL) { -+ setfscreatecon(NULL); -+ return; -+ } -+ if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0) -+ setfscreatecon(context); -+} -+ -+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ -+ -+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.role-mls openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.role-mls 2013-10-10 14:34:43.824494427 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-10 14:34:43.839494355 +0200 -@@ -2179,6 +2179,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - restore_uid(); - } - #endif -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); -+#endif - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) { - do_pam_setcred(1); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-3des-dh-size.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-3des-dh-size.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a2bedec..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-3des-dh-size.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,144 +0,0 @@ -diff -U0 openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog.3des-dh-size openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog ---- openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog.3des-dh-size 2014-01-28 14:15:25.178358616 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog 2014-01-28 14:18:24.678444650 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ -+20140126 -+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync -+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 10:12:50 -+ [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c] -+ Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an -+ effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems -+ with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger -+ than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as -+ specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat, -+ reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@ -+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 20:35:37 -+ [kex.c] -+ dh_need needs to be set to max(seclen, blocksize, ivlen, mac_len) -+ ok dtucker@, noted by mancha -+ -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/cipher.c.3des-dh-size openssh-6.4p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/cipher.c.3des-dh-size 2014-01-28 14:15:25.101359008 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/cipher.c 2014-01-28 14:17:48.119630792 +0100 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.89 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.94 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */ - /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland -@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ cipher_keylen(const Cipher *c) - } - - u_int -+cipher_seclen(const Cipher *c) -+{ -+ if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0) -+ return 14; -+ return cipher_keylen(c); -+} -+ -+u_int - cipher_authlen(const Cipher *c) - { - return (c->auth_len); -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/cipher.h.3des-dh-size openssh-6.4p1/cipher.h ---- openssh-6.4p1/cipher.h.3des-dh-size 2014-01-28 14:15:25.178358616 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/cipher.h 2014-01-28 14:17:17.858784879 +0100 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.40 2013/04/19 01:06:50 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.44 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */ - - /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen -@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *); - int cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int); - u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *); -+u_int cipher_seclen(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_authlen(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *); -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/kex.c.3des-dh-size openssh-6.4p1/kex.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/kex.c.3des-dh-size 2014-01-28 14:15:25.165358682 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/kex.c 2014-01-28 14:19:22.038152586 +0100 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.91 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.97 2014/01/25 20:35:37 markus Exp $ */ - /* - * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * -@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) - char **my, **peer; - char **cprop, **sprop; - int nenc, nmac, ncomp; -- u_int mode, ctos, need, authlen; -+ u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; - int first_kex_follows, type; - - my = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL); -@@ -545,20 +545,21 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) - choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); - choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], - sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]); -- need = 0; -+ need = dh_need = 0; - for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { - newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; -- if (need < newkeys->enc.key_len) -- need = newkeys->enc.key_len; -- if (need < newkeys->enc.block_size) -- need = newkeys->enc.block_size; -- if (need < newkeys->enc.iv_len) -- need = newkeys->enc.iv_len; -- if (need < newkeys->mac.key_len) -- need = newkeys->mac.key_len; -+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); -+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); -+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); -+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); -+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); -+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); -+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); -+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); - } - /* XXX need runden? */ - kex->we_need = need; -+ kex->dh_need = dh_need; - - /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ - if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/kexgexc.c.3des-dh-size openssh-6.4p1/kexgexc.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/kexgexc.c.3des-dh-size 2014-01-28 14:15:25.165358682 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/kexgexc.c 2014-01-28 14:19:09.718215323 +0100 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.13 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.16 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */ - /* - * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. - * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. -@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex) - int min, max, nbits; - DH *dh; - -- nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); -+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); - - if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) { - /* Old GEX request */ -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/kex.h.3des-dh-size openssh-6.4p1/kex.h ---- openssh-6.4p1/kex.h.3des-dh-size 2014-01-28 14:15:25.142358799 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/kex.h 2014-01-28 14:18:49.431318614 +0100 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.56 2013/07/19 07:37:48 markus Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.61 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */ - - /* - * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. -@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct Kex { - u_int session_id_len; - Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; - u_int we_need; -+ u_int dh_need; - int server; - char *name; - int hostkey_type; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1073a77 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -865,17 +865,24 @@ ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms + time_t + monotime(void) + { +-#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) ++#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \ ++ (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) + struct timespec ts; + static int gettime_failed = 0; + + if (!gettime_failed) { ++#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) ++ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0) ++ return (ts.tv_sec); ++#endif ++#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0) + return (ts.tv_sec); ++#endif + debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); + gettime_failed = 1; + } +-#endif ++#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ + + return time(NULL); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-FIPS-mode-SP800-131A.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-FIPS-mode-SP800-131A.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cf632d8..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-FIPS-mode-SP800-131A.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,206 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h -index 48f7b68..9ff39f4 100644 ---- a/dh.h -+++ b/dh.h -@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ int dh_estimate(int); - - /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */ - #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 -+#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS 2048 - #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 - - /* -diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c -index a468805..3a0eb16 100644 ---- a/kex.c -+++ b/kex.c -@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "ssh2.h" -@@ -93,6 +94,20 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - { NULL, -1, -1, NULL}, - }; - -+static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = { -+ { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, -+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 }, -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, EVP_sha256 }, -+#endif -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, EVP_sha256 }, -+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, EVP_sha384 }, -+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, EVP_sha512 }, -+#endif -+ { NULL, -1, -1, NULL}, -+}; -+ - char * - kex_alg_list(void) - { -@@ -116,7 +131,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) - { - const struct kexalg *k; - -- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { -+ for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) { - if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) - return k; - #ifdef GSSAPI -@@ -141,7 +156,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) - for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; - (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { - if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { -- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); -+ if (FIPS_mode()) -+ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p); -+ else -+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); - free(s); - return 0; - } -diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c -index 6193836..d435f1f 100644 ---- a/kexecdhc.c -+++ b/kexecdhc.c -@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex) - - kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); - BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ memset(hash, 0, hashlen); - kex_finish(kex); - } - #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c -index 3a580aa..9a06905 100644 ---- a/kexecdhs.c -+++ b/kexecdhs.c -@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex) - - kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); - BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ memset(hash, 0, hashlen); - kex_finish(kex); - } - #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c -index 5a3be20..a931b6e 100644 ---- a/kexgexc.c -+++ b/kexgexc.c -@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ - - #include "includes.h" - -+#include -+ - #include - - #include -@@ -64,13 +66,13 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex) - /* Old GEX request */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD); - packet_put_int(nbits); -- min = DH_GRP_MIN; -+ min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; - max = DH_GRP_MAX; - - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits); - } else { - /* New GEX request */ -- min = DH_GRP_MIN; -+ min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; - max = DH_GRP_MAX; - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST); - packet_put_int(min); -diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c -index 4e473fc..2ed49bd 100644 ---- a/kexgexs.c -+++ b/kexgexs.c -@@ -76,16 +76,16 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex) - omin = min = packet_get_int(); - onbits = nbits = packet_get_int(); - omax = max = packet_get_int(); -- min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); -+ min = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min); - max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); -- nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); -+ nbits = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); - nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); - break; - case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD: - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received"); - onbits = nbits = packet_get_int(); - /* unused for old GEX */ -- omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN; -+ omin = min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; - omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX; - break; - default: -diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h -index ee69ea2..1b68c5b 100644 ---- a/myproposal.h -+++ b/myproposal.h -@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ - "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \ - "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" - -+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ -+ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ -+ KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ -+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ -+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" -+ - #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ - HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ - "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ -diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c -index cac6762..2569016 100644 ---- a/ssh-keygen.c -+++ b/ssh-keygen.c -@@ -183,8 +183,14 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bitsp) - fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits); - exit(1); - } -- if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) -+ if (type == KEY_DSA && FIPS_mode()) -+ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); -+ else if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) - fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); -+ else if (type == KEY_RSA && bits < DEFAULT_BITS && FIPS_mode()) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "RSA keys must be at least %d bits in FIPS mode\n", DEFAULT_BITS); -+ exit(1); -+ } - else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && *bitsp < 768) - fatal("Key must at least be 768 bits"); - else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) -diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c -index 7e48880..3179d82 100644 ---- a/sshconnect2.c -+++ b/sshconnect2.c -@@ -231,6 +231,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) - } - if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; -+ else if (FIPS_mode()) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS; - - #ifdef GSSAPI - /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index 11adbf6..f5e98bc 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -2605,6 +2605,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - } - if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; -+ else if (FIPS_mode()) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS; - - if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 77a6fa4..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2267 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.audit 2013-06-11 03:26:10.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 -@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ - kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ - msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ -- jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o -+ jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o auditstub.o - - SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2012-02-24 00:40:43.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 -@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, - #endif - } - --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - /* not implemented */ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ /* not necessary */ - } - - void -@@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li - /* not implemented */ - } - -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ - void - audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - { -@@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); - } - } -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} - #endif /* BSM */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/audit-linux.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 -@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@ - - #include "log.h" - #include "audit.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "hostfile.h" -+#include "auth.h" -+#include "servconf.h" - #include "canohost.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "cipher.h" - -+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128 -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+extern u_int utmp_len; - const char* audit_username(void); - --int --linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, -- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) -+static void -+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, -+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) - { - int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; - -@@ -49,11 +60,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const - if (audit_fd < 0) { - if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || - errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ - else -- return 0; /* Must prevent login */ -+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ - } -- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, - NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", - username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); - saved_errno = errno; -@@ -65,35 +76,150 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const - if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) - rc = 0; - errno = saved_errno; -- return (rc >= 0); -+ if (rc < 0) { -+fatal_report: -+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ } - } - -+static void -+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, -+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) -+{ -+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; -+ static const char *event_name[] = { -+ "maxtries exceeded", -+ "root denied", -+ "success", -+ "none", -+ "password", -+ "challenge-response", -+ "pubkey", -+ "hostbased", -+ "gssapi", -+ "invalid user", -+ "nologin", -+ "connection closed", -+ "connection abandoned", -+ "unknown" -+ }; -+ -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ else -+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ -+ } -+ -+ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) -+ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; -+ -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, -+ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", -+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); -+ saved_errno = errno; -+ close(audit_fd); -+ /* -+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non -+ * root user. -+ */ -+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) -+ rc = 0; -+ errno = saved_errno; -+ if (rc < 0) { -+fatal_report: -+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ } -+} -+ -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; -+ -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ else -+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */ -+ } -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, -+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); -+ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ goto out; -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", -+ type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, -+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); -+out: -+ saved_errno = errno; -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ errno = saved_errno; -+ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); -+} -+ -+static int user_login_count = 0; -+ - /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ - - void - audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) - { --} - /* not implemented */ -+} - --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { -- /* not implemented */ -+ if (!user_login_count++) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); -+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ user_login_count++; - } - - void - audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) - { -- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) -- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ if (!user_login_count++) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); - } - - void - audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) - { -- /* not implemented */ -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); -+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); - } - - void -@@ -101,21 +227,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - { - switch(event) { - case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: -- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: -+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); -+ break; -+ - case SSH_NOLOGIN: -- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: - case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: -+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - break; - -+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: -+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: -+ if (user_login_count) { -+ while (user_login_count--) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); -+ } -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: - case SSH_INVALID_USER: -- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - break; - - default: -@@ -123,4 +271,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - } - } - -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; -+ char *s; -+ int audit_fd; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), -+ get_local_port()); -+ free(s); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) -+ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ -+ return; -+ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, -+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+#endif -+} -+ -+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; -+ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); -+ char *s; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, -+ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, -+ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); -+ free(s); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ else -+ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, -+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ -+#endif -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ char *s; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, -+ get_remote_port(), -+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), -+ get_local_port()); -+ free(s); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && -+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ error("cannot open audit"); -+ return; -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ error("cannot write into audit"); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", -+ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && -+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ error("cannot open audit"); -+ return; -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, -+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(), -+ NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ error("cannot write into audit"); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && -+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ error("cannot open audit"); -+ return; -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ error("cannot write into audit"); -+} - #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/audit.c.audit 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/audit.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - -@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ - #include "key.h" - #include "hostfile.h" - #include "auth.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" - - /* - * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when -@@ -111,6 +115,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) - return(event_lookup[i].name); - } - -+void -+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) -+{ -+ char *fp; -+ const char *crypto_name; -+ -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) -+ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; -+ else -+ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); -+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) -+ *rv = 0; -+ free(fp); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported(int what) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid())); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free(int ctos) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); -+} -+ - # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - /* - * Null implementations of audit functions. -@@ -140,6 +178,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - } - - /* -+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, -+ * audit_session_open. -+ */ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), -+ audit_username()); -+} -+ -+/* - * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to - * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. - * -@@ -174,13 +223,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li - /* - * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that - * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows -- * multiple sessions within a single connection. -+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for -+ * audit_end_command. - */ --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), - audit_username(), command); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that -+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows -+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from -+ * the corresponding audit_run_command. -+ */ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), -+ audit_username(), command); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. -+ * -+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. -+ */ -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", -+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, -+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. -+ */ -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. -+ */ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u", -+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid, -+ (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard -+ */ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", -+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key -+ */ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", -+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key -+ */ -+void -+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) -+{ -+ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); - } - # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ - #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/audit.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/audit.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/audit.h.audit 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/audit.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.246717277 +0200 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - # define _SSH_AUDIT_H - - #include "loginrec.h" -+#include "key.h" - - enum ssh_audit_event_type { - SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, -@@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { - }; - typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; - -+int listening_for_clients(void); -+ - void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); - void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); -+void audit_count_session_open(void); - void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); - void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); --void audit_run_command(const char *); -+int audit_run_command(const char *); -+void audit_end_command(int, const char *); - ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); -+int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); -+void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); -+void audit_unsupported(int); -+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *); -+void audit_unsupported_body(int); -+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); -+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); - - #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auditstub.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ -+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * -+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima -+ */ -+ -+#include -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported(int n) -+{ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) -+{ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free(int ctos) -+{ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+} -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.audit 2013-07-18 08:12:44.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 -@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU - { - u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; - MD5_CTX md; -- int len; -+ int len, rv; -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ char *fp; -+#endif - - /* don't allow short keys */ - if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { -@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU - MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); - - /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ -- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { -- /* Wrong answer. */ -- return (0); -+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0; -+ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { -+ debug("unsuccessful audit"); -+ rv = 0; - } -- /* Correct answer. */ -- return (1); -+ free(fp); -+#endif -+ -+ return rv; - } - - /* -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth.h.audit 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.h 2013-10-07 16:02:38.629171107 +0200 -@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt - - char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); - char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); -+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); - - FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); - FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); -@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int); - int get_hostkey_index(Key *); - int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); - void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); -+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); - - /* debug messages during authentication */ - void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.223717384 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.247717272 +0200 -@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) - /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ - authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && -- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), -+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), - buffer_len(&b))) == 1) - authenticated = 1; - -@@ -140,6 +140,18 @@ done: - return authenticated; - } - -+int -+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ int rv; -+ -+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_key(0, &rv, key); -+#endif -+ return rv; -+} -+ - /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ - int - hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.224717379 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-10-08 15:11:42.282436972 +0200 -@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) - /* test for correct signature */ - authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && -- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), -+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), - buffer_len(&b))) == 1) - authenticated = 1; - buffer_free(&b); -@@ -223,6 +223,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con - free(extra); - } - -+int -+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ int rv; -+ -+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_key(1, &rv, key); -+#endif -+ return rv; -+} -+ - static int - match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert) - { -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c.audit 2013-06-01 23:41:51.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.248717268 +0200 -@@ -245,9 +245,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - } else { - logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); - authctxt->pw = fakepw(); --#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); --#endif - } - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.248717268 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c 2013-10-07 16:06:51.117971891 +0200 -@@ -55,18 +55,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(voi - extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); - extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); - --struct Cipher { -- char *name; -- int number; /* for ssh1 only */ -- u_int block_size; -- u_int key_len; -- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ -- u_int auth_len; -- u_int discard_len; -- u_int cbc_mode; -- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); --}; -- - static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { - { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, - { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.audit 2013-04-23 11:24:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.248717268 +0200 -@@ -61,7 +61,18 @@ - typedef struct Cipher Cipher; - typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext; - --struct Cipher; -+struct Cipher { -+ char *name; -+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */ -+ u_int block_size; -+ u_int key_len; -+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ -+ u_int auth_len; -+ u_int discard_len; -+ u_int cbc_mode; -+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); -+}; -+ - struct CipherContext { - int plaintext; - int encrypt; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/kex.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/kex.c.audit 2013-06-01 23:31:18.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 -@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ - #include "dispatch.h" - #include "monitor.h" - #include "roaming.h" -+#include "audit.h" - - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) -@@ -341,9 +342,13 @@ static void - choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server) - { - char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); -- if (name == NULL) -+ if (name == NULL) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(0); -+#endif - fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", - client, server); -+ } - if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) - fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name); - enc->name = name; -@@ -359,9 +364,13 @@ static void - choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server) - { - char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); -- if (name == NULL) -+ if (name == NULL) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(1); -+#endif - fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", - client, server); -+ } - if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) - fatal("unsupported mac %s", name); - /* truncate the key */ -@@ -376,8 +385,12 @@ static void - choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server) - { - char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); -- if (name == NULL) -+ if (name == NULL) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(2); -+#endif - fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server); -+ } - if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { - comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; - } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { -@@ -492,6 +505,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) - newkeys->enc.name, - authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", - newkeys->comp.name); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name); -+#endif - } - choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); - choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], -@@ -656,3 +672,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } - #endif -+ -+static void -+enc_destroy(Enc *enc) -+{ -+ if (enc == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ if (enc->key) { -+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); -+ free(enc->key); -+ } -+ -+ if (enc->iv) { -+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); -+ free(enc->iv); -+ } -+ -+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); -+} -+ -+void -+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys) -+{ -+ if (newkeys == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); -+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); -+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/kex.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/kex.h.audit 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/kex.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 -@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); - void kexecdh_client(Kex *); - void kexecdh_server(Kex *); - -+void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); -+ - void - kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, - BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.224717379 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 -@@ -1773,6 +1773,30 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) - } - - int -+key_is_private(const Key *k) -+{ -+ switch (k->type) { -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_RSA1: -+ case KEY_RSA: -+ return k->rsa->d != NULL; -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_DSA: -+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_ECDSA: -+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; -+#endif -+ default: -+ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); -+ return 1; -+ } -+} -+ -+int - key_is_cert(const Key *k) - { - if (k == NULL) -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/key.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.224717379 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.249717264 +0200 -@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Key *key_generate(int, u_int); - Key *key_from_private(const Key *); - int key_type_from_name(char *); - int key_is_cert(const Key *); -+int key_is_private(const Key *k); - int key_type_plain(int); - int key_to_certified(Key *, int); - int key_drop_cert(Key *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/mac.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.audit 2013-06-06 00:12:37.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.250717259 +0200 -@@ -224,6 +224,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac) - mac->umac_ctx = NULL; - } - -+void -+mac_destroy(Mac *mac) -+{ -+ if (mac == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ if (mac->key) { -+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); -+ free(mac->key); -+ } -+ -+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); -+} -+ - /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ - #define MAC_SEP "," - int -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/mac.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/mac.h.audit 2013-04-23 11:24:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.250717259 +0200 -@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *); - int mac_init(Mac *); - u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int); - void mac_clear(Mac *); -+void mac_destroy(Mac *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.217717411 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c 2013-10-08 15:10:38.270726936 +0200 -@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ - #include "jpake.h" - #include "roaming.h" - #include "authfd.h" -+#include "audit.h" - - #ifdef GSSAPI - static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; -@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; - extern int auth_debug_init; - extern Buffer loginmsg; - -+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); -+ - /* State exported from the child */ - - struct { -@@ -186,6 +189,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer * - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); - #endif - - static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); -@@ -237,6 +245,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - #endif - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - #ifdef BSD_AUTH - {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, -@@ -273,6 +285,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - {0, 0, NULL} - }; -@@ -304,6 +321,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] - #endif - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - {0, 0, NULL} - }; -@@ -315,6 +336,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15 - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - {0, 0, NULL} - }; -@@ -1365,9 +1391,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) - Key *key; - u_char *signature, *data, *blob; - u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; -+ int type = 0; - int verified = 0; - int valid_data = 0; - -+ type = buffer_get_int(m); - blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); - signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); - data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); -@@ -1375,6 +1403,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) - if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || - !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); -+ if (type != key_blobtype) -+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); - - key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); - if (key == NULL) -@@ -1395,7 +1425,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) - if (!valid_data) - fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); - -- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -+ switch (key_blobtype) { -+ case MM_USERKEY: -+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -+ break; -+ case MM_HOSTKEY: -+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ verified = 0; -+ break; -+ } - debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", - __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); - -@@ -1448,6 +1488,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); - session_pty_cleanup2(s); - } -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (s->command != NULL) { -+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); -+ session_end_command2(s); -+ } -+#endif - session_unused(s->self); - } - -@@ -1728,6 +1774,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) - sshpam_cleanup(); - #endif - -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); -+ - while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) - if (errno != EINTR) - exit(1); -@@ -1770,11 +1818,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff - { - u_int len; - char *cmd; -+ Session *s; - - debug3("%s entering", __func__); - cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ - /* sanity check command, if so how? */ -- audit_run_command(cmd); -+ s = session_new(); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); -+ s->command = cmd; -+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int handle; -+ u_int len; -+ char *cmd; -+ Session *s; -+ -+ debug3("%s entering", __func__); -+ handle = buffer_get_int(m); -+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ -+ s = session_by_id(handle); -+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || -+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); -+ mm_session_close(s); - free(cmd); - return (0); - } -@@ -1910,11 +1990,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor - - blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); - current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); -+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); - free(blob); - - debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); - blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); - current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); -+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); - free(blob); - - /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */ -@@ -1960,6 +2042,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor - } - - buffer_free(&m); -+ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (compat20) { -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); -+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ -+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) -+ ; -+ - } - - -@@ -2361,3 +2458,86 @@ mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, - } - - #endif /* JPAKE */ -+ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+int -+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int what; -+ -+ what = buffer_get_int(m); -+ -+ audit_unsupported_body(what); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int ctos, len; -+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; -+ -+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); -+ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ -+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid); -+ -+ free(cipher); -+ free(mac); -+ free(compress); -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int ctos; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; -+ -+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); -+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ -+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int len; -+ char *fp; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; -+ -+ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); -+ -+ free(fp); -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h.audit 2012-12-02 23:53:21.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.251717254 +0200 -@@ -68,7 +68,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, -- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125 - - }; - -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2013-11-08 13:26:47.062595006 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-11-08 13:26:47.089594877 +0100 -@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha - */ - - int --mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) - { - Buffer m; - u_char *blob; -@@ -447,6 +447,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i - return (0); - - buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, type); - buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); - buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); - buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); -@@ -464,6 +465,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i - return (verified); - } - -+int -+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); -+} -+ -+ - /* Export key state after authentication */ - Newkeys * - mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) -@@ -642,12 +656,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor - fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); - - buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); -+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); - free(blob); - - if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) - fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); - - buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); -+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); - free(blob); - - packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); -@@ -1191,10 +1207,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - buffer_free(&m); - } - --void -+int - mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - Buffer m; -+ int handle; - - debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); - -@@ -1202,6 +1219,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command - buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); - - mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); -+ -+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return (handle); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); - buffer_free(&m); - } - #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -@@ -1453,3 +1490,72 @@ mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k, - return success; - } - #endif /* JPAKE */ -+ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+void -+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, what); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, -+ &m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, -+ &m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, -+ &m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, -+ &m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.252717250 +0200 -@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char - int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); - int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); - int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); --int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); -+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); -+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); - int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); - int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); - BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); -@@ -74,7 +75,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - #include "audit.h" - void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); --void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); -+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); -+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); -+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); -+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); -+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); - #endif - - struct Session; -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/packet.