diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@

  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.

  */

+#include <stdlib.h>

 #include <stdio.h>

 #include <errno.h>

 #include <string.h>

@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)

                 case EOF:

                 case '\0':

                     if (len > 0) { 

-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));

-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));

+                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));

+                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));

                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);

                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);

                         len = 0;

@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *

 {

     size_t i;

     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)

-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);

+        free(argv[i]);

-    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);

+    free(argv);

     return;

 }

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@

 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"

 #include "xmalloc.h"

 #include "log.h"

-#include "buffer.h"

-#include "key.h"

+#include "sshbuf.h"

+#include "sshkey.h"

 #include "authfd.h"

 #include <stdio.h>

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;

 struct identity {

     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;

     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */

-    Key *key;           /* public/private key */

+    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */

     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */

     int tried;

     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@

 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"

 #include "xmalloc.h"

 #include "log.h"

-#include "buffer.h"

-#include "key.h"

+#include "sshbuf.h"

+#include "sshkey.h"

 #include "authfd.h"

 #include <stdio.h>

 #include <openssl/evp.h>

@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@

 #include "get_command_line.h"

 extern char **environ;

+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101

+

 /* 

  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 

  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 

@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)

     if (count == 0)

         return NULL;

-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));

+    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));

     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {

         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");

         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);

@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)

 }

 void

-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)

+agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)

 {

     size_t i;

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);

+    int r;

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);

+    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)

+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);

+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)

+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);

+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)

+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

     }

 }

-void

-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,

+static void

+pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,

                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)

 {

     u_char *cookie = NULL;

@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *

     char ** reported_argv = NULL;

     size_t count = 0;

     char * action_logbuf = NULL;

-    Buffer action_agentbuf;

+    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;

     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;

     char * retc;

     int32_t reti;

+    int r;

-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();

+    rnd = arc4random();

     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);

     while (cookie_len < 16) { 

         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */

     }

-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);

+    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);

     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {

         if (i % 4 == 0) {

-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();

+            rnd = arc4random();

         }

         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;

         rnd >>= 8;

@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *

     }

     else {

         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */

+        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */

+            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);

     }

     /*

@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *

     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);

     time(&ts);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);

+    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)

+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */

-    if(retc)

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);

-    else

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);

+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)

+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

+    if (retc) {

+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)

+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

+    } else {

+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)

+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

+    }

+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)

+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

     if (free_logbuf) { 

-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);

+        free(action_logbuf);

+        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);

+    }

+    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */

+    if (reti >= 0) {

+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)

+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

+    } else {

+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)

+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

     }

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */

-    if(reti >= 0)

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);

-    else

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");

-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);

+    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */

+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)

+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

     free(cookie);

     return;

@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui

 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));

 	auth->fd = sock;

-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);

+	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)

+           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);

 	auth->howmany = 0;

 	return auth;

@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui

 int

 pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)

 {

-    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };

+    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;

     Identity *id;

-    Key *key;

+    struct sshkey *key;

     AuthenticationConnection *ac;

     char *comment;

     uint8_t retval = 0;

@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con

     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);

     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);

+        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);

         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 

         {

             if(key != NULL) {

-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));

+                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));

                 id->key = key;

                 id->filename = comment;

                 id->ac = ac;

-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {

+                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {

                     retval = 1;

                 }

-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);

-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);

-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);

+                free(id->filename);

+                key_free(id->key);

+                free(id);

                 if(retval == 1)

                     break;

             }

         }

-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);

+        sshbuf_free(session_id2);

         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);

     }

     else {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");

+        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");

     }

-    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */

     EVP_cleanup();

     return retval;

 }

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

  * a patch 8-)

  */

 #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE

-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);

+    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);

 #endif

     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {

@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

 #endif

     }

-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);

+    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);

     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);

     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);

-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);

+    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);

     if(ruser_ptr) {

         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);

@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

 #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK

         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {

             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );

-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );

+            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );

         } else

 #endif

         {

             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {

-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");

+                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");

                 goto cleanexit;

             }

             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);

@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */

     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);

+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);

         goto cleanexit;

     }

     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);

+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);

         goto cleanexit;

     }

@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

          */

         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);

     } else {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");

-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");

+        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");

+        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");

     }

     /*

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

      */

     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

+        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

         /*

          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.

@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");

         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);

         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {

-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);

+            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);

             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {

                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;

-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

+                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

                 goto cleanexit;

             }

         }

@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,

          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user

          */

         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */

-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

+            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;

         } else {

-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

+            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);

         }

     } else {

-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );

+        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );

     }

 cleanexit:

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@

 #include "xmalloc.h"

 #include "match.h"

 #include "log.h"

-#include "buffer.h"

-#include "key.h"

+#include "sshbuf.h"

+#include "sshkey.h"

 #include "misc.h"

 #include "xmalloc.h"

@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@

 #include "pathnames.h"

 #include "secure_filename.h"

-#include "identity.h"

 #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"

 extern char *authorized_keys_file;

@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us

         } else {

             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');

             if(!slash_ptr)

-                pamsshagentauth_fatal

+                fatal

                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");

             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;

             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))

-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");

+                fatal("Username too long");

             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);

             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)

@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us

                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;

         }

         authorized_keys_file =

-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,

+            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,

                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);

         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,

                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);

-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we

+        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we

                                                               percent_expand

                                                               later, we'd step

                                                               on this, so free

@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us

     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));

 #endif

     authorized_keys_file =

-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",

+        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",

                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,

                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);

