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From 797ebaa8240aefc39de3d1713468b221c83ed3f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:45:32 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] man: document the new RestrictSUIDSGID= setting
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(cherry picked from commit 7445db6eb70e8d5989f481d0c5a08ace7047ae5b)
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Related: #1687512
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---
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 doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md |  1 +
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 man/systemd.exec.xml      | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
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 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md b/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md
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index 0ea444b133..c2b5c0dcce 100644
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--- a/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md
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+++ b/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md
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@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ All execution-related settings are available for transient units.
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 ✓ MemoryDenyWriteExecute=
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 ✓ RestrictNamespaces=
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 ✓ RestrictRealtime=
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+✓ RestrictSUIDSGID=
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 ✓ RestrictAddressFamilies=
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 ✓ LockPersonality=
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 ✓ LimitCPU=
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diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
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index 87fb8b34f4..45ed1864f8 100644
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--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
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+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
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@@ -348,18 +348,19 @@ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_B CAP_C</programlisting>
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       <varlistentry>
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         <term><varname>NoNewPrivileges=</varname></term>
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-        <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service process and all its children can
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-        never gain new privileges through <function>execve()</function> (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem
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-        capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that a process and its children can never
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-        elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but certain settings override this and ignore the value of this
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-        setting.  This is the case when <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>,
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-        <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>, <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>,
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-        <varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>, <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>,
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-        <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>,
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-        <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>, <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>, or
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-        <varname>LockPersonality=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden by them,
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-        <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. Also see
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-        <ulink url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New Privileges
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+        <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service process and all its
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+        children can never gain new privileges through <function>execve()</function> (e.g. via setuid or
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+        setgid bits, or filesystem capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that
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+        a process and its children can never elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but certain
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+        settings override this and ignore the value of this setting.  This is the case when
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+        <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
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+        <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>, <varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>,
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+        <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>,
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+        <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>, <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>,
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+        <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>, <varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname> or
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+        <varname>LockPersonality=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden by
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+        them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. Also see 
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+        url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New Privileges
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         Flag</ulink>.  </para></listitem>
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       </varlistentry>
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@@ -1274,6 +1275,22 @@ RestrictNamespaces=~cgroup net</programlisting>
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         that actually require them. Defaults to off.</para></listitem>
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       </varlistentry>
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+      <varlistentry>
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+        <term><varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname></term>
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+
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+        <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If set, any attempts to set the set-user-ID (SUID) or
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+        set-group-ID (SGID) bits on files or directories will be denied (for details on these bits see
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+        
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+        project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>inode</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>). If
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+        running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>
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+        capability (e.g. setting <varname>User=</varname>), <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname> is
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+        implied. As the SUID/SGID bits are mechanisms to elevate privileges, and allows users to acquire the
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+        identity of other users, it is recommended to restrict creation of SUID/SGID files to the few
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+        programs that actually require them. Note that this restricts marking of any type of file system
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+        object with these bits, including both regular files and directories (where the SGID is a different
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+        meaning than for files, see documentation). Defaults to off.</para></listitem>
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+      </varlistentry>
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+
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       <varlistentry>
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         <term><varname>RemoveIPC=</varname></term>
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