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.231717347 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.c 2013-10-07 16:08:00.764639577 +0200 -@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ - #include - - #include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "audit.h" - #include "buffer.h" - #include "packet.h" - #include "crc32.h" -@@ -476,6 +477,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void) - return active_state->connection_out; - } - -+static int -+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ return state != NULL && -+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); -+} -+ - /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ - - void -@@ -484,13 +492,6 @@ packet_close(void) - if (!active_state->initialized) - return; - active_state->initialized = 0; -- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { -- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); -- close(active_state->connection_out); -- } else { -- close(active_state->connection_in); -- close(active_state->connection_out); -- } - buffer_free(&active_state->input); - buffer_free(&active_state->output); - buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); -@@ -499,8 +500,18 @@ packet_close(void) - buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer); - buffer_compress_uninit(); - } -- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); -- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); -+ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) { -+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); -+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); -+ audit_session_key_free(2); -+ } -+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { -+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); -+ close(active_state->connection_out); -+ } else { -+ close(active_state->connection_in); -+ close(active_state->connection_out); -+ } - } - - /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ -@@ -735,6 +746,25 @@ packet_send1(void) - */ - } - -+static void -+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys) -+{ -+ if (newkeys == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ free(newkeys->enc.name); -+ -+ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { -+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); -+ free(newkeys->mac.name); -+ } -+ -+ free(newkeys->comp.name); -+ -+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys); -+ free(newkeys); -+} -+ - void - set_newkeys(int mode) - { -@@ -760,21 +790,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode) - } - if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { - debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); -+ audit_session_key_free(mode); - cipher_cleanup(cc); -- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; -- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; -- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; -- mac_clear(mac); -- memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len); -- memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); -- memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); -- free(enc->name); -- free(enc->iv); -- free(enc->key); -- free(mac->name); -- free(mac->key); -- free(comp->name); -- free(active_state->newkeys[mode]); -+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]); - } - active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode); - if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) -@@ -2003,6 +2021,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) - return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode]; - } - -+static void -+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ if (state == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); -+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); -+ -+ buffer_free(&state->input); -+ buffer_free(&state->output); -+ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet); -+ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet); -+ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer); -+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); -+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; -+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); -+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; -+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); -+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; -+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); -+} -+ -+void -+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) -+{ -+ if (audit_it) -+ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) || -+ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state); -+ packet_destroy_state(active_state); -+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state); -+ if (audit_it) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (privsep) -+ audit_session_key_free(2); -+ else -+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); -+#endif -+ } -+} -+ - /* - * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when - * resuming a suspended connection. -@@ -2010,18 +2069,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) - void - packet_backup_state(void) - { -- struct session_state *tmp; -- - close(active_state->connection_in); - active_state->connection_in = -1; - close(active_state->connection_out); - active_state->connection_out = -1; -- if (backup_state) -- tmp = backup_state; -- else -- tmp = alloc_session_state(); - backup_state = active_state; -- active_state = tmp; -+ active_state = alloc_session_state(); - } - - /* -@@ -2038,9 +2091,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void) - backup_state = active_state; - active_state = tmp; - active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in; -- backup_state->connection_in = -1; - active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out; -- backup_state->connection_out = -1; - len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input); - if (len > 0) { - buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input); -@@ -2048,4 +2099,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void) - buffer_clear(&backup_state->input); - add_recv_bytes(len); - } -+ backup_state->connection_in = -1; -+ backup_state->connection_out = -1; -+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state); -+ free(backup_state); -+ backup_state = NULL; - } -+ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/packet.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/packet.h.audit 2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.252717250 +0200 -@@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void); - void *packet_get_input(void); - void *packet_get_output(void); - -+void packet_destroy_all(int, int); - #endif /* PACKET_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/session.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.audit 2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c 2013-10-07 16:03:43.975861636 +0200 -@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ extern int log_stderr; - extern int debug_flag; - extern u_int utmp_len; - extern int startup_pipe; --extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); -+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); - extern Buffer loginmsg; - - /* original command from peer. */ -@@ -745,6 +745,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm - /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ - close(ttyfd); - -+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA -+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, -+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely -+ ugly. */ -+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) -+ audit_count_session_open(); -+#endif -+ - /* Enter interactive session. */ - s->ptymaster = ptymaster; - packet_set_interactive(1, -@@ -816,15 +824,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) - } - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) -+ fatal("do_exec: command already set"); - if (command != NULL) -- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); -+ s->command = xstrdup(command); - else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { - char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; - - if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ - shell =_PATH_BSHELL; -- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); -+ s->command = xstrdup(shell); - } -+ if (s->command != NULL) -+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); - #endif - if (s->ttyfd != -1) - ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); -@@ -1642,7 +1654,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - int r = 0; - - /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); -+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the -+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ -+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1); - - /* Force a password change */ - if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { -@@ -1869,6 +1884,7 @@ session_unused(int id) - sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; - sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; - sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; -+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1; - sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; - sessions_first_unused = id; - } -@@ -1951,6 +1967,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha - } - - Session * -+session_by_id(int id) -+{ -+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { -+ Session *s = &sessions[id]; -+ if (s->used) -+ return s; -+ } -+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id); -+ session_dump(); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+Session * - session_by_tty(char *tty) - { - int i; -@@ -2467,6 +2496,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta - chan_write_failed(c); - } - -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+void -+session_end_command2(Session *s) -+{ -+ if (s->command != NULL) { -+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); -+ free(s->command); -+ s->command = NULL; -+ s->command_handle = -1; -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+session_end_command(Session *s) -+{ -+ if (s->command != NULL) { -+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); -+ free(s->command); -+ s->command = NULL; -+ s->command_handle = -1; -+ } -+} -+#endif -+ - void - session_close(Session *s) - { -@@ -2475,6 +2528,10 @@ session_close(Session *s) - debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); - if (s->ttyfd != -1) - session_pty_cleanup(s); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (s->command) -+ session_end_command(s); -+#endif - free(s->term); - free(s->display); - free(s->x11_chanids); -@@ -2688,6 +2745,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) - server_loop2(authctxt); - } - -+static void -+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) -+{ -+ session_pty_cleanup2(s); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ session_end_command2(s); -+#endif -+} -+ - void - do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) - { -@@ -2736,5 +2802,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) - * or if running in monitor. - */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) -- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); -+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); - } -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.h.audit openssh-6.3p1/session.h ---- openssh-6.3p1/session.h.audit 2008-05-19 07:34:50.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.h 2013-10-07 15:53:34.253717245 +0200 -@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session { - char *name; - char *val; - } *env; -+ -+ /* exec */ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ int command_handle; -+ char *command; -+#endif - }; - - void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); -@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); - void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); - void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); - void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); -+void session_end_command2(Session *); - - Session *session_new(void); -+Session *session_by_id(int); - Session *session_by_tty(char *); - void session_close(Session *); - void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); -diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.audit 2013-10-07 15:53:34.221717393 +0200 -+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c 2013-10-07 15:53:34.254717240 +0200 -@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ - #endif - #include "monitor_wrap.h" - #include "roaming.h" -+#include "audit.h" - #include "ssh-sandbox.h" - #include "version.h" - -@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; - struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; - - /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ --void destroy_sensitive_data(void); -+void destroy_sensitive_data(int); - void demote_sensitive_data(void); - - static void do_ssh1_kex(void); -@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) - num_listen_socks = -1; - } - -+/* -+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific -+ * client connection?) -+ */ -+int listening_for_clients(void) -+{ -+ return num_listen_socks > 0; -+} -+ - static void - close_startup_pipes(void) - { -@@ -550,22 +560,47 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in - } - } - --/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ -+/* -+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, -+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. -+ */ - void --destroy_sensitive_data(void) -+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) - { - int i; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; - - if (sensitive_data.server_key) { - key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); - sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; - } -+ pid = getpid(); -+ uid = getuid(); - for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { -+ char *fp; -+ -+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) -+ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], -+ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, -+ SSH_FP_HEX); -+ else -+ fp = NULL; - key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); - sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; -+ if (fp != NULL) { -+ if (privsep) -+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, -+ pid, uid)); -+ else -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, -+ pid, uid); -+ free(fp); -+ } - } -- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { -+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates -+ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { - key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); - sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; - } -@@ -579,6 +614,8 @@ void - demote_sensitive_data(void) - { - Key *tmp; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; - int i; - - if (sensitive_data.server_key) { -@@ -587,13 +624,27 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) - sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; - } - -+ pid = getpid(); -+ uid = getuid(); - for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { -+ char *fp; -+ -+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) -+ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], -+ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, -+ SSH_FP_HEX); -+ else -+ fp = NULL; - tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); - key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); - sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; - if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) - sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; -+ if (fp != NULL) { -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); -+ free(fp); -+ } - } - /* Certs do not need demotion */ - } -@@ -652,7 +703,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - - if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) - box = ssh_sandbox_init(); -- pid = fork(); -+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); - if (pid == -1) { - fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); - } else if (pid != 0) { -@@ -708,6 +759,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - } - } - -+extern Newkeys *current_keys[]; -+ - static void - privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - { -@@ -732,6 +785,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { - verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); - buffer_clear(&loginmsg); -+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]); -+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]); -+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); -+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0); - monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); - - /* NEVERREACHED */ -@@ -1178,6 +1235,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so - if (received_sigterm) { - logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", - (int) received_sigterm); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); - close_listen_socks(); - unlink(options.pid_file); - exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); -@@ -2093,6 +2151,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - */ - if (use_privsep) { - mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); -+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); - exit(0); - } - -@@ -2135,7 +2194,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - privsep_postauth(authctxt); - /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ - if (!compat20) -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); - } - - packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, -@@ -2145,6 +2204,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - do_authenticated(authctxt); - - /* The connection has been terminated. */ -+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); -+ - packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); - packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); - verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", -@@ -2302,6 +2364,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) - if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) - packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); - -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none"); -+#endif -+ - debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); - - /* Get the encrypted integer. */ -@@ -2368,7 +2434,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) - session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; - } - /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); - - if (use_privsep) - mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); -@@ -2480,6 +2546,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - void - cleanup_exit(int i) - { -+ static int in_cleanup = 0; -+ int is_privsep_child; -+ -+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep -+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse -+ indefinitely. */ -+ if (in_cleanup) -+ _exit(i); -+ in_cleanup = 1; -+ - if (the_authctxt) { - do_cleanup(the_authctxt); - if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { -@@ -2490,9 +2566,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) - pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); - } - } -+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; -+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) -+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); -+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ -- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) -+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && -+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) - audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); - #endif - _exit(i); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-ignore-bad-env-var.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-ignore-bad-env-var.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3bb49c2..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-ignore-bad-env-var.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -diff -U0 openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog.bad-env-var openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog ---- openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog.bad-env-var 2014-03-19 21:37:36.270509907 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog 2014-03-19 21:37:36.276509878 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ -+20140304 -+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync -+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 -+ [session.c] -+ ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; -+ spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ -+ -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/session.c.bad-env-var openssh-6.4p1/session.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/session.c.bad-env-var 2014-03-19 21:37:36.233510090 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/session.c 2014-03-19 21:37:36.277509873 +0100 -@@ -990,6 +990,11 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsi - u_int envsize; - u_int i, namelen; - -+ if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { -+ error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); -+ return; -+ } -+ - /* - * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null - * entry before continuing. -@@ -2255,8 +2260,8 @@ session_env_req(Session *s) - char *name, *val; - u_int name_len, val_len, i; - -- name = packet_get_string(&name_len); -- val = packet_get_string(&val_len); -+ name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len); -+ val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len); - packet_check_eom(); - - /* Don't set too many environment variables */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-ssh-keygen-V.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-ssh-keygen-V.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c63df4d..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-ssh-keygen-V.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -diff -U0 openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog.ssh-keygen-V openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog ---- openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog.ssh-keygen-V 2014-01-28 11:07:41.374758458 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/ChangeLog 2014-01-28 11:14:38.172631130 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ -+20131023 -+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 04:16:22 -+ [ssh-keygen.c] -+ Make code match documentation: relative-specified certificate expiry time -+ should be relative to current time and not the validity start time. -+ Reported by Petr Lautrbach; ok deraadt@ -+ -diff -up openssh-6.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.ssh-keygen-V openssh-6.4p1/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh-6.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.ssh-keygen-V 2014-01-28 11:07:41.365758505 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.4p1/ssh-keygen.c 2014-01-28 11:07:41.375758453 +0100 -@@ -1747,7 +1747,7 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec) - cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from); - - if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') -- cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, cert_valid_from); -+ cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); - else - cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to); - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7eeee50 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index 928999d..3887495 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ ++20140703 ++ - OpenBSD CVS Sync ++ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09 ++ [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c] ++ standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about ++ 1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant ++ + 20140420 + - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h] + OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519 +diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +index 14f540e..29916d3 100644 +--- a/gss-serv.c ++++ b/gss-serv.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. +@@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ static OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) + { + OM_uint32 status; +- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; ++ char lname[NI_MAXHOST]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + + if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + +- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { ++ if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (-1); + } +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index ba4589b..e4add93 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H + #include + #endif +@@ -2669,7 +2670,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) + { + struct stat st; + char display[512], auth_display[512]; +- char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; ++ char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + u_int i; + + if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c +index 482dc1c..66198e6 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.c ++++ b/ssh-keygen.c +@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int rounds = 0; + /* argv0 */ + extern char *__progname; + +-char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; ++char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + + /* moduli.c */ + int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..35be907 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c +index 5160869..c7a1b47 100644 +--- a/audit-bsm.c ++++ b/audit-bsm.c +@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what) + } + + void +-audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) + { + /* not implemented */ + } +diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c +index 6954fc1..6686f6a 100644 +--- a/audit-linux.c ++++ b/audit-linux.c +@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what) + const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; + + void +-audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) + { + #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION +@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, + Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); + char *s; + +- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", +- direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, + (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); + free(s); +diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c +index 13c6849..5b49434 100644 +--- a/audit.c ++++ b/audit.c +@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ audit_unsupported(int what) + } + + void +-audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) ++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) + { +- PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid())); ++ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); + } + + void +@@ -270,11 +270,11 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what) + * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. + */ + void +-audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) + { +- debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u", +- (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid, ++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, + (unsigned)uid); + } + +diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h +index a2dc3ff..903df66 100644 +--- a/audit.h ++++ b/audit.h +@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); + int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); + void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); + void audit_unsupported(int); +-void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *); ++void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *); + void audit_unsupported_body(int); +-void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); + void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); + void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); + void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c +index 45817e0..116f460 100644 +--- a/auditstub.c ++++ b/auditstub.c +@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ audit_unsupported(int n) + } + + void +-audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) ++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) + { + } + +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index ede7b67..eb5f333 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -553,13 +553,12 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) + newkeys->enc.name, + authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", + newkeys->comp.name); +-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name); +-#endif + } ++ + choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], + sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]); ++ + need = dh_need = 0; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; +@@ -571,11 +570,16 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) + dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); + dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); + dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); ++ debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); ++#endif + } + /* XXX need runden? */ + kex->we_need = need; + kex->dh_need = dh_need; + ++ + /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ + if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && + !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) { +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 70b9b4c..81bc9c1 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -2396,7 +2396,7 @@ int + mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) + { + int ctos, len; +- char *cipher, *mac, *compress; ++ char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + +@@ -2404,14 +2404,16 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) + cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + +- audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid); ++ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); + + free(cipher); + free(mac); + free(compress); ++ free(pfs); + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index 93f6535..69b29d8 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) + } + + void +-mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) + { + Buffer m; +@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, + buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 4cf0c78..e43109f 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); + int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); + void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); + void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); +-void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); + void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); + void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); + #endif +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index ee94825..41a94a7 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -2430,7 +2430,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) + packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none"); ++ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none"); + #endif + + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f71f9c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch @@ -0,0 +1,844 @@ +diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c +index cd1a775..690711e 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.c ++++ b/auth-pam.c +@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) + if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) + return (sshpam_thread_status); + signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); +- waitpid(thread, &status, 0); ++ while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINTR) ++ continue; ++ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ } + return (status); + } + #endif +diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c +index af3fdc2..39c9f89 100644 +--- a/channels.c ++++ b/channels.c +@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); + +- if (rfd != -1) ++ if (rfd >= 0) + fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); +- if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) ++ if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd) + fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); +- if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) ++ if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) + fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + c->rfd = rfd; +@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + + /* enable nonblocking mode */ + if (nonblock) { +- if (rfd != -1) ++ if (rfd >= 0) + set_nonblock(rfd); +- if (wfd != -1) ++ if (wfd >= 0) + set_nonblock(wfd); +- if (efd != -1) ++ if (efd >= 0) + set_nonblock(efd); + } + } +diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +index 9c60108..d372b53 100644 +--- a/clientloop.c ++++ b/clientloop.c +@@ -2081,14 +2081,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + char *rtype; + int want_reply; + int success = 0; ++/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */ + + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + want_reply = packet_get_char(); + debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", + rtype, want_reply); + if (want_reply) { +- packet_start(success ? +- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); ++ packet_start(/*success ? ++ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } +diff --git a/key.c b/key.c +index a2050f6..6487d81 100644 +--- a/key.c ++++ b/key.c +@@ -880,8 +880,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) + success = 1; + /*XXXX*/ + key_free(k); ++/*XXXX + if (success != 1) + break; ++XXXX*/ + /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */ + while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') + cp++; +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 3ff62b0..70b9b4c 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) + mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ +- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); +@@ -1254,6 +1254,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) + break; + } + } ++ ++ debug3("%s: key %p is %s", ++ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); ++ + if (key != NULL) + key_free(key); + +@@ -1275,9 +1279,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) + free(chost); + } + +- debug3("%s: key %p is %s", +- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); +- + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, allowed); + buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index 6df236a..93f6535 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -743,10 +743,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) + if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || + (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { + error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); +- if (tmp1 > 0) ++ if (tmp1 >= 0) + close(tmp1); +- if (tmp2 > 0) +- close(tmp2); ++ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0) ++ close(tmp2);*/ + return 0; + } + close(tmp1); +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +index c89f214..80115c2 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa) + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; + u_int16_t *portp; + u_int16_t port; +- socklen_t salen; ++ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + int i; + + if (sa == NULL) { +diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c +index f5b122b..1305e87 100644 +--- a/packet.c ++++ b/packet.c +@@ -1234,6 +1234,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void) + case DEATTACK_DETECTED: + packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: " + "network attack detected"); ++ break; + case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: + packet_disconnect("deattack denial of " + "service detected"); +diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c +index bbbc706..ae6d1aa 100644 +--- a/progressmeter.c ++++ b/progressmeter.c +@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int); + + static time_t start; /* start progress */ + static time_t last_update; /* last progress update */ +-static char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ ++static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ + static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */ + static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ + static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ +@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore) + } + + void +-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) ++start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) + { + start = last_update = monotime(); + file = f; +diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h +index 10bab99..e9ca8f0 100644 +--- a/progressmeter.h ++++ b/progressmeter.h +@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +-void start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *); ++void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *); + void stop_progress_meter(void); +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 1178a07..d9bc016 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo) + { + if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { + kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); +- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); ++ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); + } + + if (signo) +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 3839928..d482e79 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) { +- arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp); + break; + } + for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) +@@ -1473,8 +1473,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + /* increase optional counter */ +- if (intptr != NULL) +- *intptr = *intptr + 1; ++ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;) ++ if (intptr != NULL) ++ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */ + } + break; + +diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c +index 2f8e3a0..e03bc6c 100644 +--- a/serverloop.c ++++ b/serverloop.c +@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void) + static void + notify_parent(void) + { +- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0) + (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); + } + static void + notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) + { +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0) + FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); + } + static void +@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset) + { + char c; + +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) +- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) ++ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0) + debug2("notify_done: reading"); + } + +@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, + * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data + * to the program. + */ +- if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) ++ if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) + FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp); + } + notify_prepare(*readsetp); +@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset) + int len; + + /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */ +- if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { ++ if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { + data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer); + dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); + len = write(fdin, data, dlen); +@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) + set_nonblock(fdin); + set_nonblock(fdout); + /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */ +- if (fderr != -1) ++ if (fderr >= 0) + set_nonblock(fderr); + + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin)) +@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) + max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); +- if (fderr != -1) ++ if (fderr >= 0) + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); + #endif + +@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) + * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending + * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin. + */ +- if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { ++ if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { + if (fdin != fdout) + close(fdin); + else +@@ -740,15 +740,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) + buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); + + /* Close the file descriptors. */ +- if (fdout != -1) ++ if (fdout >= 0) + close(fdout); + fdout = -1; + fdout_eof = 1; +- if (fderr != -1) ++ if (fderr >= 0) + close(fderr); + fderr = -1; + fderr_eof = 1; +- if (fdin != -1) ++ if (fdin >= 0) + close(fdin); + fdin = -1; + +@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + + debug("Window change received."); + packet_check_eom(); +- if (fdin != -1) ++ if (fdin >= 0) + pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel); + } + +@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ server_request_tun(void) + } + + tun = packet_get_int(); +- if (forced_tun_device != -1) { ++ if (forced_tun_device >= 0) { + if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun) + goto done; + tun = forced_tun_device; +diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c +index 2f5907c..3a2affd 100644 +--- a/sftp-client.c ++++ b/sftp-client.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m) + } + + static void +-send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, ++send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, + u_int len) + { + Buffer msg; +@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, + + static void + send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, +- char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) ++ const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) + { + Buffer msg; + +@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) + } + + int +-do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) ++do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len) + { + u_int id, status; + Buffer msg; +@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) + + + static int +-do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag, ++do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, + SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) + { + Buffer msg; +@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag, + } + + int +-do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) ++do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) + { + return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); + } +@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) + } + + int +-do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) + } + + int +-do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) ++do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) + } + + int +-do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) + } + + Attrib * +-do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) ++do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) + { + u_int id; + +@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) + } + + Attrib * +-do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) ++do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) + { + u_int id; + +@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) + + #ifdef notyet + Attrib * +-do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) ++do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) + { + u_int id; + +@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) + #endif + + int +-do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a) ++do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) + { + u_int status, id; + +@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a) + } + + int +-do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, ++do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, + Attrib *a) + { + u_int status, id; +@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, + } + + char * +-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int type, expected_id, count, id; +@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) + } + + int +-do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath, ++do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, + int force_legacy) + { + Buffer msg; +@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath, + } + + int +-do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) ++do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; +@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) + } + + int +-do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) ++do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; +@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) + } + + int +-do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) ++do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; +@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) + + #ifdef notyet + char * +-do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + Buffer msg; + u_int type, expected_id, count, id; +@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, + + static void + send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, +- u_int len, char *handle, u_int handle_len) ++ u_int len, const char *handle, u_int handle_len) + { + Buffer msg; + +@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, + } + + int +-do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path, ++do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, + Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) + { + Attrib junk; +@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path, + } + + static int +-download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth, ++download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, + Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, + int fsync_flag) + { +@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth, + } + + int +-download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, ++download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, + int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) + { +@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, + } + + int +-do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path, ++do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, + int preserve_flag, int fsync_flag) + { + int local_fd; +@@ -1607,7 +1607,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path, + } + + static int +-upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth, ++upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, + int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int fsync_flag) + { + int ret = 0, status; +@@ -1700,7 +1700,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth, + } + + int +-upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag, ++upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag, + int print_flag, int fsync_flag) + { + char *dst_canon; +@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag, + } + + char * +-path_append(char *p1, char *p2) ++path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) + { + char *ret; + size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; +diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h +index ba92ad0..c085423 100644 +--- a/sftp-client.h ++++ b/sftp-client.h +@@ -56,79 +56,79 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t); + u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); + + /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ +-int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int); ++int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int); + + /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ +-int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); ++int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); + + /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ + void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); + + /* Delete file 'path' */ +-int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *); ++int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + + /* Create directory 'path' */ +-int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int); ++int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); + + /* Remove directory 'path' */ +-int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *); ++int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + + /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ +-Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); ++Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + + /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ +-Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); ++Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + + /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ +-int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *); ++int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); + + /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ +-int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *); ++int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *); + + /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ +-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *); ++char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + + /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ + int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); + + /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *m, int force_legacy); ++int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *m, int force_legacy); + + /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +-int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); ++int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + + /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +-int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); ++int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + + /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */ +-int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *, u_int); ++int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *, u_int); + + /* + * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); ++int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); + + /* + * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, ++int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, + int, int, int); + + /* + * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int); ++int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int); + + /* + * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ +-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int); ++int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int); + + /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ +-char *path_append(char *, char *); ++char *path_append(const char *, const char *); + + #endif +diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c +index ad1f8c8..3987117 100644 +--- a/sftp.c ++++ b/sftp.c +@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ killchild(int signo) + { + if (sshpid > 1) { + kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); +- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); ++ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); + } + + _exit(1); +@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args) + + /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ + static char * +-path_strip(char *path, char *strip) ++path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) + { + size_t len; + +@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip) + } + + static char * +-make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd) ++make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) + { + char *abs_str; + +@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) + } + + static int +-is_dir(char *path) ++is_dir(const char *path) + { + struct stat sb; + +@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ is_dir(char *path) + } + + static int +-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) ++remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + Attrib *a; + +@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) + + /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ + static int +-pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) ++pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname) + { + size_t l = strlen(pathname); + +@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) + } + + static int +-process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, ++process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, + int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) + { + char *abs_src = NULL; +@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ out: + } + + static int +-process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, ++process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, + int pflag, int rflag, int fflag) + { + char *tmp_dst = NULL; +@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) + + /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ + static int +-do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) ++do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) + { + int n; + u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; +@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) + + /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ + static int +-do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, ++do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, + int lflag) + { + char *fname, *lname; +@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, + } + + static int +-do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag) ++do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) + { + struct sftp_statvfs st; + char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 117fdde..2b50132 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1037,8 +1037,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + sanitise_stdfd(); + + /* drop */ +- setegid(getgid()); +- setgid(getgid()); ++ (void) setegid(getgid()); ++ (void) setgid(getgid()); + + #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) + /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 773bb02..1eaa9f7 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -771,8 +771,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) + privsep_preauth_child(); + setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); +- if (box != NULL) ++ if (box != NULL) { + ssh_sandbox_child(box); ++ free(box); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -1439,6 +1441,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) + if (num_listen_socks < 0) + break; + } ++ ++ if (fdset != NULL) ++ free(fdset); + } + + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87434ce --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index 3887495..a4dc72f 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ ++20140823 ++ - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on ++ lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263 ++ - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth ++ monitor, not preauth; bz#2263 ++ + 20140703 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09 +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index bdabe21..5a65114 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) + signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); + signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); ++#ifdef SIGXFSZ ++ signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); ++#endif + + if (compat20) { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4995171 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +index 03a228f..49a4f6c 100644 +--- a/ssh_config ++++ b/ssh_config +@@ -46,3 +46,7 @@ + # VisualHostKey no + # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com + # RekeyLimit 1G 1h ++# ++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain ++# Host *.local ++# CheckHostIP no diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bccf39b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +diff --git a/log.c b/log.c +index 32e1d2e..d4caeb5 100644 +--- a/log.c ++++ b/log.c +@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...) + void + log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) + { ++ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1); ++} ++ ++void ++log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) { + #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; + #endif +@@ -264,8 +269,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) + exit(1); + } + +- log_handler = NULL; +- log_handler_ctx = NULL; ++ if (reset_handler) { ++ log_handler = NULL; ++ log_handler_ctx = NULL; ++ } + + log_on_stderr = on_stderr; + if (on_stderr) +diff --git a/log.h b/log.h +index ae7df25..30c3310 100644 +--- a/log.h ++++ b/log.h +@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum { + typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *); + + void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); ++void log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int); + void log_change_level(LogLevel); + int log_is_on_stderr(void); + void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *); +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 7461fae..da2f766 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) + close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; + ++ pmonitor->m_state = "preauth"; ++ + authctxt = _authctxt; + memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); + +@@ -472,6 +474,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) + close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); + pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; + ++ pmonitor->m_state = "postauth"; ++ + monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); + signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); +@@ -552,7 +556,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) + if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) + fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", + __func__, level); +- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); ++ do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state); + + buffer_free(&logmsg); + free(msg); +@@ -2083,13 +2087,28 @@ monitor_init(void) + mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib); + } + ++ mon->m_state = ""; ++ + return mon; + } + + void +-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) ++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir) + { +- monitor_openfds(mon, 0); ++ struct stat dev_log_stat; ++ char *dev_log_path; ++ int do_logfds = 0; ++ ++ if (chroot_dir != NULL) { ++ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir); ++ ++ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) { ++ debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir); ++ do_logfds = 1; ++ } ++ free(dev_log_path); ++ } ++ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds); + } + + #ifdef GSSAPI +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index ff79fbb..00c2028 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor { + struct mm_master *m_zlib; + struct Kex **m_pkex; + pid_t m_pid; ++ char *m_state; + }; + + struct monitor *monitor_init(void); +-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *); ++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *); + void monitor_sync(struct monitor *); + + struct Authctxt; +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index e4add93..bc4a8dd 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ login_cap_t *lc; + + static int is_child = 0; + ++static int have_dev_log = 1; ++ + /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ + static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; + static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; +@@ -523,8 +525,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) + is_child = 1; + + /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ +- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, +- options.log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level, ++ options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log); + + /* + * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD +@@ -692,8 +694,8 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) + close(ptymaster); + + /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ +- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, +- options.log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level, ++ options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log); + /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ptyfd); + +@@ -797,6 +799,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + int ret; + const char *forced = NULL; + char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL; ++ struct stat dev_log_stat; + + if (options.adm_forced_command) { + original_command = command; +@@ -854,6 +857,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + tty += 5; + } + ++ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) { ++ have_dev_log = 0; ++ } ++ + verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d", + session_type, + tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", +@@ -1681,14 +1688,6 @@ child_close_fds(void) + * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. + */ + endpwent(); +- +- /* +- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them +- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after +- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file +- * descriptors open. +- */ +- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + } + + /* +@@ -1834,8 +1833,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) + exit(1); + } + +- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); +- + if (!options.use_login) + do_rc_files(s, shell); + +@@ -1859,9 +1856,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); ++ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log)); + } + ++ /* ++ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them ++ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after ++ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file ++ * descriptors open. ++ */ ++ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); ++ + fflush(NULL); + + if (options.use_login) { +diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c +index 7e644ab..e162b7a 100644 +--- a/sftp-server-main.c ++++ b/sftp-server-main.c +@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + return 1; + } + +- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); ++ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0)); + } +diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c +index b8eb59c..a0e644c 100644 +--- a/sftp-server.c ++++ b/sftp-server.c +@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) + } + + int +-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) ++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler) + { + fd_set *rset, *wset; + int i, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; +@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) + extern char *__progname; + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); +- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); + + pw = pwcopy(user_pw); + +@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) + } + } + +- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); + + if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { + client_addr = xstrdup(cp); +diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h +index 2bde8bb..ddf1a39 100644 +--- a/sftp.h ++++ b/sftp.h +@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@ + + struct passwd; + +-int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *); ++int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int); + void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 3eee75a..9c00bcb 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + + /* New socket pair */ +- monitor_reinit(pmonitor); ++ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory); + + pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); + if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) +@@ -763,6 +763,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; ++ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); ++ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; ++ ++ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1) ++ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f1e0ff --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 626a642..b186ca1 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -1859,6 +1859,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) + + if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { + printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); ++ logit("The session allows sftp connections only"); + fflush(NULL); + exit(1); + } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5c61cf --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index d9b440a..ec0bf12 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -355,8 +355,9 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, + authctxt->success = 1; + } else { + +- /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ +- if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && ++ /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty ++ * Partial succes is not failure */ ++ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && !partial && + (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) + authctxt->failures++; + if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b93f6f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index b7f3294..bc1e909 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + break; + + case sForceCommand: +- if (cp == NULL) ++ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); +@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + break; + + case sVersionAddendum: +- if (cp == NULL) ++ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); +@@ -1630,6 +1630,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + break; + + case sAuthenticationMethods: ++ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) { + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (options->num_auth_methods >= diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ab8ade --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch @@ -0,0 +1,994 @@ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 2ad26ff..0f0d39f 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ + ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ +- ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \ ++ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o utf8_stringprep.o \ + sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ +diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h +index d4df619..d98b83d 100644 +--- a/misc.h ++++ b/misc.h +@@ -106,4 +106,7 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); + int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *); + ++/* utf8_stringprep.c */ ++int utf8_stringprep(const char *, char *, size_t); ++ + #endif /* _MISC_H */ +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index b00658b..08064f4 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -519,21 +521,51 @@ input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + "type %d", type); + } + ++/* Check whether we can display UTF-8 safely */ ++static int ++utf8_ok(void) ++{ ++ static int ret = -1; ++ char *cp; ++ ++ if (ret == -1) { ++ setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); ++ cp = nl_langinfo(CODESET); ++ ret = strcmp(cp, "UTF-8") == 0; ++ } ++ return ret; ++} ++ + /* ARGSUSED */ + void + input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + { + char *msg, *raw, *lang; +- u_int len; ++ u_int done, len; + + debug3("input_userauth_banner"); ++ + raw = packet_get_string(&len); + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { + if (len > 65536) + len = 65536; + msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */ +- strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH); ++ done = 0; ++ if (utf8_ok()) { ++ if (utf8_stringprep(raw, msg, len * 4 + 1) == 0) ++ done = 1; ++ else ++ debug2("%s: UTF8 stringprep failed", __func__); ++ } ++ /* ++ * Fallback to strnvis if UTF8 display not supported or ++ * conversion failed. ++ */ ++ if (!done) { ++ strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, ++ VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH); ++ } + fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); + free(msg); + } +diff --git a/stringprep-tables.c b/stringprep-tables.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..49f4d9d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/stringprep-tables.c +@@ -0,0 +1,661 @@ ++/* Public domain. */ ++ ++/* $OpenBSD$ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Tables for RFC3454 stringprep algorithm, updated with a table of allocated ++ * characters generated from Unicode.6.2's UnicodeData.txt ++ * ++ * Intended to be included directly from utf8_stringprep.c ++ */ ++ ++/* Unassigned characters in Unicode 6.2 */ ++static const struct u32_range unassigned[] = { ++ { 0x0378, 0x0379 }, ++ { 0x037F, 0x0383 }, ++ { 0x038B, 0x038B }, ++ { 0x038D, 0x038D }, ++ { 0x03A2, 0x03A2 }, ++ { 0x0528, 0x0530 }, ++ { 0x0557, 0x0558 }, ++ { 0x0560, 0x0560 }, ++ { 0x0588, 0x0588 }, ++ { 0x058B, 0x058E }, ++ { 0x0590, 0x0590 }, ++ { 0x05C8, 0x05CF }, ++ { 0x05EB, 0x05EF }, ++ { 0x05F5, 0x05FF }, ++ { 0x0605, 0x0605 }, ++ { 0x061C, 0x061D }, ++ { 0x070E, 0x070E }, ++ { 0x074B, 0x074C }, ++ { 0x07B2, 0x07BF }, ++ { 0x07FB, 0x07FF }, ++ { 0x082E, 0x082F }, ++ { 0x083F, 0x083F }, ++ { 0x085C, 0x085D }, ++ { 0x085F, 0x089F }, ++ { 0x08A1, 0x08A1 }, ++ { 0x08AD, 0x08E3 }, ++ { 0x08FF, 0x08FF }, ++ { 0x0978, 0x0978 }, ++ { 0x0980, 0x0980 }, ++ { 0x0984, 0x0984 }, ++ { 0x098D, 0x098E }, ++ { 0x0991, 0x0992 }, ++ { 0x09A9, 0x09A9 }, ++ { 0x09B1, 0x09B1 }, ++ { 0x09B3, 0x09B5 }, ++ { 0x09BA, 0x09BB }, ++ { 0x09C5, 0x09C6 }, ++ { 0x09C9, 0x09CA }, ++ { 0x09CF, 0x09D6 }, ++ { 0x09D8, 0x09DB }, ++ { 0x09DE, 0x09DE }, ++ { 0x09E4, 0x09E5 }, ++ { 0x09FC, 0x0A00 }, ++ { 0x0A04, 0x0A04 }, ++ { 0x0A0B, 0x0A0E }, ++ { 0x0A11, 0x0A12 }, ++ { 0x0A29, 0x0A29 }, ++ { 0x0A31, 0x0A31 }, ++ { 0x0A34, 0x0A34 }, ++ { 0x0A37, 0x0A37 }, ++ { 0x0A3A, 0x0A3B }, ++ { 0x0A3D, 0x0A3D }, ++ { 0x0A43, 0x0A46 }, ++ { 0x0A49, 0x0A4A }, ++ { 0x0A4E, 0x0A50 }, ++ { 0x0A52, 0x0A58 }, ++ { 0x0A5D, 0x0A5D }, ++ { 0x0A5F, 0x0A65 }, ++ { 0x0A76, 0x0A80 }, ++ { 0x0A84, 0x0A84 }, ++ { 0x0A8E, 0x0A8E }, ++ { 0x0A92, 0x0A92 }, ++ { 0x0AA9, 0x0AA9 }, ++ { 0x0AB1, 0x0AB1 }, ++ { 0x0AB4, 0x0AB4 }, ++ { 0x0ABA, 0x0ABB }, ++ { 0x0AC6, 0x0AC6 }, ++ { 0x0ACA, 0x0ACA }, ++ { 0x0ACE, 0x0ACF }, ++ { 0x0AD1, 0x0ADF }, ++ { 0x0AE4, 0x0AE5 }, ++ { 0x0AF2, 0x0B00 }, ++ { 0x0B04, 0x0B04 }, ++ { 0x0B0D, 0x0B0E }, ++ { 0x0B11, 0x0B12 }, ++ { 0x0B29, 0x0B29 }, ++ { 0x0B31, 0x0B31 }, ++ { 0x0B34, 0x0B34 }, ++ { 0x0B3A, 0x0B3B }, ++ { 0x0B45, 0x0B46 }, ++ { 0x0B49, 0x0B4A }, ++ { 0x0B4E, 0x0B55 }, ++ { 0x0B58, 0x0B5B }, ++ { 0x0B5E, 0x0B5E }, ++ { 0x0B64, 0x0B65 }, ++ { 0x0B78, 0x0B81 }, ++ { 0x0B84, 0x0B84 }, ++ { 0x0B8B, 0x0B8D }, ++ { 0x0B91, 0x0B91 }, ++ { 0x0B96, 0x0B98 }, ++ { 0x0B9B, 0x0B9B }, ++ { 0x0B9D, 0x0B9D }, ++ { 0x0BA0, 0x0BA2 }, ++ { 0x0BA5, 0x0BA7 }, ++ { 0x0BAB, 0x0BAD }, ++ { 0x0BBA, 0x0BBD }, ++ { 0x0BC3, 0x0BC5 }, ++ { 0x0BC9, 0x0BC9 }, ++ { 0x0BCE, 0x0BCF }, ++ { 0x0BD1, 0x0BD6 }, ++ { 0x0BD8, 0x0BE5 }, ++ { 0x0BFB, 0x0C00 }, ++ { 0x0C04, 0x0C04 }, ++ { 0x0C0D, 0x0C0D }, ++ { 0x0C11, 0x0C11 }, ++ { 0x0C29, 0x0C29 }, ++ { 0x0C34, 0x0C34 }, ++ { 0x0C3A, 0x0C3C }, ++ { 0x0C45, 0x0C45 }, ++ { 0x0C49, 0x0C49 }, ++ { 0x0C4E, 0x0C54 }, ++ { 0x0C57, 0x0C57 }, ++ { 0x0C5A, 0x0C5F }, ++ { 0x0C64, 0x0C65 }, ++ { 0x0C70, 0x0C77 }, ++ { 0x0C80, 0x0C81 }, ++ { 0x0C84, 0x0C84 }, ++ { 0x0C8D, 0x0C8D }, ++ { 0x0C91, 0x0C91 }, ++ { 0x0CA9, 0x0CA9 }, ++ { 0x0CB4, 0x0CB4 }, ++ { 0x0CBA, 0x0CBB }, ++ { 0x0CC5, 0x0CC5 }, ++ { 0x0CC9, 0x0CC9 }, ++ { 0x0CCE, 0x0CD4 }, ++ { 0x0CD7, 0x0CDD }, ++ { 0x0CDF, 0x0CDF }, ++ { 0x0CE4, 0x0CE5 }, ++ { 0x0CF0, 0x0CF0 }, ++ { 0x0CF3, 0x0D01 }, ++ { 0x0D04, 0x0D04 }, ++ { 0x0D0D, 0x0D0D }, ++ { 0x0D11, 0x0D11 }, ++ { 0x0D3B, 0x0D3C }, ++ { 0x0D45, 0x0D45 }, ++ { 0x0D49, 0x0D49 }, ++ { 0x0D4F, 0x0D56 }, ++ { 0x0D58, 0x0D5F }, ++ { 0x0D64, 0x0D65 }, ++ { 0x0D76, 0x0D78 }, ++ { 0x0D80, 0x0D81 }, ++ { 0x0D84, 0x0D84 }, ++ { 0x0D97, 0x0D99 }, ++ { 0x0DB2, 0x0DB2 }, ++ { 0x0DBC, 0x0DBC }, ++ { 0x0DBE, 0x0DBF }, ++ { 0x0DC7, 0x0DC9 }, ++ { 0x0DCB, 0x0DCE }, ++ { 0x0DD5, 0x0DD5 }, ++ { 0x0DD7, 0x0DD7 }, ++ { 0x0DE0, 0x0DF1 }, ++ { 0x0DF5, 0x0E00 }, ++ { 0x0E3B, 0x0E3E }, ++ { 0x0E5C, 0x0E80 }, ++ { 0x0E83, 0x0E83 }, ++ { 0x0E85, 0x0E86 }, ++ { 0x0E89, 0x0E89 }, ++ { 0x0E8B, 0x0E8C }, ++ { 0x0E8E, 0x0E93 }, ++ { 0x0E98, 0x0E98 }, ++ { 0x0EA0, 0x0EA0 }, ++ { 0x0EA4, 0x0EA4 }, ++ { 0x0EA6, 0x0EA6 }, ++ { 0x0EA8, 0x0EA9 }, ++ { 0x0EAC, 0x0EAC }, ++ { 0x0EBA, 0x0EBA }, ++ { 0x0EBE, 0x0EBF }, ++ { 0x0EC5, 0x0EC5 }, ++ { 0x0EC7, 0x0EC7 }, ++ { 0x0ECE, 0x0ECF }, ++ { 0x0EDA, 0x0EDB }, ++ { 0x0EE0, 0x0EFF }, ++ { 0x0F48, 0x0F48 }, ++ { 0x0F6D, 0x0F70 }, ++ { 0x0F98, 0x0F98 }, ++ { 0x0FBD, 0x0FBD }, ++ { 0x0FCD, 0x0FCD }, ++ { 0x0FDB, 0x0FFF }, ++ { 0x10C6, 0x10C6 }, ++ { 0x10C8, 0x10CC }, ++ { 0x10CE, 0x10CF }, ++ { 0x1249, 0x1249 }, ++ { 0x124E, 0x124F }, ++ { 0x1257, 0x1257 }, ++ { 0x1259, 0x1259 }, ++ { 0x125E, 0x125F }, ++ { 0x1289, 0x1289 }, ++ { 0x128E, 0x128F }, ++ { 0x12B1, 0x12B1 }, ++ { 0x12B6, 0x12B7 }, ++ { 0x12BF, 0x12BF }, ++ { 0x12C1, 0x12C1 }, ++ { 0x12C6, 0x12C7 }, ++ { 0x12D7, 0x12D7 }, ++ { 0x1311, 0x1311 }, ++ { 0x1316, 0x1317 }, ++ { 0x135B, 0x135C }, ++ { 0x137D, 0x137F }, ++ { 0x139A, 0x139F }, ++ { 0x13F5, 0x13FF }, ++ { 0x169D, 0x169F }, ++ { 0x16F1, 0x16FF }, ++ { 0x170D, 0x170D }, ++ { 0x1715, 0x171F }, ++ { 0x1737, 0x173F }, ++ { 0x1754, 0x175F }, ++ { 0x176D, 0x176D }, ++ { 0x1771, 0x1771 }, ++ { 0x1774, 0x177F }, ++ { 0x17DE, 0x17DF }, ++ { 0x17EA, 0x17EF }, ++ { 0x17FA, 0x17FF }, ++ { 0x180F, 0x180F }, ++ { 0x181A, 0x181F }, ++ { 0x1878, 0x187F }, ++ { 0x18AB, 0x18AF }, ++ { 0x18F6, 0x18FF }, ++ { 0x191D, 0x191F }, ++ { 0x192C, 0x192F }, ++ { 0x193C, 0x193F }, ++ { 0x1941, 0x1943 }, ++ { 0x196E, 0x196F }, ++ { 0x1975, 0x197F }, ++ { 0x19AC, 0x19AF }, ++ { 0x19CA, 0x19CF }, ++ { 0x19DB, 0x19DD }, ++ { 0x1A1C, 0x1A1D }, ++ { 0x1A5F, 0x1A5F }, ++ { 0x1A7D, 0x1A7E }, ++ { 0x1A8A, 0x1A8F }, ++ { 0x1A9A, 0x1A9F }, ++ { 0x1AAE, 0x1AFF }, ++ { 0x1B4C, 0x1B4F }, ++ { 0x1B7D, 0x1B7F }, ++ { 0x1BF4, 0x1BFB }, ++ { 0x1C38, 0x1C3A }, ++ { 0x1C4A, 0x1C4C }, ++ { 0x1C80, 0x1CBF }, ++ { 0x1CC8, 0x1CCF }, ++ { 0x1CF7, 0x1CFF }, ++ { 0x1DE7, 0x1DFB }, ++ { 0x1F16, 0x1F17 }, ++ { 0x1F1E, 0x1F1F }, ++ { 0x1F46, 0x1F47 }, ++ { 0x1F4E, 0x1F4F }, ++ { 0x1F58, 0x1F58 }, ++ { 0x1F5A, 0x1F5A }, ++ { 0x1F5C, 0x1F5C }, ++ { 0x1F5E, 0x1F5E }, ++ { 0x1F7E, 0x1F7F }, ++ { 0x1FB5, 0x1FB5 }, ++ { 0x1FC5, 0x1FC5 }, ++ { 0x1FD4, 0x1FD5 }, ++ { 0x1FDC, 0x1FDC }, ++ { 0x1FF0, 0x1FF1 }, ++ { 0x1FF5, 0x1FF5 }, ++ { 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF }, ++ { 0x2065, 0x2069 }, ++ { 0x2072, 0x2073 }, ++ { 0x208F, 0x208F }, ++ { 0x209D, 0x209F }, ++ { 0x20BB, 0x20CF }, ++ { 0x20F1, 0x20FF }, ++ { 0x218A, 0x218F }, ++ { 0x23F4, 0x23FF }, ++ { 0x2427, 0x243F }, ++ { 0x244B, 0x245F }, ++ { 0x2700, 0x2700 }, ++ { 0x2B4D, 0x2B4F }, ++ { 0x2B5A, 0x2BFF }, ++ { 0x2C2F, 0x2C2F }, ++ { 0x2C5F, 0x2C5F }, ++ { 0x2CF4, 0x2CF8 }, ++ { 0x2D26, 0x2D26 }, ++ { 0x2D28, 0x2D2C }, ++ { 0x2D2E, 0x2D2F }, ++ { 0x2D68, 0x2D6E }, ++ { 0x2D71, 0x2D7E }, ++ { 0x2D97, 0x2D9F }, ++ { 0x2DA7, 0x2DA7 }, ++ { 0x2DAF, 0x2DAF }, ++ { 0x2DB7, 0x2DB7 }, ++ { 0x2DBF, 0x2DBF }, ++ { 0x2DC7, 0x2DC7 }, ++ { 0x2DCF, 0x2DCF }, ++ { 0x2DD7, 0x2DD7 }, ++ { 0x2DDF, 0x2DDF }, ++ { 0x2E3C, 0x2E7F }, ++ { 0x2E9A, 0x2E9A }, ++ { 0x2EF4, 0x2EFF }, ++ { 0x2FD6, 0x2FEF }, ++ { 0x2FFC, 0x2FFF }, ++ { 0x3040, 0x3040 }, ++ { 0x3097, 0x3098 }, ++ { 0x3100, 0x3104 }, ++ { 0x312E, 0x3130 }, ++ { 0x318F, 0x318F }, ++ { 0x31BB, 0x31BF }, ++ { 0x31E4, 0x31EF }, ++ { 0x321F, 0x321F }, ++ { 0x32FF, 0x32FF }, ++ { 0x4DB6, 0x4DBF }, ++ { 0x9FA6, 0x9FCB }, ++ { 0x9FCD, 0x9FFF }, ++ { 0xA48D, 0xA48F }, ++ { 0xA4C7, 0xA4CF }, ++ { 0xA62C, 0xA63F }, ++ { 0xA698, 0xA69E }, ++ { 0xA6F8, 0xA6FF }, ++ { 0xA78F, 0xA78F }, ++ { 0xA794, 0xA79F }, ++ { 0xA7AB, 0xA7F7 }, ++ { 0xA82C, 0xA82F }, ++ { 0xA83A, 0xA83F }, ++ { 0xA878, 0xA87F }, ++ { 0xA8C5, 0xA8CD }, ++ { 0xA8DA, 0xA8DF }, ++ { 0xA8FC, 0xA8FF }, ++ { 0xA954, 0xA95E }, ++ { 0xA97D, 0xA97F }, ++ { 0xA9CE, 0xA9CE }, ++ { 0xA9DA, 0xA9DD }, ++ { 0xA9E0, 0xA9FF }, ++ { 0xAA37, 0xAA3F }, ++ { 0xAA4E, 0xAA4F }, ++ { 0xAA5A, 0xAA5B }, ++ { 0xAA7C, 0xAA7F }, ++ { 0xAAC3, 0xAADA }, ++ { 0xAAF7, 0xAB00 }, ++ { 0xAB07, 0xAB08 }, ++ { 0xAB0F, 0xAB10 }, ++ { 0xAB17, 0xAB1F }, ++ { 0xAB27, 0xAB27 }, ++ { 0xAB2F, 0xABBF }, ++ { 0xABEE, 0xABEF }, ++ { 0xABFA, 0xABFF }, ++ { 0xD7A4, 0xD7AF }, ++ { 0xD7C7, 0xD7CA }, ++ { 0xD7FC, 0xD7FF }, ++ { 0xFA6E, 0xFA6F }, ++ { 0xFADA, 0xFAFF }, ++ { 0xFB07, 0xFB12 }, ++ { 0xFB18, 0xFB1C }, ++ { 0xFB37, 0xFB37 }, ++ { 0xFB3D, 0xFB3D }, ++ { 0xFB3F, 0xFB3F }, ++ { 0xFB42, 0xFB42 }, ++ { 0xFB45, 0xFB45 }, ++ { 0xFBC2, 0xFBD2 }, ++ { 0xFD40, 0xFD4F }, ++ { 0xFD90, 0xFD91 }, ++ { 0xFDC8, 0xFDCF }, ++ { 0xFDFE, 0xFDFF }, ++ { 0xFE1A, 0xFE1F }, ++ { 0xFE27, 0xFE2F }, ++ { 0xFE53, 0xFE53 }, ++ { 0xFE67, 0xFE67 }, ++ { 0xFE6C, 0xFE6F }, ++ { 0xFE75, 0xFE75 }, ++ { 0xFEFD, 0xFEFE }, ++ { 0xFF00, 0xFF00 }, ++ { 0xFFBF, 0xFFC1 }, ++ { 0xFFC8, 0xFFC9 }, ++ { 0xFFD0, 0xFFD1 }, ++ { 0xFFD8, 0xFFD9 }, ++ { 0xFFDD, 0xFFDF }, ++ { 0xFFE7, 0xFFE7 }, ++ { 0xFFEF, 0xFFF8 }, ++ { 0x1000C, 0x1000C }, ++ { 0x10027, 0x10027 }, ++ { 0x1003B, 0x1003B }, ++ { 0x1003E, 0x1003E }, ++ { 0x1004E, 0x1004F }, ++ { 0x1005E, 0x1007F }, ++ { 0x100FB, 0x100FF }, ++ { 0x10103, 0x10106 }, ++ { 0x10134, 0x10136 }, ++ { 0x1018B, 0x1018F }, ++ { 0x1019C, 0x101CF }, ++ { 0x101FE, 0x1027F }, ++ { 0x1029D, 0x1029F }, ++ { 0x102D1, 0x102FF }, ++ { 0x1031F, 0x1031F }, ++ { 0x10324, 0x1032F }, ++ { 0x1034B, 0x1037F }, ++ { 0x1039E, 0x1039E }, ++ { 0x103C4, 0x103C7 }, ++ { 0x103D6, 0x103FF }, ++ { 0x1049E, 0x1049F }, ++ { 0x104AA, 0x107FF }, ++ { 0x10806, 0x10807 }, ++ { 0x10809, 0x10809 }, ++ { 0x10836, 0x10836 }, ++ { 0x10839, 0x1083B }, ++ { 0x1083D, 0x1083E }, ++ { 0x10856, 0x10856 }, ++ { 0x10860, 0x108FF }, ++ { 0x1091C, 0x1091E }, ++ { 0x1093A, 0x1093E }, ++ { 0x10940, 0x1097F }, ++ { 0x109B8, 0x109BD }, ++ { 0x109C0, 0x109FF }, ++ { 0x10A04, 0x10A04 }, ++ { 0x10A07, 0x10A0B }, ++ { 0x10A14, 0x10A14 }, ++ { 0x10A18, 0x10A18 }, ++ { 0x10A34, 0x10A37 }, ++ { 0x10A3B, 0x10A3E }, ++ { 0x10A48, 0x10A4F }, ++ { 0x10A59, 0x10A5F }, ++ { 0x10A80, 0x10AFF }, ++ { 0x10B36, 0x10B38 }, ++ { 0x10B56, 0x10B57 }, ++ { 0x10B73, 0x10B77 }, ++ { 0x10B80, 0x10BFF }, ++ { 0x10C49, 0x10E5F }, ++ { 0x10E7F, 0x10FFF }, ++ { 0x1104E, 0x11051 }, ++ { 0x11070, 0x1107F }, ++ { 0x110C2, 0x110CF }, ++ { 0x110E9, 0x110EF }, ++ { 0x110FA, 0x110FF }, ++ { 0x11135, 0x11135 }, ++ { 0x11144, 0x1117F }, ++ { 0x111C9, 0x111CF }, ++ { 0x111DA, 0x1167F }, ++ { 0x116B8, 0x116BF }, ++ { 0x116CA, 0x11FFF }, ++ { 0x1236F, 0x123FF }, ++ { 0x12463, 0x1246F }, ++ { 0x12474, 0x12FFF }, ++ { 0x1342F, 0x167FF }, ++ { 0x16A39, 0x16EFF }, ++ { 0x16F45, 0x16F4F }, ++ { 0x16F7F, 0x16F8E }, ++ { 0x16FA0, 0x1AFFF }, ++ { 0x1B002, 0x1CFFF }, ++ { 0x1D0F6, 0x1D0FF }, ++ { 0x1D127, 0x1D128 }, ++ { 0x1D1DE, 0x1D1FF }, ++ { 0x1D246, 0x1D2FF }, ++ { 0x1D357, 0x1D35F }, ++ { 0x1D372, 0x1D3FF }, ++ { 0x1D455, 0x1D455 }, ++ { 0x1D49D, 0x1D49D }, ++ { 0x1D4A0, 0x1D4A1 }, ++ { 0x1D4A3, 0x1D4A4 }, ++ { 0x1D4A7, 0x1D4A8 }, ++ { 0x1D4AD, 0x1D4AD }, ++ { 0x1D4BA, 0x1D4BA }, ++ { 0x1D4BC, 0x1D4BC }, ++ { 0x1D4C4, 0x1D4C4 }, ++ { 0x1D506, 0x1D506 }, ++ { 0x1D50B, 0x1D50C }, ++ { 0x1D515, 0x1D515 }, ++ { 0x1D51D, 0x1D51D }, ++ { 0x1D53A, 0x1D53A }, ++ { 0x1D53F, 0x1D53F }, ++ { 0x1D545, 0x1D545 }, ++ { 0x1D547, 0x1D549 }, ++ { 0x1D551, 0x1D551 }, ++ { 0x1D6A6, 0x1D6A7 }, ++ { 0x1D7CC, 0x1D7CD }, ++ { 0x1D800, 0x1EDFF }, ++ { 0x1EE04, 0x1EE04 }, ++ { 0x1EE20, 0x1EE20 }, ++ { 0x1EE23, 0x1EE23 }, ++ { 0x1EE25, 0x1EE26 }, ++ { 0x1EE28, 0x1EE28 }, ++ { 0x1EE33, 0x1EE33 }, ++ { 0x1EE38, 0x1EE38 }, ++ { 0x1EE3A, 0x1EE3A }, ++ { 0x1EE3C, 0x1EE41 }, ++ { 0x1EE43, 0x1EE46 }, ++ { 0x1EE48, 0x1EE48 }, ++ { 0x1EE4A, 0x1EE4A }, ++ { 0x1EE4C, 0x1EE4C }, ++ { 0x1EE50, 0x1EE50 }, ++ { 0x1EE53, 0x1EE53 }, ++ { 0x1EE55, 0x1EE56 }, ++ { 0x1EE58, 0x1EE58 }, ++ { 0x1EE5A, 0x1EE5A }, ++ { 0x1EE5C, 0x1EE5C }, ++ { 0x1EE5E, 0x1EE5E }, ++ { 0x1EE60, 0x1EE60 }, ++ { 0x1EE63, 0x1EE63 }, ++ { 0x1EE65, 0x1EE66 }, ++ { 0x1EE6B, 0x1EE6B }, ++ { 0x1EE73, 0x1EE73 }, ++ { 0x1EE78, 0x1EE78 }, ++ { 0x1EE7D, 0x1EE7D }, ++ { 0x1EE7F, 0x1EE7F }, ++ { 0x1EE8A, 0x1EE8A }, ++ { 0x1EE9C, 0x1EEA0 }, ++ { 0x1EEA4, 0x1EEA4 }, ++ { 0x1EEAA, 0x1EEAA }, ++ { 0x1EEBC, 0x1EEEF }, ++ { 0x1EEF2, 0x1EFFF }, ++ { 0x1F02C, 0x1F02F }, ++ { 0x1F094, 0x1F09F }, ++ { 0x1F0AF, 0x1F0B0 }, ++ { 0x1F0BF, 0x1F0C0 }, ++ { 0x1F0D0, 0x1F0D0 }, ++ { 0x1F0E0, 0x1F0FF }, ++ { 0x1F10B, 0x1F10F }, ++ { 0x1F12F, 0x1F12F }, ++ { 0x1F16C, 0x1F16F }, ++ { 0x1F19B, 0x1F1E5 }, ++ { 0x1F203, 0x1F20F }, ++ { 0x1F23B, 0x1F23F }, ++ { 0x1F249, 0x1F24F }, ++ { 0x1F252, 0x1F2FF }, ++ { 0x1F321, 0x1F32F }, ++ { 0x1F336, 0x1F336 }, ++ { 0x1F37D, 0x1F37F }, ++ { 0x1F394, 0x1F39F }, ++ { 0x1F3C5, 0x1F3C5 }, ++ { 0x1F3CB, 0x1F3DF }, ++ { 0x1F3F1, 0x1F3FF }, ++ { 0x1F43F, 0x1F43F }, ++ { 0x1F441, 0x1F441 }, ++ { 0x1F4F8, 0x1F4F8 }, ++ { 0x1F4FD, 0x1F4FF }, ++ { 0x1F53E, 0x1F53F }, ++ { 0x1F544, 0x1F54F }, ++ { 0x1F568, 0x1F5FA }, ++ { 0x1F641, 0x1F644 }, ++ { 0x1F650, 0x1F67F }, ++ { 0x1F6C6, 0x1F6FF }, ++ { 0x1F774, 0x1FFFD }, ++ { 0x2A6D7, 0x2A6FF }, ++ { 0x2A701, 0x2B733 }, ++ { 0x2B735, 0x2B73F }, ++ { 0x2B741, 0x2B81C }, ++ { 0x2B81E, 0x2F7FF }, ++ { 0x2FA1E, 0x2FFFD }, ++ { 0x30000, 0x3FFFD }, ++ { 0x40000, 0x4FFFD }, ++ { 0x50000, 0x5FFFD }, ++ { 0x60000, 0x6FFFD }, ++ { 0x70000, 0x7FFFD }, ++ { 0x80000, 0x8FFFD }, ++ { 0x90000, 0x9FFFD }, ++ { 0xA0000, 0xAFFFD }, ++ { 0xB0000, 0xBFFFD }, ++ { 0xC0000, 0xCFFFD }, ++ { 0xD0000, 0xDFFFD }, ++ { 0xE0000, 0xE0000 }, ++ { 0xE0002, 0xE001F }, ++ { 0xE0080, 0xE00FF }, ++ { 0xE01F0, 0xEFFFD }, ++}; ++ ++/* RFC3454 Table B.1 */ ++static const struct u32_range map_to_nothing[] = { ++ { 0x00AD, 0x00AD }, ++ { 0x034F, 0x034F }, ++ { 0x1806, 0x1806 }, ++ { 0x180B, 0x180D }, ++ { 0x200B, 0x200D }, ++ { 0x2060, 0x2060 }, ++ { 0xFE00, 0xFE0F }, ++ { 0xFEFF, 0xFEFF }, ++}; ++ ++/* Local: allow tab, CR and LF */ ++static const struct u32_range whitelist[] = { ++ { 0x09, 0x09 }, ++ { 0x0a, 0x0a }, ++ { 0x0d, 0x0d }, ++}; ++ ++/* RFC3454 Tables in appendix C */ ++static const struct u32_range prohibited[] = { ++ /* C.2.1 ASCII control characters */ ++ { 0x0000, 0x001F }, ++ { 0x007F, 0x007F }, ++ /* C.2.2 Non-ASCII control characters */ ++ { 0x0080, 0x009F }, ++ { 0x06DD, 0x06DD }, ++ { 0x070F, 0x070F }, ++ { 0x180E, 0x180E }, ++ { 0x200C, 0x200C }, ++ { 0x200D, 0x200D }, ++ { 0x2028, 0x2028 }, ++ { 0x2029, 0x2029 }, ++ { 0x2060, 0x2060 }, ++ { 0x2061, 0x2061 }, ++ { 0x2062, 0x2062 }, ++ { 0x2063, 0x2063 }, ++ { 0x206A, 0x206F }, ++ { 0xFEFF, 0xFEFF }, ++ { 0xFFF9, 0xFFFC }, ++ { 0x1D173, 0x1D17A }, ++ /* C.3 Private use */ ++ { 0xE000, 0xF8FF }, ++ { 0xF0000, 0xFFFFD }, ++ { 0x100000, 0x10FFFD }, ++ /* C.4 Non-character code points */ ++ { 0xFDD0, 0xFDEF }, ++ { 0xFFFE, 0xFFFF }, ++ { 0x1FFFE, 0x1FFFF }, ++ { 0x2FFFE, 0x2FFFF }, ++ { 0x3FFFE, 0x3FFFF }, ++ { 0x4FFFE, 0x4FFFF }, ++ { 0x5FFFE, 0x5FFFF }, ++ { 0x6FFFE, 0x6FFFF }, ++ { 0x7FFFE, 0x7FFFF }, ++ { 0x8FFFE, 0x8FFFF }, ++ { 0x9FFFE, 0x9FFFF }, ++ { 0xAFFFE, 0xAFFFF }, ++ { 0xBFFFE, 0xBFFFF }, ++ { 0xCFFFE, 0xCFFFF }, ++ { 0xDFFFE, 0xDFFFF }, ++ { 0xEFFFE, 0xEFFFF }, ++ { 0xFFFFE, 0xFFFFF }, ++ { 0x10FFFE, 0x10FFFF }, ++ /* C.5 Surrogate codes */ ++ { 0xD800, 0xDFFF }, ++ /* C.6 Inappropriate for plain text */ ++ { 0xFFF9, 0xFFF9 }, ++ { 0xFFFA, 0xFFFA }, ++ { 0xFFFB, 0xFFFB }, ++ { 0xFFFC, 0xFFFC }, ++ { 0xFFFD, 0xFFFD }, ++ /* C.7 Inappropriate for canonical representation */ ++ { 0x2FF0, 0x2FFB }, ++ /* C.8 Change display properties or are deprecated */ ++ { 0x0340, 0x0340 }, ++ { 0x0341, 0x0341 }, ++ { 0x200E, 0x200E }, ++ { 0x200F, 0x200F }, ++ { 0x202A, 0x202A }, ++ { 0x202B, 0x202B }, ++ { 0x202C, 0x202C }, ++ { 0x202D, 0x202D }, ++ { 0x202E, 0x202E }, ++ { 0x206A, 0x206A }, ++ { 0x206B, 0x206B }, ++ { 0x206C, 0x206C }, ++ { 0x206D, 0x206D }, ++ { 0x206E, 0x206E }, ++ { 0x206F, 0x206F }, ++ /* C.9 Tagging characters */ ++ { 0xE0001, 0xE0001 }, ++ { 0xE0020, 0xE007F }, ++}; ++ +diff --git a/utf8_stringprep.c b/utf8_stringprep.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..bcafae7 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/utf8_stringprep.c +@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * This is a simple RFC3454 stringprep profile to sanitise UTF-8 strings ++ * from untrusted sources. ++ * ++ * It is intended to be used prior to display of untrusted strings only. ++ * It should not be used for logging because of bi-di ambiguity. It ++ * should also not be used in any case where lack of normalisation may ++ * cause problems. ++ * ++ * This profile uses the prohibition and mapping tables from RFC3454 ++ * (listed below) but the unassigned character table has been updated to ++ * Unicode 6.2. It uses a local whitelist of whitespace characters (\n, ++ * \a and \t). Unicode normalisation and bi-di testing are not used. ++ * ++ * XXX: implement bi-di handling (needed for logs) ++ * XXX: implement KC normalisation (needed for passing to libs/syscalls) ++ */ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "misc.h" ++ ++struct u32_range { ++ u_int32_t lo, hi; /* Inclusive */ ++}; ++ ++#include "stringprep-tables.c" ++ ++/* Returns 1 if code 'c' appears in the table or 0 otherwise */ ++static int ++code_in_table(u_int32_t c, const struct u32_range *table, size_t tlen) ++{ ++ const struct u32_range *e, *end = (void *)(tlen + (char *)table); ++ ++ for (e = table; e < end; e++) { ++ if (c >= e->lo && c <= e->hi) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Decode the next valid UCS character from a UTF-8 string, skipping past bad ++ * codes. Returns the decoded character or 0 for end-of-string and updates ++ * nextc to point to the start of the next character (if any). ++ * had_error is set if an invalid code was encountered. ++ */ ++static u_int32_t ++decode_utf8(const char *in, const char **nextc, int *had_error) ++{ ++ int state = 0; ++ size_t i; ++ u_int32_t c, e; ++ ++ e = c = 0; ++ for (i = 0; in[i] != '\0'; i++) { ++ e = (u_char)in[i]; ++ /* Invalid code point state */ ++ if (state == -1) { ++ /* ++ * Continue eating continuation characters until ++ * a new start character comes along. ++ */ ++ if ((e & 0xc0) == 0x80) ++ continue; ++ state = 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* New code point state */ ++ if (state == 0) { ++ if ((e & 0x80) == 0) { /* 7 bit code */ ++ c = e & 0x7f; ++ goto have_code; ++ } else if ((e & 0xe0) == 0xc0) { /* 11 bit code point */ ++ state = 1; ++ c = (e & 0x1f) << 6; ++ } else if ((e & 0xf0) == 0xe0) { /* 16 bit code point */ ++ state = 2; ++ c = (e & 0xf) << 12; ++ } else if ((e & 0xf8) == 0xf0) { /* 21 bit code point */ ++ state = 3; ++ c = (e & 0x7) << 18; ++ } else { ++ /* A five or six byte header, or 0xff */ ++ goto bad_encoding; ++ } ++ /* ++ * Check that the header byte has some non-zero data ++ * after masking off the length marker. If not it is ++ * an invalid encoding. ++ */ ++ if (c == 0) { ++ bad_encoding: ++ c = 0; ++ state = -1; ++ if (had_error != NULL) ++ *had_error = 1; ++ } ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* Sanity check: should never happen */ ++ if (state < 1 || state > 5) { ++ *nextc = NULL; ++ if (had_error != NULL) ++ *had_error = 1; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* Multibyte code point state */ ++ state--; ++ c |= (e & 0x3f) << (state * 6); ++ if (state > 0) ++ continue; ++ ++ /* RFC3629 bans codepoints > U+10FFFF */ ++ if (c > 0x10FFFF) { ++ if (had_error != NULL) ++ *had_error = 1; ++ continue; ++ } ++ have_code: ++ *nextc = in + i + 1; ++ return c; ++ } ++ if (state != 0 && had_error != NULL) ++ *had_error = 1; ++ *nextc = in + i; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Attempt to encode a UCS character as a UTF-8 sequence. Returns the number ++ * of characters used or -1 on error (insufficient space or bad code). ++ */ ++static int ++encode_utf8(u_int32_t c, char *s, size_t slen) ++{ ++ size_t i, need; ++ u_char h; ++ ++ if (c < 0x80) { ++ if (slen >= 1) { ++ s[0] = (char)c; ++ } ++ return 1; ++ } else if (c < 0x800) { ++ need = 2; ++ h = 0xc0; ++ } else if (c < 0x10000) { ++ need = 3; ++ h = 0xe0; ++ } else if (c < 0x200000) { ++ need = 4; ++ h = 0xf0; ++ } else { ++ /* Invalid code point > U+10FFFF */ ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (need > slen) ++ return -1; ++ for (i = 0; i < need; i++) { ++ s[i] = (i == 0 ? h : 0x80); ++ s[i] |= (c >> (need - i - 1) * 6) & 0x3f; ++ } ++ return need; ++} ++ ++ ++/* ++ * Normalise a UTF-8 string using the RFC3454 stringprep algorithm. ++ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (prohibited code or insufficient ++ * length in the output string. ++ * Requires an output buffer at most the same length as the input. ++ */ ++int ++utf8_stringprep(const char *in, char *out, size_t olen) ++{ ++ int r; ++ size_t o; ++ u_int32_t c; ++ ++ if (olen < 1) ++ return -1; ++ ++ for (o = 0; (c = decode_utf8(in, &in, NULL)) != 0;) { ++ /* Mapping */ ++ if (code_in_table(c, map_to_nothing, sizeof(map_to_nothing))) ++ continue; ++ ++ /* Prohibitied output */ ++ if (code_in_table(c, prohibited, sizeof(prohibited)) && ++ !code_in_table(c, whitelist, sizeof(whitelist))) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* Map unassigned code points to U+FFFD */ ++ if (code_in_table(c, unassigned, sizeof(unassigned))) ++ c = 0xFFFD; ++ ++ /* Encode the character */ ++ r = encode_utf8(c, out + o, olen - o - 1); ++ if (r < 0) ++ return -1; ++ o += r; ++ } ++ out[o] = '\0'; ++ return 0; ++} ++ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3bd0a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index 38de846..1603a07 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ ++20140420 ++ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10 ++ [sshconnect.c] ++ When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any ++ certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. ++ ++ Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey ++ dialog by offering only certificate keys. ++ ++ Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk ++ + 20140313 + - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6 + +diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c +index 394cca8..e636f33 100644 +--- a/sshconnect.c ++++ b/sshconnect.c +@@ -1219,30 +1219,40 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) + { + int flags = 0; + char *fp; ++ Key *plain = NULL; + + fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key), + key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + +- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ +- if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns && +- verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) { +- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { +- +- if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && +- flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && +- flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) +- return 0; +- +- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { +- matching_host_key_dns = 1; +- } else { +- warn_changed_key(host_key); +- error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " +- "host key to get rid of this message."); ++ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { ++ /* ++ * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade ++ * them and try the plain key. ++ */ ++ plain = key_from_private(host_key); ++ if (key_is_cert(plain)) ++ key_drop_cert(plain); ++ if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { ++ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { ++ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && ++ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && ++ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { ++ key_free(plain); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { ++ matching_host_key_dns = 1; ++ } else { ++ warn_changed_key(plain); ++ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " ++ "with the new host key to get rid " ++ "of this message."); ++ } + } + } ++ key_free(plain); + } + + return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a60d608 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 0a4930e..a7c0c5f 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, + FILE *fp; + char file[MAXPATHLEN]; + char line[BUFSIZ]; +- char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */ + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; + int found_principal = 0; +@@ -269,7 +268,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, + + snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); + /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ +- if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { ++ if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) { + return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser, + k5login_exists); + } +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index d482e79..ad5869b 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->version_addendum = NULL; + options->use_kuserok = -1; ++ options->enable_k5users = -1; + } + + void +@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->show_patchlevel = 0; + if (options->use_kuserok == -1) + options->use_kuserok = 1; ++ if (options->enable_k5users == -1) ++ options->enable_k5users = 0; + + /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ + if (use_privsep == -1) +@@ -356,7 +359,7 @@ typedef enum { + sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, +@@ -430,6 +433,7 @@ static struct { + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -437,6 +441,7 @@ static struct { + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #endif + { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1536,6 +1541,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + intptr = &options->use_kuserok; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssEnablek5users: ++ intptr = &options->enable_k5users; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPermitOpen: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') +@@ -1824,6 +1833,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); + M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); ++ M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + +@@ -2076,6 +2086,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users); + + /* string arguments */ + dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 5117dfa..d63cb71 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ typedef struct { + + int num_permitted_opens; + +- int use_kuserok; ++ int use_kuserok; ++ int enable_k5users; + char *chroot_directory; + char *revoked_keys_file; + char *trusted_user_ca_keys; +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 43671f6..6ab00ed 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes + GSSAPICleanupCredentials no + #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes + #GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index e0e5fff..aa9525d 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users ++Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication ++access control. Further details are described in ++.Xr ksu 1 . ++The default is ++.Dq no . + .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck + Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor + a client authenticates against. If diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e56d8aa --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +index a61a8c9..97ce58c 100644 +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -165,12 +165,29 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr) + option_size = sizeof(options); + if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options, + &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { +- text[0] = '\0'; +- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) +- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, +- " %2.2x", options[i]); +- fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", +- ipaddr, text); ++ i = 0; ++ do { ++ switch (options[i]) { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ ++i; ++ break; ++ case 130: ++ case 133: ++ case 134: ++ i += options[i + 1]; ++ break; ++ default: ++ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict ++ * source routing options. */ ++ text[0] = '\0'; ++ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) ++ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, ++ " %2.2x", options[i]); ++ fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", ++ ipaddr, text); ++ } ++ } while (i < option_size); + } + #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ + } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7720c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2312 @@ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 0f0d39f..9d8c2eb 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ + ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o utf8_stringprep.o \ +- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o ++ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ ++ auditstub.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ + sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ +diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c +index 6135591..5160869 100644 +--- a/audit-bsm.c ++++ b/audit-bsm.c +@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) + #endif + } + +-void ++int + audit_run_command(const char *command) + { + /* not implemented */ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ /* not necessary */ + } + + void +@@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + /* not implemented */ + } + ++int ++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ + void + audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + { +@@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + } + } ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} + #endif /* BSM */ +diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c +index b3ee2f4..946f7fa 100644 +--- a/audit-linux.c ++++ b/audit-linux.c +@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@ + + #include "log.h" + #include "audit.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++#include "servconf.h" + #include "canohost.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "cipher.h" + ++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern u_int utmp_len; + const char* audit_username(void); + +-int +-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, +- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) ++static void ++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, ++ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) + { + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + +@@ -49,11 +60,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) +- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else +- return 0; /* Must prevent login */ ++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ + } +- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, + NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", + username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; +@@ -65,35 +76,150 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; +- return (rc >= 0); ++ if (rc < 0) { ++fatal_report: ++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ } + } + ++static void ++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, ++ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) ++{ ++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ static const char *event_name[] = { ++ "maxtries exceeded", ++ "root denied", ++ "success", ++ "none", ++ "password", ++ "challenge-response", ++ "pubkey", ++ "hostbased", ++ "gssapi", ++ "invalid user", ++ "nologin", ++ "connection closed", ++ "connection abandoned", ++ "unknown" ++ }; ++ ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ ++ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) ++ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; ++ ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, ++ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", ++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); ++ saved_errno = errno; ++ close(audit_fd); ++ /* ++ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non ++ * root user. ++ */ ++ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) ++ rc = 0; ++ errno = saved_errno; ++ if (rc < 0) { ++fatal_report: ++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ } ++} ++ ++int ++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ return 0; /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); ++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ goto out; ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", ++ type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); ++out: ++ saved_errno = errno; ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ errno = saved_errno; ++ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); ++} ++ ++static int user_login_count = 0; ++ + /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ + + void + audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) + { +-} + /* not implemented */ ++} + +-void ++int + audit_run_command(const char *command) + { +- /* not implemented */ ++ if (!user_login_count++) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void ++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ user_login_count++; + } + + void + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { +- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, +- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) +- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (!user_login_count++) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + } + + void + audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + { +- /* not implemented */ ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + + void +@@ -101,21 +227,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + { + switch(event) { + case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: +- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); ++ break; ++ + case SSH_NOLOGIN: +- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + ++ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); ++ break; ++ ++ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: ++ if (user_login_count) { ++ while (user_login_count--) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), ++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: +- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, +- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, ++ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + + default: +@@ -123,4 +271,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + } + } + ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; ++ char *s; ++ int audit_fd; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), ++ get_local_port()); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) ++ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ ++ return; ++ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, ++ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++} ++ ++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; ++ ++void ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); ++ char *s; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, ++ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, ++ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, ++ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ ++#endif ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ char *s; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, ++ get_remote_port(), ++ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), ++ get_local_port()); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", ++ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, ++ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(), ++ NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} + #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ +diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c +index ced57fa..13c6849 100644 +--- a/audit.c ++++ b/audit.