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From 24ca1010222cadbfc3c734406b665e6a9775d9d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 18:49:25 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 03/21] usb: drop unnecessary usb_device_post_load checks
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RH-Author: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Message-id: <20191001184925.29912-2-dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Patchwork-id: 90933
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O-Subject: [RHEL-8.2.0 qemu-kvm PATCH 1/1] usb: drop unnecessary usb_device_post_load checks
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Bugzilla: 1757482
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RH-Acked-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
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From: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
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In usb_device_post_load, certain values of dev->setup_len or
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dev->setup_index can cause -EINVAL to be returned. One example is when
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setup_len exceeds 4096, the hard-coded value of sizeof(dev->data_buf).
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This can happen through legitimate guest activity and will cause all
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subsequent attempts to migrate the guest to fail in vmstate_load_state.
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The values of these variables can be set by USB packets originating in
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the guest. There are two ways in which they can be set: in
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do_token_setup and in do_parameter in hw/usb/core.c.
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It is easy to craft a USB packet in a guest that causes do_token_setup
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to set setup_len to a value larger than 4096. When this has been done
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once, all subsequent attempts to migrate the VM will fail in
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usb_device_post_load until the VM is next power-cycled or a
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smaller-sized USB packet is sent to the device.
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Sample code for achieving this in a VM started with "-device usb-tablet"
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running Linux with CONFIG_HIDRAW=y and HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE > 4096:
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  #include <sys/types.h>
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  #include <sys/stat.h>
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  #include <fcntl.h>
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  #include <unistd.h>
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  int main() {
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           char buf[4097];
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           int fd = open("/dev/hidraw0", O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK);
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           buf[0] = 0x1;
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           write(fd, buf, 4097);
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           return 0;
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  }
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When this code is run in the VM, qemu will output:
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  usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (4097 > 4096)
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A subsequent attempt to migrate the VM will fail and output the
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following on the destination host:
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  qemu-kvm: error while loading state for instance 0x0 of device '0000:00:06.7/1/usb-ptr'
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  qemu-kvm: load of migration failed: Invalid argument
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The idea behind checking the values of setup_len and setup_index before
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they are used is correct, but doing it in usb_device_post_load feels
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arbitrary, and will cause unnecessary migration failures. Indeed, none
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of the commit messages for c60174e8, 9f8e9895 and 719ffe1f justify why
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post_load is the right place to do these checks. They correctly point
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out that the important thing to protect is the usb_packet_copy.
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Instead, the right place to do the checks is in do_token_setup and
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do_parameter. Indeed, there are already some checks here. We can examine
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each of the disjuncts currently tested in usb_device_post_load to see
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whether any need adding to do_token_setup or do_parameter to improve
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safety there:
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  * dev->setup_index < 0
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     - This test is not needed because setup_index is explicitly set to
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0 in do_token_setup and do_parameter.
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  * dev->setup_len < 0
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     - In both do_token_setup and do_parameter, the value of setup_len
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is computed by (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6]. Since
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s->setup_buf is a byte array and setup_len is an int32_t, it's
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impossible for this arithmetic to set setup_len's top bit, so it can
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never be negative.
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  * dev->setup_index > dev->setup_len
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     - Since setup_index is 0, this is equivalent to the previous test,
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so is redundant.
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  * dev->setup_len > sizeof(dev->data_buf)
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     - This condition is already explicitly checked in both
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do_token_setup and do_parameter.
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Hence there is no need to bolster the existing checks in do_token_setup
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or do_parameter, and we can safely remove these checks from
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usb_device_post_load without reducing safety but allowing migrations to
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proceed regardless of what USB packets have been generated by the guest.
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Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
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Message-Id: <20190107175117.23769-1-jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit f30815390adb1ec153327c3832ab378e8bce9808)
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Signed-off-by: Danilo C. L. de Paula <ddepaula@redhat.com>
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---
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 hw/usb/bus.c | 6 ------
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 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/usb/bus.c b/hw/usb/bus.c
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index 11f7720..5499810 100644
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--- a/hw/usb/bus.c
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+++ b/hw/usb/bus.c
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@@ -59,12 +59,6 @@ static int usb_device_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
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     } else {
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         dev->attached = true;
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     }
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-    if (dev->setup_index < 0 ||
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-        dev->setup_len < 0 ||
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-        dev->setup_index > dev->setup_len ||
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-        dev->setup_len > sizeof(dev->data_buf)) {
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-        return -EINVAL;
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-    }
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     return 0;
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 }
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-- 
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1.8.3.1
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