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From 90dc66270b02981b19a085c6a9184e3452b7b3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:59 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
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Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
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This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring.  This
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allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
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with signed modules.  By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
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variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
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load.  The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
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in the 'MokListRT' variable.  We import those as well.
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Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
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variable.  We load those certificates into the newly introduced system
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blacklist keyring and forbid any module signed with those from loading and
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forbid the use within the kernel of any key with a matching hash.
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This facility is enabled by setting CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS.
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Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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---
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 certs/Kconfig     |  16 ++++++
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 certs/Makefile    |   4 ++
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 certs/load_uefi.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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 3 files changed, 188 insertions(+)
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 create mode 100644 certs/load_uefi.c
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diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
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index 630ae09..edf9f75 100644
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--- a/certs/Kconfig
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+++ b/certs/Kconfig
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@@ -90,4 +90,20 @@ config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
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 	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
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 	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
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+config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
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+	bool "Load certs and blacklist from UEFI db for module checking"
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+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
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+	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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+	depends on EFI
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+	depends on EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
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+	help
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+	  If the kernel is booted in secure boot mode, this option will cause
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+	  the kernel to load the certificates from the UEFI db and MokListRT
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+	  into the secondary trusted keyring.  It will also load any X.509
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+	  SHA256 hashes in the dbx list into the blacklist.
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+
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+	  The effect of this is that, if the kernel is booted in secure boot
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+	  mode, modules signed with UEFI-stored keys will be permitted to be
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+	  loaded and keys that match the blacklist will be rejected.
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+
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 endmenu
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diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
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index 738151a..a5e057a 100644
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--- a/certs/Makefile
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+++ b/certs/Makefile
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@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
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 endif
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 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
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+obj-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += load_uefi.o
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+$(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
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+
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+
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 ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
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 $(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
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diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000..b44e464
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
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@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
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+#include <linux/kernel.h>
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+#include <linux/sched.h>
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+#include <linux/cred.h>
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+#include <linux/err.h>
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+#include <linux/efi.h>
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+#include <linux/slab.h>
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+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
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+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
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+#include "internal.h"
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+
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+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
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+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
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+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
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+
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+/*
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+ * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
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+ */
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+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
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+				  unsigned long *size)
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+{
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+	efi_status_t status;
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+	unsigned long lsize = 4;
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+	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
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+	void *db;
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+
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+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
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+	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
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+		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
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+		return NULL;
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+	}
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+
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+	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
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+	if (!db) {
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+		pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
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+		return NULL;
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+	}
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+
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+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
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+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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+		kfree(db);
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+		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
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+		return NULL;
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+	}
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+
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+	*size = lsize;
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+	return db;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
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+ */
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+static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
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+					   const void *data, size_t len)
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+{
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+	char *hash, *p;
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+
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+	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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+	if (!hash)
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+		return;
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+	p = memcpy(hash, "tbs:", 4);
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+	p += 4;
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+	bin2hex(p, data, len);
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+	p += len * 2;
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+	*p = 0;
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+
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+	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
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+	kfree(hash);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
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+ */
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+static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
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+					 const void *data, size_t len)
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+{
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+	char *hash, *p;
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+
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+	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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+	if (!hash)
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+		return;
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+	p = memcpy(hash, "bin:", 4);
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+	p += 4;
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+	bin2hex(p, data, len);
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+	p += len * 2;
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+	*p = 0;
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+
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+	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
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+	kfree(hash);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
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+ * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
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+ */
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+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
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+{
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+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
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+		return add_trusted_secondary_key;
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+	return 0;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
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+ * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
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+ */
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+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
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+{
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+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
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+		return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
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+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
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+		return uefi_blacklist_binary;
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+	return 0;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
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+ */
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+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
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+{
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+	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
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+	efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
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+	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
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+	int rc = 0;
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+
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+	if (!efi.get_variable)
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+		return false;
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+
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+	/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
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+	 * an error if we can't get them.
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+	 */
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+	db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
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+	if (!db) {
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+		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
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+	} else {
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+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
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+					      db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
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+		if (rc)
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+			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
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+		kfree(db);
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+	}
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+
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+	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
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+	if (!mok) {
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+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
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+	} else {
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+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
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+					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
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+		if (rc)
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+			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
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+		kfree(mok);
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+	}
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+
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+	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
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+	if (!dbx) {
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+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
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+	} else {
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+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
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+					      dbx, dbxsize,
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+					      get_handler_for_dbx);
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+		if (rc)
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+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
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+		kfree(dbx);
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+	}
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+
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+	return rc;
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+}
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+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
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-- 
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2.9.3
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