 }

 int

-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)

+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)

 {

     return

         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@

 #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H

 #include "identity.h"

-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);

+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);

 void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);

 #endif

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@

 #include "xmalloc.h"

 #include "ssh.h"

 #include "ssh2.h"

-#include "buffer.h"

+#include "sshbuf.h"

 #include "log.h"

 #include "compat.h"

-#include "key.h"

+#include "digest.h"

+#include "sshkey.h"

 #include "pathnames.h"

 #include "misc.h"

 #include "secure_filename.h"

 #include "uidswap.h"

-

-#include "identity.h"

+#include <unistd.h>

 /* return 1 if user allows given key */

 /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */

 static int

-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)

+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)

 {

-    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];

+    char *line = NULL;

     int found_key = 0;

     u_long linenum = 0;

-    Key *found;

+    struct sshkey *found;

     char *fp;

+    size_t linesize = 0;

     found_key = 0;

-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);

+    found = sshkey_new(key->type);

-    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {

+    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {

         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */

+        linenum++;

         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */

         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);

         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')

             continue;

-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {

+        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {

             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */

             int quoted = 0;

-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);

+            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);

             /* key_options = cp; */

             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {

                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')

@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE

             }

             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */

             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);

-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {

-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);

+            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {

+                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);

                 /* still no key? advance to next line */

                 continue;

             }

         }

-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {

+        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {

             found_key = 1;

-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,

+            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,

                                   linenum);

-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",

-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);

-            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);

+            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);

+            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",

+                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);

+            free(fp);

             break;

         }

     }

-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);

+    free(line);

+    sshkey_free(found);

     if(!found_key)

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");

+        verbose("key not found");

     return found_key;

 }

@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE

  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.

  */

 int

-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)

+pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)

 {

     FILE *f;

     int found_key = 0;

     struct stat st;

-    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];

+    char buf[256];

     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */

-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);

+    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);

     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */

     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {

-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);

+        verbose("File not found: %s", file);

         return 0;

     }

@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct

     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {

         fclose(f);

-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);

+        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);

         return 0;

     }

@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct

 int

 pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,

                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,

-                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)

+                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)

 {

     FILE *f;

     int ok, found_key = 0;

@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed

     else {

         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);

         if(pw == NULL) {

-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",

+            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",

                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));

             return 0;

         }

     }

-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);

+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);

     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror

+        error

             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",

              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));

         goto out;

     }

     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path

        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);

+        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);

         goto out;

     }

     /* open the pipe and read the keys */

     if(pipe(p) != 0) {

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

+        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

         goto out;

     }

-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",

+    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",

                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);

     /* 

      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and

      * run cleanup_exit() code.

      */

-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();

+    restore_uid();

     switch ((pid = fork())) {

     case -1:                                              /* error */

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

+        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

         close(p[0]);

         close(p[1]);

         return 0;

@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed

         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */

         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {

-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,

+            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,

                                      strerror(errno));

             _exit(1);

         }

         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1

            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {

-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

+            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

             _exit(1);

         }

 #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)

@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed

 #else

         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {

 #endif

-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,

+            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,

                                      strerror(errno));

             _exit(1);

         }

@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed

 #else

         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {

 #endif

-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,

+            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,

                                      strerror(errno));

             _exit(1);

         }

@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed

         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we

            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",

+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",

                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));

         _exit(127);

     default:                                              /* parent */

         break;

     }

-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);

+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);

     close(p[1]);

     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

+        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

         close(p[0]);

         /* Don't leave zombie child */

         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);

@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed

     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {

         if(errno != EINTR) {

-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,

+            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,

                                      strerror(errno));

             goto out;

         }

     }

     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",

+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",

                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));

         goto out;

     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {

-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",

+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",

                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));

         goto out;

     }

     found_key = ok;

   out:

-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();

+    restore_uid();

     return found_key;

 }

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@

 #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H

 #include "identity.h"

-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);

-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);

+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);

+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);

 #endif

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@

 #include "xmalloc.h"

 #include "match.h"

 #include "log.h"

-#include "buffer.h"

-#include "key.h"

+#include "sshbuf.h"

+#include "sshkey.h"

 #include "misc.h"

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c

 	int comparehome = 0;

 	struct stat st;

-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);

+    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);

 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {

 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,

@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c

 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");

 			return -1;

 		}

-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));

+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));

-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);

+		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);

 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||

 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||

 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c

 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */

 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {

-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",

+			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",

 			    buf);

 			break;

 		}

diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c

--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200

@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@

 #include "xmalloc.h"

 #include "ssh.h"

 #include "ssh2.h"

-#include "buffer.h"

+#include "sshbuf.h"

 #include "log.h"

 #include "compat.h"

-#include "key.h"

+#include "sshkey.h"

+#include "ssherr.h"

 #include "pathnames.h"

 #include "misc.h"

 #include "secure_filename.h"

@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@

 #include "identity.h"

 #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"

+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54

+

 /* extern u_char  *session_id2;

 extern uint8_t  session_id_len;

  */

 int

-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)

+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)

 {

-    Buffer          b = { 0 };

+    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;

     char           *pkalg = NULL;

     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;

-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;

-    int             authenticated = 0;

+    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;

+    int             r, authenticated = 0;

-    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);

+    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);

     /* first test if this key is even allowed */

     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))

-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;

+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;

-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)

-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;

+    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)

+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;

     /* construct packet to sign and test */

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);

+    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)

+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);

-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);

+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||

+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)