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + +@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ + #include "key.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" + + /* + * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when +@@ -71,13 +75,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) + const char * + audit_username(void) + { +- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; +- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; ++ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; + +- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) ++ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + return (unknownuser); +- if (!the_authctxt->valid) +- return (invaliduser); + return (the_authctxt->user); + } + +@@ -111,6 +112,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) + return(event_lookup[i].name); + } + ++void ++audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) ++{ ++ char *fp; ++ const char *crypto_name; ++ ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) ++ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; ++ else ++ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); ++ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) ++ *rv = 0; ++ free(fp); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(int what) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid())); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(int ctos) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); ++} ++ + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* + * Null implementations of audit functions. +@@ -140,6 +175,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + } + + /* ++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, ++ * audit_session_open. ++ */ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), ++ audit_username()); ++} ++ ++/* + * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to + * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. + * +@@ -174,13 +220,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + /* + * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows +- * multiple sessions within a single connection. ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for ++ * audit_end_command. + */ +-void ++int + audit_run_command(const char *command) + { + debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that ++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from ++ * the corresponding audit_run_command. ++ */ ++void ++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), ++ audit_username(), command); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. ++ * ++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. ++ */ ++int ++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", ++ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. ++ */ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. ++ */ ++void ++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid, ++ (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard ++ */ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key ++ */ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key ++ */ ++void ++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) ++{ ++ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); + } + # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h +index 92ede5b..a2dc3ff 100644 +--- a/audit.h ++++ b/audit.h +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + # define _SSH_AUDIT_H + + #include "loginrec.h" ++#include "key.h" + + enum ssh_audit_event_type { + SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, +@@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { + }; + typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; + ++int listening_for_clients(void); ++ + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); + void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); ++void audit_count_session_open(void); + void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); + void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); +-void audit_run_command(const char *); ++int audit_run_command(const char *); ++void audit_end_command(int, const char *); + ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); ++int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); ++void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); ++void audit_unsupported(int); ++void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *); ++void audit_unsupported_body(int); ++void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); ++void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); + + #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ +diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..45817e0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/auditstub.c +@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ ++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima ++ */ ++ ++#include ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(int n) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(int ctos) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++} +diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c +index 5dad6c3..f225b0b 100644 +--- a/auth-rsa.c ++++ b/auth-rsa.c +@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) + { + u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; +- int len; ++ int len, rv; ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ char *fp; ++#endif + + /* don't allow short keys */ + if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { +@@ -117,12 +120,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) + ssh_digest_free(md); + + /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ +- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { +- /* Wrong answer. */ +- return (0); ++ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0; ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { ++ debug("unsuccessful audit"); ++ rv = 0; + } +- /* Correct answer. */ +- return (1); ++ free(fp); ++#endif ++ ++ return rv; + } + + /* +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index 420a85b..d613f8c 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -628,9 +628,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) + record_failed_login(user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); + #endif +-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); +-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + return (NULL); + } + if (!allowed_user(pw)) +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index 4605588..f9d191c 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *); + + char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); + char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); ++int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); + + FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); + FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); +@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int); + int get_hostkey_index(Key *); + int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); + void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); ++int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); + + /* debug messages during authentication */ + void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c +index 95d678e..48aede4 100644 +--- a/auth2-hostbased.c ++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c +@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) + /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && +- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), ++ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + buffer_len(&b))) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + +@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ done: + return authenticated; + } + ++int ++hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ ++ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_key(0, &rv, key); ++#endif ++ return rv; ++} ++ + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ + int + hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index cb0f931..6d1c872 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) + /* test for correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && +- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), ++ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + buffer_len(&b))) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + buffer_free(&b); +@@ -231,6 +231,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) + free(extra); + } + ++int ++user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ ++ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_key(1, &rv, key); ++#endif ++ return rv; ++} ++ + static int + match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert) + { +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 426dcd6..436cd60 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -249,9 +249,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + } else { + logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); +-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); +-#endif + } + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c +index 53d9b4f..226e56d 100644 +--- a/cipher.c ++++ b/cipher.c +@@ -57,20 +57,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void); + extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); + extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); + +-struct Cipher { +- char *name; +- int number; /* for ssh1 only */ +- u_int block_size; +- u_int key_len; +- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ +- u_int auth_len; +- u_int discard_len; +- u_int flags; +-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) +-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +-}; +- + static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { + { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, + { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, +diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h +index 133d2e7..d41758e 100644 +--- a/cipher.h ++++ b/cipher.h +@@ -63,7 +63,20 @@ + typedef struct Cipher Cipher; + typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext; + +-struct Cipher; ++struct Cipher { ++ char *name; ++ int number; /* for ssh1 only */ ++ u_int block_size; ++ u_int key_len; ++ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ ++ u_int auth_len; ++ u_int discard_len; ++ u_int flags; ++#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) ++#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) ++ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); ++}; ++ + struct CipherContext { + int plaintext; + int encrypt; +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index bce2ab8..bc3e53e 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ + #include "monitor.h" + #include "roaming.h" + #include "digest.h" ++#include "audit.h" + + #ifdef GSSAPI + #include "ssh-gss.h" +@@ -366,9 +367,13 @@ static void + choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(0); ++#endif + fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", + client, server); ++ } + if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) + fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name); + enc->name = name; +@@ -384,9 +389,13 @@ static void + choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(1); ++#endif + fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", + client, server); ++ } + if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) + fatal("unsupported mac %s", name); + /* truncate the key */ +@@ -401,8 +410,12 @@ static void + choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(2); ++#endif + fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server); ++ } + if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { + comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; + } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { +@@ -517,6 +530,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) + newkeys->enc.name, + authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", + newkeys->comp.name); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name); ++#endif + } + choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], +@@ -702,3 +718,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } + #endif ++ ++static void ++enc_destroy(Enc *enc) ++{ ++ if (enc == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (enc->key) { ++ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); ++ free(enc->key); ++ } ++ ++ if (enc->iv) { ++ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); ++ free(enc->iv); ++ } ++ ++ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); ++} ++ ++void ++newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys) ++{ ++ if (newkeys == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); ++ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); ++ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); ++} ++ +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index 313bb51..c643250 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ void kexgss_client(Kex *); + void kexgss_server(Kex *); + #endif + ++void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); ++ + void + kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, + BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); +diff --git a/key.c b/key.c +index 900b9e3..62f3edb 100644 +--- a/key.c ++++ b/key.c +@@ -1925,6 +1925,33 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) + } + + int ++key_is_private(const Key *k) ++{ ++ switch (k->type) { ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_RSA1: ++ case KEY_RSA: ++ return k->rsa->d != NULL; ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_DSA: ++ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_ECDSA: ++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; ++#endif ++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: ++ case KEY_ED25519: ++ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); ++ default: ++ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); ++ return 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++int + key_is_cert(const Key *k) + { + if (k == NULL) +diff --git a/key.h b/key.h +index d51ed81..8f61605 100644 +--- a/key.h ++++ b/key.h +@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Key *key_generate(int, u_int); + Key *key_from_private(const Key *); + int key_type_from_name(char *); + int key_is_cert(const Key *); ++int key_is_private(const Key *k); + int key_type_is_cert(int); + int key_type_plain(int); + int key_to_certified(Key *, int); +diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c +index 0977572..9388af4 100644 +--- a/mac.c ++++ b/mac.c +@@ -222,6 +222,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac) + mac->umac_ctx = NULL; + } + ++void ++mac_destroy(Mac *mac) ++{ ++ if (mac == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (mac->key) { ++ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); ++ free(mac->key); ++ } ++ ++ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); ++} ++ + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ + #define MAC_SEP "," + int +diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h +index fbe18c4..7dc7f43 100644 +--- a/mac.h ++++ b/mac.h +@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *); + int mac_init(Mac *); + u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int); + void mac_clear(Mac *); ++void mac_destroy(Mac *); +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 8b18086..5a65114 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ + #include "ssh2.h" + #include "roaming.h" + #include "authfd.h" ++#include "audit.h" + + #ifdef GSSAPI + static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; +@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; + extern int auth_debug_init; + extern Buffer loginmsg; + ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); ++ + /* State exported from the child */ + + struct { +@@ -185,6 +188,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); +@@ -239,6 +247,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { + #endif + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + #ifdef BSD_AUTH + {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, +@@ -274,6 +286,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -305,6 +322,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { + #endif + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -316,6 +337,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = { + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -1393,9 +1419,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) + Key *key; + u_char *signature, *data, *blob; + u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; ++ int type = 0; + int verified = 0; + int valid_data = 0; + ++ type = buffer_get_int(m); + blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); + signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); + data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); +@@ -1403,6 +1431,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) + if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || + !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) + fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); ++ if (type != key_blobtype) ++ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); + + key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); + if (key == NULL) +@@ -1423,7 +1453,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) + if (!valid_data) + fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); + +- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); ++ switch (key_blobtype) { ++ case MM_USERKEY: ++ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); ++ break; ++ case MM_HOSTKEY: ++ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); ++ break; ++ default: ++ verified = 0; ++ break; ++ } + debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", + __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); + +@@ -1476,6 +1516,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) + debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); + session_pty_cleanup2(s); + } ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); ++ session_end_command2(s); ++ } ++#endif + session_unused(s->self); + } + +@@ -1756,6 +1802,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) + sshpam_cleanup(); + #endif + ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); ++ + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + exit(1); +@@ -1798,11 +1846,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) + { + u_int len; + char *cmd; ++ Session *s; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ +- audit_run_command(cmd); ++ s = session_new(); ++ if (s == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); ++ s->command = cmd; ++ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, s->self); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int handle; ++ u_int len; ++ char *cmd; ++ Session *s; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ handle = buffer_get_int(m); ++ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ ++ s = session_by_id(handle); ++ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || ++ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); ++ mm_session_close(s); + free(cmd); + return (0); + } +@@ -1946,11 +2026,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) + + blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); + current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); + blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); + current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */ +@@ -1996,6 +2078,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) + } + + buffer_free(&m); ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (compat20) { ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); ++ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ ; ++ + } + + +@@ -2277,3 +2374,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { + + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++int ++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int what; ++ ++ what = buffer_get_int(m); ++ ++ audit_unsupported_body(what); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int ctos, len; ++ char *cipher, *mac, *compress; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); ++ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ ++ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid); ++ ++ free(cipher); ++ free(mac); ++ free(compress); ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int ctos; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); ++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ ++ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ int len; ++ char *fp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); ++ ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); ++ ++ free(fp); ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index ff79fbb..6dfb234 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, +- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125 + + }; + +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index d1e1caa..6df236a 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) + */ + + int +-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) + { + Buffer m; + u_char *blob; +@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) + return (0); + + buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, type); + buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); + buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); + buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); +@@ -481,6 +482,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) + return (verified); + } + ++int ++mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) ++{ ++ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); ++} ++ ++ + /* Export key state after authentication */ + Newkeys * + mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) +@@ -659,12 +673,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) + fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); + + buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) + fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); + + buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); ++ memset(blob, 0, bloblen); + free(blob); + + packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); +@@ -1208,10 +1224,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + buffer_free(&m); + } + +-void ++int + mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) + { + Buffer m; ++ int handle; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + +@@ -1219,6 +1236,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) + buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); ++ ++ handle = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (handle); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, handle); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); + buffer_free(&m); + } + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +@@ -1354,3 +1391,71 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) + + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++void ++mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, what); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, ++ &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, ++ &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, ++ &m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); ++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, ++ &m); ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 93929e0..4cf0c78 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *); + int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); + int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); + int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); +-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); ++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); ++int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); + int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); + int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); + BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); +@@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + #include "audit.h" + void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); ++int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); ++void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); ++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); ++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); + #endif + + struct Session; +diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c +index 660a9fc..f5b122b 100644 +--- a/packet.c ++++ b/packet.c +@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ + #include + + #include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "buffer.h" + #include "packet.h" + #include "crc32.h" +@@ -476,6 +477,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void) + return active_state->connection_out; + } + ++static int ++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) ++{ ++ return state != NULL && ++ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); ++} ++ + /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ + + void +@@ -484,13 +492,6 @@ packet_close(void) + if (!active_state->initialized) + return; + active_state->initialized = 0; +- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { +- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); +- close(active_state->connection_out); +- } else { +- close(active_state->connection_in); +- close(active_state->connection_out); +- } + buffer_free(&active_state->input); + buffer_free(&active_state->output); + buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); +@@ -499,8 +500,18 @@ packet_close(void) + buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer); + buffer_compress_uninit(); + } +- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); +- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); ++ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) { ++ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); ++ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); ++ audit_session_key_free(2); ++ } ++ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { ++ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); ++ close(active_state->connection_out); ++ } else { ++ close(active_state->connection_in); ++ close(active_state->connection_out); ++ } + } + + /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ +@@ -736,6 +747,25 @@ packet_send1(void) + */ + } + ++static void ++newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys) ++{ ++ if (newkeys == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ free(newkeys->enc.name); ++ ++ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { ++ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); ++ free(newkeys->mac.name); ++ } ++ ++ free(newkeys->comp.name); ++ ++ newkeys_destroy(newkeys); ++ free(newkeys); ++} ++ + void + set_newkeys(int mode) + { +@@ -761,6 +791,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode) + } + if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { + debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); ++ audit_session_key_free(mode); + cipher_cleanup(cc); + enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; + mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; +@@ -2011,6 +2042,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) + return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode]; + } + ++static void ++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) ++{ ++ if (state == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); ++ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); ++ ++ buffer_free(&state->input); ++ buffer_free(&state->output); ++ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet); ++ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet); ++ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer); ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); ++ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); ++ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; ++ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); ++// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; ++// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); ++} ++ ++void ++packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) ++{ ++ if (audit_it) ++ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) || ++ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state); ++ packet_destroy_state(active_state); ++ packet_destroy_state(backup_state); ++ if (audit_it) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (privsep) ++ audit_session_key_free(2); ++ else ++ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); ++#endif ++ } ++} ++ + /* + * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when + * resuming a suspended connection. +@@ -2018,18 +2090,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) + void + packet_backup_state(void) + { +- struct session_state *tmp; +- + close(active_state->connection_in); + active_state->connection_in = -1; + close(active_state->connection_out); + active_state->connection_out = -1; +- if (backup_state) +- tmp = backup_state; +- else +- tmp = alloc_session_state(); + backup_state = active_state; +- active_state = tmp; ++ active_state = alloc_session_state(); + } + + /* +@@ -2046,9 +2112,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void) + backup_state = active_state; + active_state = tmp; + active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in; +- backup_state->connection_in = -1; + active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out; +- backup_state->connection_out = -1; + len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input); + if (len > 0) { + buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input); +@@ -2056,4 +2120,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void) + buffer_clear(&backup_state->input); + add_recv_bytes(len); + } ++ backup_state->connection_in = -1; ++ backup_state->connection_out = -1; ++ packet_destroy_state(backup_state); ++ free(backup_state); ++ backup_state = NULL; + } ++ +diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h +index f8edf85..c36c812 100644 +--- a/packet.h ++++ b/packet.h +@@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void); + void *packet_get_input(void); + void *packet_get_output(void); + ++void packet_destroy_all(int, int); + #endif /* PACKET_H */ +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index df43592..b186ca1 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ extern int log_stderr; + extern int debug_flag; + extern u_int utmp_len; + extern int startup_pipe; +-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + extern Buffer loginmsg; + + /* original command from peer. */ +@@ -746,6 +746,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) + /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + ++#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA ++ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, ++ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely ++ ugly. */ ++ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) ++ audit_count_session_open(); ++#endif ++ + /* Enter interactive session. */ + s->ptymaster = ptymaster; + packet_set_interactive(1, +@@ -863,15 +871,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + get_remote_port()); + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) ++ fatal("do_exec: command already set"); + if (command != NULL) +- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); ++ s->command = xstrdup(command); + else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { + char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; + + if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ + shell =_PATH_BSHELL; +- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); ++ s->command = xstrdup(shell); + } ++ if (s->command != NULL) ++ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); + #endif + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); +@@ -1708,7 +1720,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) + int r = 0; + + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(1); ++ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the ++ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ ++ packet_destroy_all(0, 1); + + /* Force a password change */ + if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { +@@ -1933,6 +1948,7 @@ session_unused(int id) + sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; + sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; + sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; ++ sessions[id].command_handle = -1; + sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; + sessions_first_unused = id; + } +@@ -2015,6 +2031,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) + } + + Session * ++session_by_id(int id) ++{ ++ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { ++ Session *s = &sessions[id]; ++ if (s->used) ++ return s; ++ } ++ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id); ++ session_dump(); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++Session * + session_by_tty(char *tty) + { + int i; +@@ -2531,6 +2560,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) + chan_write_failed(c); + } + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++void ++session_end_command2(Session *s) ++{ ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); ++ free(s->command); ++ s->command = NULL; ++ s->command_handle = -1; ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ++session_end_command(Session *s) ++{ ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); ++ free(s->command); ++ s->command = NULL; ++ s->command_handle = -1; ++ } ++} ++#endif ++ + void + session_close(Session *s) + { +@@ -2539,6 +2592,10 @@ session_close(Session *s) + debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + session_pty_cleanup(s); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command) ++ session_end_command(s); ++#endif + free(s->term); + free(s->display); + free(s->x11_chanids); +@@ -2753,6 +2810,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) + server_loop2(authctxt); + } + ++static void ++do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) ++{ ++ session_pty_cleanup2(s); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ session_end_command2(s); ++#endif ++} ++ + void + do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) + { +@@ -2801,5 +2867,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) + * or if running in monitor. + */ + if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) +- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); ++ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); + } +diff --git a/session.h b/session.h +index 6a2f35e..e9b312e 100644 +--- a/session.h ++++ b/session.h +@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { + char *name; + char *val; + } *env; ++ ++ /* exec */ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ int command_handle; ++ char *command; ++#endif + }; + + void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); +@@ -73,8 +79,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); + void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); + void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); + void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); ++void session_end_command2(Session *); + + Session *session_new(void); ++Session *session_by_id(int); + Session *session_by_tty(char *); + void session_close(Session *); + void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 8a0740a..2813aa2 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ + #endif + #include "monitor_wrap.h" + #include "roaming.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "version.h" + +@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; + struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; + + /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ +-void destroy_sensitive_data(void); ++void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + void demote_sensitive_data(void); + + static void do_ssh1_kex(void); +@@ -283,6 +284,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) + num_listen_socks = -1; + } + ++/* ++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific ++ * client connection?) ++ */ ++int listening_for_clients(void) ++{ ++ return num_listen_socks > 0; ++} ++ + static void + close_startup_pipes(void) + { +@@ -562,22 +572,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) + } + } + +-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ ++/* ++ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, ++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. ++ */ + void +-destroy_sensitive_data(void) ++destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) + { + int i; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; + + if (sensitive_data.server_key) { + key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); + sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; + } ++ pid = getpid(); ++ uid = getuid(); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { ++ char *fp; ++ ++ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], SSH_FP_HEX); ++ else ++ fp = NULL; + key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; ++ if (fp != NULL) { ++ if (privsep) ++ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, ++ pid, uid)); ++ else ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, ++ pid, uid); ++ free(fp); ++ } + } +- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { ++ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates ++ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + } +@@ -591,6 +624,8 @@ void + demote_sensitive_data(void) + { + Key *tmp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; + int i; + + if (sensitive_data.server_key) { +@@ -599,13 +634,25 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) + sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; + } + ++ pid = getpid(); ++ uid = getuid(); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { ++ char *fp; ++ ++ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], SSH_FP_HEX); ++ else ++ fp = NULL; + tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; + if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; ++ if (fp != NULL) { ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); ++ free(fp); ++ } + } + /* Certs do not need demotion */ + } +@@ -675,7 +722,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + + if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) + box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); +- pid = fork(); ++ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); + } else if (pid != 0) { +@@ -729,6 +776,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + } + ++extern Newkeys *current_keys[]; ++ + static void + privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + { +@@ -753,6 +802,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + buffer_clear(&loginmsg); ++ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]); ++ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]); ++ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); ++ packet_destroy_all(0, 0); + monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); + + /* NEVERREACHED */ +@@ -1211,6 +1264,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", + (int) received_sigterm); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); + close_listen_socks(); + unlink(options.pid_file); + exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); +@@ -2134,6 +2188,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + */ + if (use_privsep) { + mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); ++ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); + exit(0); + } + +@@ -2179,7 +2234,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + privsep_postauth(authctxt); + /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ + if (!compat20) +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); + } + + packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, +@@ -2189,6 +2244,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + do_authenticated(authctxt); + + /* The connection has been terminated. */ ++ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(1); ++ + packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); + packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", +@@ -2346,6 +2404,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) + if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) + packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none"); ++#endif ++ + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); + + /* Get the encrypted integer. */ +@@ -2418,7 +2480,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) + session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; + } + /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(0); + + if (use_privsep) + mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); +@@ -2584,6 +2646,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + void + cleanup_exit(int i) + { ++ static int in_cleanup = 0; ++ int is_privsep_child; ++ ++ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep ++ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse ++ indefinitely. */ ++ if (in_cleanup) ++ _exit(i); ++ in_cleanup = 1; ++ + if (the_authctxt) { + do_cleanup(the_authctxt); + if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { +@@ -2594,9 +2666,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) + pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); + } + } ++ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; ++ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) ++ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); ++ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ +- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) ++ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && ++ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) + audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); + #endif + _exit(i); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1997fa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 4ab6717..581b121 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign + SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper + SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper + SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat ++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + MANFMT=@MANFMT@ + INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) + + LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ +@@ -180,6 +181,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o + ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(SSHLIBS) + ++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +@@ -288,6 +292,7 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ + fi + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 +diff --git a/ctr-cavstest.c b/ctr-cavstest.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..bbcbe8a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ctr-cavstest.c +@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ ++/* ++ * ++ * invocation (all of the following are equal): ++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 ++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000 ++ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++ ++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ ++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" ++ ++void usage(void) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo \n" ++ " --key --mode \n" ++ " [--iv ] --data \n\n" ++ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n" ++ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n"); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len) ++{ ++ unsigned char *bin; ++ char *p; ++ size_t n = 0; ++ int shift = 4; ++ unsigned char out = 0; ++ unsigned char *optr; ++ ++ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2); ++ optr = bin; ++ ++ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) { ++ unsigned char c; ++ ++ c = *p; ++ if (isspace(c)) ++ continue; ++ ++ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { ++ c = c - '0'; ++ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') { ++ c = c - 'A' + 10; ++ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') { ++ c = c - 'a' + 10; ++ } else { ++ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */ ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ out |= c << shift; ++ shift = (shift + 4) % 8; ++ ++ if (shift) { ++ *(optr++) = out; ++ out = 0; ++ ++n; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ *len = n; ++ return bin; ++} ++ ++#define READ_CHUNK 4096 ++#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100 ++char *read_stdin(void) ++{ ++ char *buf; ++ size_t n, total = 0; ++ ++ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK); ++ ++ do { ++ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin); ++ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */ ++ break; ++ ++ total += n; ++ buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1); ++ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE); ++ return buf; ++} ++ ++int main (int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ ++ const Cipher *c; ++ CipherContext cc; ++ char *algo = "aes128-ctr"; ++ char *hexkey = NULL; ++ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; ++ char *hexdata = NULL; ++ char *p; ++ int i; ++ int encrypt = 1; ++ void *key; ++ size_t keylen; ++ void *iv; ++ size_t ivlen; ++ void *data; ++ size_t datalen; ++ void *outdata; ++ ++ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { ++ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) { ++ algo = argv[++i]; ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) { ++ hexkey = argv[++i]; ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) { ++ ++i; ++ if (argv[i] == NULL) { ++ usage(); ++ } ++ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) { ++ encrypt = 1; ++ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) { ++ encrypt = 0; ++ } else { ++ usage(); ++ } ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) { ++ hexiv = argv[++i]; ++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) { ++ hexdata = argv[++i]; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) { ++ usage(); ++ } ++ ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ ++ c = cipher_by_name(algo); ++ if (c == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ if (hexdata == NULL) { ++ hexdata = read_stdin(); ++ } else { ++ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata); ++ } ++ ++ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen); ++ ++ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen); ++ ++ if (ivlen != 16) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen); ++ ++ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt); ++ ++ free(key); ++ free(iv); ++ ++ outdata = malloc(datalen); ++ if(outdata == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n"); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ ++ cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0); ++ ++ free(data); ++ ++ cipher_cleanup(&cc); ++ ++ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) { ++ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p); ++ } ++ ++ free(outdata); ++ ++ printf("\n"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67bd30f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c +index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644 +--- a/entropy.c ++++ b/entropy.c +@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void) + memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + + #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++ linux_seed(); ++#endif /* __linux__ */ + if (RAND_status() != 1) + fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); + } +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +index b912dbe..9206337 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in ++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di + + COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o + +-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o ++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o + + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..92a617c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c +@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ ++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "port-linux.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++ ++void ++linux_seed(void) ++{ ++ int len; ++ char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"); ++ char *random = "/dev/random"; ++ size_t ienv, randlen = 14; ++ ++ if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0")) ++ random = "/dev/urandom"; ++ else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen) ++ randlen = ienv; ++ ++ errno = 0; ++ if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) { ++ if (errno) ++ fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno)); ++ else ++ fatal ("EOF reading %s", random); ++ } ++} +diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0 +index ba43fee..0b2629a 100644 +--- a/ssh-add.0 ++++ b/ssh-add.0 +@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT + Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate + with the agent. + ++ SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++ The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done ++ from /dev/urandom. If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari- ++ able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is ++ reseeded from /dev/random. The number of bytes read is defined ++ by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. Minimum is 14 bytes. This set- ++ ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++ random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec- ++ tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++ + FILES + ~/.ssh/identity + Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of +diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1 +index 4812448..16305bf 100644 +--- a/ssh-add.1 ++++ b/ssh-add.1 +@@ -161,6 +161,20 @@ to make this work.) + Identifies the path of a + .Ux Ns -domain + socket used to communicate with the agent. ++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. + .El + .Sh FILES + .Bl -tag -width Ds +diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1 +index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.1 ++++ b/ssh-agent.1 +@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. + These sockets should only be readable by the owner. + The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr ssh 1 , + .Xr ssh-add 1 , +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1 +index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.1 ++++ b/ssh-keygen.1 +@@ -832,6 +832,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. + The file format is described in + .Xr moduli 5 . + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr ssh 1 , + .Xr ssh-add 1 , +diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8 +index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644 +--- a/ssh-keysign.8 ++++ b/ssh-keysign.8 +@@ -80,6 +80,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used. + If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate + information corresponding with the private keys above. + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr ssh 1 , + .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 +index 929904b..f65e42f 100644 +--- a/ssh.1 ++++ b/ssh.1 +@@ -1309,6 +1309,23 @@ For more information, see the + .Cm PermitUserEnvironment + option in + .Xr sshd_config 5 . ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh FILES + .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact + .It Pa ~/.rhosts +diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 +index c2c237f..058d37a 100644 +--- a/sshd.8 ++++ b/sshd.8 +@@ -951,6 +951,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one + started last). + The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. + .El ++.Sh ENVIRONMENT ++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact ++.Pp ++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from ++.Cm /dev/urandom . ++If the ++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG ++environment variable is set to value other than ++.Cm 0 ++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from ++.Cm /dev/random . ++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. ++Minimum is 14 bytes. ++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware ++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to ++be blocked until enough entropy is available. ++.El + .Sh IPV6 + IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. + .Sh SEE ALSO diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5332fb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index 9a36f1d..420a85b 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) + case 1: + revoked: + /* Key revoked */ +- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); + error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked " +- "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp); ++ "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp); + free(key_fp); + return 1; + } +diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c +index 488008f..eca0069 100644 +--- a/auth2-hostbased.c ++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c +@@ -206,16 +206,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, + + if (host_status == HOST_OK) { + if (key_is_cert(key)) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, ++ SSH_FP_HEX); + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " +- "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, +- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, ++ "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, ++ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, + cuser, lookup); + } else { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", +- key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s", ++ key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), ++ fp, cuser, lookup); + } + free(fp); + } +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index 0fd27bb..749b11a 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) + continue; + if (!key_is_cert_authority) + continue; +- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", +- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s", ++ file, linenum, key_type(found), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + /* + * If the user has specified a list of principals as + * a key option, then prefer that list to matching +@@ -406,9 +406,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) + if (key_is_cert_authority) + continue; + found_key = 1; +- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", +- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s", ++ key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + break; + } +@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) + if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) + return 0; + +- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + + if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) { +- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, +- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, ++ debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, ++ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys); + goto out; + } +diff --git a/key.c b/key.c +index 168e1b7..eb98ea8 100644 +--- a/key.c ++++ b/key.c +@@ -628,6 +628,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) + return retval; + } + ++enum fp_type ++key_fingerprint_selection(void) ++{ ++ static enum fp_type rv; ++ static char rv_defined = 0; ++ char *env; ++ ++ if (!rv_defined) { ++ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); ++ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? ++ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ rv_defined = 1; ++ } ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++char * ++key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) ++{ ++ return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep); ++} ++ ++char * ++key_fingerprint_prefix(void) ++{ ++ return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : ""; ++} ++ + /* + * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances + * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is +diff --git a/key.h b/key.h +index d8ad13d..0e3eea5 100644 +--- a/key.h ++++ b/key.h +@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *); + int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *); + char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); + u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); ++enum fp_type key_fingerprint_selection(void); ++char *key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep); ++char *key_fingerprint_prefix(void); + const char *key_type(const Key *); + const char *key_cert_type(const Key *); + int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); +diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c +index 3421452..691949f 100644 +--- a/ssh-add.c ++++ b/ssh-add.c +@@ -330,10 +330,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp) + key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { + had_identities = 1; + if (do_fp) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_HEX); +- printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", +- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n", ++ key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), ++ fp, comment, key_type(key)); + free(fp); + } else { + if (!key_write(key, stdout)) +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index ba24612..117fdde 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id) + char *p; + int ret = -1; + +- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", +- id->comment, p)) ++ p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.", ++ id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p)) + ret = 0; + free(p); + +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c +index 2a316bc..482dc1c 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.c ++++ b/ssh-keygen.c +@@ -783,13 +783,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + { + FILE *f; + Key *public; +- char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra; ++ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx; + int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1; + enum fp_rep rep; + enum fp_type fptype; + struct stat st; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); ++ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix(); + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; + + if (!have_identity) +@@ -801,8 +802,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment); + if (public != NULL) { + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment, ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment, + key_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); +@@ -867,8 +868,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + } + comment = *cp ? cp : comment; + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, + comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); +@@ -986,13 +987,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash) + if (print_fingerprint) { + enum fp_rep rep; + enum fp_type fptype; +- char *fp, *ra; ++ char *fp, *ra, *pfx; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); ++ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix(); + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; ++ + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name, ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name, + key_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); +@@ -1878,16 +1881,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) + fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); + v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00; + +- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + + printf("%s:\n", identity_file); + printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key), + key_cert_type(key)); +- printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp); +- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", +- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); ++ printf(" Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp); ++ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s%s\n", ++ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp); + printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); + if (!v00) { + printf(" Serial: %llu\n", +@@ -2686,13 +2690,12 @@ passphrase_again: + fclose(f); + + if (!quiet) { +- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", + identity_file); + printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); +- printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); ++ printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment); + printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); +diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c +index 573d7a8..394cca8 100644 +--- a/sshconnect.c ++++ b/sshconnect.c +@@ -914,10 +914,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " + "of known hosts.", type, ip); + } else if (options.visual_host_key) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); +- logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n", ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } +@@ -955,9 +955,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + else + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); + /* The default */ +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + msg2[0] = '\0'; + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { + if (matching_host_key_dns) +@@ -972,10 +971,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " + "established%s\n" +- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" ++ "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s" + "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " + "(yes/no)? ", +- host, ip, msg1, type, fp, ++ host, ip, msg1, type, ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, + options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", + options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", + msg2); +@@ -1220,8 +1220,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) + int flags = 0; + char *fp; + +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + + /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ +@@ -1327,14 +1328,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key) + continue; + if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) + continue; +- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" + "in %s:%lu\n" +- "%s key fingerprint %s.", ++ "%s key fingerprint %s%s.", + key_type(found->key), + found->host, found->file, found->line, +- key_type(found->key), fp); ++ key_type(found->key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + if (options.visual_host_key) + logit("%s", ra); + free(ra); +@@ -1349,7 +1351,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) + { + char *fp; + +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); +@@ -1357,8 +1359,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); +- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", +- key_type(host_key), fp); ++ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.", ++ key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + + free(fp); +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 7f4ff41..adbbfc7 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + key->type, pktype); + goto done; + } +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s", ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + + /* +@@ -986,8 +987,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) + int have_sig = 1; + char *fp; + +- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key), ++ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp); + free(fp); + + if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9227b37 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch @@ -0,0 +1,819 @@ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 3bb7f00..294bef5 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -154,25 +154,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + + ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) + + sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) + + scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o + $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + + ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o + $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o + $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c +index f225b0b..8bafcd6 100644 +--- a/auth-rsa.c ++++ b/auth-rsa.c +@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file, + "actual %d vs. announced %d.", + file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); + debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", + file, linenum, key_type(key), fp); + free(fp); +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index 6d1c872..3808ec8 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) + } + + if (key_is_cert(key)) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, +- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX); + auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", + key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, +@@ -223,7 +222,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) + extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); + free(fp); + } else { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX); + auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp, + extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); + free(fp); +diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c +index ec4f4ff..2b3d650 100644 +--- a/authfile.c ++++ b/authfile.c +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +@@ -1068,7 +1069,7 @@ Key * + key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const char *filename, + const char *passphrase, char **commentp) + { +- Key *pub, *prv; ++ Key *pub, *prv = NULL; + + /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ + pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(buffer, commentp); +@@ -1080,9 +1081,10 @@ key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const char *filename, + *commentp = xstrdup(filename); + } else { + key_free(pub); +- /* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */ +- prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase, +- NULL); ++ if (! FIPS_mode()) ++ /* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */ ++ prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase, ++ NULL); + } + return prv; + } +diff --git a/cipher-ctr.c b/cipher-ctr.c +index 73e9c7c..40ee395 100644 +--- a/cipher-ctr.c ++++ b/cipher-ctr.c +@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) + aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; + #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP + aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | +- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; ++ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | ++ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; + #endif + return (&aes_ctr); + } +diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c +index 226e56d..b19443c 100644 +--- a/cipher.c ++++ b/cipher.c +@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ + + #include + ++#include ++ + #include + #include + #include +@@ -90,6 +92,25 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { + { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } + }; + ++static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = { ++ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, ++ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, ++ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, ++ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, ++ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, ++ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, ++ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, ++ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, ++ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM ++ { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, ++ { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, ++#endif ++ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } ++}; + /*--*/ + + /* Returns a list of supported ciphers separated by the specified char. */ +@@ -100,7 +121,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const Cipher *c; + +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { + if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) + continue; + if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) +@@ -180,7 +201,7 @@ const Cipher * + cipher_by_name(const char *name) + { + const Cipher *c; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c; + return NULL; +@@ -190,7 +211,7 @@ const Cipher * + cipher_by_number(int id) + { + const Cipher *c; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (c->number == id) + return c; + return NULL; +@@ -232,7 +253,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name) + const Cipher *c; + if (name == NULL) + return -1; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c->number; + return -1; +diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h +index 48f7b68..9ff39f4 100644 +--- a/dh.h ++++ b/dh.h +@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ int dh_estimate(int); + + /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */ + #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 ++#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS 2048 + #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 + + /* +diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c +index b361a04..5616643 100644 +--- a/entropy.c ++++ b/entropy.c +@@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ seed_rng(void) + fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " + "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); + ++ /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */ ++ atexit(RAND_cleanup); ++ + #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY + if (RAND_status() == 1) { + debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index bc3e53e..ede7b67 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "ssh2.h" +@@ -103,6 +104,25 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { + { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, + }; + ++static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = { ++ { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 ++ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++#endif ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ++ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, ++ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, ++ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, ++# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 ++ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, ++ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, ++# endif ++#endif ++ { NULL, -1, -1, NULL}, ++}; ++ + char * + kex_alg_list(char sep) + { +@@ -126,7 +146,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + { + const struct kexalg *k; + +- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; + #ifdef GSSAPI +@@ -151,7 +171,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { +- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p); ++ else ++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); + free(s); + return 0; + } +diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c +index 2f7629c..20c9946 100644 +--- a/kexecdhc.c ++++ b/kexecdhc.c +@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex) + + kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ memset(hash, 0, hashlen); + kex_finish(kex); + } + #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c +index 2700b72..0820894 100644 +--- a/kexecdhs.c ++++ b/kexecdhs.c +@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex) + + kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ memset(hash, 0, hashlen); + kex_finish(kex); + } + #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c +index 355b7ba..427e11f 100644 +--- a/kexgexc.c ++++ b/kexgexc.c +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + + #include "includes.h" + ++#include ++ + #include + + #include +@@ -64,13 +66,13 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex) + /* Old GEX request */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD); + packet_put_int(nbits); +- min = DH_GRP_MIN; ++ min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; + max = DH_GRP_MAX; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits); + } else { + /* New GEX request */ +- min = DH_GRP_MIN; ++ min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; + max = DH_GRP_MAX; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST); + packet_put_int(min); +diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c +index 770ad28..9d4fc6d 100644 +--- a/kexgexs.c ++++ b/kexgexs.c +@@ -76,16 +76,16 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex) + omin = min = packet_get_int(); + onbits = nbits = packet_get_int(); + omax = max = packet_get_int(); +- min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); ++ min = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min); + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); +- nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); ++ nbits = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD: + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received"); + onbits = nbits = packet_get_int(); + /* unused for old GEX */ +- omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN; ++ omin = min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; + omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX; + break; + default: +diff --git a/key.c b/key.c +index 62f3edb..a2050f6 100644 +--- a/key.c ++++ b/key.c +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ + #include "crypto_api.h" + + #include ++#include + #include + + #include +@@ -636,9 +637,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void) + char *env; + + if (!rv_defined) { +- env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); +- rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? +- SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ rv = SSH_FP_SHA1; ++ else { ++ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"); ++ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ? ++ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ } + rv_defined = 1; + } + return rv; +@@ -1168,8 +1173,11 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits) + fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); + if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) + fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); +- if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) ++ if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__); + fatal("%s: key generation failed.", __func__); ++ } + BN_free(f4); + return private; + } +diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c +index 9388af4..cd7b034 100644 +--- a/mac.c ++++ b/mac.c +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ + + #include + ++#include ++ + #include + #include + #include +@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ struct macalg { + int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ + }; + +-static const struct macalg macs[] = { ++static const struct macalg all_macs[] = { + /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ + { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, +@@ -91,6 +93,24 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } + }; + ++static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = { ++ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ ++ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 ++ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, ++ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, ++#endif ++ ++ /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */ ++ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 ++ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, ++ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, ++#endif ++ ++ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } ++}; ++ + /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */ + char * + mac_alg_list(char sep) +@@ -99,7 +119,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep) + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct macalg *m; + +- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { ++ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(m->name); +@@ -133,7 +153,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name) + { + const struct macalg *m; + +- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { ++ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) + continue; + if (mac != NULL) { +diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h +index 3a0f5ae..4f35a44 100644 +--- a/myproposal.h ++++ b/myproposal.h +@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \ + "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" + ++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ ++ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ ++ KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" ++ + #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ + HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ + "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ +@@ -133,6 +139,22 @@ + #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" + #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" + ++#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ ++ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ ++ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ ++ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512," \ ++ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" ++#else ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1" ++#endif + + static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { + KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c +index 66198e6..ccf22c8 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.c ++++ b/ssh-keygen.c +@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bitsp) + fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits); + exit(1); + } ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ if (type == KEY_DSA) ++ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ if (type == KEY_ED25519) ++ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ } + if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) + fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); + else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768) +@@ -746,7 +752,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) + enum fp_type fptype; + char *fp, *ra; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection(); + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; + + pkcs11_init(0); +@@ -756,8 +762,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); +- ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5, +- SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]), + fp, key_type(keys[i])); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 1e6cb90..ea9193f 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +@@ -427,6 +429,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) ++ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ else ++ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); + + #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ +@@ -504,6 +513,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '1': ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode."); ++ } + options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; + break; + case '2': +@@ -828,7 +840,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + host_arg = xstrdup(host); + +- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ +@@ -973,6 +984,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + seed_rng(); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + if (options.user == NULL) + options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + +@@ -1020,6 +1035,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2; ++ if (options.protocol == 0) ++ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode."); ++ } ++ + /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ + if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, + options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index b00658b..6a1562c 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#include ++ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + + #include "xmalloc.h" +@@ -168,20 +170,25 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + + #ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { +- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this +- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ +- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; +- +- if (options.gss_trust_dns) +- gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); +- else +- gss_host = host; +- +- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); +- if (gss) { +- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); +- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], +- "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode"); ++ options.gss_keyex = 0; ++ } else { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = host; ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ } + } + } + #endif +@@ -193,6 +200,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; ++ + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); +@@ -208,7 +219,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; + } ++ + if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); +@@ -220,9 +235,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + } + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; ++ else if (FIPS_mode()) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS; ++ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); +- + #ifdef GSSAPI + /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the + * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index b561ec8..e977de3 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE +@@ -1468,6 +1470,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #endif + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) ++ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { ++ openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ cleanup_exit(255); ++ } ++ else ++ syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ closelog(); ++ } + /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ + saved_argc = ac; + rexec_argc = ac; +@@ -1619,8 +1633,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + else + closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); + +- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +- + /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ + if (logfile != NULL) { + log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); +@@ -1798,6 +1810,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype, + key_type(key ? key : pubkey)); + } ++ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); ++ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; ++ } + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; +@@ -1961,6 +1977,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + unmounted if desired. */ + if (chdir("/") == -1) +@@ -2530,6 +2550,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); +@@ -2539,6 +2562,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; + } + if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = +@@ -2549,6 +2575,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + } + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; ++ else if (FIPS_mode()) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS; + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); +@@ -2575,10 +2603,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) + orig = NULL; + +- if (options.gss_keyex) +- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); +- else +- gss = NULL; ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode"); ++ options.gss_keyex = 0; ++ } else { ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ } ++ } + + if (gss && orig) + xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a242394 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 42de994..60de320 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include ++#include + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "key.h" +@@ -40,10 +42,12 @@ + #include "auth.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "servconf.h" ++#include "misc.h" + + #include "buffer.h" + #include "ssh-gss.h" + ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern ServerOptions options; + + #ifdef HEIMDAL +@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options; + # include + #endif + ++/* all commands are allowed by default */ ++char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; ++ ++static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); ++static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *, ++ int); ++ + static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; + + /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ +@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + krb5_principal princ; + int retval; + const char *errmsg; ++ int k5login_exists; + + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) + return 0; +@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return 0; + } +- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { ++ /* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login. ++ * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */ ++ k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); ++ /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, ++ * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials ++ * to access these files aren't available yet. */ ++ if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value, ++ name, k5login_exists)) { ++ retval = 1; ++ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s " ++ "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)", ++ name, (char *)client->displayname.value); + } else + retval = 0; + +@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + return retval; + } + ++/* Test for existence of .k5login. ++ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok() ++ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself. ++ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence ++ * of .k5login to authorize self-login. (absence of both is required) ++ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise. ++ */ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() ++{ ++ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); ++ return access(file, F_OK) == 0; ++} ++ ++/* check .k5users for login or command authorization ++ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise. ++ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated. ++ */ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, ++ const char *luser, int k5login_exists) ++{ ++ FILE *fp; ++ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char line[BUFSIZ]; ++ char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */ ++ struct stat st; ++ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ int found_principal = 0; ++ int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0; ++ u_long linenum; ++ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); ++ /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ ++ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { ++ return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal, ++ sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) && ++ (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0); ++ } ++ if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { ++ int saved_errno = errno; ++ /* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong. ++ * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */ ++ if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) { ++ logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s", ++ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno)); ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */ ++ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) { ++ /* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */ ++ logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s", ++ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno)); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) { ++ logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user", ++ pw->pw_name, file); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* .k5users must be a regular file. krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this ++ * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { ++ logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ ++ /* Check each line. ksu allows unlimited length lines. We don't. */ ++ while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line), ++ &linenum) != -1) { ++ char *token; ++ ++ /* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */ ++ if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL) ++ continue; ++ if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) { ++ /* we matched on client principal */ ++ found_principal = 1; ++ if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) { ++ /* only shell is allowed */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = ++ xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = ++ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ break; ++ } ++ /* process the allowed commands */ ++ while (token) { ++ if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) { ++ allcommands = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = ++ xstrdup(token); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = ++ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n"); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { ++ /* terminate vector */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL; ++ /* if all commands are allowed, free vector */ ++ if (allcommands) { ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) { ++ free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]); ++ } ++ free(k5users_allowed_cmds); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ fclose(fp); ++ return found_principal; ++} ++ + + /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated + * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index b5dc144..ba4589b 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -806,6 +806,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + command = forced_command; + forced = "(key-option)"; + } ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */ ++ else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { ++ const char *match = command; ++ int allowed = 0, i = 0; ++ ++ if (!match) ++ match = s->pw->pw_shell; ++ while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) { ++ if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) { ++ debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match); ++ allowed = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ if (!allowed) { ++ debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++#endif ++ + if (forced != NULL) { + if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { + s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index 0374c88..509109a 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ + # endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */ + + # endif /* !HEIMDAL */ ++ ++/* .k5users support */ ++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; ++ + #endif /* KRB5 */ + + /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ +diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 +index 058d37a..5c4f15b 100644 +--- a/sshd.8 ++++ b/sshd.8 +@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. + The client tries to authenticate itself using + host-based authentication, + public key authentication, ++GSSAPI authentication, + challenge-response authentication, + or password authentication. + .Pp +@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as + but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + .Pp ++.It Pa ~/.k5login ++.It Pa ~/.k5users ++These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control. ++Further details are described in ++.Xr ksu 1 . ++.Pp + .It Pa ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration + and authentication information. diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..826acd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2813 @@ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 581b121..2ad26ff 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ ++ kexgssc.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ + ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ +@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ + monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ + kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ + roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index 4756dd7..ad65059 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); + static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); + static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ int authenticated = 0; ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic)))) ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ free(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -235,7 +269,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + + packet_check_eom(); + +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -277,7 +312,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = ++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -294,6 +330,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 5f4f26f..0f52b68 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + +@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + &method_passwd, +diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +index 59ad3a2..9c60108 100644 +--- a/clientloop.c ++++ b/clientloop.c +@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ + #include "msg.h" + #include "roaming.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* import options */ + extern Options options; + +@@ -1608,6 +1612,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!rekeying) { + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { + debug("need rekeying"); + xxx_kex->done = 0; +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 74e77db..9bde04e 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -584,6 +584,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], + AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c +index b39281b..a3a2289 100644 +--- a/gss-genr.c ++++ b/gss-genr.c +@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ + #include "buffer.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + + extern u_char *session_id2; + extern u_int session_id2_len; + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client)); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client) { ++ Buffer buf; ++ size_t i; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); ++ EVP_MD_CTX md; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ free(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ buffer_init(&buf); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), ++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ ++ if (oidpos != 0) ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); ++ ++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_free(&buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ free(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) + } + + OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context) +@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 759fa10..42de994 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; +- int len; ++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; + const char *errmsg; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { +@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') ++ new_ccname++; ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); ++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { ++ char *p; ++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ } ++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + ++ client->store.data = krb_context; ++ + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +index e61b37b..14f540e 100644 +--- a/gss-serv.c ++++ b/gss-serv.c +@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ + #include "channels.h" + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -100,25 +105,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) + char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + +- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + +- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (-1); +- } ++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, ++ NULL, NULL))) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + +- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); ++ } else { ++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + } +- +- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, +- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) +- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +- +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (ctx->major); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + /* Privileged */ +@@ -133,6 +145,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) + } + + /* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { ++ gss_OID_set supported; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, ++ NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + { +@@ -142,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -268,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -284,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -301,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -311,11 +397,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + void + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) + { +- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { +- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ +- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", +- gssapi_client.store.filename); +- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) { ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) { ++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) { ++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else { ++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data); ++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -348,7 +443,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + +@@ -358,9 +453,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -374,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { ++ int ok; ++ int ret; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ if (!use_privsep) { ++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + #endif +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 74e2b86..bce2ab8 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ + #include "roaming.h" + #include "digest.