diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c

index 9a36f1d..420a85b 100644

--- a/auth.c

+++ b/auth.c

@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)

 	case 1:

  revoked:

 		/* Key revoked */

-		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+		key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "

-		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);

+		    "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),

+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);

 		free(key_fp);

 		return 1;

 	}

diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c

index 488008f..eca0069 100644

--- a/auth2-hostbased.c

+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c

@@ -206,16 +206,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,

 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {

 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {

-			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,

-			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,

+			    SSH_FP_HEX);		

 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "

-			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,

-			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,

+			    "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,

+			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),

+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,

 			    cuser, lookup);

 		} else {

-			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",

-			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);

+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",

+			    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),

+			    fp, cuser, lookup);

 		}

 		free(fp);

 	}

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c

index 0fd27bb..749b11a 100644

--- a/auth2-pubkey.c

+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c

@@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)

 				continue;

 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)

 				continue;

-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,

-			    SSH_FP_HEX);

-			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",

-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);

+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);

+			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",

+			    file, linenum, key_type(found),

+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);

 			/*

 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as

 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching

@@ -406,9 +406,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)

 			if (key_is_cert_authority)

 				continue;

 			found_key = 1;

-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",

-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);

+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);

+			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",

+			    key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);

 			free(fp);

 			break;

 		}

@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)

 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)

 		return 0;

-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,

-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);

 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,

 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {

-		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,

-		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,

+		debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,

+		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),

+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,

 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);

 		goto out;

 	}

diff --git a/key.c b/key.c

index 168e1b7..eb98ea8 100644

--- a/key.c

+++ b/key.c

@@ -628,6 +628,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)

 	return retval;

 }

+enum fp_type

+key_fingerprint_selection(void)

+{

+	static enum fp_type rv;

+	static char rv_defined = 0;

+	char *env;

+

+	if (!rv_defined) {

+		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");

+		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?

+			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;

+		rv_defined = 1;

+	}

+	return rv;

+}

+

+char *

+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)

+{

+	return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);

+}

+

+char *

+key_fingerprint_prefix(void)

+{

+	return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";

+}

+

 /*

  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances

  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is

diff --git a/key.h b/key.h

index d8ad13d..0e3eea5 100644

--- a/key.h

+++ b/key.h

@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);

 int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);

 char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);

 u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);

+enum fp_type	 key_fingerprint_selection(void);

+char		*key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);

+char		*key_fingerprint_prefix(void);

 const char	*key_type(const Key *);

 const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);

 int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);

diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c

index 3421452..691949f 100644

--- a/ssh-add.c

+++ b/ssh-add.c

@@ -330,10 +330,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)

 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {

 			had_identities = 1;

 			if (do_fp) {

-				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,

-				    SSH_FP_HEX);

-				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",

-				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));

+				fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+				printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",

+				    key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),

+				    fp, comment, key_type(key));

 				free(fp);

 			} else {

 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))

diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c

index ba24612..117fdde 100644

--- a/ssh-agent.c

+++ b/ssh-agent.c

@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)

 	char *p;

 	int ret = -1;

-	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",

-	    id->comment, p))

+	p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",

+	    id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))

 		ret = 0;

 	free(p);

diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c

index 2a316bc..482dc1c 100644

--- a/ssh-keygen.c

+++ b/ssh-keygen.c

@@ -783,13 +783,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)

 {

 	FILE *f;

 	Key *public;

-	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;

+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;

 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;

 	enum fp_rep rep;

 	enum fp_type fptype;

 	struct stat st;

-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;

+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();

+	pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();

 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;

 	if (!have_identity)

@@ -801,8 +802,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)

 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);

 	if (public != NULL) {

 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);

-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,

+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,

 		    key_type(public));

 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)

 			printf("%s\n", ra);

@@ -867,8 +868,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)

 		}

 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;

 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);

-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,

+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,

 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));

 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)

 			printf("%s\n", ra);

@@ -986,13 +987,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)

 	if (print_fingerprint) {

 		enum fp_rep rep;

 		enum fp_type fptype;

-		char *fp, *ra;

+		char *fp, *ra, *pfx;

-		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;

+		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();

+		pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();

 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;

+

 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);

-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,

+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,

 		    key_type(public));

 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)

 			printf("%s\n", ra);

@@ -1878,16 +1881,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)

 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);

 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;

-	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,

-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);

 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);

 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),

 	    key_cert_type(key));

-	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);

-	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",

-	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);

+	printf("        Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),

+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);

+	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",

+	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),

+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);

 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);

 	if (!v00) {

 		printf("        Serial: %llu\n",

@@ -2686,13 +2690,12 @@ passphrase_again:

 	fclose(f);

 	if (!quiet) {

-		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,

-		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+		char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);

+		char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",

 		    identity_file);

 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");

-		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);

+		printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);

 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");

 		printf("%s\n", ra);

 		free(ra);

diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c

index 573d7a8..394cca8 100644

--- a/sshconnect.c

+++ b/sshconnect.c

@@ -914,10 +914,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,

 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "

 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);

 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {

-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,

-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

-			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);

+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",

+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);

 			free(ra);

 			free(fp);

 		}

@@ -955,9 +955,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,

 			else

 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");

 			/* The default */

-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,

-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

 			msg2[0] = '\0';

 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {

 				if (matching_host_key_dns)

@@ -972,10 +971,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,

 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),

 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "

 			    "established%s\n"

-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"

+			    "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"

 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "

 			    "(yes/no)? ",

-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,

+			    host, ip, msg1, type,

+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,

 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",

 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",

 			    msg2);

@@ -1220,8 +1220,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)

 	int flags = 0;

 	char *fp;

-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);

+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),

+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);

 	free(fp);

 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */

@@ -1327,14 +1328,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)

 			continue;

 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))

 			continue;

-		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

+		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);

 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"

 		    "in %s:%lu\n"

-		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",

+		    "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",

 		    key_type(found->key),

 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,

-		    key_type(found->key), fp);

+		    key_type(found->key),

+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);

 		if (options.visual_host_key)

 			logit("%s", ra);

 		free(ra);

@@ -1349,7 +1351,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)

 {

 	char *fp;

-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);

 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");

@@ -1357,8 +1359,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)

 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");

 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");

 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");

-	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",

-	    key_type(host_key), fp);

+	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",

+	    key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(),  fp);

 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");

 	free(fp);

diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c

index 7f4ff41..adbbfc7 100644

--- a/sshconnect2.c

+++ b/sshconnect2.c

@@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)

 		    key->type, pktype);

 		goto done;

 	}

-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);

+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",

+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);

 	free(fp);

 	/*

@@ -986,8 +987,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)

 	int have_sig = 1;

 	char *fp;

-	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);

-	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);

+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);

+	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),

+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);

 	free(fp);

 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {