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Blame SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
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--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-13 17:51:29.790005199 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-13 17:52:53.640919947 +0100
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@@ -238,17 +238,25 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
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 	}
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 	errno = 0; 
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-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
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-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
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-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
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+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
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+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
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+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
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 		close(sock);
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-        if(errno == EACCES)
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-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
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+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s", (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
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 		return -1;
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 	}
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+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
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+		close(sock);
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+		sock = -1;
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+		if(errno == EACCES)
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+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
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+	}
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-	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
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-
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+	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
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+	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
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+	fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
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+	return -1;
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+	}
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 	return sock;
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 }
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