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) + # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 +@@ -90,6 +94,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { + #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + #endif ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++#endif + { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, + }; + +@@ -119,6 +128,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) { ++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) ++ return k; ++ } ++#endif + } + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index c85680e..313bb51 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, + KEX_ECDH_SHA2, + KEX_C25519_SHA256, ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, ++#endif + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -135,6 +140,12 @@ struct Kex { + int flags; + int hash_alg; + int ec_nid; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); +@@ -166,6 +177,10 @@ void kexecdh_client(Kex *); + void kexecdh_server(Kex *); + void kexc25519_client(Kex *); + void kexc25519_server(Kex *); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++void kexgss_client(Kex *); ++void kexgss_server(Kex *); ++#endif + + void + kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, +diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..e90b567 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kexgssc.c +@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++void ++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; ++ DH *dh; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; ++ u_char *empty = ""; ++ char *msg; ++ char *lang; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); ++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ packet_put_int(min); ++ packet_put_int(nbits); ++ packet_put_int(max); ++ ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ ++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(p); ++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(g); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ ++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ ++ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); ++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ free(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = packet_read(); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ serverhostkey = ++ packet_get_string(&slen); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); ++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ msg_tok.length = strlen; ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if (packet_get_char()) { ++ recv_tok.value= ++ packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ maj_status = packet_get_int(); ++ min_status = packet_get_int(); ++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); ++ ++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); ++ if ((int)kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ free(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ dh->pub_key, /* e */ ++ dh_server_pub, /* f */ ++ shared_secret, /* K */ ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->hash_alg, ++ kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ free(msg_tok.value); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ free(serverhostkey); ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ ++ /* save session id */ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++} ++ ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..6d7518c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kexgsss.c +@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++void ++kexgss_server(Kex *kex) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ DH *dh; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) ++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) ++ free(mechs); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ min = packet_get_int(); ++ nbits = packet_get_int(); ++ max = packet_get_int(); ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, nbits, max); ++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); ++ if (dh == NULL) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_write_wait(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); ++ type = packet_read(); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ ++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ break; ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect( ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ free(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); ++ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); ++ if ((int)kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ free(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ ++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->hash_alg, ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh_client_pub, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ } else { ++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++} ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff --git a/key.c b/key.c +index eb98ea8..900b9e3 100644 +--- a/key.c ++++ b/key.c +@@ -1013,6 +1013,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", + KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 }, ++ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 }, + { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } + }; + +diff --git a/key.h b/key.h +index 0e3eea5..d51ed81 100644 +--- a/key.h ++++ b/key.h +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ enum types { + KEY_ED25519_CERT, + KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + enum fp_type { +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 229fada..aa70945 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -253,11 +255,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, +@@ -366,6 +375,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; + +@@ -471,6 +484,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +@@ -1866,6 +1883,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); + kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); +@@ -2073,6 +2097,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) + OM_uint32 major; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + goid.length = len; + +@@ -2100,6 +2127,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + in.length = len; + major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); +@@ -2117,6 +2147,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -2128,6 +2159,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m) + OM_uint32 ret; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + gssbuf.length = len; + mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); +@@ -2154,7 +2188,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) + { + int authenticated; + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); +@@ -2167,5 +2205,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ data.length = len; ++ if (data.length != 20) ++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, ++ (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ free(data.value); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, major); ++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int ok; ++ ++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ free(store.filename); ++ free(store.envvar); ++ free(store.envval); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, ok); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index 20e2b4a..ff79fbb 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, + #endif ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85, + + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index d1b6d99..d1e1caa 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + Buffer m; + int authenticated = 0; +@@ -1307,5 +1307,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ ++ major = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); ++ hash->length = len; ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return(major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ int ok; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ ++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 9d5e5ba..93929e0 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index dc884c9..7613ff2 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, ++ oGssServerIdentity, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -183,10 +185,19 @@ static struct { + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, + #endif + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, +@@ -841,10 +852,30 @@ parse_time: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssServerIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1497,7 +1528,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -1616,8 +1652,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h +index 75e3f8f..5cc97f0 100644 +--- a/readconf.h ++++ b/readconf.h +@@ -54,7 +54,12 @@ typedef struct { + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ ++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh +index 1d9e0ed..1277409 100644 +--- a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh ++++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh +@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\ + cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + +-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'` ++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'` + + type_has_legacy() { + case $1 in +diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh +index b093a91..4c8da00 100644 +--- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh ++++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh +@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ tid="certified user keys" + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` ++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` + + type_has_legacy() { + case $1 in +diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh +index 8c2ac09..a2a87ca 100644 +--- a/regress/kextype.sh ++++ b/regress/kextype.sh +@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + + tries="1 2 3 4" + for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do ++ if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then ++ continue ++ fi + verbose "kex $k" + for i in $tries; do + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true +diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh +index cf9401e..31fb0f7 100644 +--- a/regress/rekey.sh ++++ b/regress/rekey.sh +@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ increase_datafile_size 300 + + opts="" + for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do ++ if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then ++ continue ++ fi + opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" + done + for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do +@@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ done + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do + for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do ++ if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then ++ continue ++ fi + verbose "client rekey $c $kex" + ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c -oKexAlgorithms=$kex + done +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index f763317..68fb9ef 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -245,8 +248,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; ++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -344,7 +353,8 @@ typedef enum { + sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, + sHostCertificate, +@@ -411,10 +421,20 @@ static struct { + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1091,10 +1111,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStrictAcceptor: ++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -2005,6 +2037,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); + #endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 4572066..37cfa9b 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -112,7 +112,10 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ ++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index a99d7f0..0374c88 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -119,16 +136,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); + void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ +diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +index 6d1abaf..b0d343b 100644 +--- a/ssh_config ++++ b/ssh_config +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP yes + # AddressFamily any +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index b580392..e7accd6 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -682,11 +682,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. ++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the ++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target ++hostname. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Dq no . +-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index adbbfc7..cadf234 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -158,9 +158,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + { + Kex *kex; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = host; ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { + logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); + options.ciphers = NULL; +@@ -196,6 +221,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ free(gss); ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, + (time_t)options.rekey_interval); +@@ -208,10 +244,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++#endif + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; ++ } else { ++ kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); +@@ -301,6 +357,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); ++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); + #endif + + void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); +@@ -316,6 +373,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_authentication, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + NULL, +@@ -613,19 +675,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int ok = 0; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) ++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; ++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (gss_supported == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { ++ gss_supported = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; +@@ -722,8 +796,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; +- int oidlen; +- char *oidv; ++ u_int oidlen; ++ u_char *oidv; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); +@@ -832,6 +906,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + free(msg); + free(lang); + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); ++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + int +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 24ab272..e4e406e 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "version.h" + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifdef LIBWRAP + #include + #include +@@ -1744,10 +1748,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } ++#ifndef GSSAPI ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; + } ++#endif + if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); +@@ -2488,6 +2495,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( + list_hostkey_types()); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ newstr = gss; ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; +@@ -2496,6 +2545,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index c1b7c03..adfd7b1 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + # GSSAPI options + GSSAPIAuthentication yes + GSSAPICleanupCredentials no ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 95b5f8c..1fb002d 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -493,12 +493,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck ++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor ++a client authenticates against. If ++.Dq yes ++then the client must authenticate against the ++.Pa host ++service on the current hostname. If ++.Dq no ++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the ++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation ++on multi homed machines. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . ++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, ++and setting it to ++.Dq no ++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . + .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together + with successful public key client host authentication is allowed diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d30dedb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,445 @@ +diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..630ec62 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ++of an user in any environment. This includes environments with ++polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled. ++ ++To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: ++ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat ++ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root ++ ++Do not forget to enable public key authentication: ++ PubkeyAuthentication yes ++ ++ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 411eadb..4ab6717 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign + SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper + SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper ++SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + MANFMT=@MANFMT@ + INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + + LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ +@@ -176,6 +177,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11 + ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o + $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + ++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(SSHLIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +@@ -283,6 +287,7 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ + $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ + fi ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index c0ae0d4..cb0f931 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -600,6 +600,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) + _exit(1); + } + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { ++ error ("failed to copy environment: %s", ++ strerror(errno)); ++ _exit(127); ++ } ++#endif ++ + execl(options.authorized_keys_command, + options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL); + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index d04f4ed..0077dd7 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern int inetd_flag; + extern int rexeced_flag; + ++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ ++int ++sshd_selinux_enabled(void) ++{ ++ static int enabled = -1; ++ ++ if (enabled == -1) { ++ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); ++ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); ++ } ++ ++ return (enabled); ++} ++ + /* Send audit message */ + static int + sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, +@@ -307,7 +321,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ + static int +-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) + { + const char *reqlvl; + char *role; +@@ -318,16 +332,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) + + ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); + +- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + + if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { + use_current = "1"; + } else { + use_current = ""; +- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); + } + +- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); + + if (role != NULL) + free(role); +@@ -335,6 +349,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) + return rv; + } + ++static int ++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); ++} ++ ++static int ++do_setenv(char *name, const char *value) ++{ ++ return setenv(name, value, 1); ++} ++ ++int ++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) ++{ ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); ++} ++ + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void + sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +@@ -343,7 +375,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + int r = 0; + security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; + +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + if (options.use_pam) { +@@ -414,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) + { + security_context_t *ctx; + +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index b18893c..cb51f99 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + ++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); ++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c +index 0d39ab2..0dae387 100644 +--- a/platform.c ++++ b/platform.c +@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + { + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + /* Cache selinux status for later use */ +- (void)ssh_selinux_enabled(); ++ (void)sshd_selinux_enabled(); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS +diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..f8ed7af +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-keycat.c +@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ ++/* ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, ++ * including the disclaimer of warranties. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote ++ * products derived from this software without specific prior ++ * written permission. ++ * ++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of ++ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are ++ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is ++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and ++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED ++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE ++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, ++ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR ++ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. ++ * Written by Tomas Mraz ++*/ ++ ++#define _GNU_SOURCE ++ ++#include "config.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "uidswap.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++ ++#define ERR_USAGE 1 ++#define ERR_PAM_START 2 ++#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3 ++#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4 ++#define ERR_PAM_END 5 ++#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6 ++#define ERR_MEMORY 7 ++#define ERR_OPEN 8 ++#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9 ++#define ERR_FDOPEN 10 ++#define ERR_STAT 11 ++#define ERR_WRITE 12 ++#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13 ++#define BUFLEN 4096 ++ ++/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */ ++static int ++dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm, ++ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr) ++{ ++ struct pam_response *rsp; ++ ++ (void)msgm; ++ (void)appdata_ptr; ++ ++ if (num_msg <= 0) ++ return PAM_CONV_ERR; ++ ++ /* Just allocate the array as empty responses */ ++ rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response)); ++ if (rsp == NULL) ++ return PAM_CONV_ERR; ++ ++ *response = rsp; ++ return PAM_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++static struct pam_conv conv = { ++ dummy_conv, ++ NULL ++}; ++ ++char * ++make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd) ++{ ++ char *fname; ++ ++ if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return fname; ++} ++ ++int ++dump_keys(const char *user) ++{ ++ struct passwd *pwd; ++ int fd = -1; ++ FILE *f = NULL; ++ char *fname = NULL; ++ int rv = 0; ++ char buf[BUFLEN]; ++ size_t len; ++ struct stat st; ++ ++ if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { ++ return ERR_GETPWNAM; ++ } ++ ++ if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) { ++ return ERR_MEMORY; ++ } ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(pwd); ++ ++ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) { ++ rv = ERR_OPEN; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { ++ rv = ERR_STAT; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || ++ (st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) { ++ rv = ERR_FILE_MODE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ unset_nonblock(fd); ++ ++ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { ++ rv = ERR_FDOPEN; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ fd = -1; ++ ++ while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) { ++ rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0; ++ } ++ ++fail: ++ if (fd != -1) ++ close(fd); ++ if (f != NULL) ++ fclose(f); ++ free(fname); ++ restore_uid(); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", ++ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", ++ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE" ++}; ++ ++extern char **environ; ++ ++int ++set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh) ++{ ++ int i; ++ size_t j; ++ ++ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) { ++ int len = strlen(env_names[j]); ++ ++ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) { ++ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 && ++ environ[i][len] == '=') { ++ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ int retval; ++ int ev = 0; ++ ++ if (argc != 2) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s \n", argv[0]); ++ return ERR_USAGE; ++ } ++ ++ retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ return ERR_PAM_START; ++ } ++ ++ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh); ++ if (ev != 0) ++ goto finish; ++ ++ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION; ++ goto finish; ++ } ++ ++ ev = dump_keys(argv[1]); ++ ++ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION; ++ } ++ ++finish: ++ retval = pam_end (pamh,retval); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_PAM_END; ++ } ++ return ev; ++} diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fccb328 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c +--- openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm 2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c 2014-05-05 15:20:43.075246776 +0200 +@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -979,6 +980,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename + #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(filename)) + #endif ++ if (st.st_mode & 040) { ++ struct group *gr; ++ ++ if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) ++ st.st_mode &= ~040; ++ } ++ + if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7c5a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c +index 6c62bdf..11c8562 100644 +--- a/auth-krb5.c ++++ b/auth-krb5.c +@@ -54,6 +54,21 @@ + + extern ServerOptions options; + ++int ++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client, ++ int k5login_exists) ++{ ++ if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists) ++ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client); ++ else { ++ char kuser[65]; ++ ++ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser)) ++ return 0; ++ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0; ++ } ++} ++ + static int + krb5_init(void *context) + { +@@ -157,8 +172,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) + if (problem) + goto out; + +- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, +- authctxt->pw->pw_name)) { ++ /* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not ++ * depend on the existance of .k5login */ ++ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) { + problem = -1; + goto out; + } +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 60de320..0a4930e 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *, + int); + + static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; ++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int); + + /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ + +@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) + * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 + */ + ++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is ++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with ++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are ++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the ++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like ++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos ++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every ++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket. ++ * ++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for ++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos ++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). ++ * ++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to ++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this ++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the ++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name ++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or ++ * not. ++ * ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a ++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It ++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the ++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case ++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than ++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the ++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory, ++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the ++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be ++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g. ++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there ++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the ++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical ++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication ++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and ++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the ++ * given environment. ++ * ++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the ++ * access control behavior: ++ * - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch ++ * - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch ++ * ++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for ++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the ++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used. ++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if ++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can ++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be ++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be ++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does ++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can ++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new ++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7 ++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the ++ * restrictions mentioned above. ++ * ++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when ++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be ++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks ++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and ++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given ++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with ++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch. ++ * ++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g. ++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to ++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it ++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set ++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it ++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login. ++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable ++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour. ++ * ++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in ++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is ++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via ++ * krb5_kuserok() as well. ++ * ++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some ++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated ++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks ++ * during upgrade: ++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should ++ * be better disabled globally in krb5.conf ++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really ++ * only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users ++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and ++ * .k5users files directly like ksu itself does ++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use ++ * the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name ++ * given at the login prompt might be useful */ ++ + static int + ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + { +@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, + * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials + * to access these files aren't available yet. */ +- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { ++ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists) ++ && k5login_exists) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); +@@ -171,9 +270,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, + snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); + /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ + if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { +- return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal, +- sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) && +- (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0); ++ return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser, ++ k5login_exists); + } + if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { + int saved_errno = errno; +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 68fb9ef..904c869 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->version_addendum = NULL; ++ options->use_kuserok = -1; + } + + void +@@ -312,6 +313,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); + if (options->show_patchlevel == -1) + options->show_patchlevel = 0; ++ if (options->use_kuserok == -1) ++ options->use_kuserok = 1; + + /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ + if (use_privsep == -1) +@@ -338,7 +341,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, + sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, + sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, +- sKerberosGetAFSToken, ++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok, + sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, +@@ -410,11 +413,13 @@ static struct { + #else + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #else + { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #endif + { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1526,6 +1531,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + *activep = value; + break; + ++ case sKerberosUseKuserok: ++ intptr = &options->use_kuserok; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPermitOpen: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') +@@ -1811,6 +1820,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) + M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); ++ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + +@@ -2062,6 +2072,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); + + /* string arguments */ + dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 37cfa9b..5117dfa 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ typedef struct { + + int num_permitted_opens; + ++ int use_kuserok; + char *chroot_directory; + char *revoked_keys_file; + char *trusted_user_ca_keys; +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index adfd7b1..e772ed5 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes + #KerberosTicketCleanup yes + #KerberosGetAFSToken no ++#KerberosUseKuserok yes + + # GSSAPI options + GSSAPIAuthentication yes +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 1fb002d..e0e5fff 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -697,6 +697,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache + file on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . ++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok ++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +@@ -862,6 +866,7 @@ Available keywords are + .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , + .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , + .Cm KerberosAuthentication , ++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok , + .Cm MaxAuthTries , + .Cm MaxSessions , + .Cm PasswordAuthentication , diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..961cdf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2672 @@ +diff --git a/HOWTO.ldap-keys b/HOWTO.ldap-keys +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..dd5f5cc +--- /dev/null ++++ b/HOWTO.ldap-keys +@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ ++ ++HOW TO START ++ ++1) configure LDAP server ++ * Use LDAP server documentation ++2) add appropriate LDAP schema ++ * For OpenLDAP or SunONE Use attached schema, otherwise you have to create it. ++ * LDAP user entry ++ User entry: ++ - attached to the 'ldapPublicKey' objectclass ++ - attached to the 'posixAccount' objectclass ++ - with a filled 'sshPublicKey' attribute ++3) insert users into LDAP ++ * Use LDAP Tree management tool as useful ++ * Entry in the LDAP server must respect 'posixAccount' and 'ldapPublicKey' which are defined in core.schema and the additionnal lpk.schema. ++ * Example: ++ dn: uid=captain,ou=commanders,dc=enterprise,dc=universe ++ objectclass: top ++ objectclass: person ++ objectclass: organizationalPerson ++ objectclass: posixAccount ++ objectclass: ldapPublicKey ++ description: Jonathan Archer ++ userPassword: Porthos ++ cn: onathan Archer ++ sn: onathan Archer ++ uid: captain ++ uidNumber: 1001 ++ gidNumber: 1001 ++ homeDirectory: /home/captain ++ sshPublicKey: ssh-rss AAAAB3.... =captain@universe ++ sshPublicKey: command="kill -9 1" ssh-rss AAAAM5... ++4) on the ssh side set in sshd_config ++ * Set up the backend ++ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-wrapper ++ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ++ * Do not forget to set ++ PubkeyAuthentication yes ++ * Swith off unnecessary auth methods ++5) confugure ldap.conf ++ * Default ldap.conf is placed in /etc/ssh ++ * The configuration style is the same as other ldap based aplications ++6) if necessary edit ssh-ldap-wrapper ++ * There is a possibility to change ldap.conf location ++ * There are some debug options ++ * Example ++ /usr/libexec/openssh -s -f /etc/ldap.conf -w -d >> /tmp/ldapdebuglog.txt ++ ++HOW TO MIGRATE FROM LPK ++ ++1) goto HOW TO START 4) .... the ldap schema is the same ++ ++2) convert the group requests to the appropriate LDAP requests ++ ++HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ++ ++1) use debug in sshd ++ * /usr/sbin/sshd -d -d -d -d ++2) use debug in ssh-ldap-helper ++ * ssh-ldap-helper -d -d -d -d -s ++3) use tcpdump ... other ldap client etc. ++ ++ADVANTAGES ++ ++1) Blocking an user account can be done directly from LDAP (if sshd is using PubkeyAuthentication + AuthorizedKeysCommand with ldap only). ++ ++DISADVANTAGES ++ ++1) LDAP must be well configured, getting the public key of some user is not a problem, but if anonymous LDAP ++ allows write to users dn, somebody could replace some user's public key by his own and impersonate some ++ of your users in all your server farm -- be VERY CAREFUL. ++2) With incomplete PKI the MITM attack when sshd is requesting the public key, could lead to a compromise of your servers allowing login ++ as the impersonated user. ++3) If LDAP server is down there may be no fallback on passwd auth. ++ ++MISC. ++ ++1) todo ++ * Possibility to reuse the ssh-ldap-helper. ++ * Tune the LDAP part to accept all possible LDAP configurations. ++ ++2) differences from original lpk ++ * No LDAP code in sshd. ++ * Support for various LDAP platforms and configurations. ++ * LDAP is configured in separate ldap.conf file. ++ ++3) docs/link ++ * http://pacsec.jp/core05/psj05-barisani-en.pdf ++ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/openssh-lpk/ ++ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/sshgate/ ++ * http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/openssh-lpk ++ * http://lam.sf.net/ ( http://lam.sourceforge.net/documentation/supportedSchemas.htm ) ++ ++4) contributors/ideas/greets ++ - Eric AUGE ++ - Andrea Barisani ++ - Falk Siemonsmeier. ++ - Jacob Rief. ++ - Michael Durchgraf. ++ - frederic peters. ++ - Finlay dobbie. ++ - Stefan Fisher. ++ - Robin H. Johnson. ++ - Adrian Bridgett. ++ ++5) Author ++ Jan F. Chadima ++ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh + ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass + SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign ++SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper ++SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +@@ -60,8 +62,9 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ + LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ + EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + MANFMT=@MANFMT@ ++INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) + + LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ +@@ -98,8 +101,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ + sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ + sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o + +-MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out +-MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 ++MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out ssh-ldap-helper.8.out ssh-ldap.conf.5.out ++MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 ssh-ldap-helper.8 ssh-ldap.conf.5 + MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ + + CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out +@@ -170,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readco + ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + ++ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +@@ -273,6 +279,10 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ ++ fi + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 +@@ -289,6 +299,10 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ++ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \ ++ fi + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 +@@ -318,6 +332,13 @@ install-sysconf: + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi ++ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ ++ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf ]; then \ ++ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ldap.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf; \ ++ else \ ++ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ ++ fi ; \ ++ fi + + host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ +@@ -381,6 +402,8 @@ uninstall: + -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 +@@ -392,6 +415,7 @@ uninstall: + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ++ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 + + regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 7c6ce08..722a19e 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -1625,6 +1625,106 @@ if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then + fi + fi + ++# Check whether user wants LDAP support ++LDAP_MSG="no" ++INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="" ++AC_ARG_WITH(ldap, ++ [ --with-ldap[[=PATH]] Enable LDAP pubkey support (optionally in PATH)], ++ [ ++ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then ++ ++ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="yes" ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DLDAP_DEPRECATED" ++ ++ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" ++ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" ++ fi ++ ++ AC_DEFINE([WITH_LDAP_PUBKEY], 1, [Enable LDAP pubkey support]) ++ LDAP_MSG="yes" ++ ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(lber.h) ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate )) ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap_ssl.h) ++ ++ AC_ARG_WITH(ldap-lib, ++ [ --with-ldap-lib=type select ldap library [auto|netscape5|netscape4|netscape3|umich|openldap]]) ++ ++ if test -z "$with_ldap_lib"; then ++ with_ldap_lib=auto ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = umich -o $with_ldap_lib = openldap \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(lber, main, LIBS="-llber $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap, main, LIBS="-lldap $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape5 \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap50, main, LIBS="-lldap50 -lssldap50 -lssl3 -lnss3 -lnspr4 -lprldap50 -lplc4 -lplds4 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape4 \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl41, main, LIBS="-lldapssl41 -lplc3 -lplds3 -lnspr3 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl40, main, LIBS="-lldapssl40 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap41, main, LIBS="-lldap41 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap40, main, LIBS="-lldap40 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape3 \); then ++ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl30, main, LIBS="-lldapssl30 $LIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate a valid LDAP library) ++ fi ++ ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working LDAP support]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ++ #include ], ++ [(void)ldap_init(0, 0);], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ++ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldap libraries **]) ++ ]) ++ AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \ ++ ldap_init \ ++ ldap_get_lderrno \ ++ ldap_set_lderrno \ ++ ldap_parse_result \ ++ ldap_memfree \ ++ ldap_controls_free \ ++ ldap_set_option \ ++ ldap_get_option \ ++ ldapssl_init \ ++ ldap_start_tls_s \ ++ ldap_pvt_tls_set_option \ ++ ldap_initialize \ ++ ) ++ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(ldap_set_rebind_proc, ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ++ #include ], ++ [ldap_set_rebind_proc(0, 0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=3], ++ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=2]) ++ AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc) ++ AC_DEFINE(LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS, $ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc, [number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) ++ ) ++ fi ++ ] ++) ++AC_SUBST(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ++ + dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + Blowfish_initstate \ +diff --git a/ldap-helper.c b/ldap-helper.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..e95a94a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldap-helper.c +@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pka-ldap.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ldapconf.h" ++#include "ldapbody.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++static int config_debug = 0; ++int config_exclusive_config_file = 0; ++static char *config_file_name = "/etc/ssh/ldap.conf"; ++static char *config_single_user = NULL; ++static int config_verbose = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; ++int config_warning_config_file = 0; ++extern char *__progname; ++ ++static void ++usage(void) ++{ ++ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", ++ __progname); ++ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -d Output the log messages to stderr.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -e Check the config file for unknown commands.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Use alternate config file (default is /etc/ssh/ldap.conf).\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -s user Do not demonize, send the user's key to stdout.\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -v Increase verbosity of the debug output (implies -d).\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, " -w Warn on unknown commands in the config file.\n"); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Main program for the ssh pka ldap agent. ++ */ ++ ++int ++main(int ac, char **av) ++{ ++ int opt; ++ FILE *outfile = NULL; ++ ++ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); ++ ++ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); ++ ++ /* ++ * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been ++ * set. ++ */ ++ initialize_options(); ++ ++ /* Parse command-line arguments. */ ++ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "def:s:vw")) != -1) { ++ switch (opt) { ++ case 'd': ++ config_debug = 1; ++ break; ++ ++ case 'e': ++ config_exclusive_config_file = 1; ++ config_warning_config_file = 1; ++ break; ++ ++ case 'f': ++ config_file_name = optarg; ++ break; ++ ++ case 's': ++ config_single_user = optarg; ++ outfile = fdopen (dup (fileno (stdout)), "w"); ++ break; ++ ++ case 'v': ++ config_debug = 1; ++ if (config_verbose < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) ++ config_verbose++; ++ break; ++ ++ case 'w': ++ config_warning_config_file = 1; ++ break; ++ ++ case '?': ++ default: ++ usage(); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Initialize loging */ ++ log_init(__progname, config_verbose, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, config_debug); ++ ++ if (ac != optind) ++ fatal ("illegal extra parameter %s", av[1]); ++ ++ /* Ensure that fds 0 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ ++ if (config_debug == 0) ++ sanitise_stdfd(); ++ ++ /* Read config file */ ++ read_config_file(config_file_name); ++ fill_default_options(); ++ if (config_verbose == SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { ++ debug3 ("=== Configuration ==="); ++ dump_config(); ++ debug3 ("=== *** ==="); ++ } ++ ++ ldap_checkconfig(); ++ ldap_do_connect(); ++ ++ if (config_single_user) { ++ process_user (config_single_user, outfile); ++ } else { ++ usage(); ++ fatal ("Not yet implemented"); ++/* TODO ++ * open unix socket a run the loop on it ++ */ ++ } ++ ++ ldap_do_close(); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* Ugly hack */ ++void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *b, u_int *l) { return NULL; } ++void buffer_put_string(Buffer *b, const void *f, u_int l) {} ++ +diff --git a/ldap-helper.h b/ldap-helper.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..14cb29a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldap-helper.h +@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldap-helper.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAP_HELPER_H ++#define LDAP_HELPER_H ++ ++extern int config_exclusive_config_file; ++extern int config_warning_config_file; ++ ++#endif /* LDAP_HELPER_H */ +diff --git a/ldap.conf b/ldap.conf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..42e38d3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldap.conf +@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ ++# $Id: openssh-5.5p1-ldap.patch,v 1.3 2010/07/07 13:48:36 jfch2222 Exp $ ++# ++# This is the example configuration file for the OpenSSH ++# LDAP backend ++# ++# see ssh-ldap.conf(5) ++# ++ ++# URI with your LDAP server name. This allows to use ++# Unix Domain Sockets to connect to a local LDAP Server. ++#uri ldap://127.0.0.1/ ++#uri ldaps://127.0.0.1/ ++#uri ldapi://%2fvar%2frun%2fldapi_sock/ ++# Note: %2f encodes the '/' used as directory separator ++ ++# Another way to specify your LDAP server is to provide an ++# host name and the port of our LDAP server. Host name ++# must be resolvable without using LDAP. ++# Multiple hosts may be specified, each separated by a ++# space. How long nss_ldap takes to failover depends on ++# whether your LDAP client library supports configurable ++# network or connect timeouts (see bind_timelimit). ++#host 127.0.0.1 ++ ++# The port. ++# Optional: default is 389. ++#port 389 ++ ++# The distinguished name to bind to the server with. ++# Optional: default is to bind anonymously. ++#binddn cn=openssh_keys,dc=example,dc=org ++ ++# The credentials to bind with. ++# Optional: default is no credential. ++#bindpw TopSecret ++ ++# The distinguished name of the search base. ++#base dc=example,dc=org ++ ++# The LDAP version to use (defaults to 3 ++# if supported by client library) ++#ldap_version 3 ++ ++# The search scope. ++#scope sub ++#scope one ++#scope base ++ ++# Search timelimit ++#timelimit 30 ++ ++# Bind/connect timelimit ++#bind_timelimit 30 ++ ++# Reconnect policy: hard (default) will retry connecting to ++# the software with exponential backoff, soft will fail ++# immediately. ++#bind_policy hard ++ ++# SSL setup, may be implied by URI also. ++#ssl no ++#ssl on ++#ssl start_tls ++ ++# OpenLDAP SSL options ++# Require and verify server certificate (yes/no) ++# Default is to use libldap's default behavior, which can be configured in ++# /etc/openldap/ldap.conf using the TLS_REQCERT setting. The default for ++# OpenLDAP 2.0 and earlier is "no", for 2.1 and later is "yes". ++#tls_checkpeer hard ++ ++# CA certificates for server certificate verification ++# At least one of these are required if tls_checkpeer is "yes" ++#tls_cacertfile /etc/ssl/ca.cert ++#tls_cacertdir /etc/pki/tls/certs ++ ++# Seed the PRNG if /dev/urandom is not provided ++#tls_randfile /var/run/egd-pool ++ ++# SSL cipher suite ++# See man ciphers for syntax ++#tls_ciphers TLSv1 ++ ++# Client certificate and key ++# Use these, if your server requires client authentication. ++#tls_cert ++#tls_key ++ +diff --git a/ldapbody.c b/ldapbody.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..3029108 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapbody.c +@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ldapconf.h" ++#include "ldapmisc.h" ++#include "ldapbody.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++#define LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT "(&(objectclass=%s)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%s)%s)" ++#define PUBKEYATTR "sshPublicKey" ++#define LDAP_LOGFILE "%s/ldap.