diff --git a/.docker.metadata b/.docker.metadata index 471928d..58cc027 100644 --- a/.docker.metadata +++ b/.docker.metadata @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -4191963addb1f68b3bebfb93dbe12cb5db7a22d1 SOURCES/07f3374cf1b29aadf824d8b8dcbf6e63403689c6.tar.gz +82c5eac259a4161cf051893bd532409007c1ce81 SOURCES/b2f74b220126bddbae585cfe2406498ced3ae065.tar.gz e21d6c1b9e04650915499946bb4e6a01727c7d54 SOURCES/container-storage-setup-413b408.tar.gz -1d7cd417c6e8414b65bd127f488719b5355e135f SOURCES/containerd-b968034.tar.gz +7fda753d7eb81e1f48fdee734a6dc898b4edf02f SOURCES/containerd-7989550.tar.gz c5e6169ea101c97d94257f48fa227f5ff0501454 SOURCES/docker-lvm-plugin-20a1f68.tar.gz 0beb6283e30f1e87e907576f4571ccb0a48b6be5 SOURCES/docker-novolume-plugin-385ec70.tar.gz 656b1d1605dc43d7f5c00cedadd686dbd418d285 SOURCES/libnetwork-c5d66a0.tar.gz 965d64f5a81c3a428ca3b29495ecf66748c67c1f SOURCES/rhel-push-plugin-af9107b.tar.gz -704ece9f78221c6a58364f942a0d03d64a93b85a SOURCES/runc-290a336.tar.gz +59482abd62fc50a2b4fbf5ad79b4414a1963aeeb SOURCES/runc-df5c38a.tar.gz 7941233b1ed34afdc074e74ab26a86dea20ee7d4 SOURCES/tini-fec3683.tar.gz 496f9927f4254508ea1cd94f473b5b9321d41245 SOURCES/v1.10-migrator-c417a6a.tar.gz diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 94377a1..552ea32 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -SOURCES/07f3374cf1b29aadf824d8b8dcbf6e63403689c6.tar.gz +SOURCES/b2f74b220126bddbae585cfe2406498ced3ae065.tar.gz SOURCES/container-storage-setup-413b408.tar.gz -SOURCES/containerd-b968034.tar.gz +SOURCES/containerd-7989550.tar.gz SOURCES/docker-lvm-plugin-20a1f68.tar.gz SOURCES/docker-novolume-plugin-385ec70.tar.gz SOURCES/libnetwork-c5d66a0.tar.gz SOURCES/rhel-push-plugin-af9107b.tar.gz -SOURCES/runc-290a336.tar.gz +SOURCES/runc-df5c38a.tar.gz SOURCES/tini-fec3683.tar.gz SOURCES/v1.10-migrator-c417a6a.tar.gz diff --git a/README.debrand b/README.debrand deleted file mode 100644 index 01c46d2..0000000 --- a/README.debrand +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Warning: This package was configured for automatic debranding, but the changes -failed to apply. diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch b/SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 59bbcf5..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,290 +0,0 @@ -From 2a03a0c265d5bd3e77bc22e7d1fbb57388984727 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Aleksa Sarai -Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH 1/1] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host - binary to container - -There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a -pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we -have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being -writeable). - -As a hotfix we require memfd_create(2), but we can always extend this to -use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or tmpfs. The main downside to this -approach is no page-cache sharing for the runc binary (which overlayfs -would give us) but this is far less complicated. - -This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the -Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes -ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to -worry about it). - -Fixes: CVE-2019-5736 -Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner -Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai -Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel ---- - libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c | 11 ++ - 2 files changed, 232 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c - -diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..d9f6093a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c -@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ -+#define _GNU_SOURCE -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */ -+#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create) -+# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create -+#endif -+#ifndef SYS_memfd_create -+# error "memfd_create(2) syscall not supported by this glibc version" -+#endif -+int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags) -+{ -+ return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags); -+} -+ -+/* This comes directly from . */ -+#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE -+# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024 -+#endif -+#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS -+# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9) -+# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10) -+#endif -+#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL -+# define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */ -+# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */ -+# define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */ -+# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */ -+#endif -+ -+ -+#define OUR_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe" -+#define OUR_MEMFD_SEALS \ -+ (F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE) -+ -+static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) -+{ -+ void *old = ptr; -+ do { -+ ptr = realloc(old, size); -+ } while(!ptr); -+ return ptr; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is -+ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather -+ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed. -+ */ -+static int is_self_cloned(void) -+{ -+ int fd, seals; -+ -+ fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; -+ -+ seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS); -+ close(fd); -+ return seals == OUR_MEMFD_SEALS; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can -+ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access. -+ */ -+static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length) -+{ -+ int fd; -+ char buf[4096], *copy = NULL; -+ -+ if (!length) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); -+ if (fd < 0) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ *length = 0; -+ for (;;) { -+ int n; -+ -+ n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); -+ if (n < 0) -+ goto error; -+ if (!n) -+ break; -+ -+ copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy)); -+ memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n); -+ *length += n; -+ } -+ close(fd); -+ return copy; -+ -+error: -+ close(fd); -+ free(copy); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of -+ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry -+ * to the array of pointers. -+ */ -+static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output) -+{ -+ int num = 0; -+ char *cur = data; -+ -+ if (!data || *output != NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ while (cur < data + data_length) { -+ num++; -+ *output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output)); -+ (*output)[num - 1] = cur; -+ cur += strlen(cur) + 1; -+ } -+ (*output)[num] = NULL; -+ return num; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ. -+ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a -+ * main() that we can just get the arguments from. -+ */ -+static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp) -+{ -+ char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL; -+ size_t cmdline_size, environ_size; -+ -+ cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size); -+ if (!cmdline) -+ goto error; -+ environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size); -+ if (!environ) -+ goto error; -+ -+ if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0) -+ goto error; -+ if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ return 0; -+ -+error: -+ free(environ); -+ free(cmdline); -+ return -EINVAL; -+} -+ -+#define SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */ -+static int clone_binary(void) -+{ -+ int binfd, memfd, err; -+ ssize_t sent = 0; -+ -+ memfd = memfd_create(OUR_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); -+ if (memfd < 0) -+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; -+ -+ binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); -+ if (binfd < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, SENDFILE_MAX); -+ close(binfd); -+ if (sent < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, OUR_MEMFD_SEALS); -+ if (err < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ return memfd; -+ -+error: -+ close(memfd); -+ return -EIO; -+} -+ -+int ensure_cloned_binary(void) -+{ -+ int execfd; -+ char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL; -+ -+ /* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */ -+ int cloned = is_self_cloned(); -+ if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE) -+ return cloned; -+ -+ if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ execfd = clone_binary(); -+ if (execfd < 0) -+ return -EIO; -+ -+ fexecve(execfd, argv, envp); -+ return -ENOEXEC; -+} -diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c -index 0a10f802..814c738d 100644 ---- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c -+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c -@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist) - free(namespaces); - } - -+/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */ -+int ensure_cloned_binary(void); -+ - void nsexec(void) - { - int pipenum; -@@ -435,6 +438,14 @@ void nsexec(void) - if (pipenum == -1) - return; - -+ /* -+ * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary -+ * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary -+ * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736. -+ */ -+ if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0) -+ bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary"); -+ - /* make the process non-dumpable */ - if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0) { - bail("failed to set process as non-dumpable"); --- -2.20.1 - diff --git a/SPECS/docker.spec b/SPECS/docker.spec index e4ec5d5..bcf24e9 100644 --- a/SPECS/docker.spec +++ b/SPECS/docker.spec @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ # docker %global git_docker https://github.com/projectatomic/docker -%global commit_docker 07f3374cf1b29aadf824d8b8dcbf6e63403689c6 +%global commit_docker b2f74b220126bddbae585cfe2406498ced3ae065 %global shortcommit_docker %(c=%{commit_docker}; echo ${c:0:7}) # docker_branch used in %%check %global docker_branch %{name}-%{version} @@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ # docker-runc %global git_runc https://github.com/projectatomic/runc -%global commit_runc 290a33602b16ff2d1cc5339bc0297f0e094462ce +%global commit_runc df5c38a9167e87f53a9894d77c0950e178a745e7 %global shortcommit_runc %(c=%{commit_runc}; echo ${c:0:7}) # docker-containerd %global git_containerd https://github.com/projectatomic/containerd -%global commit_containerd b968034319d76c623176301198c1e34ea6541b33 +%global commit_containerd 7989550b83317f799af20ab4df3a5b6487767fc9 %global shortcommit_containerd %(c=%{commit_containerd}; echo ${c:0:7}) # docker-init @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Name: %{repo} Epoch: 2 Version: 1.13.1 -Release: 91.git%{shortcommit_docker}%{?dist} +Release: 94.git%{shortcommit_docker}%{?dist} Summary: Automates deployment of containerized applications License: ASL 2.0 URL: https://%{import_path} @@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ Source29: 99-docker.conf Source30: %{git_tini}/archive/%{commit_tini}/tini-%{shortcommit_tini}.tar.gz Source31: %{git_libnetwork}/archive/%{commit_libnetwork}/libnetwork-%{shortcommit_libnetwork}.tar.gz Source32: seccomp.json -Patch0: 0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch BuildRequires: cmake BuildRequires: sed BuildRequires: git @@ -303,9 +302,6 @@ tar zxf %{SOURCE17} # untar docker-runc tar zxf %{SOURCE19} -pushd runc-%{commit_runc} -%patch0 -p1 -popd # untar docker-containerd tar zxf %{SOURCE20} @@ -745,6 +741,17 @@ fi %{_bindir}/%{name}-v1.10-migrator-* %changelog +* Tue Feb 26 2019 Lokesh Mandvekar - 2:1.13.1-94.gitb2f74b2 +- Resolves: #1556901, #1678096 +- built docker-runc @projectatomic/docker-1.13.1-rhel commit df5c38a + +* Tue Feb 19 2019 Frantisek Kluknavsky - 2:1.13.1-93.gitb2f74b2 +- rebased containerd to 7989550b83317f799af20ab4df3a5b6487767fc9 +- Resolves: #1671861 + +* Mon Feb 11 2019 Frantisek Kluknavsky - 2:1.13.1-92.gitb2f74b2 +- rebase + * Sat Feb 09 2019 Lokesh Mandvekar - 2:1.13.1-91.git07f3374 - Resolves: #1665326 - CVE-2019-5736