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From 181ed1777c3dd50b1ff9907b0a4199e845af1270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2021 16:21:17 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 1/4] virtiofsd: Whitelist fchmod
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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RH-Author: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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Message-id: <20210618162117.97775-2-mreitz@redhat.com>
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Patchwork-id: 101719
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O-Subject: [RHEL-8.5.0 qemu-kvm PATCH 1/1] virtiofsd: Whitelist fchmod
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Bugzilla: 1967914
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RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
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lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should
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be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.
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Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:
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On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit
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set and a security.capability xattr:
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(1) # touch foo
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(2) # chmod u+s foo
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(3) # setcap '' foo
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Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has
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dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):
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int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
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    capng_setpid(getpid());
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    capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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    capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
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    capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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    ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
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}
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This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a
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mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that
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will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().
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(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs.
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utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the
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latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)
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Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1842667
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Reported-by: Qian Cai <caiqian@redhat.com>
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Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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Message-Id: <20200608093111.14942-1-mreitz@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 63659fe74e76f5c5285466f0c5cfbdca65b3688e)
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Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Danilo C. L. de Paula <ddepaula@redhat.com>
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---
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 tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 +
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 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
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diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c b/tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c
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index bd9e7b083c..3b1522acdd 100644
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--- a/tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c
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+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c
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@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {
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     SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
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     SCMP_SYS(fallocate),
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     SCMP_SYS(fchdir),
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+    SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
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     SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
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     SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
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     SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
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-- 
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2.27.0
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