%d" ++ ++static FILE *logfile = NULL; ++static LDAP *ld; ++ ++static char *attrs[] = { ++ PUBKEYATTR, ++ NULL ++}; ++ ++void ++ldap_checkconfig (void) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE ++ if (options.host == NULL && options.uri == NULL) ++#else ++ if (options.host == NULL) ++#endif ++ fatal ("missing \"host\" in config file"); ++} ++ ++#if defined(LDAP_API_FEATURE_X_OPENLDAP) && (LDAP_API_VERSION > 2000) ++static int ++_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, LDAP_CONST char *url, int request, ber_int_t msgid) ++{ ++ struct timeval timeout; ++ int rc; ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ LDAPMessage *result; ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ ++ ++ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind to %s", options.binddn); ++ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ error ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#if !defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) || !defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ return ldap_simple_bind_s (ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw); ++#else ++ if (ldap_simple_bind(ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw) < 0) ++ fatal ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); ++ ++ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; ++ timeout.tv_usec = 0; ++ result = NULL; ++ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, FALSE, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { ++ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); ++ ldap_msgfree (result); ++ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; ++ } ++ debug3 ("LDAP rebind to %s succesfull", options.binddn); ++ return rc; ++#endif ++} ++#else ++ ++static int ++_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, char **whop, char **credp, int *methodp, int freeit) ++{ ++ if (freeit) ++ return LDAP_SUCCESS; ++ ++ *whop = strdup (options.binddn); ++ *credp = strdup (options.bindpw); ++ *methodp = LDAP_AUTH_SIMPLE; ++ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind for %s", *whop); ++ return LDAP_SUCCESS; ++} ++#endif ++ ++void ++ldap_do_connect(void) ++{ ++ int rc, msgid, ld_errno = 0; ++ struct timeval timeout; ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ int parserc; ++ LDAPMessage *result; ++ LDAPControl **controls; ++ int reconnect = 0; ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ ++ ++ debug ("LDAP do connect"); ++ ++retry: ++ if (reconnect) { ++ debug3 ("Reconnecting with ld_errno %d", ld_errno); ++ if (options.bind_policy == 0 || ++ (ld_errno != LDAP_SERVER_DOWN && ld_errno != LDAP_TIMEOUT) || ++ reconnect > 5) ++ fatal ("Cannot connect to LDAP server"); ++ ++ if (reconnect > 1) ++ sleep (reconnect - 1); ++ ++ if (ld != NULL) { ++ ldap_unbind (ld); ++ ld = NULL; ++ } ++ logit("reconnecting to LDAP server..."); ++ } ++ ++ if (ld == NULL) { ++ int rc; ++ struct timeval tv; ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION ++ if (options.debug > 0) { ++#ifdef LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE ++ if (options.logdir) { ++ char *logfilename; ++ int logfilenamelen; ++ ++ logfilenamelen = strlen (LDAP_LOGFILE) + strlen ("000000") + strlen (options.logdir); ++ logfilename = xmalloc (logfilenamelen); ++ snprintf (logfilename, logfilenamelen, LDAP_LOGFILE, options.logdir, (int) getpid ()); ++ logfilename[logfilenamelen - 1] = 0; ++ if ((logfile = fopen (logfilename, "a")) == NULL) ++ fatal ("cannot append to %s: %s", logfilename, strerror (errno)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP debug into %s", logfilename); ++ free (logfilename); ++ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE, logfile); ++ } ++#endif ++ if (options.debug) { ++#ifdef LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL ++ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); ++#endif /* LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ ++#ifdef LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL ++ (void) ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); ++#endif /* LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ ++ debug3 ("Set LDAP debug to %d", options.debug); ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION */ ++ ++ ld = NULL; ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT ++ if (options.host != NULL) { ++ if (options.ssl_on == SSL_LDAPS) { ++ if ((rc = ldapssl_client_init (options.sslpath, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldapssl_client_init %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAPssl client init"); ++ } ++ ++ if (options.ssl_on != SSL_OFF) { ++ if ((ld = ldapssl_init (options.host, options.port, TRUE)) == NULL) ++ fatal ("ldapssl_init failed"); ++ debug3 ("LDAPssl init"); ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT */ ++ ++ /* continue with opening */ ++ if (ld == NULL) { ++#if defined (HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S) || (defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS)) ++ /* Some global TLS-specific options need to be set before we create our ++ * session context, so we set them here. */ ++ ++#ifdef LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE ++ /* rand file */ ++ if (options.tls_randfile != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE, ++ options.tls_randfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS random file %s", options.tls_randfile); ++ } ++#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE */ ++ ++ /* ca cert file */ ++ if (options.tls_cacertfile != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, ++ options.tls_cacertfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ error ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert file %s ", options.tls_cacertfile); ++ } ++ ++ /* ca cert directory */ ++ if (options.tls_cacertdir != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR, ++ options.tls_cacertdir)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert dir %s ", options.tls_cacertdir); ++ } ++ ++ /* require cert? */ ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, ++ &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS check peer to %d ", options.tls_checkpeer); ++ ++ /* set cipher suite, certificate and private key: */ ++ if (options.tls_ciphers != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE, ++ options.tls_ciphers)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS ciphers to %s ", options.tls_ciphers); ++ } ++ ++ /* cert file */ ++ if (options.tls_cert != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE, ++ options.tls_cert)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS cert file %s ", options.tls_cert); ++ } ++ ++ /* key file */ ++ if (options.tls_key != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE, ++ options.tls_key)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE): %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("Set TLS key file %s ", options.tls_key); ++ } ++#endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE ++ if (options.uri != NULL) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_initialize (&ld, options.uri)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_initialize %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP initialize %s", options.uri); ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INTITIALIZE */ ++ ++ /* continue with opening */ ++ if ((ld == NULL) && (options.host != NULL)) { ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INIT ++ if ((ld = ldap_init (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) ++ fatal ("ldap_init failed"); ++ debug3 ("LDAP init %s:%d", options.host, options.port); ++#else ++ if ((ld = ldap_open (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) ++ fatal ("ldap_open failed"); ++ debug3 ("LDAP open %s:%d", options.host, options.port); ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INIT */ ++ } ++ ++ if (ld == NULL) ++ fatal ("no way to open ldap"); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) ++ if (options.ssl == SSL_LDAPS) { ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS, &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_%d", options.tls_checkpeer); ++ } ++#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS */ ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ++ &options.ldap_version); ++#else ++ ld->ld_version = options.ldap_version; ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", options.ldap_version); ++ ++#if LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 3 ++ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc, NULL); ++#elif LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 2 ++ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc); ++#else ++#warning unknown LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set rebind proc"); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_DEREF) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_DEREF, &options.deref); ++#else ++ ld->ld_deref = options.deref; ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set deref to %d", options.deref); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT, ++ &options.timelimit); ++#else ++ ld->ld_timelimit = options.timelimit; ++#endif ++ debug3 ("LDAP set timelimit to %d", options.timelimit); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT) ++ /* ++ * This is a new option in the Netscape SDK which sets ++ * the TCP connect timeout. For want of a better value, ++ * we use the bind_timelimit to control this. ++ */ ++ timeout = options.bind_timelimit * 1000; ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, &timeout); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set opt connect timeout to %d", timeout); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT) ++ tv.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; ++ tv.tv_usec = 0; ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &tv); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set opt network timeout to %ld.0", tv.tv_sec); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, ++ options.referrals ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set referrals to %d", options.referrals); ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_RESTART) ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESTART, ++ options.restart ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set restart to %d", options.restart); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S ++ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { ++ int version; ++ ++ if (ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &version) ++ == LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ if (version < LDAP_VERSION3) { ++ version = LDAP_VERSION3; ++ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ++ &version); ++ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", version); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP start TLS"); ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S */ ++ } ++ ++ if ((msgid = ldap_simple_bind (ld, options.binddn, ++ options.bindpw)) == -1) { ++ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); ++ ++ error ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); ++ reconnect++; ++ goto retry; ++ } ++ debug3 ("LDAP simple bind (%s)", options.binddn); ++ ++ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; ++ timeout.tv_usec = 0; ++ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, FALSE, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { ++ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); ++ ++ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); ++ reconnect++; ++ goto retry; ++ } ++ debug3 ("LDAP result in time"); ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) ++ controls = NULL; ++ if ((parserc = ldap_parse_result (ld, result, &rc, 0, 0, 0, &controls, TRUE)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_parse_result %s", ldap_err2string (parserc)); ++ debug3 ("LDAP parse result OK"); ++ ++ if (controls != NULL) { ++ ldap_controls_free (controls); ++ } ++#else ++ rc = ldap_result2error (session->ld, result, TRUE); ++#endif ++ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("error trying to bind as user \"%s\" (%s)", ++ options.binddn, ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ ++ debug2 ("LDAP do connect OK"); ++} ++ ++void ++process_user (const char *user, FILE *output) ++{ ++ LDAPMessage *res, *e; ++ char *buffer; ++ int bufflen, rc, i; ++ struct timeval timeout; ++ ++ debug ("LDAP process user"); ++ ++ /* quick check for attempts to be evil */ ++ if ((strchr(user, '(') != NULL) || (strchr(user, ')') != NULL) || ++ (strchr(user, '*') != NULL) || (strchr(user, '\\') != NULL)) { ++ logit ("illegal user name %s not processed", user); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* build filter for LDAP request */ ++ bufflen = strlen (LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT) + strlen(options.account_class) + strlen (user); ++ if (options.ssh_filter != NULL) ++ bufflen += strlen (options.ssh_filter); ++ buffer = xmalloc (bufflen); ++ snprintf(buffer, bufflen, LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT, options.account_class, user, (options.ssh_filter != NULL) ? options.ssh_filter : NULL); ++ buffer[bufflen - 1] = 0; ++ ++ debug3 ("LDAP search scope = %d %s", options.scope, buffer); ++ ++ timeout.tv_sec = options.timelimit; ++ timeout.tv_usec = 0; ++ if ((rc = ldap_search_st(ld, options.base, options.scope, buffer, attrs, 0, &timeout, &res)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ error ("ldap_search_st(): %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ free (buffer); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* free */ ++ free (buffer); ++ ++ for (e = ldap_first_entry(ld, res); e != NULL; e = ldap_next_entry(ld, e)) { ++ int num; ++ struct berval **keys; ++ ++ keys = ldap_get_values_len(ld, e, PUBKEYATTR); ++ num = ldap_count_values_len(keys); ++ for (i = 0 ; i < num ; i++) { ++ char *cp; //, *options = NULL; ++ ++ for (cp = keys[i]->bv_val; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); ++ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') ++ continue; ++ ++ /* We have found the desired key. */ ++ fprintf (output, "%s\n", keys[i]->bv_val); ++ } ++ ++ ldap_value_free_len(keys); ++ } ++ ++ ldap_msgfree(res); ++ debug2 ("LDAP process user finished"); ++} ++ ++void ++ldap_do_close(void) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ ++ debug ("LDAP do close"); ++ if ((rc = ldap_unbind_ext(ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ fatal ("ldap_unbind_ext: %s", ++ ldap_err2string (rc)); ++ ++ ld = NULL; ++ debug2 ("LDAP do close OK"); ++ return; ++} ++ +diff --git a/ldapbody.h b/ldapbody.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..665dca2 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapbody.h +@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPBODY_H ++#define LDAPBODY_H ++ ++#include ++ ++void ldap_checkconfig(void); ++void ldap_do_connect(void); ++void process_user(const char *, FILE *); ++void ldap_do_close(void); ++ ++#endif /* LDAPBODY_H */ ++ +diff --git a/ldapconf.c b/ldapconf.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..525060a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapconf.c +@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "ldap-helper.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ldapconf.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* Keyword tokens. */ ++ ++typedef enum { ++ lBadOption, ++ lHost, lURI, lBase, lBindDN, lBindPW, lRootBindDN, ++ lScope, lDeref, lPort, lTimeLimit, lBind_TimeLimit, ++ lLdap_Version, lBind_Policy, lSSLPath, lSSL, lReferrals, ++ lRestart, lTLS_CheckPeer, lTLS_CaCertFile, ++ lTLS_CaCertDir, lTLS_Ciphers, lTLS_Cert, lTLS_Key, ++ lTLS_RandFile, lLogDir, lDebug, lSSH_Filter, ++ lAccountClass, lDeprecated, lUnsupported ++} OpCodes; ++ ++/* Textual representations of the tokens. */ ++ ++static struct { ++ const char *name; ++ OpCodes opcode; ++} keywords[] = { ++ { "URI", lURI }, ++ { "Base", lBase }, ++ { "BindDN", lBindDN }, ++ { "BindPW", lBindPW }, ++ { "RootBindDN", lRootBindDN }, ++ { "Host", lHost }, ++ { "Port", lPort }, ++ { "Scope", lScope }, ++ { "Deref", lDeref }, ++ { "TimeLimit", lTimeLimit }, ++ { "TimeOut", lTimeLimit }, ++ { "Bind_Timelimit", lBind_TimeLimit }, ++ { "Network_TimeOut", lBind_TimeLimit }, ++/* ++ * Todo ++ * SIZELIMIT ++ */ ++ { "Ldap_Version", lLdap_Version }, ++ { "Version", lLdap_Version }, ++ { "Bind_Policy", lBind_Policy }, ++ { "SSLPath", lSSLPath }, ++ { "SSL", lSSL }, ++ { "Referrals", lReferrals }, ++ { "Restart", lRestart }, ++ { "TLS_CheckPeer", lTLS_CheckPeer }, ++ { "TLS_ReqCert", lTLS_CheckPeer }, ++ { "TLS_CaCertFile", lTLS_CaCertFile }, ++ { "TLS_CaCert", lTLS_CaCertFile }, ++ { "TLS_CaCertDir", lTLS_CaCertDir }, ++ { "TLS_Ciphers", lTLS_Ciphers }, ++ { "TLS_Cipher_Suite", lTLS_Ciphers }, ++ { "TLS_Cert", lTLS_Cert }, ++ { "TLS_Certificate", lTLS_Cert }, ++ { "TLS_Key", lTLS_Key }, ++ { "TLS_RandFile", lTLS_RandFile }, ++/* ++ * Todo ++ * TLS_CRLCHECK ++ * TLS_CRLFILE ++ */ ++ { "LogDir", lLogDir }, ++ { "Debug", lDebug }, ++ { "SSH_Filter", lSSH_Filter }, ++ { "AccountClass", lAccountClass }, ++ { NULL, lBadOption } ++}; ++ ++/* Configuration ptions. */ ++ ++Options options; ++ ++/* ++ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. ++ */ ++ ++static OpCodes ++parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) ++ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) ++ return keywords[i].opcode; ++ ++ if (config_warning_config_file) ++ logit("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", ++ filename, linenum, cp); ++ return lBadOption; ++} ++ ++/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ ++#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" ++ ++/* return next token in configuration line */ ++static char * ++ldap_strdelim(char **s) ++{ ++ char *old; ++ int wspace = 0; ++ ++ if (*s == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ old = *s; ++ ++ *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE); ++ if (*s == NULL) ++ return (old); ++ ++ *s[0] = '\0'; ++ ++ /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ ++ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; ++ if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) ++ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; ++ ++ return (old); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This ++ * only sets those values that have not already been set. ++ */ ++#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" ++ ++static int ++process_config_line(char *line, const char *filename, int linenum) ++{ ++ char *s, **charptr, **xstringptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg; ++ char *rootbinddn = NULL; ++ int opcode, *intptr, value; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ ++ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { ++ if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) ++ break; ++ line[len] = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ s = line; ++ /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ ++ if ((keyword = ldap_strdelim(&s)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ ++ if (*keyword == '\0') ++ keyword = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') ++ return 0; ++ ++ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum); ++ ++ switch (opcode) { ++ case lBadOption: ++ /* don't panic, but count bad options */ ++ return -1; ++ /* NOTREACHED */ ++ ++ case lHost: ++ xstringptr = &options.host; ++parse_xstring: ++ if (!s || *s == '\0') ++ fatal("%s line %d: missing dn",filename,linenum); ++ if (*xstringptr == NULL) ++ *xstringptr = xstrdup(s); ++ return 0; ++ ++ case lURI: ++ xstringptr = &options.uri; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lBase: ++ xstringptr = &options.base; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lBindDN: ++ xstringptr = &options.binddn; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lBindPW: ++ charptr = &options.bindpw; ++parse_string: ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*charptr == NULL) ++ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ ++ case lRootBindDN: ++ xstringptr = &rootbinddn; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lScope: ++ intptr = &options.scope; ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp (arg, "sub") == 0 || strcasecmp (arg, "subtree") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; ++ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "one") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; ++ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "base") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lDeref: ++ intptr = &options.scope; ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (!strcasecmp (arg, "never")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "searching")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "finding")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_FINDING; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "always")) ++ value = LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lPort: ++ intptr = &options.port; ++parse_int: ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); ++ ++ /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ ++ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); ++ if (arg == endofnumber) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lTimeLimit: ++ intptr = &options.timelimit; ++parse_time: ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) ++ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lBind_TimeLimit: ++ intptr = &options.bind_timelimit; ++ goto parse_time; ++ ++ case lLdap_Version: ++ intptr = &options.ldap_version; ++ goto parse_int; ++ ++ case lBind_Policy: ++ intptr = &options.bind_policy; ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_open") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_init") == 0) ++ value = 1; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "soft") == 0) ++ value = 0; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ break; ++ ++ case lSSLPath: ++ charptr = &options.sslpath; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lSSL: ++ intptr = &options.ssl; ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) ++ value = SSL_LDAPS; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) ++ value = SSL_OFF; ++ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "start_tls")) ++ value = SSL_START_TLS; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lReferrals: ++ intptr = &options.referrals; ++parse_flag: ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) ++ value = 1; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) ++ value = 0; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ *intptr = value; ++ break; ++ ++ case lRestart: ++ intptr = &options.restart; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case lTLS_CheckPeer: ++ intptr = &options.tls_checkpeer; ++ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); ++ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ ++ if (strcasecmp(arg, "never") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "demand") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "allow") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW; ++ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "try") == 0) ++ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY; ++ else ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*intptr == -1) ++ break; ++ ++ case lTLS_CaCertFile: ++ charptr = &options.tls_cacertfile; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_CaCertDir: ++ charptr = &options.tls_cacertdir; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_Ciphers: ++ xstringptr = &options.tls_ciphers; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lTLS_Cert: ++ charptr = &options.tls_cert; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_Key: ++ charptr = &options.tls_key; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lTLS_RandFile: ++ charptr = &options.tls_randfile; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lLogDir: ++ charptr = &options.logdir; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lDebug: ++ intptr = &options.debug; ++ goto parse_int; ++ ++ case lSSH_Filter: ++ xstringptr = &options.ssh_filter; ++ goto parse_xstring; ++ ++ case lAccountClass: ++ charptr = &options.account_class; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case lDeprecated: ++ debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", ++ filename, linenum, keyword); ++ return 0; ++ ++ case lUnsupported: ++ error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", ++ filename, linenum, keyword); ++ return 0; ++ ++ default: ++ fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode); ++ } ++ ++ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ ++ if ((arg = ldap_strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", ++ filename, linenum, arg); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options ++ * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if ++ * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. ++ */ ++ ++void ++read_config_file(const char *filename) ++{ ++ FILE *f; ++ char line[1024]; ++ int active, linenum; ++ int bad_options = 0; ++ struct stat sb; ++ ++ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) ++ fatal("fopen %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ++ ++ if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) ++ fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ++ if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || ++ (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) ++ fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); ++ ++ debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); ++ ++ /* ++ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned ++ * on/off by Host specifications. ++ */ ++ active = 1; ++ linenum = 0; ++ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { ++ /* Update line number counter. */ ++ linenum++; ++ if (process_config_line(line, filename, linenum) != 0) ++ bad_options++; ++ } ++ fclose(f); ++ if ((bad_options > 0) && config_exclusive_config_file) ++ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", ++ filename, bad_options); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet ++ * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options ++ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, ++ * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. ++ */ ++ ++void ++initialize_options(void) ++{ ++ memset(&options, 'X', sizeof(options)); ++ options.host = NULL; ++ options.uri = NULL; ++ options.base = NULL; ++ options.binddn = NULL; ++ options.bindpw = NULL; ++ options.scope = -1; ++ options.deref = -1; ++ options.port = -1; ++ options.timelimit = -1; ++ options.bind_timelimit = -1; ++ options.ldap_version = -1; ++ options.bind_policy = -1; ++ options.sslpath = NULL; ++ options.ssl = -1; ++ options.referrals = -1; ++ options.restart = -1; ++ options.tls_checkpeer = -1; ++ options.tls_cacertfile = NULL; ++ options.tls_cacertdir = NULL; ++ options.tls_ciphers = NULL; ++ options.tls_cert = NULL; ++ options.tls_key = NULL; ++ options.tls_randfile = NULL; ++ options.logdir = NULL; ++ options.debug = -1; ++ options.ssh_filter = NULL; ++ options.account_class = NULL; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those ++ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. ++ */ ++ ++void ++fill_default_options(void) ++{ ++ if (options.uri != NULL) { ++ LDAPURLDesc *ludp; ++ ++ if (ldap_url_parse(options.uri, &ludp) == LDAP_SUCCESS) { ++ if (options.ssl == -1) { ++ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap") == 0) ++ options.ssl = 2; ++ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldapi") == 0) ++ options.ssl = 0; ++ else if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldaps") == 0) ++ options.ssl = 1; ++ } ++ if (options.host == NULL) ++ options.host = xstrdup (ludp->lud_host); ++ if (options.port == -1) ++ options.port = ludp->lud_port; ++ ++ ldap_free_urldesc (ludp); ++ } ++ } ++ if (options.ssl == -1) ++ options.ssl = SSL_START_TLS; ++ if (options.port == -1) ++ options.port = (options.ssl == 0) ? 389 : 636; ++ if (options.uri == NULL) { ++ int len; ++#define MAXURILEN 4096 ++ ++ options.uri = xmalloc (MAXURILEN); ++ len = snprintf (options.uri, MAXURILEN, "ldap%s://%s:%d", ++ (options.ssl == 0) ? "" : "s", options.host, options.port); ++ options.uri[MAXURILEN - 1] = 0; ++ options.uri = xrealloc (options.uri, len + 1, 1); ++ } ++ if (options.binddn == NULL) ++ options.binddn = ""; ++ if (options.bindpw == NULL) ++ options.bindpw = ""; ++ if (options.scope == -1) ++ options.scope = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; ++ if (options.deref == -1) ++ options.deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; ++ if (options.timelimit == -1) ++ options.timelimit = 10; ++ if (options.bind_timelimit == -1) ++ options.bind_timelimit = 10; ++ if (options.ldap_version == -1) ++ options.ldap_version = 3; ++ if (options.bind_policy == -1) ++ options.bind_policy = 1; ++ if (options.referrals == -1) ++ options.referrals = 1; ++ if (options.restart == -1) ++ options.restart = 1; ++ if (options.tls_checkpeer == -1) ++ options.tls_checkpeer = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; ++ if (options.debug == -1) ++ options.debug = 0; ++ if (options.ssh_filter == NULL) ++ options.ssh_filter = ""; ++ if (options.account_class == NULL) ++ options.account_class = "posixAccount"; ++} ++ ++static const char * ++lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) ++ if (keywords[i].opcode == code) ++ return(keywords[i].name); ++ return "UNKNOWN"; ++} ++ ++static void ++dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) ++{ ++ if (val == NULL) ++ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); ++ else ++ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); ++} ++ ++static void ++dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) ++{ ++ if (val == -1) ++ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); ++ else ++ debug3("%s %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); ++} ++ ++struct names { ++ int value; ++ char *name; ++}; ++ ++static void ++dump_cfg_namedint(OpCodes code, int val, struct names *names) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ if (val == -1) ++ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); ++ else { ++ for (i = 0; names[i].value != -1; i++) ++ if (names[i].value == val) { ++ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), names[i].name); ++ return; ++ } ++ debug3("%s unknown: %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); ++ } ++} ++ ++static struct names _yesnotls[] = { ++ { 0, "No" }, ++ { 1, "Yes" }, ++ { 2, "Start_TLS" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _scope[] = { ++ { LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "Base" }, ++ { LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "One" }, ++ { LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE, "Sub"}, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _deref[] = { ++ { LDAP_DEREF_NEVER, "Never" }, ++ { LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING, "Searching" }, ++ { LDAP_DEREF_FINDING, "Finding" }, ++ { LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS, "Always" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _yesno[] = { ++ { 0, "No" }, ++ { 1, "Yes" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _bindpolicy[] = { ++ { 0, "Soft" }, ++ { 1, "Hard" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++static struct names _checkpeer[] = { ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER, "Never" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD, "Hard" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND, "Demand" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW, "Allow" }, ++ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY, "TRY" }, ++ { -1, NULL }}; ++ ++void ++dump_config(void) ++{ ++ dump_cfg_string(lURI, options.uri); ++ dump_cfg_string(lHost, options.host); ++ dump_cfg_int(lPort, options.port); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lSSL, options.ssl, _yesnotls); ++ dump_cfg_int(lLdap_Version, options.ldap_version); ++ dump_cfg_int(lTimeLimit, options.timelimit); ++ dump_cfg_int(lBind_TimeLimit, options.bind_timelimit); ++ dump_cfg_string(lBase, options.base); ++ dump_cfg_string(lBindDN, options.binddn); ++ dump_cfg_string(lBindPW, options.bindpw); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lScope, options.scope, _scope); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lDeref, options.deref, _deref); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lReferrals, options.referrals, _yesno); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lRestart, options.restart, _yesno); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lBind_Policy, options.bind_policy, _bindpolicy); ++ dump_cfg_string(lSSLPath, options.sslpath); ++ dump_cfg_namedint(lTLS_CheckPeer, options.tls_checkpeer, _checkpeer); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertFile, options.tls_cacertfile); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertDir, options.tls_cacertdir); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Ciphers, options.tls_ciphers); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Cert, options.tls_cert); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Key, options.tls_key); ++ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_RandFile, options.tls_randfile); ++ dump_cfg_string(lLogDir, options.logdir); ++ dump_cfg_int(lDebug, options.debug); ++ dump_cfg_string(lSSH_Filter, options.ssh_filter); ++ dump_cfg_string(lAccountClass, options.logdir); ++} ++ +diff --git a/ldapconf.h b/ldapconf.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..2cb550c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapconf.h +@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPCONF_H ++#define LDAPCONF_H ++ ++#define SSL_OFF 0 ++#define SSL_LDAPS 1 ++#define SSL_START_TLS 2 ++ ++/* Data structure for representing option data. */ ++ ++typedef struct { ++ char *host; ++ char *uri; ++ char *base; ++ char *binddn; ++ char *bindpw; ++ int scope; ++ int deref; ++ int port; ++ int timelimit; ++ int bind_timelimit; ++ int ldap_version; ++ int bind_policy; ++ char *sslpath; ++ int ssl; ++ int referrals; ++ int restart; ++ int tls_checkpeer; ++ char *tls_cacertfile; ++ char *tls_cacertdir; ++ char *tls_ciphers; ++ char *tls_cert; ++ char *tls_key; ++ char *tls_randfile; ++ char *logdir; ++ int debug; ++ char *ssh_filter; ++ char *account_class; ++} Options; ++ ++extern Options options; ++ ++void read_config_file(const char *); ++void initialize_options(void); ++void fill_default_options(void); ++void dump_config(void); ++ ++#endif /* LDAPCONF_H */ +diff --git a/ldapincludes.h b/ldapincludes.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..8539bdc +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapincludes.h +@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPINCLUDES_H ++#define LDAPINCLUDES_H ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LBER_H ++#include ++#endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_H ++#include ++#endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SSL_H ++#include ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* LDAPINCLUDES_H */ +diff --git a/ldapmisc.c b/ldapmisc.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..de23c0c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapmisc.c +@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++#include "ldapmisc.h" ++ ++#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_GET_LDERRNO ++int ++ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP * ld, char **m, char **s) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION ++ int rc; ++#endif ++ int lderrno; ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) ++ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ lderrno = ld->ld_errno; ++#endif ++ ++ if (s != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) ++ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ *s = ld->ld_error; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ if (m != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) ++ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ *m = ld->ld_matched; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return lderrno; ++} ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_SET_LDERRNO ++int ++ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP * ld, int lderrno, const char *m, const char *s) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION ++ int rc; ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ ld->ld_errno = lderrno; ++#endif ++ ++ if (s != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ ld->ld_error = s; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ if (m != NULL) { ++#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) ++ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) ++ return rc; ++#else ++ ld->ld_matched = m; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return LDAP_SUCCESS; ++} ++#endif ++ +diff --git a/ldapmisc.h b/ldapmisc.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..4c271df +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ldapmisc.h +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef LDAPMISC_H ++#define LDAPMISC_H ++ ++#include "ldapincludes.h" ++ ++int ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP *, char **, char **); ++int ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP *, int, const char *, const char *); ++ ++#endif /* LDAPMISC_H */ ++ +diff --git a/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema b/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..c84f90f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema +@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ ++# ++# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey ++# useful with PKA-LDAP also ++# ++# Author: Eric AUGE ++# ++# Based on the proposal of : Mark Ruijter ++# ++ ++ ++# octetString SYNTAX ++attributetype ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' ++ EQUALITY octetStringMatch ++ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) ++ ++# printableString SYNTAX yes|no ++objectclass ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' ++ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) ++ ) +diff --git a/openssh-lpk-sun.schema b/openssh-lpk-sun.schema +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..3136673 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/openssh-lpk-sun.schema +@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ ++# ++# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey ++# useful with PKA-LDAP also ++# ++# Author: Eric AUGE ++# ++# Schema for Sun Directory Server. ++# Based on the original schema, modified by Stefan Fischer. ++# ++ ++dn: cn=schema ++ ++# octetString SYNTAX ++attributeTypes: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' ++ EQUALITY octetStringMatch ++ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) ++ ++# printableString SYNTAX yes|no ++objectClasses: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY ++ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' ++ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) ++ ) +diff --git a/ssh-ldap-helper.8 b/ssh-ldap-helper.8 +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..5d2d7be +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-ldap-helper.8 +@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ ++.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap-helper.8,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ ++.\" ++.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++.\" ++.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++.\" ++.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++.\" ++.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2010 $ ++.Dt SSH-LDAP-HELPER 8 ++.Os ++.Sh NAME ++.Nm ssh-ldap-helper ++.Nd sshd helper program for ldap support ++.Sh SYNOPSIS ++.Nm ssh-ldap-helper ++.Op Fl devw ++.Op Fl f Ar file ++.Op Fl s Ar user ++.Sh DESCRIPTION ++.Nm ++is used by ++.Xr sshd 1 ++to access keys provided by an LDAP. ++.Nm ++is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the ++sshd configuration file ++.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config ++by setting ++.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ++to ++.Dq /usr/libexec/ssh-ldap-wrapper . ++.Pp ++.Nm ++is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ++.Xr sshd 8 via ++.Xr ssh-ldap-wrapper . ++.Pp ++The options are as follows: ++.Bl -tag -width Ds ++.It Fl d ++Set the debug mode; ++.Nm ++prints all logs to stderr instead of syslog. ++.It Fl e ++Implies \-w; ++.Nm ++halts if it encounters an unknown item in the ldap.conf file. ++.It Fl f ++.Nm ++uses this file as the ldap configuration file instead of /etc/ssh/ldap.conf (default). ++.It Fl s ++.Nm ++prints out the user's keys to stdout and exits. ++.It Fl v ++Implies \-d; ++increases verbosity. ++.It Fl w ++.Nm ++writes warnings about unknown items in the ldap.conf configuration file. ++.El ++.Sh SEE ALSO ++.Xr sshd 8 , ++.Xr sshd_config 5 , ++.Xr ssh-ldap.conf 5 , ++.Sh HISTORY ++.Nm ++first appeared in ++OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . ++.Sh AUTHORS ++.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com +diff --git a/ssh-ldap-wrapper b/ssh-ldap-wrapper +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..cb500aa +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-ldap-wrapper +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++ ++exec /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-helper -s "$1" ++ +diff --git a/ssh-ldap.conf.5 b/ssh-ldap.conf.5 +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..f7081b8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-ldap.conf.5 +@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ ++.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap.conf.5,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ ++.\" ++.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. ++.\" ++.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++.\" ++.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++.\" ++.Dd $Mdocdate: may 12 2010 $ ++.Dt SSH-LDAP.CONF 5 ++.Os ++.Sh NAME ++.Nm ssh-ldap.conf ++.Nd configuration file for ssh-ldap-helper ++.Sh SYNOPSIS ++.Nm /etc/ssh/ldap.conf ++.Sh DESCRIPTION ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++reads configuration data from ++.Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf ++(or the file specified with ++.Fl f ++on the command line). ++The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. ++Lines starting with ++.Ql # ++and empty lines are interpreted as comments. ++.Pp ++The value starts with the first non-blank character after ++the keyword's name, and terminates at the end of the line, ++or at the last sequence of blanks before the end of the line. ++Quoting values that contain blanks ++may be incorrect, as the quotes would become part of the value. ++The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that ++keywords are case-insensitive, and arguments, on a case by case basis, may be case-sensitive). ++.Bl -tag -width Ds ++.It Cm URI ++The argument(s) are in the form ++.Pa ldap[si]://[name[:port]] ++and specify the URI(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++should connect. The URI scheme may be any of ++.Dq ldap , ++.Dq ldaps ++or ++.Dq ldapi , ++which refer to LDAP over TCP, LDAP over SSL (TLS) and LDAP ++over IPC (UNIX domain sockets), respectively. ++Each server's name can be specified as a ++domain-style name or an IP address literal. Optionally, the ++server's name can followed by a ':' and the port number the LDAP ++server is listening on. If no port number is provided, the default ++port for the scheme is used (389 for ldap://, 636 for ldaps://). ++For LDAP over IPC, name is the name of the socket, and no port ++is required, nor allowed; note that directory separators must be ++URL-encoded, like any other characters that are special to URLs; ++A space separated list of URIs may be provided. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm Base ++Specifies the default base Distinguished Name (DN) to use when performing ldap operations. ++The base must be specified as a DN in LDAP format. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm BindDN ++Specifies the default BIND DN to use when connecting to the ldap server. ++The bind DN must be specified as a Distinguished Name in LDAP format. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm BindPW ++Specifies the default password to use when connecting to the ldap server via ++.Cm BindDN . ++There is no default. ++.It Cm RootBindDN ++Intentionaly does nothing. Recognized for compatibility reasons. ++.It Cm Host ++The argument(s) specifies the name(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++should connect. Each server's name can be specified as a ++domain-style name or an IP address and optionally followed by a ':' and ++the port number the ldap server is listening on. A space-separated ++list of hosts may be provided. ++There is no default. ++.Cm Host ++is deprecated in favor of ++.Cm URI . ++.It Cm Port ++Specifies the default port used when connecting to LDAP servers(s). ++The port may be specified as a number. ++The default port is 389 for ldap:// or 636 for ldaps:// respectively. ++.Cm Port ++is deprecated in favor of ++.Cm URI . ++.It Cm Scope ++Specifies the starting point of an LDAP search and the depth from the base DN to which the search should descend. ++There are three options (values) that can be assigned to the ++.Cm Scope parameter: ++.Dq base , ++.Dq one ++and ++.Dq subtree . ++Alias for the subtree is ++.Dq sub . ++The value ++.Dq base ++is used to indicate searching only the entry at the base DN, resulting in only that entry being returned (keeping in mind that it also has to meet the search filter criteria!). ++The value ++.Dq one ++is used to indicate searching all entries one level under the base DN, but not including the base DN and not including any entries under that one level under the base DN. ++The value ++.Dq subtree ++is used to indicate searching of all entries at all levels under and including the specified base DN. ++The default is ++.Dq subtree . ++.It Cm Deref ++Specifies how alias dereferencing is done when performing a search. There are four ++possible values that can be assigned to the ++.Cm Deref ++parameter: ++.Dq never , ++.Dq searching , ++.Dq finding , ++and ++.Dq always . ++The value ++.Dq never ++means that the aliases are never dereferenced. ++The value ++.Dq searching ++means that the aliases are dereferenced in subordinates of the base object, but ++not in locating the base object of the search. ++The value ++.Dq finding ++means that the aliases are only dereferenced when locating the base object of the search. ++The value ++.Dq always ++means that the aliases are dereferenced both in searching and in locating the base object ++of the search. ++The default is ++.Dq never . ++.It Cm TimeLimit ++Specifies a time limit (in seconds) to use when performing searches. ++The number should be a non-negative integer. A ++.Cm TimeLimit ++of zero (0) specifies that the search time is unlimited. Please note that the server ++may still apply any server-side limit on the duration of a search operation. ++The default value is 10. ++.It Cm TimeOut ++Is an aliast to ++.Cm TimeLimit . ++.It Cm Bind_TimeLimit ++Specifies the timeout (in seconds) after which the poll(2)/select(2) ++following a connect(2) returns in case of no activity. ++The default value is 10. ++.It Cm Network_TimeOut ++Is an alias to ++.Cm Bind_TimeLimit . ++.It Cm Ldap_Version ++Specifies what version of the LDAP protocol should be used. ++The allowed values are 2 or 3. The default is 3. ++.It Cm Version ++Is an alias to ++.Cm Ldap_Version . ++.It Cm Bind_Policy ++Specifies the policy to use for reconnecting to an unavailable LDAP server. There are 2 available values: ++.Dq hard ++and ++.Dq soft. ++.Dq hard has 2 aliases ++.Dq hard_open ++and ++.Dq hard_init . ++The value ++.Dq hard ++means that reconects that the ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++tries to reconnect to the LDAP server 5 times before failure. There is exponential backoff before retrying. ++The value ++.Dq soft ++means that ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++fails immediately when it cannot connect to the LDAP seerver. ++The deault is ++.Dq hard . ++.It Cm SSLPath ++Specifies the path to the X.509 certificate database. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm SSL ++Specifies whether to use SSL/TLS or not. ++There are three allowed values: ++.Dq yes , ++.Dq no ++and ++.Dq start_tls ++Both ++.Dq true ++and ++.Dq on ++are the aliases for ++.Dq yes . ++.Dq false ++and ++.Dq off ++are the aliases for ++.Dq no . ++If ++.Dq start_tls ++is specified then StartTLS is used rather than raw LDAP over SSL. ++The default for ldap:// is ++.Dq start_tls , ++for ldaps:// ++.Dq yes ++and ++.Dq no ++for the ldapi:// . ++In case of host based configuration the default is ++.Dq start_tls . ++.It Cm Referrals ++Specifies if the client should automatically follow referrals returned ++by LDAP servers. ++The value can be or ++.Dq yes ++or ++.Dq no . ++.Dq true ++and ++.Dq on ++are the aliases for ++.Dq yes . ++.Dq false ++and ++.Dq off ++are the aliases for ++.Dq no . ++The default is yes. ++.It Cm Restart ++Specifies whether the LDAP client library should restart the select(2) system call when interrupted. ++The value can be or ++.Dq yes ++or ++.Dq no . ++.Dq true ++and ++.Dq on ++are the aliases for ++.Dq yes . ++.Dq false ++and ++.Dq off ++are the aliases for ++.Dq no . ++The default is yes. ++.It Cm TLS_CheckPeer ++Specifies what checks to perform on server certificates in a TLS session, ++if any. The value ++can be specified as one of the following keywords: ++.Dq never , ++.Dq hard , ++.Dq demand , ++.Dq allow ++and ++.Dq try . ++.Dq true , ++.Dq on ++and ++.Dq yes ++are aliases for ++.Dq hard . ++.Dq false , ++.Dq off ++and ++.Dq no ++are the aliases for ++.Dq never . ++The value ++.Dq never ++means that the client will not request or check any server certificate. ++The value ++.Dq allow ++means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, ++the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, it will ++be ignored and the session proceeds normally. ++The value ++.Dq try ++means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, ++the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, ++the session is immediately terminated. ++The value ++.Dq demand ++means that the server certificate is requested. If no ++certificate is provided, or a bad certificate is provided, the session ++is immediately terminated. ++The value ++.Dq hard ++is the same as ++.Dq demand . ++It requires an SSL connection. In the case of the plain conection the ++session is immediately terminated. ++The default is ++.Dq hard . ++.It Cm TLS_ReqCert ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_CheckPeer . ++.It Cm TLS_CACertFile ++Specifies the file that contains certificates for all of the Certificate ++Authorities the client will recognize. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_CACert ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_CACertFile . ++.It Cm TLS_CACertDIR ++Specifies the path of a directory that contains Certificate Authority ++certificates in separate individual files. The ++.Cm TLS_CACert ++is always used before ++.Cm TLS_CACertDir . ++The specified directory must be managed with the OpenSSL c_rehash utility. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_Ciphers ++Specifies acceptable cipher suite and preference order. ++The value should be a cipher specification for OpenSSL, ++e.g., ++.Dq HIGH:MEDIUM:+SSLv2 . ++The default is ++.Dq ALL . ++.It Cm TLS_Cipher_Suite ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_Ciphers . ++.It Cm TLS_Cert ++Specifies the file that contains the client certificate. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_Certificate ++Is an alias for ++.Cm TLS_Cert . ++.It Cm TLS_Key ++Specifies the file that contains the private key that matches the certificate ++stored in the ++.Cm TLS_Cert ++file. Currently, the private key must not be protected with a password, so ++it is of critical importance that the key file is protected carefully. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm TLS_RandFile ++Specifies the file to obtain random bits from when /dev/[u]random is ++not available. Generally set to the name of the EGD/PRNGD socket. ++The environment variable RANDFILE can also be used to specify the filename. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm LogDir ++Specifies the directory used for logging by the LDAP client library. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm Debug ++Specifies the debug level used for logging by the LDAP client library. ++There is no default. ++.It Cm SSH_Filter ++Specifies the user filter applied on the LDAP serch. ++The default is no filter. ++.It Cm AccountClass ++Specifies the LDAP class used to find user accounts. ++The default is posixAccount. ++.El ++.Sh FILES ++.Bl -tag -width Ds ++.It Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf ++Ldap configuration file for ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 . ++.El ++.Sh "SEE ALSO" ++.Xr ldap.conf 5 , ++.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 ++.Sh HISTORY ++.Nm ++first appeared in ++OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . ++.Sh AUTHORS ++.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..579446b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index a7b8b6a..24ab272 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -1620,6 +1620,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, + &cfg, NULL); + ++ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux */ ++ if (! options.use_pam) ++ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several problems."); ++ + seed_rng(); + + /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 36cb27a..c1b7c03 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no + # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. ++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several ++# problems. + UsePAM yes + + #AllowAgentForwarding yes diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6507647 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index c18524e..d04f4ed 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -409,6 +409,25 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + debug3("%s: done", __func__); + } + ++void ++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) ++{ ++ security_context_t *ctx; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ ++ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { ++ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (ctx != NULL) { ++ if (setcon(ctx) != 0) ++ logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); ++ freecon(ctx); ++ } ++} ++ + #endif + #endif + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index 8ef6cc4..b18893c 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + ++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + #endif + +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 2bcf818..b5dc144 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -1538,6 +1538,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + pw->pw_uid); + chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); + free(tmp); + free(chroot_path); +@@ -1565,6 +1568,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + #endif ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || ++ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { + fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); +@@ -1826,9 +1835,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); +-#endif + exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); + } + +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 07f9926..a97f8b7 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); ++#endif ++ + /* Change our root directory */ + if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) + fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, +@@ -768,6 +772,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); + + skip: ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ /* switch SELinux content for root too */ ++ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ + monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12f4a9f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +index 49a4f6c..3f83c40 100644 +--- a/ssh_config ++++ b/ssh_config +@@ -50,3 +50,15 @@ + # Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain + # Host *.local + # CheckHostIP no ++ ++Host * ++ GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access ++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted ++# mode correctly we set this to yes. ++ ForwardX11Trusted yes ++# Send locale-related environment variables ++ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++ SendEnv XMODIFIERS +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index c735429..e68ddee 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ + # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the + # default value. + ++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell ++# SELinux about this change. ++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER ++# + #Port 22 + #AddressFamily any + #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +@@ -21,10 +25,10 @@ + # HostKey for protocol version 1 + #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key + # HostKeys for protocol version 2 +-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ++HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key ++HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ++HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + + # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key + #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h +@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ + # Logging + # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging + #SyslogFacility AUTH ++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV + #LogLevel INFO + + # Authentication: +@@ -71,9 +76,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! + #PasswordAuthentication yes + #PermitEmptyPasswords no ++PasswordAuthentication yes + + # Change to no to disable s/key passwords + #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes ++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + + # Kerberos options + #KerberosAuthentication no +@@ -82,8 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + #KerberosGetAFSToken no + + # GSSAPI options +-#GSSAPIAuthentication no +-#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +@@ -94,12 +101,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. +-#UsePAM no ++UsePAM yes + + #AllowAgentForwarding yes + #AllowTcpForwarding yes + #GatewayPorts no +-#X11Forwarding no ++X11Forwarding yes + #X11DisplayOffset 10 + #X11UseLocalhost yes + #PermitTTY yes +@@ -122,6 +129,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Default for new installations. + # no default banner path + #Banner none + ++# Accept locale-related environment variables ++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS ++ + # override default of no subsystems + Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server + +diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0 +index 413c260..87e7ee7 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.0 ++++ b/sshd_config.0 +@@ -675,9 +675,9 @@ DESCRIPTION + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, +- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The +- default is AUTH. ++ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, ++ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. ++ The default is AUTH. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index ce71efe..12465c2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + .It Cm SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + .Xr sshd 8 . +-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, ++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, + LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. + The default is AUTH. + .It Cm TCPKeepAlive diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4740c99 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch @@ -0,0 +1,896 @@ +diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c +index d789bad..cd1a775 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.c ++++ b/auth-pam.c +@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) + * during the ssh authentication process. + */ + int +-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) ++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) + { + int ret = 1; + #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV +diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h +index a1a2b52..b109a5a 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.h ++++ b/auth-pam.h +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void); + void do_pam_set_tty(const char *); + void do_pam_setcred(int ); + void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); ++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); + char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); + char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); + void free_pam_environment(char **); +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index 124e597..4605588 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt { + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ + char *style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role; ++#endif + void *kbdintctxt; + char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ + #ifdef BSD_AUTH +diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c +index 0f870b3..df040bb 100644 +--- a/auth1.c ++++ b/auth1.c +@@ -381,6 +381,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) + { + u_int ulen; + char *user, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role=NULL; ++#endif + + /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ + packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER); +@@ -389,11 +392,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) + user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen); + packet_check_eom(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = '\0'; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = '\0'; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ else ++ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL) ++ *style++ = '\0'; ++#endif + + authctxt->user = user; + authctxt->style = style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role; ++#endif + + /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ + if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index c28a705..4756dd7 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + int authenticated = 0; ++ char *micuser; + Buffer b; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + u_int len; +@@ -263,7 +264,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); + mic.length = len; + +- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0)) ++ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); ++ else ++#endif ++ micuser = authctxt->user; ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-with-mic"); + + gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); +@@ -275,6 +282,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + + buffer_free(&b); ++ if (micuser != authctxt->user) ++ free(micuser); + free(mic.value); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; +diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c +index eca0069..95d678e 100644 +--- a/auth2-hostbased.c ++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c +@@ -112,7 +112,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); +- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role) { ++ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); ++ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); ++ } else ++#endif ++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); + buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index 749b11a..c0ae0d4 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -133,9 +133,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); +- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, ++ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", +- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); ++ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "", ++ authctxt->role ? "/" : "", ++ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); + free(userstyle); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index a5490c0..5f4f26f 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role = NULL; ++#endif + int authenticated = 0; + + if (authctxt == NULL) +@@ -226,6 +229,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = 0; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + +@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) + use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; +- if (use_privsep) ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; ++#endif ++ if (use_privsep) { + mm_inform_authserv(service, style); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ mm_inform_authrole(role); ++#endif ++ } + userauth_banner(); + if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) + packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index e4c8c32..f31cd91 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ char * + colon(char *cp) + { + int flag = 0; ++ int start = 1; + + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return NULL; +@@ -445,6 +446,13 @@ colon(char *cp) + return (cp); + if (*cp == '/') + return NULL; ++ if (start) { ++ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */ ++ if (*cp == '/') ++ return (0); ++ if (*cp != '.') ++ start = 0; ++ } + } + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 531c4f9..229fada 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *); ++#endif + int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); +@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -805,6 +811,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) + else { + /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1); ++#endif + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); + } + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -846,6 +855,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) + return (0); + } + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int ++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ monitor_permit_authentications(1); ++ ++ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ debug3("%s: role=%s", ++ __func__, authctxt->role); ++ ++ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { ++ free(authctxt->role); ++ authctxt->role = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++#endif ++ + int + mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) + { +@@ -1220,7 +1248,7 @@ static int + monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) + { + Buffer b; +- char *p, *userstyle; ++ char *p, *r, *userstyle; + u_int len; + int fail = 0; + +@@ -1246,6 +1274,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); ++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) ++ *r = '\0'; + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); +@@ -1281,7 +1311,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, + char *chost) + { + Buffer b; +- char *p, *userstyle; ++ char *p, *r, *userstyle; + u_int len; + int fail = 0; + +@@ -1298,6 +1328,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); ++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) ++ *r = '\0'; + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index 5bc41b5..20e2b4a 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49, + MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50, + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, ++#endif ++ + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105, +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index 1a47e41..d1b6d99 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -336,6 +336,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) + buffer_free(&m); + } + ++/* Inform the privileged process about role */ ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void ++mm_inform_authrole(char *role) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* Do the password authentication */ + int + mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 18c2501..9d5e5ba 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void); + DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); + int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); + void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void mm_inform_authrole(char *); ++#endif + struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); + char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); + int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +index 6ecfb93..b912dbe 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in ++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di + + COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o + +-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o ++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o + + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..c18524e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh ++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST) ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "port-linux.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++#include ++#include ++#endif ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern int rexeced_flag; ++ ++/* Send audit message */ ++static int ++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, ++ security_context_t selected_context) ++{ ++ int rc=0; ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++ char *msg = NULL; ++ int audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ security_context_t default_raw=NULL; ++ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL; ++ rc = -1; ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ error("Error connecting to audit system."); ++ return rc; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating default context."); ++ default_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating selected context."); ++ selected_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s", ++ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"), ++ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) { ++ error("Error allocating memory."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, ++ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) { ++ error("Error sending audit message."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ rc = 0; ++ out: ++ free(msg); ++ freecon(default_raw); ++ freecon(selected_raw); ++ close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++static int ++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) ++{ ++ struct av_decision avd; ++ int retval; ++ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS; ++ ++ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst); ++ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd); ++ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, ++ security_context_t *sc) { ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his ++ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the ++ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */ ++#endif ++ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ } ++#endif ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ context_t con; ++ char *type=NULL; ++ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) { ++ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'", ++ role); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_role_set(con, role); ++ context_type_set(con, type); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ if (!*sc) ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) { ++ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */ ++ context_t con; ++ security_context_t obtained_raw; ++ security_context_t requested_raw; ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_range_set(con, lvl); ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) { ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) { ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'", ++ obtained_raw, requested_raw); ++ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) { ++ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */ ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++ out: ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++static void ++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) ++{ ++ *role = NULL; ++ *level = NULL; ++ if (the_authctxt) { ++ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { ++ char *slash; ++ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); ++ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *slash = '\0'; ++ *level = slash + 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++} ++ ++/* Return the default security context for the given username */ ++static int ++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, ++ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) ++{ ++ char *sename, *lvl; ++ char *role; ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ int r = 0; ++ context_t con = NULL; ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME ++ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { ++ sename = NULL; ++ lvl = NULL; ++ } ++#else ++ sename = pwname; ++ lvl = ""; ++#endif ++ ++ if (r == 0) { ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc); ++#else ++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ if (r == 0) { ++ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; ++ ++ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) ++ fatal("failed to allocate security context"); ++ ++ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL) ++ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context"); ++ reqlvl = context_range_get(con); ++ freecon(sshdsc); ++ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0) ++ /* we actually don't change level */ ++ reqlvl = ""; ++ ++ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl); ++ ++ } ++ ++ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) { ++ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc); ++ ++ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) { ++ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0) ++ default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */ ++ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) { ++ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } else { ++ r = -1; ++ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } ++ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc) ++ freecon(default_level_sc); ++ } ++ } else { ++ *user_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " ++ "context for %s", __func__, pwname); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME ++ free(sename); ++ free(lvl); ++#endif ++ ++ if (role != NULL) ++ free(role); ++ if (con) ++ context_free(con); ++ ++ return (r); ++} ++ ++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ ++static int ++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ char *role; ++ char *use_current; ++ int rv; ++ ++ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ++ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ use_current = "1"; ++ } else { ++ use_current = ""; ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ } ++ ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ ++ if (role != NULL) ++ free(role); ++ ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ ++void ++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) ++{ ++ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; ++ int r = 0; ++ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ ++ if (options.use_pam) { ++ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { ++ switch (security_getenforce()) { ++ case -1: ++ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); ++ case 0: ++ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", ++ __func__); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.", ++ __func__); ++ } ++ } ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); ++ ++ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); ++ if (r >= 0) { ++ r = setexeccon(user_ctx); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", ++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON ++ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", ++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ if (user_ctx == NULL) { ++ user_ctx = default_ctx; ++ } ++ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) { ++ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was ++ a failure */ ++ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx); ++ } ++ if (r < 0) { ++ switch (security_getenforce()) { ++ case -1: ++ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); ++ case 0: ++ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", ++ __func__); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.", ++ __func__); ++ } ++ } ++ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) ++ freecon(user_ctx); ++ if (default_ctx != NULL) ++ freecon(default_ctx); ++ ++ debug3("%s: done", __func__); ++} ++ ++#endif ++#endif ++ +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +index 4637a7a..22ea8ef 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +@@ -103,37 +103,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + return sc; + } + +-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ +-void +-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +-{ +- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; +- +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) +- return; +- +- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); +- +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); +- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { +- switch (security_getenforce()) { +- case -1: +- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); +- case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); +- break; +- default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " +- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); +- } +- } +- if (user_ctx != NULL) +- freecon(user_ctx); +- +- debug3("%s: done", __func__); +-} +- + /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */ + void + ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index e3d1004..8ef6cc4 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); + void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); +-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); ++ ++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c +index 30fc609..0d39ab2 100644 +--- a/platform.c ++++ b/platform.c +@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw) + } + #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); + #endif + } + +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 7523de9..07f9926 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -2138,6 +2138,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + restore_uid(); + } + #endif ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); ++#endif + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..166e569 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +index 97ce58c..1f9320a 100644 +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -338,6 +338,21 @@ clear_cached_addr(void) + cached_port = -1; + } + ++void set_remote_ipaddr(void) { ++ if (canonical_host_ip != NULL) ++ free(canonical_host_ip); ++ ++ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { ++ canonical_host_ip = ++ get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); ++ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) ++ cleanup_exit(255); ++ } else { ++ /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */ ++ canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); ++ } ++} ++ + /* + * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned + * string must not be freed. +@@ -347,17 +362,9 @@ const char * + get_remote_ipaddr(void) + { + /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ +- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) { +- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { +- canonical_host_ip = +- get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); +- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) +- cleanup_exit(255); +- } else { +- /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */ +- canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); +- } +- } ++ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) ++ set_remote_ipaddr(); ++ + return canonical_host_ip; + } + +diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h +index 4c8636f..4079953 100644 +--- a/canohost.h ++++ b/canohost.h +@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ + */ + + const char *get_canonical_hostname(int); ++void set_remote_ipaddr(void); + const char *get_remote_ipaddr(void); + const char *get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int); + +diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c +index e636f33..451a58b 100644 +--- a/sshconnect.c ++++ b/sshconnect.c +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ + #include "monitor_fdpass.h" + #include "ssh2.h" + #include "version.h" ++#include "canohost.h" + + char *client_version_string = NULL; + char *server_version_string = NULL; +@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, + + /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ + packet_set_connection(sock, sock); ++ set_remote_ipaddr(); + + return 0; + } +@@ -492,6 +494,7 @@ ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, + + /* Set the connection. */ + packet_set_connection(sock, sock); ++ set_remote_ipaddr(); + + return 0; + } diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen index d54e4b9..a1143f3 100644 --- a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # # The creation is controlled by the $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS environment # variable. -AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NODSA +AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA ECDSA ED25519" # source function library . /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ECDSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +ED25519_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # pull in sysconfig settings [ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd @@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ do_rsa1_keygen() { chmod 640 $RSA1_KEY chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then - /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY.pub + /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY{,.pub} fi success $"RSA1 key generation" echo @@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ do_rsa_keygen() { chmod 640 $RSA_KEY chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then - /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY.pub + /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY{,.pub} fi success $"RSA key generation" echo @@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ do_rsa_keygen() { } do_dsa_keygen() { - if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then + if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: " rm -f $DSA_KEY if test ! -f $DSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ do_dsa_keygen() { chmod 640 $DSA_KEY chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then - /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY.pub + /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY{,.pub} fi success $"DSA key generation" echo @@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ do_ecdsa_keygen() { chmod 640 $ECDSA_KEY chmod 644 $ECDSA_KEY.pub if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then - /sbin/restorecon $ECDSA_KEY.pub + /sbin/restorecon $ECDSA_KEY{,.pub} fi success $"ECDSA key generation" echo @@ -111,13 +112,43 @@ do_ecdsa_keygen() { fi } -# Create keys if necessary -if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNO ]; then - do_rsa_keygen - if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xRSAONLY ]; then - do_ecdsa_keygen - if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNODSA ]; then - do_dsa_keygen +do_ed25519_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $ED25519_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then + echo -n $"Generating SSH2 ED25519 host key: " + rm -f $ED25519_KEY + if test ! -f $ED25519_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t ed25519 -f $ED25519_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chgrp ssh_keys $ED25519_KEY + chmod 640 $ED25519_KEY + chmod 644 $ED25519_KEY.pub + if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then + /sbin/restorecon $ED25519_KEY{,.pub} + fi + success $"ED25519 key generation" + echo + else + failure $"ED25519 key generation" + echo + exit 1 fi fi +} + +if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" == "xNO" ]; then + exit 0 fi + +# legacy options +case $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS in + NODSA) AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA ECDSA ED25519";; + RSAONLY) AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA";; + YES) AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="DSA RSA ECDSA ED25519";; +esac + +for KEY in $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS; do + case $KEY in + DSA) do_dsa_keygen;; + RSA) do_rsa_keygen;; + ECDSA) do_ecdsa_keygen;; + ED25519) do_ed25519_keygen;; + esac +done diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service index 4be6fb6..a27d4f6 100644 --- a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.service @@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ [Unit] Description=OpenSSH Server Key Generation ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +PartOf=sshd.service sshd.socket [Service] ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen Type=oneshot +RemainAfterExit=yes diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.service b/SOURCES/sshd.service index 6348bc1..4e3ea9b 100644 --- a/SOURCES/sshd.service +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.service @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ [Unit] Description=OpenSSH server daemon -After=syslog.target network.target auditd.service +After=network.target sshd-keygen.service +Wants=sshd-keygen.service [Service] EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/sshd -ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID KillMode=process diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig b/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig index ddd7744..e666ab9 100644 --- a/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ # Configuration file for the sshd service. -# The server keys are automatically generated if they omitted -# to change the automatic creation uncomment the appropriate -# line. The default is NODSA which means rsa and ecdsa keys are -# generated. +# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing. +# To change the automatic creation uncomment and change the appropriate +# line. Accepted key types are: DSA RSA ECDSA ED25519. +# The default is "RSA ECDSA ED25519" -# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NODSA -# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=RSAONLY -# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NO -# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=YES +# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="" +# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA ECDSA ED25519" # Do not change this option unless you have hardware random # generator and you REALLY know what you are doing diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd@.service b/SOURCES/sshd@.service index ac1b8e0..0189d71 100644 --- a/SOURCES/sshd@.service +++ b/SOURCES/sshd@.service @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ [Unit] Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon Wants=sshd-keygen.service -After=auditd.service sshd-keygen.service +After=sshd-keygen.service [Service] EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec index 22093be..c677a1e 100644 --- a/SPECS/openssh.spec +++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec @@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ %endif # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 -%define openssh_ver 6.4p1 -%define openssh_rel 8 +%define openssh_ver 6.6.1p1 +%define openssh_rel 11 %define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.9.3 -%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 8 +%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 9 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2 Name: openssh @@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ Version: %{openssh_ver} Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel} URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html #URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net -Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +# Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz #Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc Source2: sshd.pam Source3: sshd.init @@ -92,9 +93,9 @@ Source13: sshd-keygen Patch0: openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch #? -Patch100: openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch +Patch100: openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1872 -Patch101: openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch +Patch101: openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1894 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=735889 Patch102: openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch @@ -102,7 +103,10 @@ Patch102: openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch Patch103: openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402 -Patch200: openssh-6.4p1-audit.patch +Patch200: openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248 +# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event +Patch201: openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch # --- pam_ssh-agent --- # make it build reusing the openssh sources @@ -114,25 +118,21 @@ Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch # don't use xfree (#1024965) Patch303: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX) -Patch400: openssh-6.3p1-role-mls.patch +Patch400: openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634 -Patch404: openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch +Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch #?-- unwanted child :( -Patch501: openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch +Patch501: openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch #? -Patch502: openssh-6.3p1-keycat.patch +Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch #http6://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644 -Patch601: openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1701 -Patch602: openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch +Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch #http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/src/crypto/dist/ssh/Attic/sftp-glob.c.diff?r1=1.13&r2=1.13.12.1&f=h Patch603: openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893 -Patch604: openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329 (WONTFIX) -Patch605: openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch +Patch604: openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925 Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch #? @@ -143,59 +143,80 @@ Patch608: openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch Patch609: openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch #? -Patch700: openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch +Patch700: openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch #? -Patch701: openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch +# drop? Patch701: openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch #? Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch #? Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch -#? -Patch704: openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=205842 +# drop? Patch704: openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch #? Patch705: openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch #? -Patch706: openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch +Patch706: openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX) -Patch707: openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch +Patch707: openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1890 (WONTFIX) need integration to prng helper which is discontinued :) -Patch708: openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch +Patch708: openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1640 (WONTFIX) Patch709: openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch # warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545) -Patch711: openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch +Patch711: openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch # make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch # add cavs test binary for the aes-ctr -Patch713: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch +Patch713: openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch #http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html #changed cache storage type - #848228 -Patch800: openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch +Patch800: openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html -Patch801: openssh-6.3p1-force_krb.patch +Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch +# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843) +# CVE-2014-9278 +Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch Patch900: openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780 -Patch901: openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch +Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch # use default_ccache_name from /etc/krb5.conf (#991186) Patch902: openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch -# increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups (#1010607) -Patch903: openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch -# FIPS mode - adjust the key echange DH groups and ssh-keygen according to SP800-131A (#1001748) -Patch904: openssh-6.4p1-FIPS-mode-SP800-131A.patch # Run ssh-copy-id in the legacy mode when SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY variable is set (#969375 Patch905: openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch # Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650) Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch -# ssh-keygen - relative-specified certificate expiry time should be relative to current time and -# not the validity start time (#1058234) -Patch907: openssh-6.4p1-ssh-keygen-V.patch -# use the size of security of 3des for DH (#1053107) -Patch908: openssh-6.4p1-3des-dh-size.patch -# ignore environment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters (#1077843) -Patch909: openssh-6.4p1-ignore-bad-env-var.patch - +# Try CLOCK_BOOTTIME with fallback (#1091992) +Patch907: openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch +# Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey +# dialog by offering only certificate keys. (#1081338) +Patch908: openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch +# OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519 key exchange incorrectly +# Disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6 +Patch909: openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch +# standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths (#1051490) +Patch910: openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch +# set a client's address right after a connection is set +# http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2257 +Patch911: openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch +# apply RFC3454 stringprep to banners when possible +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2058 +# slightly changed patch from comment 10 +Patch912: openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch +# don't consider a partial success as a failure +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2270 +Patch913: openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch +# log when a client requests an interactive session and only sftp is allowed (#1130198) +Patch914: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch +# fix parsing of empty options in sshd_conf +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2281 +Patch915: openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch +# Ignore SIGXFSZ in postauth monitor +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2263 +Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch +# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#1083482) +Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet @@ -257,12 +278,6 @@ Requires(post): systemd-units Requires(preun): systemd-units Requires(postun): systemd-units -# Not yet ready -# %package server-ondemand -# Summary: Systemd unit file to run an ondemand OpenSSH server -# Group: System Environment/Daemons -# Requires: %{name}-server%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release} - %package server-sysvinit Summary: The SysV initscript to manage the OpenSSH server. Group: System Environment/Daemons @@ -351,19 +366,16 @@ remote ssh-agent instance. The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks. %prep -%setup -q -a 4 +%setup -q -a 4 -n openssh-6.6p1 #Do not enable by default %if 0 %patch0 -p1 -b .wIm %endif -%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity %patch101 -p1 -b .fingerprint -%patch102 -p1 -b .getaddrinfo +# investigate %patch102 -p1 -b .getaddrinfo %patch103 -p1 -b .packet -%patch200 -p1 -b .audit - %if %{pam_ssh_agent} pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} %patch300 -p1 -b .psaa-build @@ -386,21 +398,19 @@ popd %patch502 -p1 -b .keycat %patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts -%patch602 -p1 -b .randclean %patch603 -p1 -b .glob %patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm -%patch605 -p1 -b .remove_stale %patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man %patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe %patch608 -p1 -b .askpass-ld %patch609 -p1 -b .x11 - -%patch700 -p1 -b .fips -%patch701 -p1 -b .exit-deadlock +# +# drop? %patch701 -p1 -b .exit-deadlock %patch702 -p1 -b .progress %patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info -%patch704 -p1 -b .edns -%patch705 -p1 -b .manpage +# investigate - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=205842 +# probably not needed anymore %patch704 -p1 -b .edns +# drop it %patch705 -p1 -b .manpage %patch706 -p1 -b .localdomain %patch707 -p1 -b .redhat %patch708 -p1 -b .entropy @@ -408,20 +418,33 @@ popd %patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no %patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr %patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs - +# %patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex %patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb - +# %patch900 -p1 -b .canohost %patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok %patch902 -p1 -b .ccache_name -%patch903 -p1 -b .dh -%patch904 -p1 -b .SP800-131A %patch905 -p1 -b .legacy-ssh-copy-id %patch906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote -%patch907 -p1 -b .ssh-keygen-V -%patch908 -p1 -b .3des-dh-size -%patch909 -p1 -b .bad-env-var +%patch907 -p1 -b .CLOCK_BOOTTIME +%patch908 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-2653 +%patch909 -p1 -b .6.6.1 +%patch910 -p1 -b .NI_MAXHOST +%patch911 -p1 -b .set_remote_ipaddr +%patch912 -p1 -b .utf8-banner +%patch913 -p1 -b .partial-success +%patch914 -p1 -b .log-sftp-only +%patch915 -p1 -b .servconf +%patch916 -p1 -b .SIGXFSZ +%patch918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot +%patch802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users + +%patch200 -p1 -b .audit +%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-fps +%patch700 -p1 -b .fips + +%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity %if 0 # Nothing here yet @@ -476,7 +499,7 @@ fi --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ - --enable-vendor-patchlevel="FC-%{version}-%{release}" \ + --enable-vendor-patchlevel="RHEL7-%{openssh_ver}-%{openssh_rel}" \ --disable-strip \ --without-zlib-version-check \ --with-ssl-engine \ @@ -640,9 +663,11 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ %files %defattr(-,root,root) -%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns TODO +%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc} +%license LICENCE +%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh -%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* @@ -730,12 +755,64 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ %if %{pam_ssh_agent} %files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth %defattr(-,root,root) -%doc pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE +%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc} +%license pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/security/pam_ssh_agent_auth.so %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/pam_ssh_agent_auth.8* %endif %changelog +* Fri Jan 16 2015 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-11 + 0.9.3-9 +- fix direction in CRYPTO_SESSION audit message (#1171248) + +* Wed Jan 14 2015 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-10 + 0.9.3-9 +- add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default CVE-2014-9278 + (#1169843) + +* Fri Dec 19 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-9 + 0.9.3-9 +- log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#1083482) + +* Mon Dec 15 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-8 + 0.9.3-9 +- increase size of AUDIT_LOG_SIZE to 256 (#1171163) +- record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event (#1171248) + +* Thu Nov 13 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-7 + 0.9.3-9 +- fix gsskex patch to correctly handle MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN request (#1118005) + +* Fri Nov 07 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-6 + 0.9.3-9 +- correct the calculation of bytes for authctxt->krb5_ccname (#1161073) + +* Tue Nov 04 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-5 + 0.9.3-9 +- change audit trail for unknown users (#1158521) + +* Sun Oct 26 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-4 + 0.9.3-9 +- revert the default of KerberosUseKuserok back to yes +- fix kuserok patch which checked for the existence of .k5login unconditionally + and hence prevented other mechanisms to be used properly + +* Mon Sep 29 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-3 + 0.9.3-9 +- fix parsing empty options in sshd_conf +- ignore SIGXFSZ in postauth monitor + +* Tue Sep 23 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-2 + 0.9.3-9 +- slightly change systemd units logic - use sshd-keygen.service (#1066615) +- log when a client requests an interactive session and only sftp is allowed (#1130198) +- sshd-keygen - don't generate DSA and ED25519 host keys in FIPS mode (#1143867) + +* Mon Sep 08 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-1 + 0.9.3-9 +- new upstream release (#1059667) +- prevent a server from skipping SSHFP lookup - CVE-2014-2653 (#1081338) +- make /etc/ssh/moduli file public (#1134448) +- test existence of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key in sshd-keygen.service +- don't clean up gssapi credentials by default (#1134447) +- ssh-agent - try CLOCK_BOOTTIME with fallback (#1134449) +- disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6 +- add support for ED25519 keys to sshd-keygen and sshd.sysconfig +- standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths (#1097665) +- set a client's address right after a connection is set (mindrot#2257) (#912792) +- apply RFC3454 stringprep to banners when possible (mindrot#2058) (#1104662) +- don't consider a partial success as a failure (mindrot#2270) (#1112972) + * Wed Mar 19 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.4p1-8 + 0.9.3-8 - ignore environment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters (#1077843)